Danielle Meuleman

The applicants brought a motion for a stay of a Divisional Court order, pending determination of their motion for leave to appeal.

The Divisional Court had dismissed their judicial review of an Animal Care Board decision approving costs for animal care.

The applicants sought the stay to prevent forfeiture of animals due to unpaid accounts.

The Court of Appeal applied the RJR-MacDonald test for stays, combined with principles for leave to appeal from Sault Dock Co. Ltd. The court found no serious issue to be tried, no irreparable harm (as the animals had already been forfeited), and that the balance of convenience did not favour a stay.

The motion was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The applicants sought judicial review of a decision by the Animal Care Review Board confirming a statement of account for over $1.5 million in care costs for more than 200 seized sled dogs.

The applicants argued the Board erred in its evidentiary findings, including relying on hearsay and failing to make adverse credibility findings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board's decision was reasonable as it was based on uncontroverted evidence from the respondent, and the applicants had failed to adduce any evidence or cross-examine the respondent's witness at the hearing.

The moving parties sought a stay of an Animal Care Review Board decision confirming a $1.5 million statement of account issued by Animal Welfare Services for the care of approximately 200 seized dogs.

Without a stay, the dogs would be forfeited to the Crown.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found that the balance of convenience favoured the moving parties, as refusing the stay would render related ongoing proceedings moot and destroy their unique herd of dogs.

The motion for a stay pending judicial review was granted.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash rulings by Justice Colvin in an ongoing appeal.

The rulings disallowed the applicant's choice of agent (who was not a licensed paralegal or lawyer) and refused an adjournment.

The applicant also sought to remove Justice Colvin and amend the appeal.

The court dismissed the application for certiorari, finding no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The judge's decision to disqualify the agent was upheld due to the agent's failure to comply with duties and responsibilities, particularly the "trial by ambush" tactic of not providing advance notice.

The refusal to grant an adjournment was also upheld as the applicant should have been prepared to proceed.

The court noted that the substantive appeal had not been heard and could be re-argued before Justice Colvin.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice which held that the Crown could not appeal a judicial stay of proceedings under the Provincial Offences Act, but rather had to proceed by way of certiorari.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, applying the Supreme Court of Canada's reasoning in Jewitt to find that a judicial stay is tantamount to a dismissal.

Therefore, the Crown has a right of appeal under section 116(1)(b) of the Provincial Offences Act.

The appellant challenged a conviction for failing to report a blasting incident that propelled fly-rock into the air and damaged nearby property.

The Court held that the reporting duty under the Environmental Protection Act is triggered where a contaminant is discharged out of the normal course of events and there is or may be an adverse effect, without requiring proof of actual impairment to the natural environment.

It emphasized the statute’s broad remedial purpose and confirmed that each branch of the adverse-effect definition independently engages the duty to notify the regulator.

On the facts, the discharge caused significant property damage and potential serious harm, requiring immediate reporting.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was engaged in a blasting operation that sent fly-rock onto neighbouring private property, causing damage.

The appellant did not report the incident to the Ministry of the Environment and was charged with failing to report the discharge of a contaminant under s. 15(1) of the Environmental Protection Act.

The appellant argued that reporting was only required if the discharge caused non-trivial harm to the natural environment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory definition of 'adverse effect' includes property damage as an independent trigger for liability, regardless of whether the natural environment itself is harmed.