William D. Delaney

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and attempted murder at trial.

The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal upheld the convictions.

On further appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the appellant challenged the reasonableness of the verdicts.

The Court unanimously agreed with the majority of the Court of Appeal that the verdict was not unreasonable and dismissed the appeal.

The Crown appealed from the respondent's acquittal on a charge of counselling the commission of murder.

The respondent, a victim of severe spousal abuse, had attempted to hire a hit man to kill her husband.

The trial judge acquitted on the basis of the common law defence of duress.

The Supreme Court held that duress requires compulsion to commit a specific offence and is not available where threats were not made for the purpose of compelling the commission of an offence.

However, given the uncertainty in the law, the Crown's change of position between trial and appeal, and the exceptional circumstances, a stay of proceedings was entered rather than ordering a new trial.

Fish J. dissented in part, favouring a new trial over a stay.

The accused was convicted of robbery based entirely on DNA evidence found on a Halloween mask left near the scene.

At trial, the investigating officer improperly gave bad character evidence about the accused, which the trial judge did not address in his reasons.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding the Crown had not proven the error was harmless.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, holding that the trial judge's express statement that he relied 'entirely' on the DNA evidence meant the improper character evidence played no part in the convictions, making its admission a harmless error.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal that set aside his acquittal for breaking and entering and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, adopting the dissenting reasons of Justice Cromwell of the Court of Appeal, which found that the trial judge's error concerning corroboration did not affect the result.

The appellant, a young person with a learning disability, was charged with dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The trial judge excluded his videotaped statement to police, finding the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he understood his rights under s. 146 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, holding the standard of proof for waiver was a balance of probabilities.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal.

The majority held that while the test for compliance with the informational requirement is objective, the Crown must prove compliance with all components of s. 146, including waiver, beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellants were charged with driving 'over 80' after failing breathalyzer tests.

At trial, they adduced expert 'straddle evidence' indicating that, based on their drinking patterns and average alcohol elimination rates, their blood alcohol concentrations could have been either above or below the legal limit at the time of driving.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that straddle evidence does not rebut the statutory presumption in s. 258(1)(d.1) of the Criminal Code, as it merely confirms the accused consumed enough alcohol to reach a level exceeding 80 mg and does not tend to show the concentration was below the legal limit.

The appeals were dismissed and the convictions/orders for new trials were upheld.

The 13-year-old appellant pleaded guilty to assault with a weapon, a primary designated offence, after stabbing his mother in the foot with a pen.

The trial judge declined to make a mandatory DNA data bank order, finding under s. 487.051(2) of the Criminal Code that the impact on the young person's privacy and security would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest, taking into account the principles of youth criminal justice legislation.

The Court of Appeal overturned this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the trial judge's decision, holding that a trial judge may consider the underlying principles of youth criminal justice legislation when balancing the factors under s. 487.051(2).

The accused, Mi'kmaq Indians in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, were charged with cutting and possessing timber from Crown lands without authorization.

They argued they had a right to log for commercial purposes pursuant to the treaties of 1760-61 and aboriginal title.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the treaties did not confer a right to commercial logging, as it was not the logical evolution of a traditional Mi'kmaq trading activity.

The Court also held that the accused did not establish aboriginal title to the cutting sites, as the evidence did not show sufficiently regular and exclusive use of the lands at the time of British sovereignty.

The convictions were restored.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered after the provincial appellate court excluded the accused’s post-polygraph confessions to multiple arsons.

The majority held that the common law confessions rule is a contextual voluntariness inquiry concerned with both reliability and fairness, requiring consideration of threats or promises, oppression, operating mind, and police trickery.

It further held that appellate courts owe deference to a trial judge’s factual assessment of voluntariness absent palpable and overriding error.

On the facts, the police interrogation, while persistent and strategic, did not involve inducements or oppression sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to voluntariness, and the confessions and re-enactment were admissible.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and attempted murder after shooting his stepfather and his stepfather's companion.

At trial, the appellant admitted the actus reus but raised a mental disorder defence under s. 16 of the Criminal Code and argued he lacked the requisite intent.

The trial judge extensively reviewed the mental disorder evidence when discussing the s. 16 defence but only briefly referred back to it when instructing the jury on planning and deliberation.

The trial judge also instructed the jury that hiding the murder weapon could indicate consciousness of guilt.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the jury charge as a whole sufficiently related the mental disorder evidence to the issue of planning and deliberation.

While the trial judge erred in failing to limit the consciousness of guilt instruction to the s. 16 issue, the Court applied the curative proviso as the error was minor and would not have affected the verdict.

The appellant father and the mother separated, and the mother agreed that the child would live with the father.

Years later, the mother obtained an ex parte interim access order.

The father then left the jurisdiction with the child.

He was charged with child abduction under s. 283(1) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge acquitted him, finding he had not 'taken' the child since the child was legally in his care.

The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the father's appeal, holding that s. 283(1) does not require the deprived parent to have actual physical possession of the child at the time of the offence, and that the offence can be committed by a parent with lawful care of the child.

The appellant drove his boat through a known swimming area at considerable speed without keeping a proper lookout, striking and fatally injuring a swimmer.

He was convicted of dangerous operation of a vessel.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada considered whether the trial judge applied the proper test for the offence as set out in R. v. Hundal.

The majority held that although the trial judge erred by applying a stricter subjective mens rea test rather than the modified objective test, no miscarriage of justice occurred given the strong evidence of a marked departure from the standard of care.

The appeal was dismissed using the curative proviso.

The accused was arrested for a sexual assault and advised of his right to counsel.

While detained, the police requested a blood sample, ostensibly for the investigation of the assault for which he was arrested, but primarily to compare against DNA evidence from an earlier, unrelated sexual assault.

The accused consented to the blood sample without being informed of the police's dual investigative purpose or being re-advised of his right to counsel regarding the earlier assault.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the accused's rights under sections 8, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter were violated because his consent was not fully informed.

The Court upheld the exclusion of the DNA evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, concluding its admission would render the trial unfair.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal that had overturned the accused's conviction for sexually assaulting his stepdaughter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the Court of Appeal erred in requiring a victim to offer some minimal word or gesture of objection and in equating a lack of resistance with consent.

The Court found there was sufficient evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could reasonably convict.