Jennifer A. MacLellan

The appellant appealed 13 domestic violence-related convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the W.(D.) framework and in assessing the complainant's credibility.

The majority of the Court of Appeal below had upheld the convictions.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge correctly instructed herself on W.(D.), that assessing complainant credibility before the accused's does not automatically reverse the burden of proof, and that credibility findings responsive to live issues at trial attract significant deference on appeal.

The Court clarified the proper use of absence of motive to lie and lack of embellishment as credibility factors, noting that lack of embellishment cannot be used to bolster a complainant's credibility but may be considered in assessing motive to lie.

The Crown appealed a Nova Scotia Court of Appeal decision that set aside convictions for first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court agreed that the trial judge's instructions on party liability for first degree murder were in error, such that the first degree murder conviction could not stand.

However, the Court held that the trial judge was not required to charge the jury on manslaughter, as the evidence did not meet the air of reality test.

The Court further held that the trial judge did not err in the evidence left for the jury under the third prong of the Carter test for admissibility of co-conspirator hearsay.

Accordingly, the appeal was allowed in part: the conspiracy conviction was restored and a conviction for second degree murder was substituted.

The Crown appealed the Court of Appeal's decision setting aside the accused's second degree murder conviction and ordering a new trial on manslaughter only.

The accused had been convicted of second degree murder by a jury after evidence of his after-the-fact conduct — including moving, burning, and disposing of his domestic partner's body — was admitted on the issues of causation and intent.

The majority of the Supreme Court held that the after-the-fact conduct was properly admissible to prove intent for second degree murder, and that the jury charge, assessed as a whole, adequately equipped the jury to decide the case without a limiting instruction on propensity reasoning; the conviction for second degree murder was restored.

Martin J., dissenting in part, agreed on admissibility but found the omission of a propensity limiting instruction was a reversible error of law requiring a new trial on second degree murder.

Karakatsanis J. dissented entirely, holding the after-the-fact conduct was inadmissible on intent and a directed verdict should have been granted.

The Crown appealed from the respondent's acquittal on a charge of counselling the commission of murder.

The respondent, a victim of severe spousal abuse, had attempted to hire a hit man to kill her husband.

The trial judge acquitted on the basis of the common law defence of duress.

The Supreme Court held that duress requires compulsion to commit a specific offence and is not available where threats were not made for the purpose of compelling the commission of an offence.

However, given the uncertainty in the law, the Crown's change of position between trial and appeal, and the exceptional circumstances, a stay of proceedings was entered rather than ordering a new trial.

Fish J. dissented in part, favouring a new trial over a stay.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of two accomplices who were granted immunity and witness protection.

The trial judge warned the jury to be cautious in accepting their testimony and that it would be unsafe to rely on their evidence alone, but instructed that they could rely on it if convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that it was true.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the trial judge's Vetrovec warning was thorough and complete, and properly alerted the jury to the dangers of accepting the accomplices' testimony without corroborating evidence.