Monika Rahman

This appeal concerned the constitutionality of section 12 of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act, which limits parliamentary privilege, specifically freedom of speech and debate, for members of the Committee regarding the disclosure of classified information.

The application judge had declared section 12 ultra vires Parliament.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that Parliament possesses the plenary legislative authority under section 18 of the Constitution Act, 1867 to define and limit its own privileges, including freedom of speech and debate, without requiring a constitutional amendment.

The court found that section 12 is intra vires the federal Parliament, emphasizing that Parliament can legislate to define the scope of its own powers and privileges, especially when members voluntarily accept such limits.

The appellant appealed a committal order for extradition to the United States to stand trial for Internet luring and child exploitation offences.

The Court of Appeal upheld the committal order and dismissed the application for judicial review of the Minister's surrender order.

The majority found that the search warrants were valid, that the extradition judge did not err in applying the disclosure test, and that the Minister reasonably exercised her discretion in ordering surrender.

The dissent argued that the extradition judge applied the wrong disclosure test and exercised discretion unreasonably, rendering the hearing unfair.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision to order his extradition to the United States to face charges of engaging in a child exploitation enterprise, conspiracy to advertise the distribution of child pornography, and conspiracy to distribute child pornography.

The applicant had allegedly played a leadership role in an international child pornography organization operating a website called "Dreamboard." While on bail pending extradition proceedings, the applicant was charged in Canada with possession and making of child pornography, to which he pleaded guilty.

At sentencing, the applicant successfully applied to have the sentencing judge consider evidence of distribution through Dreamboard as an aggravating factor.

The applicant argued that his extradition would violate the protection against double jeopardy under the Canada-U.S. extradition treaty, would violate fundamental justice under the Charter due to the severity of potential sentence, and would unjustifiably infringe his right to remain in Canada.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Minister's decision, finding that the double jeopardy analysis must be offence-based rather than conduct-based, that the severity of the potential sentence would not shock the Canadian conscience, and that the applicant's Charter rights would not be violated.

The appellant challenged an order permitting an FBI "clean team" to examine seized computer servers and prepare a report to assist the court in determining what material should be sent to the United States under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act.

The servers were seized pursuant to a valid search warrant in connection with an investigation into alleged copyright infringement.

The court held that while the application judge had jurisdiction under section 15(2) of the Act to make such an order, the application judge erred in failing to consider the effect on the appearance of fairness and judicial impartiality of having an entity closely associated with one of the adversaries examine the material and prepare the report.

The court set aside the order and held that any entity retained to assist the judge should be independent of the interested parties, absent compelling circumstances such as unique expertise.

The Attorney General of Canada, on behalf of the United States, brought a second application for the extradition of the respondent on charges of cross-border internet child sexual exploitation.

The first committal order was quashed on appeal due to insufficient evidence linking the respondent to the IP address.

In this second application, relying on both American and Canadian-gathered evidence, the court found sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the reasonable inference that the respondent committed the offences using his laptop and IP address.

The respondent's applications for further disclosure and Charter exclusion having been dismissed, the court ordered his committal for extradition.

The applicant, Marco Viscomi, brought a Charter application to exclude Canadian-gathered evidence from a second extradition application, alleging unlawful residential searches, improper execution of searches, unauthorized forensic searches, unlawful detention of seized items, and a breach of the affiant's duty of candour in obtaining a search warrant.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the search warrants were lawfully issued, the forensic searches were authorized, the detention of items was not contrary to the Charter, and there was no material breach of the duty of candour.

While acknowledging potential minor Charter breaches related to arbitrary detention, the court concluded that these were not serious and had no meaningful impact on the lawfulness of the evidence seizure, thus not warranting exclusion under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The United States sought the extradition of the applicant for child pornography offences.

The applicant brought a Charter application to exclude evidence seized during a search of his residence by Canadian police.

The court found that the search warrant was invalid as the information to obtain lacked reasonable grounds to believe evidence would be found at the new address.

Furthermore, the manner of the search was highly unreasonable, involving an unnecessary dynamic entry with flash grenades, gratuitous damage to the home, and the arbitrary detention and mistreatment of the occupants, including the applicant.

The court concluded that the police conduct flagrantly breached sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded all evidence seized during the search under section 24(2) of the Charter.