Kenneth W. F. Fiske

The Crown appealed the Court of Appeal's decision setting aside the accused's second degree murder conviction and ordering a new trial on manslaughter only.

The accused had been convicted of second degree murder by a jury after evidence of his after-the-fact conduct — including moving, burning, and disposing of his domestic partner's body — was admitted on the issues of causation and intent.

The majority of the Supreme Court held that the after-the-fact conduct was properly admissible to prove intent for second degree murder, and that the jury charge, assessed as a whole, adequately equipped the jury to decide the case without a limiting instruction on propensity reasoning; the conviction for second degree murder was restored.

Martin J., dissenting in part, agreed on admissibility but found the omission of a propensity limiting instruction was a reversible error of law requiring a new trial on second degree murder.

Karakatsanis J. dissented entirely, holding the after-the-fact conduct was inadmissible on intent and a directed verdict should have been granted.

The accused was convicted of robbery based entirely on DNA evidence found on a Halloween mask left near the scene.

At trial, the investigating officer improperly gave bad character evidence about the accused, which the trial judge did not address in his reasons.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding the Crown had not proven the error was harmless.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, holding that the trial judge's express statement that he relied 'entirely' on the DNA evidence meant the improper character evidence played no part in the convictions, making its admission a harmless error.

The accused was acquitted of sexual assault but convicted of the included offence of assault at trial.

The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court allowed the appeal and restored the trial judge's judgment, adopting the dissenting reasons of Roscoe J.A. in the Court of Appeal.

The appellant pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death after a firearm he was holding discharged while he was intoxicated, killing his friend.

He challenged the constitutionality of the four-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 220(a) of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated s. 12 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the mandatory minimum sentence does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, as it is not grossly disproportionate for the offender or for reasonable hypotheticals.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to credit the appellant for pre-trial custody against the mandatory minimum sentence.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault.

The Crown failed to disclose a statement made by an eyewitness, though a summary was included in police reports provided to the defence.

The Court of Appeal found that defence counsel had exercised due diligence in pursuing disclosure.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the undisclosed statement could have affected the defence's strategy, such as the decision not to call evidence.

The Court concluded that the non-disclosure affected the fairness of the trial process and impaired the appellant's right to make full answer and defence.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault against two different victims.

The Crown inadvertently failed to disclose a witness statement to the defence.

Applying the principles from R. v. Dixon, the Supreme Court of Canada found that the undisclosed statement did not affect the reliability of the conviction for the first assault.

However, for the second assault, the statement contained exculpatory evidence that could have raised a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed in part, and a new trial was ordered for the second assault.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault.

He appealed on the basis that the Crown failed to disclose statements made by four individuals, although summaries were included in police reports provided to defence counsel.

Applying the principles from a companion case, the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal.

The Court found that the undisclosed statements had very low materiality and that defence counsel failed to exercise due diligence by not requesting the full statements despite knowing of their existence.

Consequently, the failure to produce the statements did not affect the fairness of the trial process.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault.

He appealed on the basis that the Crown failed to disclose a statement made by a witness, although a summary of the statement was included in police reports provided to defence counsel.

The Supreme Court of Canada applied the principles from the companion case of R. v. Dixon.

The Court found that the undisclosed statement would not have affected the reliability of the conviction and that defence counsel failed to exercise due diligence by not requesting the full statement despite knowing of its existence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault following a group beating.

The Crown inadvertently failed to disclose four witness statements, though summaries were included in police occurrence reports provided to defence counsel during the trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Crown breached its duty to disclose relevant material, the appellant's right to make full answer and defence was not impaired.

The undisclosed statements would not have affected the reliability of the conviction, and defence counsel's lack of due diligence in pursuing the full statements after receiving the summaries was a significant factor in concluding that the overall fairness of the trial process was not compromised.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder on the ground that he was denied the right to make full answer and defence due to ineffective representation of counsel.

The Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal but dismissed the appeal for the reasons given by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal.

The appellants were acquitted at trial on charges of keeping gambling devices and keeping a common gaming house.

The Crown appealed to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, which allowed the appeals and ordered new trials, finding that the police seizure of gambling devices in business establishments open to the public did not violate the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the accused's appeals, adopting the reasons of the Court of Appeal that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in a business establishment open to the public.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault.

