A. Thomas McKay

A young person, A.S.L., was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault.

The defence brought a motion for a stay of proceedings due to undue delay under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial conclusion exceeded the 18-month ceiling for provincial court matters.

The court found that the majority of the delay was attributable to the Crown's failure to provide timely disclosure, despite repeated requests from the defence.

While 30 days of delay were attributed to the defence for not raising all pre-trial motions at the first judicial pre-trial, this was insufficient to bring the net delay below the ceiling.

The Crown's argument that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted an exceptional circumstance was rejected, as the Crown could have mitigated the delay by providing disclosure earlier.

As the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonable delay, a stay of proceedings was granted.

A young person, A.S.L., charged with three counts of sexual assault involving two complainants (GR and MD) and one count of breaching release terms, applied for severance of the counts related to GR from the count related to MD.

The court considered factors for severance, including the risk of prejudice to the accused, the lack of factual nexus between the allegations, and the limited efficiency gained by a joint trial.

The court found that the interests of justice required severance due to the risk of prejudice and the distinct nature of the allegations.

This ruling addresses whether a criminal trial continuation for aggravated assault and other charges should proceed remotely by videoconference, given that both Crown counsel and the presiding judge were unable to attend in person due to personal reasons.

The accused opposed remote proceedings, arguing it would impact trial fairness and credibility assessment.

The court held that while the accused must be physically present for evidentiary portions of the trial unless he consents to remote appearance, Crown counsel, the judge, and witnesses (including the complainant and an expert) could appear remotely.

The decision balanced the accused's right to a fair trial and the open court principle with public health concerns during the pandemic and the need for efficient court functioning, concluding that remote testimony could enhance credibility assessment by allowing unmasked, close-up views of witnesses.

A young person was charged with two counts of sexual assault, two counts of sexual interference, and one count of threatening.

The complainant was the accused's younger sister.

The allegations involved multiple incidents of sexual touching occurring between January 2014 and May 2015, and a threatening statement made in November 2017.

The court found the complainant's evidence detailed, consistent, and compelling.

The court rejected the defence evidence and accepted the Crown's submissions.

The accused was convicted on all five counts.

The defendant pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography, making child pornography available, and agreeing by telecommunication to commit an offense under section 163.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought a three-year sentence, while the defence sought 18 months.

The court imposed a global sentence of three years in custody, with credit for 315 days of pretrial custody enhanced at a 1.5:1 ratio.

The court emphasized that denunciation and deterrence are paramount sentencing principles in child pornography cases, particularly given the egregious nature of the written material discovered in chat logs that reached the highest level of depravity on the Oliver scale.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and possession of cocaine following a minor motor vehicle collision in Waterloo.

The Crown alleged the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol and/or drugs.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the arrest and the reliability of the drug recognition evaluation.

The court found the arrest was lawful based on reasonable and probable grounds.

However, the Crown failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in acquittal on the impaired driving charge.

The court found the accused guilty of possession of cocaine, rejecting his testimony that he was unaware of the drug in borrowed sweatpants.

The accused was charged with two counts of sexual assault, one count of threatening, and one count of assault with a weapon.

The complainant and accused were in a relationship characterized by extensive electronic communications involving discussions of violent sexual fantasies and rape role-play.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The court found that while the complainant's evidence contained significant contradictions and inconsistencies, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant did not consent to the sexual activity.

The court also found that the accused's evidence was consistent and corroborated by the electronic messaging between the parties.

The court noted the unusual factual circumstances, including the complainant's own confusion about her feelings at the time and her subsequent Instagram post stating "it was consensual but consequential."

The accused was charged with possession of fentanyl, cannabis, and methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, carrying a concealed weapon, possession of a prohibited weapon, and three counts of breaching a probation order.

The Crown alleged that police lawfully stopped the accused for operating an E-bike with a non-functioning rear light and swerving behavior, detected the odour of fresh marijuana, and arrested the accused.

A search incident to arrest revealed quantities of controlled substances and weapons.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the stop, arrest, and search, and alleged a violation of the right to counsel.

The court found the stop and arrest lawful, but identified a technical violation of the right to counsel due to an 11-minute delay.

The court admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding the breach technical in nature with no real impact on the accused's protected rights, and that excluding reliable evidence would undermine the administration of justice.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The accused, a police officer, was charged with attempting to obstruct justice contrary to section 139(2) of the Criminal Code.

After his common-law spouse discovered embarrassing videos on an external hard drive and threatened to report alleged child pornography to police, the accused removed his laptop from their shared residence and reformatted it, deleting all prior data.

The Crown alleged this constituted an attempt to obstruct justice.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused wilfully intended to obstruct the course of justice, as there were plausible alternative inferences supported by the evidence, including that the accused reformatted the laptop to avoid further embarrassment and conflict rather than to obstruct a police investigation.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with 13 offences arising from a domestic relationship with a young woman.

The Crown withdrew four charges and proceeded on five counts: common assault, two counts of assault with a weapon (knife and door), assault causing bodily harm, and unlawful confinement.

The trial involved extensive evidence of a pattern of physical and emotional abuse, isolation, drug manipulation, and threats.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and compelling, rejecting defence arguments based on myths and stereotypes about domestic violence victims.

The court convicted on all five remaining counts.

The accused, a 71-year-old businessman with a PhD in chemistry, was charged with sexually assaulting a 25-year-old woman who worked part-time in an administrative role for his business.

