Jeffrey G. Johnston

The applicants sought a temporary stay of a Sending Order issued under section 15(1) of the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, requesting the imposition of terms and conditions to protect trade secrets and intellectual property.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicants failed to demonstrate a serious question to be tried or irreparable harm.

The court reiterated that the Act is a complete code for mutual legal assistance proceedings and that the existing treaty provides sufficient protection, thus precluding additional submissions to the Minister of Justice for further conditions.

The applicants sought leave to appeal a decision upholding a sending order under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act.

The applicants argued that because a British Columbia court of coordinate jurisdiction had denied a similar sending order involving the same parties and investigation, the Ontario court should be bound by principles of res judicata and issue estoppel.

The motion judge dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding no jurisdiction to hear the appeal and rejecting the res judicata and issue estoppel arguments on their merits.

The applicants sought to re-open the issue of the validity of a search warrant and rescind a Sending Order made under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act.

They relied on fresh evidence that a related search warrant in British Columbia, based on the same Request to Send from Belgium, had been set aside due to a misleading police affidavit.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Ontario police affidavit did not suffer from the same deficiencies as the British Columbia affidavit and that the Request to Send provided sufficient reasonable and probable grounds to believe an offence had been committed under Belgian law.

An appeal concerning the interpretation of the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act.

The respondent was convicted in the United States of conspiracy and fraud, sentenced to 30 years imprisonment, and ordered to pay a $26 million USD forfeiture money judgment.

American authorities discovered $9.2 million CAD in a Canadian bank account believed to belong to the respondent and obtained a restraint order.

The respondent appealed the motion judge's decision upholding the restraint order, arguing the funds were not proceeds of crime or offence-related property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that "proceeds of crime" should be interpreted broadly in the context of mutual legal assistance to respect differences in foreign legal systems and to fulfill Canada's international treaty obligations.

The applicant, an American citizen facing charges of sexual assault of a minor in Wisconsin, sought judicial interim release pending extradition proceedings.

The court found that the reverse onus applied as the applicant was not ordinarily resident in Canada.

The proposed surety was deemed inadequate due to a lack of understanding of the charges, an unrealistic supervision plan, and an inability to post a sufficient bond.

Given the applicant's history of fleeing jurisdiction and the serious nature of the charges, the court concluded that detention was necessary on the primary grounds to ensure his attendance in court.

Bail was denied.

On appeal from a Superior Court decision granting a sending order under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act (MLACMA) to send seized evidence to Belgium.

The appellants sought to include terms and conditions in the sending order to restrict disclosure of commercially sensitive information about cyclotron design and manufacture to a state-owned competitor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the sending judge did not err in refusing to impose such restrictions.

The court found that the Treaty between Canada and Belgium, combined with MLACMA, adequately protects against improper use and disclosure through the Minister's supervisory role and the Treaty's restrictions on use and disclosure.

The appellant, the sole director of a Canadian company that contracted to supply armoured vehicles to the United States government, appealed his committal for extradition to the US on fraud charges and sought judicial review of the Minister's surrender order.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence that a civil relator action based on the same allegations had been dismissed in the US, arguing this created an issue estoppel and rendered the extradition an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the application for judicial review, holding that the fresh evidence was irrelevant to the extradition hearing judge's limited statutory role and that the Minister reasonably concluded that issue estoppel was a defence to be raised at trial in the requesting state.

The applicant sought a sending order under s. 15(1) of the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act to send business records seized from the respondents to the Kingdom of Belgium for a criminal fraud investigation.

The respondents opposed the order, arguing the seized materials contained trade secrets and that the Belgian investigation was a bad faith attempt to gain a competitive advantage.

The court granted the sending order, finding the search warrant was lawfully executed and there was no evidence of bad faith.

The court noted that concerns regarding intellectual property were addressed by the treaty's restrictions on unauthorized disclosure and were matters for the Minister of Justice, not the court.

In a mutual legal assistance proceeding, the applicants sought disclosure of the requesting state's Request to Send and leave to cross-examine the RCMP affiant who obtained the search warrant.

Applying the Larosa framework, the court held the allegations of misleading or false information were not capable of supporting the remedy sought because the remaining affidavit evidence would still justify issuance of the warrant.

The court further found no air of reality to the allegation that the requesting state deliberately misled the court, and no tenable allegation of mala fides was established.

Both preliminary applications were dismissed.

The Republic of France sought the appellant's extradition for his alleged role in a 1980 terrorist bombing in Paris.

The extradition judge committed the appellant for surrender based primarily on a French handwriting analysis linking him to the bombing, finding the report was not manifestly unreliable despite methodological criticisms.

The Minister of Justice subsequently ordered the appellant's surrender, rejecting arguments that France had not yet decided to put him on trial and that the case relied on intelligence reports potentially derived from torture.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal from the committal order and his application for judicial review of the surrender order, upholding the extradition judge's application of the test for committal and finding the Minister's surrender decision reasonable.

The Crown appealed the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal's decision quashing the respondent's convictions for indecent assault and gross indecency.

