Aaron Prevost

After a five-day judge-alone trial, James Nathan McLarnon was found guilty of sexual assault, multiple counts of assault with a weapon, assault with choking, assault, uttering threats to cause death, and unlawful confinement, all arising from intimate partner violence against the same complainant, M.C., between 2020 and 2021.

The Crown sought a seven-year global sentence; the defence proposed three years.

The court imposed a global sentence of five and a half years, reduced by pre-sentence custody and a modest "Duncan" credit for harsh pre-trial conditions, resulting in a final sentence of two years and 234 days.

The decision details the aggravating and mitigating factors, the application of the totality principle, and the ancillary orders imposed.

This decision addresses the application of section 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms concerning the right to counsel upon detention.

Dylan Smith was charged with two Highway Traffic Act offences related to a fatal accident.

The key issue was whether Smith was detained when he gave a statement in the back of a police cruiser without being informed of his right to counsel, thus triggering Charter protections.

The court applied the purposive approach to detention from R. v. Grant and R. v. Suberu, considering physical and psychological restraint.

It found that although Smith was not physically restrained or formally arrested, the circumstances—being isolated in the cruiser, cautioned about charges, and the power imbalance—amounted to detention.

Consequently, his right to counsel was engaged and denied, leading to exclusion of the statement under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with nine offences arising from multiple incidents of intimate partner violence against his former partner, including assault, unlawful confinement, and sexual assault.

The incidents occurred in the context of severe drug addiction and trafficking.

The court applied the W.D. framework to assess credibility, rejecting the accused's denials and accepting the complainant's evidence despite her history of drug use and memory gaps.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The applicant, Tiffani Martin, sought to exclude evidence (fentanyl, cocaine, and hashish) seized from her purse, arguing violations of her ss. 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) Charter rights.

The court found multiple Charter breaches, including arbitrary prolonged investigative detention, arbitrary arrest for possession of a restricted weapon without reasonable and probable grounds, delayed notification and facilitation of the right to counsel, and an unlawful search of her purse (not incidental to arrest nor a lawful inventory search).

Applying the R. v. Grant factors for s. 24(2) Charter exclusion, the court determined that the seriousness and impact of the police misconduct outweighed society's interest in admitting the reliable evidence.

Consequently, the drug evidence was excluded, which is anticipated to lead to the applicant's acquittal on the drug trafficking charges.

The accused was charged with possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking after police executed search warrants at a residence and on her vehicle, finding significant quantities of fentanyl, cocaine, and cash.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence to prove constructive possession.

The court found that while there was a high suspicion of the accused's involvement in the trafficking operation, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she had knowledge and control of the drugs, as other individuals had access to the residence and vehicle.

The accused was found not guilty.

The offender, Ashlyn Chrisjohn, pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death and failing to stop after an accident causing death.

The court considered the gravity of the offences, the offender's significant responsibility, and mitigating factors including a Gladue report detailing her personal circumstances and efforts towards rehabilitation.

The Crown sought concurrent five-year terms, while the defence sought time served or a conditional sentence.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence as primary sentencing goals, finding that a sentence of time served or a conditional sentence would be inappropriate given the egregious nature of the offences and the high blameworthiness.

A four-year custodial sentence was imposed for dangerous driving causing death, with a concurrent three-year sentence for failing to stop, along with a driving prohibition and DNA order.

The accused was arrested on an outstanding warrant for failing to attend court.

Following the arrest, police searched his vehicle and found a loaded handgun.

The accused brought a Charter application arguing the search violated his s. 8 rights.

The court found that the search was not truly incidental to the arrest, as there was no reasonable prospect of securing evidence related to the failure to attend court offence.

The court concluded that the warrantless search violated s. 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court excluded the handgun from evidence, finding that the police conduct was serious and lacked good faith, and that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The applicant, having pleaded guilty to manslaughter, sought interim release pending sentencing.

The court considered the release plan, including electronic monitoring and cultural supports, against the applicant's lengthy criminal record, history of non-compliance, and the serious nature of the offence.

Despite the principles favouring release for Aboriginal accused and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, the court found that detention was justified on both secondary (public safety) and tertiary (maintaining confidence in the administration of justice) grounds.

The court endorsed previous findings that the applicant's history of re-offending and non-compliance outweighed the proposed supervision plan.

The defendant, Heather Vanessa Leith, challenged the validity of a search warrant issued under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, asserting a violation of her s. 8 Charter rights due to insufficient reasonable and probable grounds in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

She sought a declaration of a Charter breach and exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2).

The court reviewed the ITO, including confidential informant information, and found that the issuing justice had a reasonable and objective basis to issue the warrant.

Consequently, the s. 8 Charter rights were not violated, and the application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police found drugs in a locked tool box at a business unit he frequented.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on the accused's access to the unit, a hidden compartment in his vehicle, and surveillance evidence suggesting drug dealing.

The court found that while it was highly likely the accused was trafficking drugs, the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had knowledge and control of the specific cocaine found in the tool box, as others also had access to the unit.

The accused was acquitted.

The defendant brought an application under s. 8 of the Charter challenging the facial validity of three search warrants and seeking to exclude evidence under s. 24(2).

The court found that certain information in the Information to Obtain (ITO) regarding a 2016 apartment lab investigation was misleading and should be excised.

