Marie-France Major

A power producer sought judicial intervention to force renegotiation of a long-term fixed-price electricity contract after market changes generated large resale profits for the purchaser.

The Court held Quebec civil law did not provide a basis to imply a duty to renegotiate, to apply unforeseeability in these circumstances, or to redistribute contractual benefits through good faith or equity.

The agreement allocated price fluctuation risk and remained enforceable as written.

The appeal was dismissed, with a dissent that would have recognized a relational-contract duty to cooperate.

In a builders’ risk insurance appeal, the appellants sought coverage for replacing windows scratched during post-installation cleaning performed by a contractor.

The insurers relied on an exclusion for the cost of making good faulty workmanship.

The Court held that, in this context, the exclusion removes only the cost of redoing the faulty work itself, while resulting physical damage remains covered.

The Court also held that interpretation of this standard form contract was reviewable for correctness in the circumstances.

The appeals were allowed with costs and the trial judgment was restored.

The Court allowed the appeal and restored the Federal Court decision dismissing the constitutional challenge to a First Nation election rule requiring Grade 12 education for candidates.

The claimant failed to show that the requirement had a disproportionate discriminatory impact on an enumerated or analogous ground, including age or residence on reserve, because the evidentiary record was insufficient.

The appellant challenged a conviction for failing to report a blasting incident that propelled fly-rock into the air and damaged nearby property.

The Court held that the reporting duty under the Environmental Protection Act is triggered where a contaminant is discharged out of the normal course of events and there is or may be an adverse effect, without requiring proof of actual impairment to the natural environment.

It emphasized the statute’s broad remedial purpose and confirmed that each branch of the adverse-effect definition independently engages the duty to notify the regulator.

On the facts, the discharge caused significant property damage and potential serious harm, requiring immediate reporting.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, a mother and infant who suffered brain damage during a vaginal birth after caesarean section (VBAC), appealed a Court of Appeal order setting aside a trial judgment due to the trial judge's extensive copying of the plaintiffs' submissions.

The Supreme Court held that incorporating the material of others in reasons for judgment does not, without more, require the decision to be set aside; the presumption of judicial integrity is rebutted only where copying would lead a reasonable person to conclude the judge did not independently consider the issues.

On the merits, the Court affirmed liability against the prenatal obstetrician for failure to obtain informed consent to VBAC, but set aside findings of liability against the hospital, nurse, and other physicians for lack of causation.

The Crown appealed as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada from the Manitoba Court of Appeal's decision upholding the respondent's acquittal on a charge of uttering threats to cause death contrary to s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The accused had repeatedly told his ex-girlfriend he would kill her if she proceeded with an abortion.

The trial judge found a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused intended his words to intimidate, considering the recipient's testimony that she did not take the threats seriously.

The majority (4-3) held the trial judge correctly stated the law and properly considered the recipient's evidence as context for assessing mens rea.

The dissent would have allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred by making the recipient's perception the determinative factor in assessing intent.

The Supreme Court of Canada heard two appeals concerning the property and financial rights of common law partners upon the breakdown of their relationships.

The Court held that the 'common intention' resulting trust has no further role in resolving domestic property disputes.

Instead, the law of unjust enrichment is the primary vehicle.

The Court clarified that a monetary remedy for unjust enrichment need not always be calculated on a quantum meruit (fee-for-services) basis.

Where the parties were engaged in a 'joint family venture' and there is a link between the claimant's contributions and the accumulation of wealth, the remedy should be calculated based on the share of the accumulated wealth proportionate to the claimant's contributions.

In Vanasse, the Court restored the trial judge's award based on wealth accumulation.

In Kerr, the Court ordered a new trial for the unjust enrichment claims and restored the trial judge's order for spousal support effective from the date proceedings commenced.

The Province of British Columbia issued a request for proposals (RFP) for the construction of a highway, restricting eligible bidders to six proponents.

The Province accepted a bid from an ineligible joint venture involving one of the eligible proponents and an ineligible third party.

The unsuccessful eligible bidder, the appellant, sued for breach of contract.

The Province relied on an exclusion clause in the RFP that barred claims for compensation as a result of participating in the RFP.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Province breached the tendering contract by accepting an ineligible bid.

The Court laid to rest the doctrine of fundamental breach and established a three-part test for exclusion clauses.

Applying the test, the majority found that the exclusion clause did not apply to the Province's conduct, as the appellant's claim arose from the Province's dealings with an ineligible bidder, not from the appellant's participation in the RFP process.

The Quebec legislature amended the Charter of the French language to disregard periods of attendance at unsubsidized English-language private schools and instruction received pursuant to special authorizations when determining eligibility for publicly funded English-language instruction.

The respondents challenged these amendments.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that paragraphs 2 and 3 of s. 73 of the Charter of the French language infringe the minority language educational rights guaranteed by s. 23(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court found that the absolute prohibition on considering such instruction creates a fictitious educational pathway, preventing the required global qualitative assessment.

The infringement was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter, as the measures were not minimally impairing.

The appeals and cross-appeals were dismissed, and the provisions were declared unconstitutional, with the declaration suspended for one year.

