CITATION: R. v. Dimini, 2026 ONCJ 380
INFORMATION NO: 4211-998-23-42102957-00
ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
- and - MICHAEL DIMINI
R E A S O N S F O R S E N T E N C E
BEFORE THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE BLOCK
On May 13, 2026, at THUNDER BAY, Ontario Courtroom 206
APPEARANCES
V. KARADZIC For the Crown
M. O'DOHERTY For the Defence
On November 24, 2020, Sergeant Michael Dimini was the patrol sergeant for the north zone of Thunder Bay. That evening the defendant involved himself in a "Keep the Peace/ Stand-by" call in the south zone of Thunder Bay.
The day before this event, the father-in-law of the defendant had some hand tools and a television stolen from his garage. It was soon determined that the television was being offered for sale on Facebook Marketplace. The defendant's father-in-law and one of his adult children arranged with the vendor, one Derek Turner, to attend a residence in south Fort William and "buy" the television.
The police were advised of these arrangements. Four Thunder Bay Police Service constables were dispatched on the Keep the Peace/Stand-by assignment to ensure recovery of the television without incident. The four officers had a high level of experience. They were aware of the particular security implications associated with this call for service. The address was known to be associated with the consumption and perhaps sale of illegal drugs. The vendor who negotiated the sale had an outstanding arrest warrant. The attending officers knew of these issues and planned their attendance accordingly. A short time after they attended, the television was transferred to its lawful owner without incident. During their attendance, the officers asked the lessee of the apartment, one Cassandra Stachiw, whether they could enter the premises. She cordially refused entry. The police officers agreed with her assessment that they would need a warrant to enter without her consent and it was clear to them that the basis for a warrant did not exist.
As the successful recovery of the television occurred, the defendant arrived. He had attended the vicinity of the call before the officers assigned to it. His presence had not been requested. He did not advise dispatch or the attending police of his attendance prior to his appearance at the door of the apartment building. No exigent circumstances existed which might have justified his unexpected attendance. He did not debrief his colleagues on their discussion with the lessee. He immediately led the four officers already present into the premises.
The warrantless entry into apartment 14, 230 Frederika Street was done over the objection of the lessee of the apartment and accompanied by Sergeant Dimini's profane verbal abuse of her. The search for his father-in-law's tools came up empty. Several of the occupants were arrested on charges that included the possession of a small quantity of apparent percocets. The arrestees were then held for bail. The apartment was trashed.
The four other officers were disturbed by the warrantless and unlawful entry. After the arrests had concluded the most senior of the officers assigned to the call, a constable of 33 years' experience, asked Sergeant Dimini what grounds may have existed for entry into the apartment. The defendant responded that the entry was "probably a Charter breach, but that it's no big deal".
Later that evening another highly experienced constable told the defendant that he was concerned that the defendant had involved himself in the matter because of his relationship with the complainant's daughter. He received both a rebuke from the defendant and, as a justification for the warrantless search of the residence, the assertion that the stolen tools were located in the residence and that he had received advice that the entry and search were proper and lawful.
Later that same night the defendant discussed the controversy with an officer of equal rank, the patrol sergeant for the south zone. The defendant was annoyed that the conflict issue had been raised by the subordinate officer. Of more importance, he raised for the first time the falsehood that the police were justified in entering the apartment in "fresh pursuit" of a wanted man carrying the stolen television in question.
The concerns raised by the other officers who entered the residence became the subject of queries by the office of the crown attorney in Thunder Bay and by other senior officers. They asked the defendant on several occasions what lawful grounds may have existed for the entry and search. The defendant did not respond directly to these inquiries.
In response Sergeant Dimini edited an Occurrence Report written by another officer to insert the fabricated "fresh pursuit" narrative justifying his conduct. That alteration is the core of the conviction of Sergeant Dimini for the obstruction of justice charge. It was also compelling post-offence conduct supporting the conviction for breach of trust.
The trial was conducted by three experienced counsel and it was a model of issue-focused, efficient advocacy. Ten trial days including final submissions were needed. Much evidence was entered through agreed statements of fact. Written submissions were submitted. No defence was called.
In convicting the defendant of breach of trust I found the following:
There was no legitimate public purpose contemplated here. The motive was personal. The defendant believed that the occupants of the apartment had no rights that he was bound to respect. His object was not only a search for the missing tools based on the suspicion that the vendor of the television was in possession of the purloined tools. After he failed to find the tools, he intensified his misconduct through the arrests and detention for bail of some of the occupants. The defendant's aim was the infliction of extra-legal sanction on the persons he believed associated with the theft or sale of items belonging to his relation.
