Gary Gordon Boyd

The applicants challenged the validity of powers of attorney and wills executed by their elderly parents in April and December 2017, alleging lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence by the respondent son.

The court found that while the parents did not lack testamentary capacity, the December 2017 wills were procured through the respondent's undue influence.

The evidence demonstrated a pattern of coercion, isolation, and manipulation by the respondent, who controlled access to the parents and fabricated allegations against the applicants.

The December 2017 wills were set aside, and the respondent was ordered to pass his accounts for the period he acted as attorney for property.

The defendants brought a motion for security for costs and the release of funds held in trust from a real estate transaction.

On the return of the motion, after the court highlighted significant evidentiary deficiencies in their affidavit materials, the defendants abandoned the motion in its entirety.

The court formally dismissed the abandoned motion and awarded the plaintiff costs on a partial indemnity scale, noting the motion was poorly executed and lacked merit.

The plaintiff, Music and Beyond Performing Arts, brought a motion to enforce minutes of settlement signed at the conclusion of a mediation.

The defendant, Nico van Duyvenbode, raised several objections, including claims of duress, mediator bias, and procedural irregularities.

The court found no merit in any of the defendant’s arguments and granted the motion to enforce the settlement, holding that the interests of justice required enforcement.

The court also addressed preliminary issues regarding the admissibility of a late affidavit and the right to examine witnesses, ultimately allowing the affidavit but giving it little weight.

The defendants, John and Elaine Wright, brought a motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff, Laura Burley's, claim against them.

Burley had slipped and fallen on a municipal sidewalk adjacent to the Wrights' apartment building, where she was a tenant.

The City of Ottawa admitted responsibility for the sidewalk.

The court found that the Wrights did not owe a common law duty to maintain the municipal sidewalk, were not "occupiers" under the Occupiers' Liability Act, had no common law duty to warn about public sidewalk conditions, and no implied contractual duty to maintain the sidewalk or provide direct passage through the building.

The motion for partial summary judgment was granted, dismissing Burley's action against the Wrights.

The City's crossclaim against the Wrights was also dismissed by consent.

The applicants sought interim relief in an estate dispute, including leave to pass accounts for an attorney for property, production of bank records, and permission to visit Michael Dawson (101 years old).

The respondents opposed some relief and sought to strike an exhibit from an affidavit.

The court, through extensive discussion, facilitated the parties' agreement on most interim issues.

The court ordered the amendment of the title of proceeding to properly constitute Josephine Dawson's estate, granted leave for the applicants to bring a motion to pass accounts, ordered the production of bank records, and permitted the applicants to visit Michael Dawson under supervision.

The court also struck an exhibit from Sheila Dawson's affidavit and adjourned the motion to strike related paragraphs.

The court emphasized the need for parties to resolve procedural matters collaboratively and warned about the costs of estate litigation.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their statement of claim following the death of the original plaintiff, a resident of a retirement home who was allegedly assaulted by a staff member.

The defendants opposed amendments adding claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of statutes, arguing they were statute-barred or pleaded evidence.

The court granted leave to amend, finding the new claims were either not new causes of action or potentially saved by the lack of a limitation period for assault where dependency exists, though one paragraph pleading evidence of a fine was struck.

The defendant, Bruce McConville, brought a motion to amend his Statement of Defence by withdrawing an admission regarding the non-disclosure of asset sales in a prior family law proceeding.

The plaintiff, Jennifer Horrocks, opposed the motion, citing the defendant's history of non-disclosure and previous court findings.

The court applied the three-part test for withdrawing admissions, finding that the defendant met the low threshold for showing a triable issue due to contradictory evidence, provided a reasonable explanation for the inadvertent admission, and that no uncompensable prejudice would result.

The motion was granted, but no costs were awarded to the successful moving party due to the motion being necessitated by his own error and troublesome conduct in the underlying family law matter.

The appellants sought to stay an action in favour of arbitration, arguing that two share purchase agreements contained arbitration clauses.

The motion judge refused to stay the action, finding that one of the agreements (National Trade Agreement) never existed due to lack of incorporation and consideration, thus no arbitration agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that where an agreement is void ab initio (never existed), the arbitration clause within it also does not exist and cannot survive under s. 17(2) of the Arbitration Act.

The Court also found the motion judge correctly limited his analysis to the National Trade Agreement.

The court-appointed Receiver and certain plaintiffs brought motions to interpret or amend a 2017 costs order made by Justice Kane.

The costs order, as drafted, appeared to make Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 396 (CCC 396) jointly and severally liable with the Burdet Group defendants to pay $410,000 in costs to the plaintiffs.

However, the same order also awarded CCC 396 $220,000 in costs payable by the plaintiffs.

The court found that the costs order contained an accidental omission and was inconsistent with Justice Kane's written costs decision.

Applying Rule 59.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court amended the costs order to explicitly exclude CCC 396 from the defendants liable to pay costs to the plaintiffs.

