Croft Michaelson

The appellant was convicted by jury of attempting to knowingly participate in or contribute to the activities of Al-Shabaab, a terrorist group, and counselling an undercover police officer to do the same.

The trial judge imposed consecutive sentences of five years on each count, resulting in a total sentence of 9 years and 7.5 months with credit for presentence custody.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the conviction grounds and upholding the sentence as fit and appropriate for terrorist offences.

The offender was convicted of taking two individuals hostage in Somalia for 15 months.

He acted as the translator and negotiator for the hostage-takers, demanding a ransom and threatening to kill the hostages.

The hostages were held in deplorable conditions and one was repeatedly physically and sexually assaulted.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, sentencing the offender to 15 years in prison, less credit for pre-sentence custody on a 2:1 basis.

The accused was charged with hostage taking in relation to the kidnapping of Amanda Lindhout and Nigel Brennan in Somalia.

The accused admitted to acting as the negotiator and translator for the hostage takers but raised the common law defence of duress, claiming he was forced to participate under threat of death or bodily harm.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as unbelievable, relying on intercepted communications and admissions made to an undercover officer that he participated for a share of the ransom money.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was not acting under duress, and he was found guilty as a party to the offence.

The accused brought a motion to adjourn his criminal trial pending the completion of an appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal regarding a decision under s. 38 of the Canada Evidence Act that refused further disclosure on national security grounds.

The court noted that the criminal proceeding had been ongoing for 27 months and an adjournment would push the trial beyond the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

Finding that the Federal Court judge had already concluded the non-disclosed information would not materially affect the accused's ability to make full answer and defence, the court dismissed the motion to adjourn, prioritizing the public interest in having the trial proceed on the merits without undue delay.

The appellant, a successful federal election candidate in 2008, was convicted of exceeding his election expense limit, wilfully exceeding his personal contribution limit, and filing a false election campaign return.

He paid $21,000 personally for voter identification and get-out-the-vote services from a contractor, circumventing campaign spending limits, and then conspired to file a false return reporting only $1,575 in expenses.

The trial judge and Summary Conviction Appeal Judge upheld the convictions.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the interpretation of "election expense" under the Canada Elections Act, arguing that the Crown must prove the actual use and commercial value of services purchased.

The Court of Appeal rejected this interpretation, holding that the statutory definition of election expense is clear and unambiguous, and that expenses are measured by the cost incurred, not the value of goods or services consumed.

The court also upheld the application of Criminal Code party liability provisions to Canada Elections Act offences.

The applicant, charged with taking Amanda Lindhout hostage in Somalia, brought a Garofoli application to exclude wiretap evidence obtained by the RCMP.

The court held that the applicant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in phone calls demanding a ransom from the Canadian government.

Although some interceptions were made under an unconstitutional emergency wiretap provision or without prior authorization, the court admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding the police acted in good faith and the breaches were not serious.

The court also upheld the validity of the various wiretap authorizations on the amplified record.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with hostage taking, brought an application to exclude statements made to undercover police officers and post-arrest statements.

The police conducted a multi-year undercover operation, posing as a book publisher to lure the applicant to Canada.

The court found the operation was a variant of a 'Mr. Big' operation but did not amount to an abuse of process, and the probative value of the confessions outweighed any prejudice.

The court also dismissed arguments that the applicant's pre-arrest and post-arrest statements violated his section 7 right to silence or his section 10(b) right to counsel, finding the statements voluntary and the right to counsel adequately provided.

The Court allowed an accused’s appeal and restored a stay of proceedings for breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

Applying Jordan, it held that net delay remained above the 30‑month ceiling after proper deductions for defence delay and certain discrete events.

The case was not particularly complex despite voluminous disclosure, and transitional exceptional circumstances did not justify the remaining delay.

The Court emphasized that all justice system actors must proactively prevent and minimize delay and that Jordan must be followed as governing law.

The appellant was charged with several offences following execution of a search warrant at a residence that uncovered a marijuana grow-operation and a handgun.

At trial, the appellant challenged the validity of the search warrant under a sub-facial analysis, arguing that the information to obtain contained erroneous information and that police conduct in seeking the warrant was subversive of the pre-authorization process.

The trial judge found the warrant was valid after excising improper portions of the information to obtain, and declined to exercise a residual discretion to quash the warrant despite identifying deficiencies in the affiant's conduct.

The appellant was convicted and appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in applying a "clearest of cases" standard rather than a lower threshold for setting aside a valid warrant based on subversion of the pre-authorization process.

The appellant was arrested for drug trafficking and subjected to a 'bedpan vigil' search authorized by a general warrant.

He was detained for 43 hours, handcuffed to cell bars, and experienced severe withdrawal symptoms without medical supervision.

The Court of Appeal held that while a general warrant can authorize a bedpan vigil search, the warrant was defective because it purported to authorize indefinite detention, violating the requirement to bring an arrested person before a justice without unreasonable delay.

The court also found the search was conducted in an unreasonable manner, violating the appellant's Charter rights.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the convictions were set aside, and an acquittal was ordered.

Following the dismissal of the Crown's appeal from costs ordered against it in forfeiture proceedings under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the respondents sought costs of the appeal.

The Court of Appeal declined to award costs, noting that costs are generally not awarded against the Crown in criminal proceedings absent a Charter infringement, serious Crown misconduct, or exceptional circumstances.