There was no evidence that the defendant gave any thought to seeking judicial authorization and there was no evidence that he debriefed his colleagues on arrival or consulted them on entry. In subsequent discussion he acknowledged both the illegality of his conduct and his indifference to that illegality. He concocted grounds which had no basis in reality and inserted that fiction into an official document.
With respect to the offence of obstruct justice I found that the editing of the Occurrence Report created by another officer had as its initial goal the maintenance of an unlawful and morally corrupt criminal action against the occupants of the apartment. Once the search had become controversial and multiple officials sought an explanation of the grounds for the search, the aim of the insertion of the "fresh pursuit" falsehood became the deflection and defeat of their inquiry.
It is well-settled law that both of these offences call out for general deterrence and denunciation as the guiding sentencing principles.
In the case of Cusack, 1978 CanLII 2283 (NS CA), 41 CCC (2d) 289, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal held at paras. 13 and 14 the following:
13 In my opinion the paramount consideration in this case is the protection of the public from offences of this sort being committed by persons who are given special authority by our law to deal with individual members of society, and to deter such persons from acting in breach of their trust. All citizens must have confidence that police officers who are vested with substantial rights of interference with individual liberties exercise these rights with scrupulous propriety, and that any failure to so act will result not only in dismissal from the position of trust but also in the imposition of substantial punishment.
14 The commission of offences by police officers has been considered on numerous occasions by the courts, and the unanimous finding has been that their sentence should be more severe than that of an ordinary person who commits the same crime because of the position of public trust which they held at the time of the offence and their knowledge of the consequences of its perpetration.
That was given to us some years ago, decades ago by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal.
This succinct statement of principle was followed by the ONCA in R. v. Feeney, 238 CCC (2d) at page 49, a 2008 decision, and in R. v. Schertzer, 2015 ONCA 259. These cases reflect the universal instruction of our appellate courts that the primary considerations in sentencing police officers for breach of trust are denunciation and general deterrence.
The record before me is replete with testimonials of the professional achievements, personal courage, and good character of the defendant. Senior courts have taken notice that offenders facing sentence in these matters are typically of good character with no prior convictions and a plethora of sympathetic character letters. In this respect, consider the words of Justice Casey Hill in R. v. Cook, [2010] ONSC 5016, at para. 36:
Not surprising is the reality that individuals who find themselves before a criminal court convicted of this offence are able to adduce abundant character evidence.
Senior courts have commented that "it is, of course, this very type of character profile which allows an individual to attain a position of trust." In this respect, see R. v. Williams 2007 CanLII 13949 (ON SC), [2007] O.J. No. 1604 and Willis [2018] NSJ 378.
Courts have held that as police compliance with the rule of law is presumptive, when sentencing a police officer for a crime involving breach of trust the court may properly take into account that the accused would be well aware of the consequences of their conduct. In this respect see Cusack, once again, (page 385), and Cook.
The admission by the defendant to a colleague that the entry was "probably a Charter breach, but that it's no big deal" indicates that the defendant was both aware of and cynically indifferent to the illegality of his acts.
I am unaware of any case with facts identical to the one before this court. In Schertzer, the Ontario Court of Appeal reviewed the 45-day conditional sentences imposed after trial in a case with significant parallels to our own. While some of the co-accused were convicted of perjury, Schertzer himself was convicted of attempt obstruct justice.
In granting the Crown's cross appeal on sentence, the Court found 3-year sentences appropriate. This Court held at paras. 136 through 137 of the judgment:
136 When the perpetrators of the crime are police officers sworn to uphold the law, the objective of denunciation has heightened significance. Police officers owe a special duty to be faithful to the justice system.
137 The sentencing judge addressed the objective of general deterrence. However, the 45-day sentences do not reflect society's condemnation of the conduct. Nor do they address the need to denounce the crimes and are thus demonstrably unfit.
The accused police officers searched a residence before the search warrant physically arrived at the premises. They then falsified their notes in order to conceal the warrant-less search of the residence. All of the defendants except Schertzer also lied at the preliminary inquiry. The attempt obstruct justice and perjury counts relied on essentially the same facts: the defendants searched the premises without a warrant and covered their conduct up. Schertzer himself was not convicted of perjury as he did not testify. The Court of Appeal nevertheless found that his attempt obstruct justice conviction merited the same 3-year sentence as was imposed on his confederates.
In arriving at their conclusion, the Court of Appeal noted the trial judge's view that the lengthy and invasive investigation on the prolonged nature of the proceedings "had a significant deterrent effect", that incarceration would be particularly difficult for the officers, and that the defendants had little to gain from the warrantless search. These comments were noted at Schertzer, paras. 128-129. The court determined that "while deference is owed to the sentencing judge, the objective of denunciation requires that this Court intervene as the sentences were demonstrably unfit".
The Court cited the passage from Cusack noted at the beginning of this judgment and went on to quote from R. v. Hall, 2001 BCCA 74 at para 12:
Obstruction of justice or attempting to obstruct justice strikes at our system of a lawful society. The message must be clear that this type of interference with the community system for handling criminal offences will not be tolerated. It is for this reason that the courts must act firmly to express society's disapproval and denunciation of this conduct.
The facts in the case before me are, if anything, worse than those found in Schertzer. The police in Schertzer obtained a warrant after they conducted the search. This would seem to be good evidence that reasonable and probable grounds for the search existed. The motive for their crime appears to have been impatience at the time required to receive approval for the search. There was no evidence of demonstrable personal gain or element of personal interest behind the deceit. Schertzer's co-accused participated willingly. No blameless colleagues were conscripted into this crime.
Not so in our case. The defendant's crime did not consist of concocting a record about whether a warrant was received before a premises was searched. His crime consisted of searching a residence without a shred of reasonable and probable grounds, exigent circumstances or anything else resembling a lawful basis to enter 230 Frederika Street. He then surreptitiously inserted a fiction justifying the search into an Occurrence Report written by a subordinate colleague.
I disagree with the suggestion that this case differs in the degree of planning and deliberation from Schertzer. In that case there was little or no evidence of the degree to which the police planned the crime in advance of the search but obvious evidence of collective criminal deliberation afterwards.
In the case before me, it is clear that the defendant was aware of the loss of the television and the tools earlier on the day of the illegal entry and search. He communicated throughout the day with family members engaged in the search for the missing items. He conducted a computer search of the name of the vendor prior to the assignment of the other officers to the "Keep the Peace/Stand-by" call. He attended the immediate area before the police assigned the matter and then made a surprise appearance once the task of the assignment had been completed.
The obvious and compelling inference is that the defendant contemplated his intervention well in advance of the police attendance independent of the successful recovery of the television. The decision to enter the premises was no spur of the moment error in judgment, but a planned and calculated intervention. As we know, the defendant also energetically pursued the cover-up of the breach of trust afterwards, culminating in the acts which ground his conviction for attempt obstruct justice.
The defendant outranked the four colleagues who were actually assigned to the call. They had no real option other than to follow his command that "we're going in". They also made it clear in their evidence they would not expose a colleague to the potential danger inherent in entering a suspected drug den alone. His conscription of fellow officers as assistants in this criminal enterprise is an aggravating factor not found in Schertzer.
The arrest of some of the occupants and their subsequent detention for bail must also be considered an aggravating factor.
I think particularly of the lessee, Ms. Stachiw. She was entitled to insist on a warrant prior police entry, a position honoured by the four police she encountered minutes before the defendant's arrival. I am unable to accept the suggestion that the defendant's conduct facilitated her subsequent success in dealing with substance abuse or escaping her criminal boyfriend. There was no evidence that the defendant sought her welfare or rehabilitation. He threatened her, yelled savage profanities at her, and trashed her apartment in addition to the other indignities inflicted on her by arrest and detention prior to bail.
It may be inferred from all of the circumstances and his admission that the Charter breach was "no big deal" and that the defendant believed that the occupants of the premises were safe targets. The conditions of life which are associated with drug addiction and membership in the drug-addicted demimonde made the residents of 230 Frederika Street, apartment 14, vulnerable to abuse and illegal acts by the defendant. The court must strongly deter this conduct. Even the "usual suspects" have rights.
I am urged to consider a substantial number of judgments that imposed conditional sentences in breach of trust cases. In the main trial decisions, these cases seem to involve catastrophic errors in judgment that were the consequence of unusual stressors involving family members, substance abuse, or personal difficulties. These cases all lack the conscription of blameless fellow officers in the instant crimes. These cases generally involve the mitigation of a plea of guilt and are seldom perpetrated by officers of higher rank.
It is my view that officers of higher rank must be held to a higher standard than constables. They are meant to provide leadership and set an example of conduct. It is an aggravating feature of these offences that they were committed by a police officer of higher rank.