The Crown alleged that the accused touched the complainant's genital area over her clothing during a drive in the countryside on March 5, 2016, after she had reluctantly agreed to accompany him.

The accused claimed he held an honest but mistaken belief that the complainant had consented based on what he characterized as conflicting signals between her verbal protests and her body language.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and consistent with corroborating evidence including text messages, cell phone extraction reports, restaurant surveillance video, and an audio recording of the drive.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as not credible and found that even if accepted, his belief in consent would have been based on recklessness or wilful blindness, precluding a valid defence under section 273.2 of the Criminal Code.

A conviction was entered.

The accused pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing death and two offences under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

On November 24, 2016, the 23-year-old accused, while extremely intoxicated with a blood-alcohol concentration between 185-240 mg/100mL, drove a rental SUV at 188 km/h through a red light in a 60 km/h residential zone and struck a stationary vehicle, killing the 60-year-old driver.

The accused also fraudulently obtained a work permit and attempted to establish a business while on a student visa.

The court imposed a sentence of six years for impaired driving causing death, plus one year consecutive for the immigration offence under section 122, and one year concurrent for the offence under section 127, with a 10-year driving prohibition.

The accused was charged with break and enter contrary to section 348(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, possession of break-in instruments contrary to section 351(1) of the Criminal Code, and entering upon land of Canadian National Railway contrary to section 26.1 of the Railway Safety Act.

Police conducted surveillance of two suspects on bicycles in the early morning hours of January 16, 2016, in London, Ontario.

The suspects were observed engaging in suspicious behaviour, then lost sight of briefly before officers followed their tracks to a commercial property where a freshly cut hole in the fence and broken window indicated a break and enter in progress.

The suspects fled the scene and were arrested approximately one hour later.

Break-in instruments were recovered from bags found at the scene.

The court found the Crown proved all charges beyond a reasonable doubt through eyewitness identification, physical evidence, and circumstantial evidence.

The accused pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded prohibited firearm with readily accessible ammunition contrary to section 95(2) of the Criminal Code.

Police executed a search warrant at his residence and discovered a loaded sawed-off shotgun with the hammer cocked in the firing position and no safety mechanism, along with additional shotgun shells.

The court rejected the defence submission for credit for time spent on bail, finding insufficient evidence of hardship or punitive conditions.

The court imposed a sentence of three years in custody, characterizing the conduct as a "true crime" under the framework established in R v. Nur, emphasizing denunciation, deterrence, and public protection.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching involving a 14-year-old complainant.

The accused believed the complainant was 17 years old based on her statements to him and his family, her Facebook profile, her association with a group of older teenagers, and her participation in activities typical of older youth.

The court found that the accused took all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age and held a genuine subjective belief that she was 16 or older.

The accused was acquitted on all charges.

The accused was charged with two drinking and driving offences under sections 253(1)(a) and 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code following a single motor vehicle accident.

The defence challenged the lawfulness of the arrest and breath demand under the Charter, alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9.

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest and breath demand based on the totality of circumstances.

The court convicted on the over-80 charge but acquitted on the impaired driving charge, finding insufficient evidence of impairment of driving ability despite the elevated blood-alcohol readings.

The accused was charged with impaired driving contrary to section 253(1)(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code, and with having a blood alcohol concentration above zero while licensed as a novice driver contrary to section 44.1(3) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The Crown alleged the accused drove his vehicle into a tree while impaired by alcohol.

The defence argued the accused had not consumed alcohol prior to the accident but had consumed a large quantity of vodka immediately after the accident.

The court rejected the defence evidence as contrived and illogical, finding the accused's blood alcohol content at the time of driving was between 290-335 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The court convicted on the impaired driving charge and the Highway Traffic Act charge, staying the section 253(1)(a) charge.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired and with an elevated blood alcohol content, as well as provincial offences related to leaving the scene of an accident and failing to report an accident.

The accused was found unconscious in the driver's seat of a damaged vehicle parked in a private driveway.

Police discovered open alcohol in the vehicle and obtained breath samples showing blood alcohol levels of 171 and 164 mg/100mL.

The accused challenged the charges on Charter grounds, alleging violations of sections 8 and 10(b).

The court found that the accused was in care or control of the motor vehicle, that any Charter breaches were minimal and justified by exigent circumstances, and that the evidence was admissible.

The accused was convicted on all charges.

The accused was charged with three offences arising from an altercation in a laneway: uttering a threat to cause bodily harm, assault, and carrying a weapon (knife) for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

The Crown's case relied on eyewitness identification evidence from two civilian witnesses who had a face-to-face confrontation with the accused and another woman.

The court examined the reliability of eyewitness identification evidence, considering the quality of observation, lighting conditions, and the identification procedures employed.

The court found that despite some inconsistencies in the witnesses' accounts and the absence of formal identification procedures, the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the individual who assaulted and threatened the complainant.

The court also amended the information to reflect that the accused possessed a beer bottle rather than a knife for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, based on the trial evidence.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving contrary to section 249(2) of the Criminal Code following a motor vehicle accident at the intersection of Oxford Street and Veterans Memorial Parkway in London, Ontario.

The Crown alleged the accused was racing another vehicle at speeds exceeding 150 kilometres per hour in a 60 kilometre per hour zone, resulting in a collision with an innocent third party.

The accused claimed she was fleeing an aggressive pursuer.

The court found the accused was operating the trailing vehicle in a race, rejected her evidence as tailored and illogical, and convicted her based on the credible testimony of three independent witnesses who consistently described dangerous high-speed driving.