Croft Michaelson

The appellant was convicted by jury of attempting to knowingly participate in or contribute to the activities of Al-Shabaab, a terrorist group, and counselling an undercover police officer to do the same.

The trial judge imposed consecutive sentences of five years on each count, resulting in a total sentence of 9 years and 7.5 months with credit for presentence custody.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the conviction grounds and upholding the sentence as fit and appropriate for terrorist offences.

The offender was convicted of taking two individuals hostage in Somalia for 15 months.

He acted as the translator and negotiator for the hostage-takers, demanding a ransom and threatening to kill the hostages.

The hostages were held in deplorable conditions and one was repeatedly physically and sexually assaulted.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, sentencing the offender to 15 years in prison, less credit for pre-sentence custody on a 2:1 basis.

The accused was charged with hostage taking in relation to the kidnapping of Amanda Lindhout and Nigel Brennan in Somalia.

The accused admitted to acting as the negotiator and translator for the hostage takers but raised the common law defence of duress, claiming he was forced to participate under threat of death or bodily harm.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as unbelievable, relying on intercepted communications and admissions made to an undercover officer that he participated for a share of the ransom money.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was not acting under duress, and he was found guilty as a party to the offence.

The accused brought a motion to adjourn his criminal trial pending the completion of an appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal regarding a decision under s. 38 of the Canada Evidence Act that refused further disclosure on national security grounds.

The court noted that the criminal proceeding had been ongoing for 27 months and an adjournment would push the trial beyond the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

Finding that the Federal Court judge had already concluded the non-disclosed information would not materially affect the accused's ability to make full answer and defence, the court dismissed the motion to adjourn, prioritizing the public interest in having the trial proceed on the merits without undue delay.

The appellant, a successful federal election candidate in 2008, was convicted of exceeding his election expense limit, wilfully exceeding his personal contribution limit, and filing a false election campaign return.

He paid $21,000 personally for voter identification and get-out-the-vote services from a contractor, circumventing campaign spending limits, and then conspired to file a false return reporting only $1,575 in expenses.

The trial judge and Summary Conviction Appeal Judge upheld the convictions.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the interpretation of "election expense" under the Canada Elections Act, arguing that the Crown must prove the actual use and commercial value of services purchased.

The Court of Appeal rejected this interpretation, holding that the statutory definition of election expense is clear and unambiguous, and that expenses are measured by the cost incurred, not the value of goods or services consumed.

The court also upheld the application of Criminal Code party liability provisions to Canada Elections Act offences.

The applicant, charged with hostage taking, brought an application to exclude statements made to undercover police officers and post-arrest statements.

The police conducted a multi-year undercover operation, posing as a book publisher to lure the applicant to Canada.

The court found the operation was a variant of a 'Mr. Big' operation but did not amount to an abuse of process, and the probative value of the confessions outweighed any prejudice.

The court also dismissed arguments that the applicant's pre-arrest and post-arrest statements violated his section 7 right to silence or his section 10(b) right to counsel, finding the statements voluntary and the right to counsel adequately provided.

The applicant, charged with taking Amanda Lindhout hostage in Somalia, brought a Garofoli application to exclude wiretap evidence obtained by the RCMP.

The court held that the applicant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in phone calls demanding a ransom from the Canadian government.

Although some interceptions were made under an unconstitutional emergency wiretap provision or without prior authorization, the court admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding the police acted in good faith and the breaches were not serious.

The court also upheld the validity of the various wiretap authorizations on the amplified record.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The Court allowed an accused’s appeal and restored a stay of proceedings for breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

Applying Jordan, it held that net delay remained above the 30‑month ceiling after proper deductions for defence delay and certain discrete events.

The case was not particularly complex despite voluminous disclosure, and transitional exceptional circumstances did not justify the remaining delay.

The Court emphasized that all justice system actors must proactively prevent and minimize delay and that Jordan must be followed as governing law.

The appellant was charged with several offences following execution of a search warrant at a residence that uncovered a marijuana grow-operation and a handgun.

At trial, the appellant challenged the validity of the search warrant under a sub-facial analysis, arguing that the information to obtain contained erroneous information and that police conduct in seeking the warrant was subversive of the pre-authorization process.

The trial judge found the warrant was valid after excising improper portions of the information to obtain, and declined to exercise a residual discretion to quash the warrant despite identifying deficiencies in the affiant's conduct.

The appellant was convicted and appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in applying a "clearest of cases" standard rather than a lower threshold for setting aside a valid warrant based on subversion of the pre-authorization process.

The accused, Chiheb Esseghaier and Raed Jaser, were convicted by a jury of multiple terrorism offences, including conspiracy to commit murder for the benefit of a terrorist group and participating in the activities of a terrorist group.

The offences involved a plot to derail a VIA passenger train and discussions of a sniper plot to assassinate prominent individuals.

At sentencing, Jaser argued for a reduced sentence based on alleged entrapment, drug addiction, and insincere religious beliefs, relying on expert psychological evidence.

The court rejected these arguments, finding the expert evidence inadmissible and contrary to the jury's verdicts.

For Esseghaier, who was self-represented, amicus curiae raised issues of fitness and mental illness.

The court found Esseghaier fit to be sentenced and concluded that any present mental illness was not causally linked to the offences committed in 2012.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for terrorism offences designed to cause indiscriminate killing, the court sentenced both accused to life imprisonment for the murder conspiracy, with concurrent determinate sentences for the other offences, and ordered a 10-year period of parole ineligibility.

In advance of a high‑profile terrorism prosecution, the court determined several issues concerning jury selection.