The appellant, a young person with a learning disability, was charged with dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The trial judge excluded his videotaped statement to police, finding the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he understood his rights under s. 146 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, holding the standard of proof for waiver was a balance of probabilities.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal.

The majority held that while the test for compliance with the informational requirement is objective, the Crown must prove compliance with all components of s. 146, including waiver, beyond a reasonable doubt.

The parties separated after 12 years of marriage.

At trial, family assets were divided equally, and the trial judge ordered that the husband's contingent tax liabilities associated with his tax shelters should be shared equally by the spouses on an 'if and when' basis.

The Court of Appeal set aside this order, holding that the Family Relations Act precluded a freestanding order apportioning debt.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Act does not preclude an order dividing a contingent liability that cannot be valued at the time of trial, and that fairness required both spouses to assume responsibility for the contingent liabilities associated with tax shelters from which they both benefited.

The appellant was wrongfully dismissed from his position as a union business agent without notice.

During negotiations, the employer offered him the opportunity to return to work to serve out a 24-month working notice period.

The appellant refused to return to work unless certain conditions were met, including the rescission of his termination letter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a wrongfully dismissed employee may be required to mitigate their damages by returning to work for the same employer, provided the salary and working conditions are substantially the same and the personal relationships are not acrimonious.

The Court found that the appellant's refusal to return to work was objectively unreasonable and constituted a failure to mitigate his damages.

The plaintiffs, claiming to be descendants of the Papaschase Indian Band, brought an action against the Crown for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and treaty breach relating to the 1889 surrender of their reserve.

The Crown applied for summary dismissal.

The Supreme Court of Canada restored the chambers judge's order dismissing the action, finding that there was no genuine issue for trial because the claims were barred by the Limitation of Actions Act.

The evidence established that the causes of action were discoverable by the plaintiffs in the 1970s, well beyond the limitation period.

The appellants challenged the province's policy of seeking compensation for fire services fees from individuals involved in motor vehicle accidents, arguing it violated section 7 of the Charter by potentially deterring people from calling for essential services.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that there was no evidence to support this assertion.

The Court also affirmed that section 7 does not protect purely economic interests and that the province's process of establishing liability through the courts accords with fundamental justice.

The appellant appealed a Court of Appeal decision that set aside a contempt order against the respondent.

The respondent had been found in contempt for failing to secure his support obligations with an irrevocable letter of credit and to post security for costs.

The Court of Appeal had held that the motions judge lacked jurisdiction under Rule 60.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure because the orders were for the 'payment of money'.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting appellate judge that neither security order amounted to an order for the payment of money, and reinstated the contempt order.

The appellant hospital terminated the grievor's employment after a three-year absence due to illness, relying on an automatic termination clause in the collective agreement.

The union grieved the termination, arguing the employer failed in its duty to accommodate.

The arbitrator dismissed the grievance, finding the employer had accommodated the grievor beyond the collective agreement's requirements and that she remained totally disabled.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that while a collective agreement cannot contract out of human rights legislation, a negotiated termination clause is a significant factor in assessing the employer's duty to accommodate and undue hardship.

The appellant, owner of the famous VEUVE CLICQUOT trade-mark for champagne, sought to prevent the respondents from using the trade-name and registered trade-marks 'Cliquot' in association with their mid-priced women's clothing stores.

The appellant alleged that the respondents' use caused confusion under section 20 of the Trade-marks Act and depreciated the value of the goodwill attaching to its mark under section 22.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no likelihood of confusion given the significant differences in the wares and channels of trade.

The Court also dismissed the section 22 claim, holding that the appellant failed to establish that consumers would make a mental association between the clothing stores and the champagne mark, or that any such association would likely depreciate the value of the appellant's goodwill.

The appellant brought an application in French against the respondent municipality.

The municipality presented its pleadings in English.

The appellant objected, arguing that section 22 of the Official Languages Act required the municipality, as an 'institution', to adopt the official language chosen by the other party in civil proceedings.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the definition of 'institution' in the Act does not include municipalities, and therefore the municipality was not obliged to use the appellant's chosen language.

The Court also held that the obligation under section 22 does not extend to translating evidence or case law.

The appellants operated a senior citizens residence and borrowed funds through successive mortgages arranged by Morguard.

The trial judge found that Morguard and its officers committed fraud, deceit, and breach of fiduciary duty by overstating discharge amounts, charging excessive undisclosed fees, and hiding a corporate officer's personal involvement in the loans.

The trial judge awarded compensatory damages but declined to award punitive damages.

On appeal, the appellants sought punitive damages and increased compensation, while the respondents cross-appealed liability and damages, relying on a release executed by the parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeals, upholding the trial judge's findings and concluding that the release was properly set aside due to fraudulent misrepresentation.

The appellants sold a portion of surplus railway lands and applied for subdivision approval.

The Provincial Planning Board ruled that the 10% reserve requirement under the Planning Act should be calculated based only on the surplus lands, not the entire parcel.

The Alberta Court of Appeal reversed this decision, holding the reserve applied to the entire parcel.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, setting aside the Court of Appeal's judgment and restoring the Board's order.