Gary Gordon Boyd

The plaintiff, Music and Beyond Performing Arts, brought a motion to enforce minutes of settlement signed at the conclusion of a mediation.

The defendant, Nico van Duyvenbode, raised several objections, including claims of duress, mediator bias, and procedural irregularities.

The court found no merit in any of the defendant’s arguments and granted the motion to enforce the settlement, holding that the interests of justice required enforcement.

The court also addressed preliminary issues regarding the admissibility of a late affidavit and the right to examine witnesses, ultimately allowing the affidavit but giving it little weight.

The defendants, John and Elaine Wright, brought a motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff, Laura Burley's, claim against them.

Burley had slipped and fallen on a municipal sidewalk adjacent to the Wrights' apartment building, where she was a tenant.

The City of Ottawa admitted responsibility for the sidewalk.

The court found that the Wrights did not owe a common law duty to maintain the municipal sidewalk, were not "occupiers" under the Occupiers' Liability Act, had no common law duty to warn about public sidewalk conditions, and no implied contractual duty to maintain the sidewalk or provide direct passage through the building.

The motion for partial summary judgment was granted, dismissing Burley's action against the Wrights.

The City's crossclaim against the Wrights was also dismissed by consent.

The applicants sought interim relief in an estate dispute, including leave to pass accounts for an attorney for property, production of bank records, and permission to visit Michael Dawson (101 years old).

The respondents opposed some relief and sought to strike an exhibit from an affidavit.

The court, through extensive discussion, facilitated the parties' agreement on most interim issues.

The court ordered the amendment of the title of proceeding to properly constitute Josephine Dawson's estate, granted leave for the applicants to bring a motion to pass accounts, ordered the production of bank records, and permitted the applicants to visit Michael Dawson under supervision.

The court also struck an exhibit from Sheila Dawson's affidavit and adjourned the motion to strike related paragraphs.

The court emphasized the need for parties to resolve procedural matters collaboratively and warned about the costs of estate litigation.

The defendant, Bruce McConville, brought a motion to amend his Statement of Defence by withdrawing an admission regarding the non-disclosure of asset sales in a prior family law proceeding.

The plaintiff, Jennifer Horrocks, opposed the motion, citing the defendant's history of non-disclosure and previous court findings.

The court applied the three-part test for withdrawing admissions, finding that the defendant met the low threshold for showing a triable issue due to contradictory evidence, provided a reasonable explanation for the inadvertent admission, and that no uncompensable prejudice would result.

The motion was granted, but no costs were awarded to the successful moving party due to the motion being necessitated by his own error and troublesome conduct in the underlying family law matter.

The appellants sought to stay an action in favour of arbitration, arguing that two share purchase agreements contained arbitration clauses.

The motion judge refused to stay the action, finding that one of the agreements (National Trade Agreement) never existed due to lack of incorporation and consideration, thus no arbitration agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that where an agreement is void ab initio (never existed), the arbitration clause within it also does not exist and cannot survive under s. 17(2) of the Arbitration Act.

The Court also found the motion judge correctly limited his analysis to the National Trade Agreement.

The appellants sought an interpretation of their retainer agreement with the respondent law firms, arguing it was a contingency fee agreement capped at one-third of any favourable result.

The respondents contended it was a "pay-as-you-go" agreement based on hourly rates, with a potential premium.

The application judge found it was a "pay-as-you-go" agreement with a reduced hourly rate and a premium, where only the premium was capped, not the hourly fees.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no error in the application judge's interpretation.

The Court affirmed that the application judge correctly applied principles of contract interpretation, including considering surrounding circumstances while ensuring they did not overwhelm the clear wording of the agreement.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application under the Condominium Act, alleging the respondent corporation failed to properly maintain common elements and acted oppressively regarding a noise complaint from fans above her unit.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the application judge's finding that the corporation acted reasonably and complied with its statutory obligations, thus not breaching the appellant's reasonable expectations or acting oppressively.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The applicants sought a declaration that the respondents were vexatious litigants and an order requiring them to seek leave before instituting further legal proceedings.

The court reviewed the respondents' extensive litigation history, including repetitive claims, collateral attacks on previous orders, and persistent failure to pay costs.

The court found the respondents to be vexatious litigants under section 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and granted the applications, imposing a standard leave requirement and a "Chavali Order" to prevent serial applications for leave.

The defendant Kaufman LLP brought a motion for summary judgment against the plaintiff, Antranik Kechichian.

The plaintiff's claim alleged negligence and breach of contract by Kaufman LLP for failing to assign a commercial lease, leading to a default judgment against Optical Vision of Canada Ltd., a company in which the plaintiff had an ownership interest.

The court found that the plaintiff had no provable, compensable loss and that the relief sought was duplicative of ongoing proceedings in Québec.

Furthermore, the action was found to be statute-barred as the plaintiff was aware of the alleged issues more than two years before commencing the action.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the action against Kaufman LLP.

The defendant Kaufman LLP, former lawyers for the plaintiff, brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the action against them.

The grounds for the motion included that the action was commenced outside the limitation period, the plaintiff lacked standing to claim damages, the claim was duplicative, and it constituted an impermissible collateral attack on Québec Superior Court orders.

The court found that the plaintiff's claim against Kaufman LLP was statute-barred, as it was commenced well beyond the two-year limitation period from when the plaintiff knew or ought to have known of the alleged professional negligence.

