Tyler Robert Botten

The accused brought a Dawson application seeking leave to cross-examine Detective Constable St. Cyr on his Information to Obtain (ITO) for a search warrant of the accused's residence.

The court considered whether proposed cross-examination would assist in determining material issues, particularly the sufficiency of grounds for the warrant and the credibility and reliability of the confidential informants upon which the affiant relied.

The court granted partial leave to cross-examine on specific areas including clarification of terminology, the relevance of prior police occurrences, the length of time confidential informants were assigned numbers, and the basis for the affiant's assertions regarding informant credibility.

The offender was convicted of taking two individuals hostage in Somalia for 15 months.

He acted as the translator and negotiator for the hostage-takers, demanding a ransom and threatening to kill the hostages.

The hostages were held in deplorable conditions and one was repeatedly physically and sexually assaulted.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, sentencing the offender to 15 years in prison, less credit for pre-sentence custody on a 2:1 basis.

The accused were arrested based on a confidential informant tip indicating they possessed cocaine and oxycodone.

The Crown charged Adams with possession of oxycodone contrary to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and Harkness with possession for the purpose of trafficking and trafficking in oxycodone.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the arrest and subsequent searches on Charter grounds.

The court found that the arrest lacked reasonable and probable grounds, being based on a tip that spoke only of "possibilities" rather than credibly based probability.

The court also found violations of the right to counsel and unreasonable searches of the accused's person and cell phone.

All evidence obtained as a result of these violations was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with hostage taking in relation to the kidnapping of Amanda Lindhout and Nigel Brennan in Somalia.

The accused admitted to acting as the negotiator and translator for the hostage takers but raised the common law defence of duress, claiming he was forced to participate under threat of death or bodily harm.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as unbelievable, relying on intercepted communications and admissions made to an undercover officer that he participated for a share of the ransom money.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was not acting under duress, and he was found guilty as a party to the offence.

The accused brought a motion to adjourn his criminal trial pending the completion of an appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal regarding a decision under s. 38 of the Canada Evidence Act that refused further disclosure on national security grounds.

The court noted that the criminal proceeding had been ongoing for 27 months and an adjournment would push the trial beyond the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

Finding that the Federal Court judge had already concluded the non-disclosed information would not materially affect the accused's ability to make full answer and defence, the court dismissed the motion to adjourn, prioritizing the public interest in having the trial proceed on the merits without undue delay.

The applicant, charged with hostage taking, brought an application to exclude statements made to undercover police officers and post-arrest statements.

The police conducted a multi-year undercover operation, posing as a book publisher to lure the applicant to Canada.

The court found the operation was a variant of a 'Mr. Big' operation but did not amount to an abuse of process, and the probative value of the confessions outweighed any prejudice.

The court also dismissed arguments that the applicant's pre-arrest and post-arrest statements violated his section 7 right to silence or his section 10(b) right to counsel, finding the statements voluntary and the right to counsel adequately provided.

A young person was convicted of robbery committed during a home invasion on June 13, 2015.

The defendant, who was 15 at the time of the offence, was among a group that invaded a residence, held the complainant against her will, and ransacked the home stealing property valued at $5,348.23.

The defendant participated by searching for items to steal while the complainant was being held.

At sentencing, the Crown sought a deferred custody order of three months followed by probation, while defence counsel argued that probation alone would be sufficient.

The court found that the statutory conditions for imposing custody were not met, as the offence did not cause serious bodily harm and did not create a substantial likelihood of bodily harm.

The court imposed a 12-month probation order with conditions including restitution, community service, counselling, and a weapons prohibition.

On a summary conviction appeal from a conviction for failing to provide a breath sample, the court held that the trial judge erred in the s. 10(b) Charter analysis.

The trial judge improperly treated the appellant's response of 'yeah, yeah' as an implicit waiver of the right to counsel without the clear and unequivocal waiver required by Prosper, and failed to apply the proper forthwith analysis under Quansah to the roadside screening demand.

The court further held that the resulting statements should be excluded under s. 24(2) applying Grant, because the police conduct seriously infringed a fundamental right.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

Summary conviction appeal from a conviction for driving over 80 arising from a roadside stop during a RIDE program.

The appellant argued that, after unsuccessful efforts to reach counsel of choice, police failed to provide the additional informational warning required when a detainee appears to change course on exercising the right to counsel.

The court held that the trial judge erred by not undertaking the required Prosper analysis and that the failure to give the warning breached s. 10(b) of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the Intoxilyzer readings and set aside the conviction, ordering a new trial before a different judge.

The appellants appealed their convictions for first and second degree murder arising from a firebombing that killed two children.

The Crown's theory was that the primary appellant orchestrated the arson to silence the children's mother, who had accused him of sexual assault, and hired the other appellants to execute the plan.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's admission of bad character evidence, Vetrovec caution regarding an unsavoury witness, instructions on unlawful object murder, or instructions on post-offence conduct.

The court also upheld the 23-year parole ineligibility period for the appellant convicted of second degree murder.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that his arrest at the door of his apartment was unlawful and unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's factual findings, including marihuana smoke, suspicious conduct, and drug paraphernalia visible from the door, provided ample grounds for a lawful arrest.

As the arrest was lawful, there was no breach of section 9 of the Charter, and the appeal was dismissed.