The Crown appealed the Court of Appeal's decision setting aside the accused's second degree murder conviction and ordering a new trial on manslaughter only.
The accused had been convicted of second degree murder by a jury after evidence of his after-the-fact conduct — including moving, burning, and disposing of his domestic partner's body — was admitted on the issues of causation and intent.
The majority of the Supreme Court held that the after-the-fact conduct was properly admissible to prove intent for second degree murder, and that the jury charge, assessed as a whole, adequately equipped the jury to decide the case without a limiting instruction on propensity reasoning; the conviction for second degree murder was restored.
Martin J., dissenting in part, agreed on admissibility but found the omission of a propensity limiting instruction was a reversible error of law requiring a new trial on second degree murder.
Karakatsanis J. dissented entirely, holding the after-the-fact conduct was inadmissible on intent and a directed verdict should have been granted.
