David J. Bright

The Crown appealed the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal's decision quashing the respondent's convictions for indecent assault and gross indecency.

The accused had been extradited to Canada to face charges, but more than 14 years elapsed between the laying of charges and trial, with approximately 12 years attributable to Crown delay in effecting extradition.

The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously agreed with the Court of Appeal that the accused's s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time was violated, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault.

He appealed on the basis that the Crown failed to disclose statements made by four individuals, although summaries were included in police reports provided to defence counsel.

Applying the principles from a companion case, the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal.

The Court found that the undisclosed statements had very low materiality and that defence counsel failed to exercise due diligence by not requesting the full statements despite knowing of their existence.

Consequently, the failure to produce the statements did not affect the fairness of the trial process.

The Crown applied for leave to appeal a trial judge's dismissal of a motion for a mistrial in a manslaughter case.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the application for leave to appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada granted the motion to quash, holding that it had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal at this stage of the proceedings.

The appellants, financial planners, recommended investment projects to their clients and received commissions from the promoters without adequately disclosing these commissions to their clients.

They were acquitted at trial of accepting secret commissions under s. 426(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, but the Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a corrupt bargain is not required for the offence, and that a new trial was necessary to determine whether the disclosure made by the appellants was adequate and timely.

The appellant, a civilian, was stopped by military police on a public highway just outside a military base after being observed speeding on the base.

The officers noted signs of impairment and issued a breathalyzer demand, which the appellant refused.

He was acquitted at trial on the basis that military police were not 'peace officers' under the Criminal Code with respect to civilians.

The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while military police do not have general peace officer status over civilians under s. 2(f)(i), they do qualify as peace officers under s. 2(f)(ii) when enforcing laws on a military base pursuant to the Defence Establishment Trespass Regulations.

The officers retained this authority when stopping the appellant immediately outside the base.

The appellant police officer and a fellow officer were involved in an altercation with a pedestrian who subsequently died from his injuries.

The fellow officer was convicted of manslaughter, while the appellant was acquitted.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial for the appellant, finding the trial judge misdirected the jury on the justified use of force and the mental element for aiding and abetting manslaughter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the trial judge's instructions were adequate given the appellant's distinct position regarding the power of arrest and that the jury was properly instructed on the required mental element.