Peter P. Rosinski

The appellant, a young person with a learning disability, was charged with dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The trial judge excluded his videotaped statement to police, finding the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he understood his rights under s. 146 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, holding the standard of proof for waiver was a balance of probabilities.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal.

The majority held that while the test for compliance with the informational requirement is objective, the Crown must prove compliance with all components of s. 146, including waiver, beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant, a young person, pleaded guilty to several offences and was sentenced to secure custody and community supervision.

The sentencing judge interpreted s. 39(1)(c) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act to allow consideration of the offences for which the young person was currently being sentenced when determining if there was a 'pattern of findings of guilt'.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the shared meaning of the English and French versions of the provision requires that the prior findings of guilt must have been entered before the commission of the current offence, and generally requires at least three prior convictions to establish a pattern.

However, the Court found that the appellant's prior record still established a pattern, upholding the custodial sentence.

The Court also upheld the sufficiency of the pre-sentence report and the remittal of the DNA order.

The 13-year-old appellant pleaded guilty to assault with a weapon, a primary designated offence, after stabbing his mother in the foot with a pen.

The trial judge declined to make a mandatory DNA data bank order, finding under s. 487.051(2) of the Criminal Code that the impact on the young person's privacy and security would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest, taking into account the principles of youth criminal justice legislation.

The Court of Appeal overturned this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the trial judge's decision, holding that a trial judge may consider the underlying principles of youth criminal justice legislation when balancing the factors under s. 487.051(2).

The accused was acquitted of sexual assault but convicted of the included offence of assault at trial.

The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court allowed the appeal and restored the trial judge's judgment, adopting the dissenting reasons of Roscoe J.A. in the Court of Appeal.