Moiz Rahman

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching involving his former common-law stepson, as well as assault and breach of recognizance.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility and reliability of the complainant's evidence, specifically regarding inconsistencies, motive to fabricate, collusion, and implausibility.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment or application of the burden of proof, concluding that the trial judge adequately addressed the defence's arguments and properly applied the W.(D.) framework.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge erred by finding he continued to beat the victim after an initial punch, a theory not put to him at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's finding that the initial punch was unprovoked was supported by the evidence and fatal to the appellant's claim of self-defence.

The findings regarding a subsequent beating were therefore irrelevant and did not infect the rejection of the self-defence claim.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for assault and suffers from treatment-resistant schizophrenia, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention at a maximum security psychiatric facility.

The appellant argued the Board should have conducted its own inquiries or ordered an independent assessment due to a lack of unanimity among his treatment team regarding his placement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable, balanced the appellant's continuing threat to public safety with his liberty interests, and reflected the least onerous and least restrictive disposition.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and gross indecency involving an underage neighbour, arguing that the jury's verdicts were inconsistent because he was acquitted of four other sexual offences, including rape.

He contended that the jury must have reached an impermissible credibility compromise.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the verdicts were not inconsistent.

The jury was entitled to accept some of the complainant's evidence while rejecting other parts, and it was open to them to distinguish between the offences involving intercourse and those that did not.

The applicant sought directions under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act regarding servers seized in Canada pursuant to a warrant issued to assist a United States criminal investigation.

The applicant proposed that a “clean team” of United States investigators conduct a forensic examination of the servers in Canada and prepare a report to the court identifying potentially relevant evidence before any sending order.

The respondent argued that privacy interests required an independent Canadian forensic examiner instead.

The court held that the clean team proposal, subject to safeguards including supervision by Canadian authorities and prohibition on disclosure to investigators without court authorization, adequately protected privacy interests and complied with the Act and Charter principles.

The court emphasized the importance of international comity and cooperation in mutual legal assistance matters and granted the requested order.

The appellant was convicted in Jordan of murdering his ex-wife in the United States and served six and a half years of a 15-year sentence before being released under a general amnesty.

The United States subsequently sought his extradition from Canada to stand trial for the same murder.

The extradition judge committed the appellant, finding he lacked jurisdiction to consider the appellant's double jeopardy claim, and the Minister of Justice ordered his surrender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and judicial review application, holding that the committal judge correctly identified the limits of his jurisdiction and that the Minister's surrender decision was reasonable, as the United States did not participate in the Jordanian prosecution and the potential sentence of life without parole did not shock the conscience.

The Attorney General of Canada applied under s. 39(1) of the Extradition Act to transfer electronic devices seized from the respondent to the United States.

The devices were seized when the respondent was arrested under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, prior to his arrest under the Extradition Act.

The court interpreted s. 39(1) and concluded that the term 'arrest' refers only to an arrest made pursuant to the Extradition Act.

Consequently, the application to transfer the items was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that his arrest at the door of his apartment was unlawful and unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's factual findings, including marihuana smoke, suspicious conduct, and drug paraphernalia visible from the door, provided ample grounds for a lawful arrest.

As the arrest was lawful, there was no breach of section 9 of the Charter, and the appeal was dismissed.

The Attorney General of Canada sought a sending order under s. 15 of the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act to provide U.S. authorities with mirror-image copies of thirty-two seized computer servers as part of an international criminal investigation into alleged copyright infringement, conspiracy, money laundering, and racketeering.

The responding party argued the request was overly broad given the enormous volume of data on the servers and the limited evidence linking them to the alleged offences, and sought either refusal of the order or an independent forensic examination report.

The court held that although there were reasonable grounds supporting the initial warrant, privacy interests in the informational contents of computers required careful limits on the scope of disclosure.

Relying on appellate authority emphasizing that computer searches must not provide unfettered access to all stored data, the court concluded that further judicial supervision was required.

The application for a sending order was adjourned and the servers were ordered to be brought before the court so that the scope of material to be sent could be refined.

The applicant, a Canadian citizen who previously held refugee status, sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision ordering her surrender for extradition to the Czech Republic.