The Crown and defence jointly sought rulings regarding the appointment of additional jurors under s. 631(2.2) of the Criminal Code, the scope of challenge for cause based on pre‑trial publicity and racial or religious prejudice, and the procedure for determining those challenges.

The court held that the anticipated length and complexity of the trial justified appointing two additional jurors to minimize the risk of mistrial.

It permitted challenge for cause using six structured questions addressing exposure to publicity and potential bias relating to visible minority status and religion.

The court also ordered the exclusion of all jurors during the challenge process under s. 640(2.1) and directed that challenges be decided by static triers pursuant to s. 640(2.2) to preserve juror impartiality.

Pre‑trial evidentiary motion concerning proposed redactions to intercepted wiretap conversations in a terrorism prosecution.

Defence counsel sought editing of eight passages on the basis that their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value under the common law exclusionary discretion.

The court applied the probative‑value versus prejudice balancing analysis and concluded that certain passages referencing derogatory comments about Jews, references to Osama bin Laden, and discussions of adultery punishments should be edited because they were minimally probative and risked inflammatory jury prejudice.

However, proposed edits relating to references to bombs and bomb‑making were refused because they were relevant to the alleged conspiracies and the relationship between participants.

The motion was therefore granted in part and dismissed in part.

The accused was convicted of preventing or endeavouring to prevent an elector from voting at the federal election held on May 2, 2011, contrary to the Canada Elections Act.

The accused, as communications director for the local Conservative candidate in Guelph, was a major and active participant in a scheme involving approximately 7,000 automated telephone calls directing targeted non-Conservative supporters to false polling locations.

The court imposed a sentence of 9 months imprisonment followed by 12 months probation, emphasizing that general deterrence and denunciation were the primary sentencing principles given the serious nature of interference with the democratic electoral process.

During the 2011 federal election campaign in Guelph, Ontario, automated telephone calls were made to approximately 6,738 voters falsely indicating that their polling stations had been changed to another location.

The accused, Michael Sona, was the communications director for the Conservative Party candidate.

The Crown alleged that Sona was responsible for creating and placing these calls, or alternatively, that he was a party to the offence by aiding or abetting those who did.

The defence argued that while the circumstances raised suspicions, the Crown had not proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found Sona guilty, determining that although the evidence did not establish he personally uploaded the messages to the automated calling service, he was actively involved in creating the scheme and was a party to the offence through aiding and abetting.

In a terrorism prosecution involving allegations of conspiracy to derail a passenger train, the Crown moved for the appointment of amicus curiae because one accused insisted on representing himself while rejecting the legitimacy of Canadian law.

The court reviewed the law governing amicus appointments following the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ontario v. C.L.A. of Ontario, emphasizing that amicus must not function as defence counsel or undermine the accused’s right to self‑representation.

Given the seriousness and complexity of the terrorism charges, the anticipated evidentiary issues (including wiretap admissibility and editing), and the likelihood that the self‑represented accused would refuse to participate meaningfully in proceedings governed by Canadian law, the court found exceptional circumstances justifying the appointment.

Amicus was appointed with a limited role to assist the court on complex legal and evidentiary issues while respecting the accused’s autonomy.

The appellant telecommunications company challenged a general warrant and related assistance order requiring it to produce stored text messages of two subscribers on a prospective, daily basis over a two-week period.

The majority held the general warrant invalid, with two concurring opinions reaching that result by different routes.

One plurality held that the prospective daily production of future text messages constituted an interception of private communications requiring authorization under Part VI of the Criminal Code, making the general warrant unavailable under s. 487.01(1)(c).

The other concurring opinion held that even if not strictly an interception, the technique was substantively equivalent to one, precluding resort to the general warrant.

The dissent would have upheld the general warrant, finding the technique was disclosure of previously intercepted communications rather than an interception itself.

In this criminal appeal concerning terrorism convictions under Part II.1 of the Criminal Code, the appellant challenged the constitutionality of key terrorism provisions, the fairness of the trial after appellate restoration of the motive clause, the reasonableness of the verdicts, and the sentence imposed on appeal.

The Court held that the challenged participation provision was not overbroad under s. 7 and that the legislative scheme did not establish a breach of expressive freedom on the record before it.

It further held that re-insertion of the motive clause caused no trial unfairness, the armed conflict exception did not apply on the evidence, and the convictions were reasonable.

On sentence, the Court affirmed correction of errors in principle and upheld the substituted life term with consecutive terms and extended parole ineligibility.

In a pair of extradition appeals, the Court held that surrender of Canadian citizens to the United States on terrorism-related charges did not unjustifiably infringe mobility rights under s. 6(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court reaffirmed that extradition generally constitutes a marginal limitation on the right to remain in Canada and that ministerial balancing under the established multi-factor framework attracts substantial deference.

It rejected arguments that weak foreign jurisdiction or feasible domestic prosecution should be near-dispositive limits on surrender.

The Court also held that procedural fairness did not require the Minister to obtain and disclose prosecutorial assessments about whether to proceed domestically.

The surrender decisions were found reasonable on the record, and both appeals were dismissed.

The applicant, facing terrorism charges, elected to be tried in the provincial court.

The Director of Public Prosecutions subsequently preferred a direct indictment under s. 577 of the Criminal Code, moving the trial to the Superior Court.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash the indictment, arguing that s. 577 does not apply to an accused who elected a provincial court trial and that overriding his election violated his s. 7 Charter rights.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, holding that s. 577 broadly permits direct indictments regardless of the accused's election, and that there is no constitutional right to a trial by a judge alone in a specific court.