Jason Kirsh

The applicants brought a motion for a stay of a Divisional Court order, pending determination of their motion for leave to appeal.

The Divisional Court had dismissed their judicial review of an Animal Care Board decision approving costs for animal care.

The applicants sought the stay to prevent forfeiture of animals due to unpaid accounts.

The Court of Appeal applied the RJR-MacDonald test for stays, combined with principles for leave to appeal from Sault Dock Co. Ltd. The court found no serious issue to be tried, no irreparable harm (as the animals had already been forfeited), and that the balance of convenience did not favour a stay.

The motion was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his habeas corpus application, arguing his detention was unlawful due to a new information adding charges without a new arrest and the failure to hold timely detention review hearings under s. 525 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial court maintained jurisdiction over the appellant despite the new information, as he was lawfully before the court.

It further affirmed that the failure to hold a s. 525 detention review hearing does not automatically render detention unlawful; the appropriate remedy is an immediate review, which the appellant was offered and eventually received.

The court also found no abuse of process justifying a stay of proceedings.

Following the dismissal of an appeal as an abuse of process, the Crown sought costs.

The appellant, a declared vexatious litigant, had used an alias to subvert a prior order and commence the appeal without leave.

The court found the appellant's conduct reprehensible and outrageous, warranting full indemnity costs.

Costs were fixed at $6,000 payable to the Crown.

The Crown moved to dismiss an appeal brought by 'Maxine Adwella' against a decision of the Animal Care Review Board regarding the removal of abandoned pets.

The Crown argued that 'Maxine Adwella' was an alias for Althea Reyes, who had previously been declared a vexatious litigant and was prohibited from commencing proceedings without leave.

The court found that the appellant was indeed Althea Reyes using an alias to circumvent the vexatious litigant order.

The appeal was dismissed pursuant to Rule 2.1.03(1) and as an abuse of process.