Trevor Brown

The defendant, charged with speeding, brought two motions: a recusal motion against the judge and a Charter motion seeking disclosure of the investigating officer's training and qualifications, specific tests performed on the speed measurement device, and police standing orders governing speed enforcement, along with a stay of proceedings.

The recusal motion was dismissed as no reasonable apprehension of bias was established.

The court granted the disclosure aspect of the Charter motion, finding the requested information relevant to assess the reliability of the speed measurement evidence, particularly in light of the principles from York (Regional Municipality) v. McGuigan.

The motion for a stay of proceedings was not fully determined at this stage.

The accused was charged with hostage taking in relation to the kidnapping of Amanda Lindhout and Nigel Brennan in Somalia.

The accused admitted to acting as the negotiator and translator for the hostage takers but raised the common law defence of duress, claiming he was forced to participate under threat of death or bodily harm.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as unbelievable, relying on intercepted communications and admissions made to an undercover officer that he participated for a share of the ransom money.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was not acting under duress, and he was found guilty as a party to the offence.

A 19-year-old first-time offender pleaded guilty to nine counts: six counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking in various Schedule I substances (cocaine, crack cocaine, MDA, MDMA, fentanyl, and heroin), one count of possession of proceeds of crime ($1,070), and two counts of possession of firearms without a licence.

Police discovered approximately $300,000 worth of drugs, two loaded firearms (a Tikka rifle and a 12-gauge shotgun), and various weapons in the accused's apartment.

The court imposed a sentence of four years and nine months (57 months), less 21 days of pre-trial custody credited at 1.5 days, resulting in 56 months to be served concurrently on the drug and proceeds counts, with 30 months concurrent on the firearms counts.

The court balanced serious aggravating factors (nature and quantity of drugs, loaded firearms, commercial enterprise) against significant mitigating factors (youth, lack of criminal record, guilty plea, strong family support, and rehabilitation prospects).

The accused brought a motion to adjourn his criminal trial pending the completion of an appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal regarding a decision under s. 38 of the Canada Evidence Act that refused further disclosure on national security grounds.

The court noted that the criminal proceeding had been ongoing for 27 months and an adjournment would push the trial beyond the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

Finding that the Federal Court judge had already concluded the non-disclosed information would not materially affect the accused's ability to make full answer and defence, the court dismissed the motion to adjourn, prioritizing the public interest in having the trial proceed on the merits without undue delay.

Following a judge-alone trial on a 45-count indictment, the court found that the accused engaged in a sustained pattern of drugging women with GHB or Ketamine and sexually assaulting them while they were unconscious or otherwise incapable of consenting.

The court applied the law of conscious consent, incapacity, and administering a stupefying substance under s. 246(b) of the Criminal Code, and admitted count-to-count similar fact evidence to assess intent, absence of consent, and the lack of any air of reality to mistaken belief in consent.

The court also relied on expert evidence concerning the pharmacological effects of GHB and Ketamine and on disturbing cellphone images and videos created by the accused.

Convictions were entered on most assault, sexual assault, stupefying substance, and drug trafficking counts, with acquittals on a limited number of counts where the evidence left a reasonable doubt.

Because of the publication ban, this summary avoids identifying protected persons.

The applicant, charged with taking Amanda Lindhout hostage in Somalia, brought a Garofoli application to exclude wiretap evidence obtained by the RCMP.

The court held that the applicant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in phone calls demanding a ransom from the Canadian government.

Although some interceptions were made under an unconstitutional emergency wiretap provision or without prior authorization, the court admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding the police acted in good faith and the breaches were not serious.

The court also upheld the validity of the various wiretap authorizations on the amplified record.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with hostage taking, brought an application to exclude statements made to undercover police officers and post-arrest statements.

The police conducted a multi-year undercover operation, posing as a book publisher to lure the applicant to Canada.

The court found the operation was a variant of a 'Mr. Big' operation but did not amount to an abuse of process, and the probative value of the confessions outweighed any prejudice.

The court also dismissed arguments that the applicant's pre-arrest and post-arrest statements violated his section 7 right to silence or his section 10(b) right to counsel, finding the statements voluntary and the right to counsel adequately provided.

The Crown sought a pre-trial ruling on the voluntariness and admissibility of a video statement provided by the accused to police.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary due to alleged excessive force during arrest.

The court found that the brief and reasonable force used by police during the arrest, which occurred ten hours prior, did not impact the accused's state of mind when giving the statement to an officer not involved in the arrest.

No threats or inducements were found.

The statement was deemed voluntary and admissible.

The appeal concerned whether a drug recognition expert’s opinion under s. 254(3.1) of the Criminal Code is automatically admissible at trial or remains governed by common law expert-evidence rules.