The appellants sought an interpretation of their retainer agreement with the respondent law firms, arguing it was a contingency fee agreement capped at one-third of any favourable result.

The respondents contended it was a "pay-as-you-go" agreement based on hourly rates, with a potential premium.

The application judge found it was a "pay-as-you-go" agreement with a reduced hourly rate and a premium, where only the premium was capped, not the hourly fees.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no error in the application judge's interpretation.

The Court affirmed that the application judge correctly applied principles of contract interpretation, including considering surrounding circumstances while ensuring they did not overwhelm the clear wording of the agreement.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiff appealed an Associate Judge's order dismissing its motion for a protective order over the production of its financial statements to the defendants, who are direct competitors.

The plaintiff sought to limit disclosure to 'counsel's eyes only', arguing the statements contained confidential and commercially sensitive information.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge did not err in concluding the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a real and substantial risk of serious financial harm.

A motion to adduce fresh evidence was also dismissed as the proposed evidence would not be conclusive of the issue on appeal.

The defendant brought a motion to amend her Statement of Defence and Crossclaim to allege that the plaintiff credit union and its former employee participated in a fraudulent mortgage transaction.

The court dismissed the motion to amend the pleadings regarding the employee and the credit union, finding that the defendant knew of the employee's involvement years prior.

The proposed amendments constituted a new cause of action that was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

Minor amendments elaborating on the existing fraud pleadings against the co-defendant were permitted.

Following a declaration that the respondents were vexatious litigants, the applicants sought costs on a full or substantial indemnity basis.

The court awarded costs on a substantial indemnity basis due to the respondents' abusive conduct.

However, the court reduced the costs claimed by one applicant because their counsel was located in Toronto, finding it unreasonable to expect the unsuccessful party to pay higher Toronto rates for a matter heard in the Ottawa region.

The parties settled a shareholder dispute, agreeing that the defendant would purchase the plaintiff's shares and pay 'costs as agreed or assessed'.

They could not agree on the scale or quantum of costs.

The defendant argued the costs should be assessed by an assessment officer pursuant to Rule 57.04.

The plaintiff argued the court should determine the costs as part of enforcing the settlement.

The court held that because determining the appropriate scale of costs required interpreting the settlement agreement, a judge should make the necessary factual and legal determinations rather than delegating to an assessment officer.

The plaintiff was directed to bring a motion to enforce the settlement.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application under the Condominium Act, alleging the respondent corporation failed to properly maintain common elements and acted oppressively regarding a noise complaint from fans above her unit.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the application judge's finding that the corporation acted reasonably and complied with its statutory obligations, thus not breaching the appellant's reasonable expectations or acting oppressively.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The applicants sought a declaration that the respondents were vexatious litigants and an order requiring them to seek leave before instituting further legal proceedings.

The court reviewed the respondents' extensive litigation history, including repetitive claims, collateral attacks on previous orders, and persistent failure to pay costs.

The court found the respondents to be vexatious litigants under section 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and granted the applications, imposing a standard leave requirement and a "Chavali Order" to prevent serial applications for leave.

This motion for summary judgment, brought by Kaufman LLP against the plaintiff, Antranik Kechichian, concerned claims of negligence and breach of contract related to the failure to assign a commercial lease and other alleged damages.

The court found the plaintiff's claims to be statute-barred and without merit, concluding there were no triable issues.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of Kaufman LLP, dismissing the action against them.

Kaufman LLP, a defendant law firm, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for professional negligence.

The plaintiff alleged that Kaufman LLP failed to secure a binding agreement for a share purchase.

Kaufman LLP argued the claim was statute-barred, lacked damages, was duplicative, and was an impermissible attack on prior insolvency orders.

The court found that Kaufman LLP did not provide sufficient evidence to address the plaintiff's allegations and failed to meet its burden to establish no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and the plaintiff was presumptively entitled to costs.

The plaintiff brought an action against multiple defendants, including lawyers Francois Lepage and Bernier Beaudry, who represented CLE Capital Inc. in a failed equipment purchase transaction involving the plaintiff.

Lepage and Beaudry moved for summary judgment, arguing the statement of claim failed to disclose a valid cause of action against them and that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The plaintiff alleged the lawyers stalled the transaction and sought "legal fees and punitive damages." The court found that the lawyers, acting for the seller, did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff (the buyer).

Additionally, the plaintiff suffered no compensable loss, and the claim for punitive damages was unsustainable.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the action against the moving parties.

The defendants, lawyers from Morency, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim.

Their arguments were that the allegations were unsupported by evidence, constituted an impermissible collateral attack on decisions of the Québec Superior Court (specifically, vesting orders from CCAA/BIA proceedings related to the sale of Laurier Optical assets), and that the claims were statute-barred.

The plaintiff alleged fraudulent orchestration of bankruptcy and illegal hacking.

The court found that the plaintiff's claims were indeed a collateral attack on final Québec orders, lacked any evidentiary support, and were commenced beyond the two-year limitation period.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the defendants, dismissing the action.