However, the remaining evidence, including corroborated confidential informant information, physical surveillance, and electronic tracking data, provided sufficient reasonable grounds for the warrants to be issued for the defendant's residence, business, and vehicle.

The application was dismissed.

The accused, Derek Denesevich, sought a bail review under s. 520 and a detention review under s. 525(1) of the Criminal Code, following his detention order by a Justice of the Peace for alleged attempts to import firearm components.

The court conducted a blended hearing, considering new evidence and the passage of time (eight months in custody).

The Crown argued for continued detention on primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds, citing the accused's U.S. criminal record and flight risk.

The court found that primary ground concerns were mitigated by proposed release conditions (passport surrender, police check-ins).

Regarding secondary and tertiary grounds, the court re-evaluated the U.S. criminal record, finding the alarm diminished, and emphasized the importance of the Charter right to bail and the principle that pre-trial detention is a last resort.

The court concluded that continued detention was not necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice, especially given the elapsed time.

The accused was ordered released on a recognizance with two sureties and specific conditions.

Three appellants appealed their convictions for drug trafficking offences arising from Project O'Bunker, a large joint forces investigation in London, Ontario.

The appellants challenged the dismissal of their s. 11(b) Charter applications alleging unreasonable delay, and one appellant also challenged his conviction on the merits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding that while the total delay of 39-40 months exceeded the presumptive ceiling of 30 months established in R. v. Jordan, the delay was justified by the exceptional complexity of the prosecution and the transitional exceptional circumstance based on reasonable reliance on the previous Morin framework.

At a preliminary inquiry, the accused was charged with second-degree murder of Dakoda Martin and aggravated assault of Andre Williams.

The defence conceded sufficient evidence for aggravated assault and manslaughter but argued there was no evidence of subjective foresight of death required for second-degree murder.

The court found that circumstantial evidence, including the location and nature of the fatal chest wound, the depth of penetration, and evidence of a deliberate stabbing to a vulnerable area while the victim lay on the ground, could reasonably support an inference that the accused knew the bodily harm would likely cause death.

The accused was committed to stand trial on second-degree murder and aggravated assault.

The applicant, charged with production of marijuana and possession of oxycodone, brought a Charter application under sections 8 and 9 challenging the validity of a search warrant and his subsequent arrest.

The search warrant was based on a detailed tip from a named informant who had dated the applicant.

The applicant argued the police failed to sufficiently corroborate the tip before obtaining the warrant.

The court dismissed the application, finding the detailed, first-hand information provided reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant without the need for further surveillance, and that the arrest was lawful.

The applicant, found guilty of drug trafficking and possession of proceeds, sought a stay of proceedings based on entrapment.

The court examined whether the undercover officer had reasonable suspicion to offer an opportunity to commit the offence or if the police conduct constituted random virtue testing.

The court found that the police had reasonable suspicion based on information from a known citizen and that the investigative steps taken were legitimate, not inducing the crime.

The entrapment defence failed, and the application for a stay was dismissed.

The applicant, Leon Kofman, charged with drug and weapon offenses, sought to exclude evidence obtained from searches of two residential condominiums pursuant to a search warrant.

The applicant alleged a violation of his section 8 Charter right to be free from unreasonable search or seizure, arguing the Information To Obtain (ITO) lacked reasonable grounds to connect drug trafficking to the target locations and was misleading.

The court found the ITO deficient and misleading, concluding that the warrant could not have issued and the searches were unlawful, thus breaching the applicant's section 8 Charter rights.

Applying the R. v. Grant factors, the court determined that the seriousness of the state conduct (reckless and negligent ITO preparation), the significant impact on the applicant's high expectation of privacy in his residences, and the societal interest in maintaining the repute of justice (despite the importance of the evidence to the Crown's case) favoured exclusion.

Consequently, all evidence seized from both condominiums was excluded.

Anna Thiessen, charged with possession of cocaine and methamphetamine for trafficking, brought an application for a directed verdict at the close of the Crown's case.

The court considered whether there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to infer that she had constructive or attributed possession of the drugs found in a crawl space at her jointly owned property.

Applying the test for a directed verdict, the court found no reasonable inference could be drawn that she had knowledge, consented to, or controlled the drugs.

The application was granted, and Anna Thiessen was acquitted of both counts.

The court accepted a joint sentencing submission for the accused, Jason Daniel.

The sentence included credit for 189 days of pre-sentence custody (calculated at 1.5x, totaling 284 days), an additional 60 days of intermittent custody, and two years of probation.

Probation conditions included non-association with specified individuals, reporting requirements, residence approval, counselling, and prohibitions against possessing controlled drugs/substances or weapons.

A DNA order was issued, and a $200 victim fine surcharge was imposed.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving contrary to section 249(2) of the Criminal Code following a motor vehicle accident at the intersection of Oxford Street and Veterans Memorial Parkway in London, Ontario.

The Crown alleged the accused was racing another vehicle at speeds exceeding 150 kilometres per hour in a 60 kilometre per hour zone, resulting in a collision with an innocent third party.

The accused claimed she was fleeing an aggressive pursuer.

The court found the accused was operating the trailing vehicle in a race, rejected her evidence as tailored and illogical, and convicted her based on the credible testimony of three independent witnesses who consistently described dangerous high-speed driving.