At trial, the defence sought to cross-examine the complainant on prior inconsistent statements that referred to sexual activity other than the subject matter of the charge.

The trial judge excluded three of these statements under s. 276 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred in excluding the statements.

The Court held that s. 276 should not be used to prevent cross-examination on material inconsistencies relevant to credibility, especially when the reference to prior sexual activity was inextricably linked to police questioning.

The accused was involved in a single-vehicle accident and taken to the hospital.

More than two hours after the accident, a police officer formed the belief that the accused was impaired and demanded a blood sample, which the accused refused.

The trial judge and the Court of Appeal acquitted the accused on the basis that the demand under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code must be made within two hours of the offence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that section 254(3) only requires the police officer to form the belief within two hours of the offence, and the demand itself must follow forthwith or as soon as practicable, even if outside the two-hour limit.

The appellant shot and killed a man after a drunken altercation.

He was arrested for a 'shooting incident' and advised of his right to counsel, which he waived, giving a statement to the police.

The police did not inform him that the victim had died until after the statement was taken.

The appellant argued his statement should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter because his s. 10(a) right to be informed of the reasons for his arrest was violated, vitiating his s. 10(b) waiver.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while s. 10(a) was violated, the appellant had sufficient awareness of his jeopardy to validly waive his right to counsel, as he must have known he likely killed the victim.

The Court also found the statement's admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and dismissed the appeal.

The respondent was charged with communicating in a public place for the purpose of obtaining the sexual services of a prostitute contrary to s. 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge convicted the respondent, but the Court of Appeal set aside the conviction, holding that the provision infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and was not saved by s. 1.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that while the provision infringes s. 2(b), it is a reasonable limit demonstrably justified under s. 1.

The Court further held that the provision does not infringe the guarantee of freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter, as its target is expressive conduct rather than conduct of an associational nature.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder based in part on the testimony of an accomplice.

On appeal, the appellant argued that gaps in the trial transcript, including a portion of the judge's charge to the jury, constituted a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant also argued that the trial judge failed to give a clear and sharp warning regarding the dangers of accepting the uncorroborated testimony of the accomplice.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the missing transcript portions did not create a serious possibility of error and that the trial judge's warning regarding the accomplice's testimony was sufficient under the circumstances.

Criminal appeal from conviction for conspiracy to obtain contributions for a governing political party through influence peddling.

The majority held that questioning prospective jurors in private after arraignment and plea, on grounds including possible partiality, formed part of the trial for purposes of s. 577(1) of the Criminal Code and violated the accused's right to be present.

The majority further held that this defect could not be cured by later challenges for cause or by the curative provisions dealing with jury irregularities, and that the process impermissibly intruded into the Code's exclusive scheme for determining juror impartiality.

A new trial was ordered, although the majority indicated agreement with the dissent's resolution of the remaining issues concerning the definition of “person”, the co-conspirators' hearsay exception, and good character instructions.

The appellant, a civilian, was stopped by military police on a public highway just outside a military base after being observed speeding on the base.

The officers noted signs of impairment and issued a breathalyzer demand, which the appellant refused.

He was acquitted at trial on the basis that military police were not 'peace officers' under the Criminal Code with respect to civilians.

The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while military police do not have general peace officer status over civilians under s. 2(f)(i), they do qualify as peace officers under s. 2(f)(ii) when enforcing laws on a military base pursuant to the Defence Establishment Trespass Regulations.

The officers retained this authority when stopping the appellant immediately outside the base.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, expressing substantial agreement with the dissenting reasons of MacDonald J.A. in the court below regarding errors in the charge to the jury.

The respondent's driver's licence was revoked following a Criminal Code conviction, but reinstated pending his appeal.

After his appeal was dismissed, he continued to drive, mistakenly believing he was entitled to do so until he received official notification from the Registrar of Motor Vehicles.

He was charged with driving while his licence was cancelled under the provincial Motor Vehicle Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the offence is one of strict liability, the respondent's mistake was one of law, not fact.

As ignorance of the law is not an excuse and there was no evidence of officially induced error, the Court allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial.