Vlatko Karadzic

Sentencing decision for a police sergeant convicted after trial of breach of trust and obstruction of justice arising from a planned warrantless entry into an apartment, unlawful search, arrests and detention of occupants, and later alteration of an occurrence report to fabricate a lawful basis for entry.

The court held that denunciation and general deterrence were the dominant principles because the offender was a senior police officer who knowingly abused public authority, conscripted subordinate officers, targeted vulnerable occupants, and pursued a deliberate cover-up.

Although the offender had strong rehabilitation prospects, family support, and mental health and alcohol-use challenges that post-dated the offences, those factors did not displace the need for a penitentiary term.

A global sentence of 3 years' imprisonment was imposed, with ancillary DNA and victim fine surcharge orders refused.

The prosecution alleged a police sergeant unlawfully entered and searched a private apartment, directed arrests and detention, and later altered an official occurrence report to fabricate grounds for entry.

The court found no lawful grounds, no exigent circumstances, and no fresh-pursuit basis, and accepted evidence that the impugned narrative was inserted after the fact.

Applying the breach-of-trust framework, the court held the conduct was a marked departure from expected standards and was undertaken for personal, non-public purposes.

The court also found the report-editing and related falsehoods proved obstruct justice beyond a reasonable doubt.

Convictions were entered on both counts.

The Ontario Court of Justice sentenced police officer Ryan Dougherty following his conviction for assault causing bodily harm.

While re-apprehending a vulnerable individual under the Mental Health Act, Officer Dougherty used excessive force, striking the defenceless victim four times in the face and causing a fractured nose and concussion.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence with probation, while the defence argued for a conditional discharge.

Justice O’Marra determined that a conditional discharge would be contrary to the public interest given the severity of the injuries and the breach of public trust, ultimately imposing a suspended sentence with one year of probation, 100 hours of community service, a DNA order, and a non-communication order.

The accused, a police officer charged with breach of trust and fabricating evidence, brought a motion to compel the Crown to call a fellow officer as a witness.

The Crown refused to call the officer, citing concerns about his reliability due to inconsistencies in his statements.

The court declined to order the Crown to call the witness, affirming the Crown's discretion.

However, given the witness's materiality and allegations that his statement was improperly influenced by an investigating detective, the court exercised its exceptional discretion to call the officer as the court's own witness, permitting both parties to cross-examine him with certain restrictions.

A York Regional Police officer, Jordan Nesbitt, was charged with breach of trust, fabricating evidence, and attempting to obstruct justice following a vehicle search.

The Crown alleged he planted cocaine and falsified reports to justify an unlawful search.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, citing issues with witness credibility, the integrity of the scene, and plausible alternative explanations for the presence of substances.

The defendant was acquitted on all counts.

A police constable was charged with assault causing bodily harm after an altercation with an individual he was attempting to re-apprehend under the Mental Health Act.

The court found that while the officer was justified in the initial apprehension, the subsequent use of force, specifically four closed-fist strikes to the individual's face while he was on the ground and largely defenceless, was excessive and disproportionate.

The court found the officer's testimony inconsistent and concluded that the force was used out of frustration and annoyance rather than genuine safety concerns.

The officer was found guilty of assault causing bodily harm.

Peter Bouctsis, a youth, was convicted of second-degree murder.

The Crown sought an adult sentence under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, arguing that the presumption of diminished moral culpability was rebutted and a youth sentence would be insufficient for accountability, rehabilitation, and public safety.

The court found that the offender demonstrated adult-level maturity and sophistication in planning the crime and continued criminal conduct while in custody.

The court granted the Crown's application, imposing a life sentence with parole eligibility after seven years, emphasizing the need for long-term monitoring for public protection.

The accused, a young person, was tried for second-degree murder following a drug rip-off where he shot the victim twice, including once in the head.

The sole issue at trial was whether the accused had the requisite specific intent for murder under s. 229(a) of the Criminal Code, or whether he should be convicted of manslaughter.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to the accused's out-of-court exculpatory statements and found them implausible.

Applying the common sense inference that a sane and sober person intends the natural and probable consequences of their actions, the court concluded the accused intended to cause bodily harm that he knew was likely to cause death and was reckless whether death ensued.

The accused was found guilty of second-degree murder.

The applicant sought an order in the nature of prohibition to prevent a judge of the Ontario Court of Justice from proceeding with his criminal trial remotely via video conference, and an order to quash the ruling that ordered the trial to proceed remotely.

The applicant argued that there was no jurisdiction to order a remote trial or compel a complainant to testify remotely without consent or application.

The Superior Court dismissed both applications, holding that the trial judge had jurisdiction under the Criminal Code to order remote participation for the Crown, expert witness, and complainant.

The court clarified that while an accused's remote participation requires their consent, errors in exercising jurisdiction are reviewable by appeal, not by extraordinary remedies like prohibition or certiorari, unless they amount to a jurisdictional error or breach of natural justice.

This ruling addresses whether a criminal trial continuation for aggravated assault and other charges should proceed remotely by videoconference, given that both Crown counsel and the presiding judge were unable to attend in person due to personal reasons.

The accused opposed remote proceedings, arguing it would impact trial fairness and credibility assessment.

The court held that while the accused must be physically present for evidentiary portions of the trial unless he consents to remote appearance, Crown counsel, the judge, and witnesses (including the complainant and an expert) could appear remotely.

