Frank E. DeMont

The appellants, two managerial staff members at a coal mine where an explosion killed 26 miners, were charged with manslaughter.

During the trial, the trial judge made a private phone call to a senior member of the Attorney General's staff, requesting the removal of the lead Crown counsel and threatening to take steps to secure that end.

The trial judge subsequently denied the Crown's motion for recusal and later ordered a stay of proceedings due to the Crown's failure to disclose relevant evidence.

The Court of Appeal set aside the stay and ordered a new trial, finding a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's conduct created a reasonable apprehension of bias, which retroactively rendered his order staying the proceedings void.

A new trial was ordered, with costs awarded to the appellants due to the systemic problems and the trial judge's conduct.

The accused was arrested for a sexual assault and advised of his right to counsel.

While detained, the police requested a blood sample, ostensibly for the investigation of the assault for which he was arrested, but primarily to compare against DNA evidence from an earlier, unrelated sexual assault.

The accused consented to the blood sample without being informed of the police's dual investigative purpose or being re-advised of his right to counsel regarding the earlier assault.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the accused's rights under sections 8, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter were violated because his consent was not fully informed.

The Court upheld the exclusion of the DNA evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, concluding its admission would render the trial unfair.

The accused appealed a sexual assault conviction on the basis that his court-appointed interpreter, when called as a defence witness, failed to provide full and contemporaneous interpretation of his own testimony and part of an exchange with the trial judge.

The Court held that s. 14 of the Charter protects an accused's right to interpretation that is continuous, precise, impartial, competent and contemporaneous whenever the case is being advanced.

The Court rejected any requirement to prove actual prejudice at the breach stage, found no valid personal waiver, and held that the Criminal Code curative provisos do not apply to an infringement of the constitutional right to interpreter assistance.

Because the breach occurred during material trial evidence on identification, the conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.