The accused had been extradited to Canada to face charges, but more than 14 years elapsed between the laying of charges and trial, with approximately 12 years attributable to Crown delay in effecting extradition.

The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously agreed with the Court of Appeal that the accused's s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time was violated, and dismissed the appeal.

The United States sought the extradition of two Aboriginal Canadians to face drug trafficking charges.

The applicants faced significantly harsher sentences in the US than they would in Canada, and the US system does not consider Aboriginal status in sentencing.

The Minister of Justice ordered their surrender, concluding that the Gladue principles were not relevant to their s. 6(1) Charter mobility rights and that surrender would not shock the conscience under s. 7.

The Court of Appeal set aside the surrender orders, holding that the Minister erred in law by failing to properly apply the Gladue principles to the s. 7 analysis and by failing to conduct an independent Cotroni analysis under s. 6(1).

The Court found that surrendering the applicants to face crushing sentences without consideration of their Aboriginal background would violate the principles of fundamental justice.

The Czech Republic sought the appellant's extradition for robbery and property damage.

At the committal hearing, the appellant alleged he was tortured by Czech police and forced to sign a false confession, arguing this violated his s. 7 Charter rights and constituted an abuse of process.

The extradition judge refused to consider the torture allegations, ruling they were matters for the Minister of Justice at the surrender stage.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that under the subsequent Khadr decision, allegations of abuse by the requesting state implicate the extradition court's integrity and must be addressed by the extradition judge.

A new committal hearing was ordered.

L'État requérant a demandé l'extradition de l'appelant vers la République tchèque pour des infractions de vol qualifié et de dommages matériels. À l'audience d'incarcération, l'appelant a allégué avoir été torturé par la police tchèque pour signer de faux aveux et a demandé un sursis d'instance en vertu de l'art. 7 de la Charte.

La juge d'extradition a refusé d'examiner ces allégations, concluant qu'elles relevaient du ministre de la Justice à l'étape de l'extradition, et a ordonné l'incarcération.

La Cour d'appel a accueilli l'appel, concluant que, selon l'arrêt Khadr, les allégations de torture par l'État requérant engagent l'intégrité du tribunal canadien et doivent être examinées par le juge d'extradition.

Une nouvelle audience d'incarcération a été ordonnée.

The Information Commissioner of Canada sought judicial review of refusals to disclose records located in the offices of the Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defence, and the Minister of Transport, as well as the Prime Minister's agenda held by the RCMP and PCO.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that Ministers' offices are not 'government institutions' under the Access to Information Act.

The Court established a two-part test to determine if records in a Minister's office are 'under the control' of a government institution: whether the record relates to a departmental matter, and whether the institution could reasonably expect to obtain a copy.

Applying this test, the requested records were not under the control of the respective government institutions.

Furthermore, the Prime Minister is not an 'officer' of a government institution under the Privacy Act, meaning his agenda is exempt from disclosure as personal information.

The appeals were dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision ordering his surrender to the United States to face fraud charges.

The applicant argued that his significant health problems would not be adequately treated in the Florida prison system and that the Minister should have obtained formal assurances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the Minister did not act unreasonably in relying on information from United States authorities and in declining to request specific assurances as a precondition to surrender.

The respondent, a Canadian citizen, was detained by U.S. authorities at Guantanamo Bay.

Canadian intelligence officials interviewed him, knowing he had been subjected to sleep deprivation, and shared the information with U.S. authorities.

The respondent sought an order requiring the Canadian government to request his repatriation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the conduct of Canadian officials violated the respondent's rights under s. 7 of the Charter.

However, the Court concluded that ordering the government to request repatriation was not an appropriate remedy, as it unduly interfered with the Crown prerogative over foreign affairs.

Instead, the Court granted a declaration that the respondent's Charter rights were violated, leaving it to the government to determine how best to respond.

The United States sought the extradition of the respondent for telemarketing fraud.

In support of the committal application, the requesting state submitted a record of the case containing a summary of evidence gathered in both the US and Canada.

The respondent objected to the Canadian-gathered evidence as inadmissible hearsay under s. 32(2) of the Extradition Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that ss. 32(2) and 33(1) provide a modified approach to the hearsay rule in the extradition context, allowing Canadian-gathered evidence to be presented in summary form provided its contents would otherwise be admissible under Canadian law.

The appeal was allowed and the committal and surrender orders were restored.

The appellant, a dual Canadian-American citizen, was convicted in Canada of drug offences.

The United States subsequently sought his extradition for a related drug transaction in Detroit.

The Minister of Justice ordered his surrender, concluding that extradition would not unjustifiably infringe his mobility rights under s. 6(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Minister's decision to surrender a fugitive, including the assessment of Charter rights, is reviewable on a standard of reasonableness.

The Court found that the Minister provided adequate reasons and reasonably concluded that the appellant had not already been punished in Canada for the U.S. offence, and that the U.S. had a greater interest in prosecuting the conduct that occurred on its territory.