The decision balanced the accused's right to a fair trial and the open court principle with public health concerns during the pandemic and the need for efficient court functioning, concluding that remote testimony could enhance credibility assessment by allowing unmasked, close-up views of witnesses.

The accused, Dillion Hamilton-Palimaka, was charged with break and enter, wounding an animal, and causing unnecessary pain to an animal after his girlfriend's dog, Lexi, was brutally attacked.

The case relied on circumstantial evidence, including Lexi's developing fear of the accused, the accused's access to the home, his angry departure from a funeral, and inconsistencies in his and his brothers' alibi testimony regarding precise timings.

The court found the accused's and his brothers' evidence unreliable.

The accused was convicted of causing unnecessary pain to an animal, but acquitted of break and enter (due to permissive entry) and the wounding charges (Crown not seeking conviction).

The Crown applied for a temporary publication ban on portions of an agreed statement of fact and bail synopsis relating to an adult accused who pleaded guilty to manslaughter.

The ban was sought to protect the fair trial rights of a young person co-accused who was scheduled to be tried for second-degree murder at a later date.

The court applied the Dagenais/Mentuck test and concluded that a broad ban was not necessary, as alternative measures like jury instructions and the passage of time would mitigate prejudice.

However, a limited ban was granted for evidence that could identify the young person or would be presumptively inadmissible at their trial.

The Crown applied under s.715(1) of the Criminal Code to admit the preliminary hearing transcript of a key witness, Boris Golan, at trial, arguing he was absent from Canada and refused to testify.

The accused was charged with fraud over $5,000.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Crown failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the witness was truly unavailable, citing insufficient diligence in verifying his absence and exploring electronic testimony options.

Furthermore, the court found that the accused did not have a full opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary hearing because the Crown failed to disclose the witness's intention to leave Canada, which would have altered defence counsel's cross-examination strategy.

Breanna Flynn was found guilty of theft over $5,000 and possession of stolen property over $5,000, with the latter charge stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The court considered aggravating factors, including breach of trust and the amount stolen, and mitigating factors such as no prior criminal record.

Emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence for breach of trust offences, the court rejected the defence's request for an intermittent sentence and imposed a four-month custodial sentence followed by thirty months of probation with a restitution order for the remaining loss of $2,937.85 to Wilfrid Laurier University.

Breanna Flynn, a financial operations assistant at Wilfrid Laurier University bookstore, was charged with theft over $5,000 and possession of property obtained by crime over $5,000.

Missing deposits totaling $31,298.20 were discovered from the bookstore safe.

Police found $27,962 in Canadian currency and the three missing Brinks deposit bags in Flynn's bedroom closet.

Flynn's explanation for the cash and bags was deemed implausible and defied logic and common sense.

The court applied the W.(D.) analysis, disbelieved the accused's testimony, and found her evidence did not raise a reasonable doubt.

Based on circumstantial evidence, the court inferred that Flynn stole the deposits.

She was found guilty of both counts.

The accused, charged with theft over $5,000 and possession of property obtained by crime, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence seized from her home.

She argued the search warrant was invalid because the Information to Obtain (ITO) failed to disclose that the workplace video surveillance was motion-activated and contained a time gap.

The court dismissed the application, finding the omissions were not material to the existence of reasonable and probable grounds and were not made intentionally or recklessly.

The court concluded the search did not violate s. 8 of the Charter and, alternatively, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence obtained from a judicially authorized search of his iPhone following his arrest for break and enter, firearm, and drug trafficking offences.

He argued the warrant lacked sufficient evidentiary basis and authorized an overly broad search contrary to s. 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Garofoli standard of review, the court examined whether the issuing justice could have granted the authorization based on the information to obtain.

The court held that the ITO provided reasonable grounds to believe the phone would contain evidence related to planning and execution of the offence.

The warrant was appropriately limited to specified categories of data and the application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg under s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

He argued that his roadside admission that he was the driver was statutorily compelled under the Highway Traffic Act and therefore inadmissible under s. 7 of the Charter, and that his s. 10(b) right to counsel was infringed when police refused his request to call his parents.

The court held that, given the statutory obligation under ss. 199–200 of the Highway Traffic Act to report an accident and identify oneself to police, the appellant’s admission that he was the driver was compelled and should not have been admitted.

The court rejected the trial judge’s reliance on hypothetical cross‑examination suggesting the appellant would have made the admission anyway.

However, the court found no reversible error regarding the right to counsel analysis.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed convictions for mischief under $5,000 and breach of an undertaking arising from the slashing of vehicle tires.

At trial, the Crown introduced evidence that the appellant had previously threatened the complainant and his family and made comments about the complainant’s vehicle tires.

No voir dire was conducted to determine whether this prior discreditable conduct evidence had probative value outweighing its prejudicial effect.

The appeal court held that such evidence is presumptively inadmissible unless properly assessed through a voir dire.

Because the trial judge relied on this evidence in assessing guilt, the admission of the evidence constituted reversible error.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown relied on breath samples taken at the detachment to establish the offence.

The sole issue at trial was whether the breath samples were taken "as soon as practicable" as required by section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code to invoke the presumption of identity.

The defence challenged an unexplained 28-minute delay between the first and second breath samples.

The court found that the entire chain of events from the time of the offence to the taking of the first sample was reasonable, and that the Crown was not required to provide a detailed explanation for every minute of custody.

The court convicted the accused.