She argued that under the Supreme Court's decision in Németh, her prior refugee status required the Minister to refuse surrender unless circumstances had changed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, holding that Németh did not apply because the applicant's refugee status ceased when she acquired Canadian citizenship.

The Court also rejected arguments that her extradition violated her Charter mobility or equality rights, and found the Minister's decision regarding her health to be reasonable.

The appellant, a dual Canadian and Hungarian citizen with no refugee status, was committed for extradition to Hungary on fraud charges.

The Minister of Justice ordered his unconditional surrender.

The appellant appealed the committal and sought judicial review of the surrender order, arguing that the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Németh altered the burden of proof under section 44(1) of the Extradition Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and application, holding that Németh applies only to individuals with refugee status and does not alter the burden of proof for non-refugees.

The Court found no error in the committal order or the Minister's conclusion that surrender would not be unjust or oppressive.

The respondents were subject to an extradition request by the United States for fraud.

During the extradition hearing, the judge ordered the Crown to disclose communications regarding the sharing of Canadian-gathered evidence with American authorities, which the respondents argued breached their Charter rights.

The Crown refused to fully comply with the disclosure orders, invited the judge to discharge the respondents without explanation, and immediately appealed the discharge to challenge the interlocutory disclosure orders.

The Court of Appeal held that the Crown's conduct in forcing an appeal of an interlocutory order without demonstrating a reasonable alternative constituted an abuse of process, and dismissed the appeal without considering the merits of the disclosure orders.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's order of surrender, arguing a denial of natural justice because the order was made without his written submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the applicant was aware of his right to make submissions but failed to do so, and did not attempt to make late submissions or ask for reconsideration.

The appellant appealed a committal order for extradition, arguing that the extradition judge's refusal to grant an adjournment to allow him to seek court-appointed counsel violated the principles of fundamental justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the extradition judge properly balanced the necessary factors, including the history of the proceeding, the lack of legal complexity, and the overwhelming case for committal.

The Republic of Poland sought the extradition of the applicant for fraud-related offences.

The applicant applied for a stay of proceedings, alleging abuse of process on the basis that Canada had previously attempted a 'disguised extradition' through deportation proceedings at Poland's behest, and that the Attorney General of Canada had engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by improperly withholding relevant documents.

The court found that the deportation proceedings were indeed a disguised extradition initiated solely to appease Poland, and that the Attorney General's defiance of a production order constituted an abuse of process.

A stay of proceedings was granted.

The appellant appealed a committal order for extradition to the United States on a charge equivalent to conspiracy to traffic in cocaine.

He argued that the evidence only demonstrated an attempt to enter into a conspiracy and that the extradition judge improperly relied on expert evidence to find an agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that wiretap evidence and the appellant's subsequent arrest for importing cocaine supported an inference of an ongoing agreement, and that the expert evidence was properly used to interpret coded conversations.

The applicant sought an order under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for the appointment of counsel to argue his appeal from committal for extradition and his application for judicial review of the Minister's surrender order.

The court first determined that a single judge in chambers has jurisdiction to appoint counsel for a judicial review application when it is joined with an appeal from committal.

However, applying the Bernardo test, the court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's appeal and judicial review lacked sufficient merit and that he could effectively present his case with the assistance of duty counsel.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's decision to surrender him to the United States under the Extradition Act.

Due to an administrative error, the applicant was prematurely removed to the United States before his application was heard.

The applicant argued the court should order his return or seek assurances before hearing the merits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed this argument, finding no prejudice to the fair hearing as he was represented by competent counsel.

On the merits, the applicant argued he should not be surrendered without assurances that his Canadian guilty plea would not be used against him in the US.

The Court dismissed the application, holding that the guilty plea was voluntary and the use of evidence in the US is a matter for American prosecutors.

The appellant appealed an order of committal for extradition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the anticipated evidence of an alleged co-conspirator was directly admissible against the appellant to prove both the conspiracy and the substantive offence, without engaging the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule.

The court also upheld the extradition judge's finding that the appellant's identification was established through a combination of circumstances.

The appellant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's order of surrender.

The Court of Appeal applied the narrow scope of review established in U.S.A. v. Lake and found that the Minister had considered all arguments put forward by the appellant.

The court concluded the Minister's decision was not unreasonable and dismissed the application.