The majority held the provision does not create automatic admissibility, but found the statutory and regulatory framework conclusively establishes the expert’s specialized expertise for administering the 12-step evaluation.

On that basis, and with the other Mohan factors not in dispute, the opinion evidence was admissible without an additional voir dire in this case.

The dissent would have required proof of threshold reliability of the underlying science before admitting the opinion on impairment.

The appeal was dismissed and the new trial order was confirmed.

The accused, an 18-year-old with no criminal record, sought a bail review after being detained on firearms and drug charges.

The Justice of the Peace had denied bail solely on the tertiary ground, finding that public confidence would be undermined if released, despite a strong bail plan involving his parents as sureties.

The Superior Court granted the review, holding that the Justice of the Peace erred by failing to consider the strength of the bail plan and the accused's personal circumstances within the tertiary ground analysis.

The accused was released on strict house arrest with increased sureties.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a youth charged with drug possession.

Police officers had searched the youth's partially unzipped backpack found in a vehicle after observing an open bottle of vodka nearby and noting the youth was intoxicated.

The trial judge found the search violated section 8 of the Charter and excluded the evidence under section 24(2).

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the search was authorized under section 32(5) of the Liquor Licence Act because the officer had reasonable grounds to believe liquor was unlawfully kept in the vehicle and the backpack was not fastened closed.

The court further held that even if a breach occurred, the evidence should not have been excluded under section 24(2).

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant was charged with impaired driving.

A police officer, certified as a Drug Recognition Expert (DRE), evaluated the appellant and concluded his ability to drive was impaired by cannabis.

The trial judge excluded the DRE's opinion evidence after a Mohan voir dire, leading to an acquittal.

The summary conviction appeal judge overturned the acquittal, finding the evidence admissible under the Criminal Code without a voir dire.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that section 254(3.1) of the Criminal Code implicitly renders DRE opinion evidence admissible to prove drug-impaired driving without the necessity of a Mohan voir dire.

The accused applied for a change of venue for a new jury trial after her previous conviction for second degree murder was set aside and a new trial ordered.

Both the defence and the Crown agreed that a change of venue from the original judicial district was necessary due to extensive media publicity surrounding the case.

The dispute concerned the appropriate venue, with the accused seeking either Pembroke or Ottawa while the Crown proposed Sudbury.

The court weighed factors including witness convenience, community impartiality, the accused’s financial hardship, and trial scheduling.

Balancing these considerations, the court held that the interests of justice favoured transferring the trial to Ottawa.

The accused was charged with Over 80 contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code arising from an incident on March 16, 2013 in Ottawa.

The sole issue was whether the Crown established that the accused understood the demand under section 254(3) of the Criminal Code.

The defence argued that the officer's failure to record the accused's response to the demand in his notes meant the Crown failed to establish this pre-condition to admissibility of the breath sample evidence.

The court found that the officer's testimony that the accused indicated understanding, combined with the accused's compliance with the demand without confusion, was sufficient to establish understanding.

The court declined to follow R. v. Brown and found the demand was sufficiently expressed and understood.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of internet luring contrary to section 172.1(2) of the Criminal Code.

Over a three-month period, the accused engaged in explicit sexual conversations with an undercover police officer posing as a 14-year-old girl, repeatedly offering money for sex, arranging meetings, and ultimately attending a prearranged location where he was arrested.

The court imposed an 18-month custodial sentence (with credit for pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions) followed by two years probation, rejecting the defence submission for a conditional sentence.

The court found this was not one of the "rarest of cases" warranting a conditional sentence and emphasized that denunciation and general deterrence must be paramount in internet luring offences.

The appellant appealed his conviction for careless storage of ammunition after burying hundreds of rounds of military rifle ammunition in shallow holes in a public county forest.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the risk of harm to the public and improperly took judicial notice that public forests are used by the public.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that abandoning control of inherently dangerous material in a public domain constituted a marked departure from the standard of care, and that the trial judge's use of judicial notice regarding public land usage was appropriate.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on a charge of impaired operation of a motor vehicle by a drug under s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal court found the trial judge failed to consider the cumulative effect of the evidence regarding whether the accused’s impairment was caused by drugs, including eyewitness evidence of impaired driving, expert evidence regarding the presence of drugs, and a statement to police.

The trial judge also failed to rule on the voluntariness and admissibility of the accused’s statement after a voir dire.

These errors constituted errors of law that materially affected the acquittal.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The accused was convicted of possession of contraband cigarettes and faced a mandatory minimum fine of $9,600 under the Excise Act.

Finding the accused unable to pay and concluding that jail was inappropriate, the trial judge imposed a conditional sentence in default of payment.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that a conditional sentence is a form of imprisonment and cannot be used merely to enforce an unpaid fine where the offender genuinely lacks the means to pay.

The Court set aside the conditional sentence but stayed further collection procedures since the sentence had already been served.