The court found no serious misconduct by the Crown on the appeal itself, and no exceptional circumstances justifying a costs award.

Furthermore, the court noted that section 683 of the Criminal Code precludes a costs award on the appeal.

The Crown appealed a nearly $1 million costs award made against it after its unsuccessful application to forfeit two properties under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The application judge found the Crown's conduct, including pursuing a meritless application against innocent third parties and taking an intransigent attitude, amounted to a marked and unacceptable departure from reasonable standards.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Ontario Court of Justice has an implied power to award costs in CDSA forfeiture applications, the correct standard was applied, and the quantum of costs was reasonable.

The appellant, a former Member of Parliament, appealed his convictions and sentence for exceeding election expense limits, exceeding personal contribution limits, and filing a false electoral campaign return under the Canada Elections Act.

The Crown cross-appealed the sentence, seeking a longer term of imprisonment.

The appeal court dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge correctly interpreted the definition of election expenses, properly assessed credibility, and correctly applied party liability provisions.

The court also dismissed both sentence appeals, upholding the global sentence of one month in jail, a four-month conditional sentence, and 18 months' probation as proportionate and fit, though it set aside a $10,000 restitution order on consent.

The applicant was convicted of a terrorism offence in 2010 and received a sentence functionally equivalent to over six years.

Years later, legislative amendments allowed the government to revoke the citizenship of individuals with terrorism sentences of five years or more.

Facing citizenship revocation, the applicant sought an extension of time to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension, finding that the severe collateral consequences and the retrospective nature of the legislation meant the interests of justice favoured allowing the applicant to seek a sentence reduction.

The accused, Chiheb Esseghaier and Raed Jaser, were convicted by a jury of multiple terrorism offences, including conspiracy to commit murder for the benefit of a terrorist group and participating in the activities of a terrorist group.

The offences involved a plot to derail a VIA passenger train and discussions of a sniper plot to assassinate prominent individuals.

At sentencing, Jaser argued for a reduced sentence based on alleged entrapment, drug addiction, and insincere religious beliefs, relying on expert psychological evidence.

The court rejected these arguments, finding the expert evidence inadmissible and contrary to the jury's verdicts.

For Esseghaier, who was self-represented, amicus curiae raised issues of fitness and mental illness.

The court found Esseghaier fit to be sentenced and concluded that any present mental illness was not causally linked to the offences committed in 2012.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for terrorism offences designed to cause indiscriminate killing, the court sentenced both accused to life imprisonment for the murder conspiracy, with concurrent determinate sentences for the other offences, and ordered a 10-year period of parole ineligibility.

The appellant was convicted of participating in or contributing to the activities of a terrorist group after attending a training camp and providing computer assistance to the group's leaders.

On appeal, he challenged the admission of intercepted private communications obtained in breach of section 8 of the Charter, undated departure letters found in his bedroom, and cross-examination on religious and ideological materials.

He also argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the actus reus of the offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's evidentiary rulings and finding the jury instructions substantially complied with the law.

During the sentencing hearing for two accused convicted of terrorism offences, amicus and the Crown sought a psychiatric assessment of one of the accused to determine his fitness.

The court held that there is no jurisdiction under the Criminal Code to order a fitness assessment after a verdict has been rendered.

However, the court found reasonable grounds to order a further psychiatric assessment under s. 21 of the Ontario Mental Health Act, noting flaws in a previous psychiatric report that had improperly modified the legal test for fitness.

The appellant was convicted of drug trafficking and possessing proceeds of crime after the trial judge discharged two jurors during deliberations.

The jury had reported a stalemate, with ten voting to convict and two to acquit.

Following complaints from other jurors, the trial judge conducted extensive inquiries into the two dissenting jurors' conduct and ultimately discharged them.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's inquiries improperly probed the content of the deliberations, undermining jury secrecy.

The discharge of the two holdout jurors created an appearance of unfairness, resulting in an unfair trial.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

In advance of a high‑profile terrorism prosecution, the court determined several issues concerning jury selection.

The Crown and defence jointly sought rulings regarding the appointment of additional jurors under s. 631(2.2) of the Criminal Code, the scope of challenge for cause based on pre‑trial publicity and racial or religious prejudice, and the procedure for determining those challenges.

The court held that the anticipated length and complexity of the trial justified appointing two additional jurors to minimize the risk of mistrial.

It permitted challenge for cause using six structured questions addressing exposure to publicity and potential bias relating to visible minority status and religion.

The court also ordered the exclusion of all jurors during the challenge process under s. 640(2.1) and directed that challenges be decided by static triers pursuant to s. 640(2.2) to preserve juror impartiality.

Pre‑trial evidentiary motion concerning proposed redactions to intercepted wiretap conversations in a terrorism prosecution.

Defence counsel sought editing of eight passages on the basis that their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value under the common law exclusionary discretion.

The court applied the probative‑value versus prejudice balancing analysis and concluded that certain passages referencing derogatory comments about Jews, references to Osama bin Laden, and discussions of adultery punishments should be edited because they were minimally probative and risked inflammatory jury prejudice.

However, proposed edits relating to references to bombs and bomb‑making were refused because they were relevant to the alleged conspiracies and the relationship between participants.

The motion was therefore granted in part and dismissed in part.