I cannot consider the prolonged period that the defendant faced proceedings as a serious mitigating feature in sentence. No issue of delay was raised before this court. The defendant was not charged in these matters when they first arose in November 2020. In fact, he was speedily cleared by the Thunder Bay Police Service. He was charged only in 2023, after the Ontario Provincial Police investigated the matter.
I cannot ameliorate the sentence appreciably because of the negative publicity and public shaming that I am told the defendant has experienced. Per Justice Hill in Cook (supra) at para. 37:
In any case involving conviction and sentence, the accused is stigmatized, more or less, by the process. While shame and disgrace may be amplified in the case of a public official, these consequences are not to be over-emphasized in determining a fit punishment.
In mitigation of sentence, I consider the inevitable emotional and financial damage to the defendant's spouse, parents and children in imposing incarceration. I appreciate that he has managed and managed seriously challenges of alcohol use, depressive disorder and
work-related Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. These conditions were diagnosed after the events that led to the defendant's conviction. There is no evidence that these conditions lead to the conduct for which I sentence him. I expect that the defendant's concern for the well-being of his loved ones will exacerbate the stresses of custody and negatively affect his psychological challenges and they must mitigate the sentence.
The defendant has a strong support network of family, spouse and friends. He has found a livelihood after his retirement from the police service. He has strong prospects of rehabilitation.
There is no evidence before me about any particular circumstances that exist in Thunder Bay. In the absence of such evidence, I cannot consider any local factors to be aggravating on sentence. Nor is there evidence of any endangerment to the records management system. The system worked. The time, date and author of the Occurrence Report falsification were accurately tracked.
I also consider that the defendant will likely need to be isolated from other inmates during his period of custody.
I have considered the defendant's position that a period of 15 to 18 months to be served in the community and the Crown's position that the same range of incarceration is sufficient.
I have commented a moment ago about the plethora of, principally, trial court decisions in which conditional sentences were approved by the court. I have described my view that these cases lack the aggravating features described above. Here we have serious unlawful acts committed by a senior officer who propagated multiple falsehoods to escape consequences. We must ask ourselves the question: How is the administration of criminal justice to inspire the confidence of the citizens and the probity of other officers if the sentence imposed does not reflect the gravity of the betrayal?
In my view, a reformatory sentence, still less the grant of a conditional sentence, does not approach the degree of denunciation required by the acts proved. Nor would it provide significant deterrence to those who would exploit the public trust in their office for personal or sordid ends.
In my view, the breach of trust committed through the calculated illegal entry and search of the Frederika Street apartment, the arrests and detentions that followed, and the conscription of subordinate officers in this crime merits a sentence of 3 years in the penitentiary. The subsequent fraudulent alteration of the Occurrence Report to insert the bogus justification for the Frederika Street action would normally merit a 2-year consecutive sentence of imprisonment.
I must give effect to the mitigating features described in this judgment and represented by able counsel and the principles of restraint, proportionality and totality by imposing a global sentence of 3 years' imprisonment. On the breach of trust I impose a 3-year penitentiary sentence. The obstruct justice count merits a sentence of 2 years concurrent to the other sentence.
I have been asked to impose a series of ancillary orders. I very much doubt that Mr. Dimini is going to have a future which involves the commission of criminal offences. On balance, I decline to impose the requirement that there be a DNA sample extracted from Mr. Dimini. I also think that he is going to have some financial burdens when he emerges from custody which may make the imposition of a Victim Fine Surcharge onerous. I decline to impose a Victim Fine Surcharge.
This is my sentence in the matter. Sir, if you might step into custody now. Thank you.
I would be remiss if I didn't comment on the progress of this trial. Much of what has been heard by way of evidence must disturb people who are citizens of this province and this city. The trial itself was very well conducted by the counsel who were involved. The issues were dealt with in a very thorough, straightforward and professional manner, and I must commend counsel for their conduct in this matter.
FORM 3
ELECTRONIC CERTIFICATE OF TRANSCRIPT (SUBSECTION 5(2))
Evidence Act
I, Vanessa Giorno, certify that this document is a true and accurate transcript of the recording of R. v. DIMINI,
Michael, in the Ontario Court of Justice held at 125 Brodie Street North, Thunder Bay, Ontario, taken from Recording No. 4211_CR206_20260513_092905 6_BLOCKM.dcr, which has been certified in Form 1.
06/08/2026 Vanessa Giorno
(Date) (Electronic signature)
487 3892 741 ACT ID No.
ONTARIO, Canada (Province of signing)
A certificate in Form 3 is admissible in evidence and is proof, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the transcript is a transcript of the certified recording of evidence and proceedings in the proceeding that is identified in the certificate.