Joel E. Pink

The Crown appealed from the respondent's acquittal on a charge of counselling the commission of murder.

The respondent, a victim of severe spousal abuse, had attempted to hire a hit man to kill her husband.

The trial judge acquitted on the basis of the common law defence of duress.

The Supreme Court held that duress requires compulsion to commit a specific offence and is not available where threats were not made for the purpose of compelling the commission of an offence.

However, given the uncertainty in the law, the Crown's change of position between trial and appeal, and the exceptional circumstances, a stay of proceedings was entered rather than ordering a new trial.

Fish J. dissented in part, favouring a new trial over a stay.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault following a jury trial where credibility was the central issue.

The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction, finding the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on the application of reasonable doubt to credibility as required by R. v. W. (D.).

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the jury charge, when read as a whole, did not leave the jury with any misapprehension as to the correct burden and standard of proof.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault.

He appealed on the basis that the Crown failed to disclose a statement made by a witness, although a summary of the statement was included in police reports provided to defence counsel.

The Supreme Court of Canada applied the principles from the companion case of R. v. Dixon.

The Court found that the undisclosed statement would not have affected the reliability of the conviction and that defence counsel failed to exercise due diligence by not requesting the full statement despite knowing of its existence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and attempted murder after shooting his stepfather and his stepfather's companion.

At trial, the appellant admitted the actus reus but raised a mental disorder defence under s. 16 of the Criminal Code and argued he lacked the requisite intent.

The trial judge extensively reviewed the mental disorder evidence when discussing the s. 16 defence but only briefly referred back to it when instructing the jury on planning and deliberation.

The trial judge also instructed the jury that hiding the murder weapon could indicate consciousness of guilt.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the jury charge as a whole sufficiently related the mental disorder evidence to the issue of planning and deliberation.

While the trial judge erred in failing to limit the consciousness of guilt instruction to the s. 16 issue, the Court applied the curative proviso as the error was minor and would not have affected the verdict.

The appellant drove his boat through a known swimming area at considerable speed without keeping a proper lookout, striking and fatally injuring a swimmer.

He was convicted of dangerous operation of a vessel.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada considered whether the trial judge applied the proper test for the offence as set out in R. v. Hundal.

The majority held that although the trial judge erred by applying a stricter subjective mens rea test rather than the modified objective test, no miscarriage of justice occurred given the strong evidence of a marked departure from the standard of care.

The appeal was dismissed using the curative proviso.

The accused was acquitted of three counts of first-degree murder.

The Crown appealed, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury by instructing them to reject the accused's out-of-court confession if his trial testimony raised a reasonable doubt about it.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the accused's appeal and restored the acquittal, finding that the jury charge, read as a whole, did not improperly instruct the jury to evaluate the evidence in a piecemeal or two-stage fashion.

The appellant shot and killed a man after a drunken altercation.

He was arrested for a 'shooting incident' and advised of his right to counsel, which he waived, giving a statement to the police.

The police did not inform him that the victim had died until after the statement was taken.

The appellant argued his statement should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter because his s. 10(a) right to be informed of the reasons for his arrest was violated, vitiating his s. 10(b) waiver.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while s. 10(a) was violated, the appellant had sufficient awareness of his jeopardy to validly waive his right to counsel, as he must have known he likely killed the victim.

The Court also found the statement's admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, and dismissed the appeal.

The respondent was charged with communicating in a public place for the purpose of obtaining the sexual services of a prostitute contrary to s. 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge convicted the respondent, but the Court of Appeal set aside the conviction, holding that the provision infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and was not saved by s. 1.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that while the provision infringes s. 2(b), it is a reasonable limit demonstrably justified under s. 1.

The Court further held that the provision does not infringe the guarantee of freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter, as its target is expressive conduct rather than conduct of an associational nature.

The appellant was arrested for attempted murder and briefly consulted a lawyer.

Two hours later, the victim died, and the charge was upgraded to first degree murder.

The appellant requested to speak to her lawyer again but could not reach him due to the late hour.

The police subsequently questioned her, and she provided an inculpatory statement and later led them to the murder weapon.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the change in the charge triggered a renewed right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

The police breached this right by failing to provide a reasonable opportunity for her to consult counsel and by eliciting a statement.

The Court excluded the statement and the appellant's conduct in locating the knife under s. 24(2), restoring her manslaughter conviction.