Additionally, the court noted that the plaintiff had not incurred personal liability or compensable loss as a result of the alleged negligence.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the action against Kaufman LLP.

Kaufman LLP, a defendant law firm, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for professional negligence.

The plaintiff alleged that Kaufman LLP failed to secure a binding agreement for a share purchase.

Kaufman LLP argued the claim was statute-barred, lacked damages, was duplicative, and was an impermissible attack on prior insolvency orders.

The court found that Kaufman LLP did not provide sufficient evidence to address the plaintiff's allegations and failed to meet its burden to establish no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and the plaintiff was presumptively entitled to costs.

The defendants, lawyers from Morency, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim.

Their arguments were that the allegations were unsupported by evidence, constituted an impermissible collateral attack on decisions of the Québec Superior Court (specifically, vesting orders from CCAA/BIA proceedings related to the sale of Laurier Optical assets), and that the claims were statute-barred.

The plaintiff alleged fraudulent orchestration of bankruptcy and illegal hacking.

The court found that the plaintiff's claims were indeed a collateral attack on final Québec orders, lacked any evidentiary support, and were commenced beyond the two-year limitation period.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the defendants, dismissing the action.

The plaintiff brought an action against multiple defendants, including lawyers Francois Lepage and Bernier Beaudry, who represented CLE Capital Inc. in a failed equipment purchase transaction involving the plaintiff.

Lepage and Beaudry moved for summary judgment, arguing the statement of claim failed to disclose a valid cause of action against them and that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The plaintiff alleged the lawyers stalled the transaction and sought "legal fees and punitive damages." The court found that the lawyers, acting for the seller, did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff (the buyer).

Additionally, the plaintiff suffered no compensable loss, and the claim for punitive damages was unsustainable.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the action against the moving parties.

This motion for summary judgment, brought by Kaufman LLP against the plaintiff, Antranik Kechichian, concerned claims of negligence and breach of contract related to the failure to assign a commercial lease and other alleged damages.

The court found the plaintiff's claims to be statute-barred and without merit, concluding there were no triable issues.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of Kaufman LLP, dismissing the action against them.

This appeal and cross-appeal arose from a fraudulent scheme involving the sale of used vehicles.

The trial judge found the appellant garage liable for conversion of five missing vehicles and awarded damages of $40,792.

The trial judge dismissed conversion claims regarding consigned vehicles, finding the parties acquired them in good faith without notice of defects in title.

The appellants challenged the findings regarding stolen vehicles, mitigation of damages, quantum of damages, and the failure to adjudicate certain counterclaims.

The respondents cross-appealed the mercantile agent finding and the costs award.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal, with limited relief granted for a contribution and indemnity claim against one defendant.

The appellants were found liable for condominium arrears following a trial.

Their appeal to the Court of Appeal was unsuccessful, as was their subsequent motion for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The appellants then brought a motion in the Superior Court under Rule 59.06(2) to set aside the judgment and obtain judgment in their favour.

The motion judge dismissed the motion under Rule 2.1.02(1), fixing costs at $500.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding the Rule 59.06(2) motion to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The appellants sought relief that exceeded what was permissible on such a motion, and the set-off issue argument they raised had already been made at trial.

This appeal concerns the management of Carleton Condominium Corporation No. 396 following a 35-day trial.

The trial judge found that the director engaged in oppressive conduct including self-dealing, lack of financial disclosure, charging personal legal fees to the corporation, failing to declare conflicts, refusing to produce court-ordered records, and implementing an invalid by-law.

The trial judge ordered termination of the condominium corporation, declared the director's oppressive conduct, held the director personally liable for costs, and awarded common expense arrears to the corporation.

The appellants challenged the oppression finding, personal liability, and termination order.

The respondents cross-appealed the timing of arrears payment and the cost award against them.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upheld the oppression finding and termination order, confirmed personal liability for the director, and modified the cost award.

A 19-year-old first-time offender pleaded guilty to nine counts: six counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking in various Schedule I substances (cocaine, crack cocaine, MDA, MDMA, fentanyl, and heroin), one count of possession of proceeds of crime ($1,070), and two counts of possession of firearms without a licence.

Police discovered approximately $300,000 worth of drugs, two loaded firearms (a Tikka rifle and a 12-gauge shotgun), and various weapons in the accused's apartment.

The court imposed a sentence of four years and nine months (57 months), less 21 days of pre-trial custody credited at 1.5 days, resulting in 56 months to be served concurrently on the drug and proceeds counts, with 30 months concurrent on the firearms counts.

The court balanced serious aggravating factors (nature and quantity of drugs, loaded firearms, commercial enterprise) against significant mitigating factors (youth, lack of criminal record, guilty plea, strong family support, and rehabilitation prospects).

Following a prior judgment finding the defendants liable for a fraudulent carpet supply scheme, the court issued supplementary reasons clarifying how the plaintiff must elect judgment between an undisclosed principal and its agents for contract damages while allowing fraud-based damages to be enforced against all defendants.

The court explained the composition of the compensatory damages award and confirmed that only the contract-based component required an election of judgment.

In determining costs, the court considered the discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Given the defendants’ fraudulent conduct and the complexity and length of the litigation, the court concluded that full indemnity costs were justified.

The plaintiff was awarded $630,475.47 in costs jointly and severally against the defendants.