Michael Hargadon

The Crown brought an application alleging that the accused breached a Conditional Sentence Order by sending a text message to his son in violation of a no-contact condition.

The accused denied sending the message, testifying that while the email account used to send the message was associated with his business, he had never used it to contact his son and could not cancel the account as it was owned by his former spouse.

The court found that the Crown had not established the identity of the sender on a balance of probabilities and dismissed the application.

The accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter in connection with the death of Adrian Richardson, who was shot during a home invasion and robbery on May 2, 2022.

The accused drove the perpetrators to and from the victim's residence, knowing that violence was a distinct possibility.

The court accepted a joint submission and imposed a sentence of four years imprisonment with enhanced pre-sentence custody credits, resulting in an effective sentence of 211 days, followed by 12 months probation, a lifetime firearms prohibition, and a victim fine surcharge.

A police constable was charged with assault causing bodily harm after an altercation with an individual he was attempting to re-apprehend under the Mental Health Act.

The court found that while the officer was justified in the initial apprehension, the subsequent use of force, specifically four closed-fist strikes to the individual's face while he was on the ground and largely defenceless, was excessive and disproportionate.

The court found the officer's testimony inconsistent and concluded that the force was used out of frustration and annoyance rather than genuine safety concerns.

The officer was found guilty of assault causing bodily harm.

This is a sentencing decision for Skye Blackburde, an Indigenous woman, who pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing the death of Marcella Jourdain.

The incident involved high blood alcohol and cannabis levels, reckless driving at excessive speed (147 km/h on a gravel road with an 80 km/h limit), and prior related driving convictions.

The court considered significant aggravating factors, including the accused's criminal record and dangerous driving, alongside substantial mitigating factors.

These mitigating factors included her late but genuine guilty plea, sincere remorse, and extensive rehabilitative efforts, including successful completion of residential treatment and active participation in community aftercare, leading to a pro-social lifestyle and employment.

The court also gave due weight to Gladue principles, acknowledging her horrific upbringing and its impact on her moral culpability.

While emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence as primary sentencing objectives, the court balanced these with rehabilitation and the Gladue factors, ultimately imposing a six-year custodial sentence, reduced to three years and eleven months after accounting for pre-trial custody, treatment time, and restrictive bail conditions.

The accused, Marshall Hardy-Fox, pleaded guilty to kidnapping and accessory after the fact in connection with the death of Lee Chiodo, who was kidnapped and murdered over a drug debt by co-accused David Hui and Musab Saboon.

Hardy-Fox, a drug addict with no prior criminal record, acted as the driver during the kidnapping and later cooperated with the police, testifying against Hui and Saboon.

The Crown sought a total sentence of 6-8 years, while the defence argued for time served (21 months) plus probation, emphasizing Gladue factors and the accused's cooperation.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the drug-related nature of the offences and the use of a firearm, alongside significant mitigating factors such as the accused's lack of record, early guilty plea, remorse, assistance to the prosecution, and Indigenous background (Gladue factors).

The judge imposed a sentence of 3 years and 8 months (44 months) for kidnapping and 2 years concurrently for accessory after the fact.

With 21 months credit for pre-sentence custody and restrictive bail conditions, the remaining custodial sentence was 23 months, followed by a 3-year probation order.

The plaintiff sought summary judgment for assault and battery against a dentist and vicarious liability against his professional corporation.

The defendants admitted liability for assault and vicarious liability but disputed battery and the quantum of damages.

The court found insufficient evidence to establish direct physical contact for battery, thus dismissing that claim.

However, the court granted summary judgment for assault and vicarious liability, awarding damages for the plaintiff's pain and suffering.

The appellant appealed her conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient, particularly regarding credibility findings in a Charter application.

The Charter application alleged arbitrary detention and sought exclusion of evidence, claiming the traffic stop was solely for a roadside sobriety test.

The trial judge dismissed the Charter application, finding the traffic stop lawful based on observed Highway Traffic Act infractions and that the breath demand complied with the Criminal Code.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, deferring to the trial judge's credibility findings and concluding that the reasons were sufficient, finding no basis to interfere with the rulings.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter due to an alleged violation of his s. 11(b) right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay from charge to trial was 42 months.

The court attributed 4 months and 2 weeks to defence delay and 1 month and 3 weeks to a discrete event (court recording system failure), resulting in a net delay of 35 months and 3 weeks.

This exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown failed to demonstrate transitional exceptional circumstances to justify the delay, citing a general lack of diligence, including a year for disclosure and 12 months for a two-day preliminary inquiry.

The court found a violation of s. 11(b) and granted a stay of proceedings.

The applicant, charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking, brought a Stinchcombe application seeking disclosure of police documents related to two search warrants.

The defence alleged fraud in obtaining the second warrant, specifically fabricating a confidential informant (CI #6).

The court dismissed the application for disclosure of the "SMEAC" report (finding it irrelevant to guilt/innocence and protected by public interest privilege), confidential informant handling notes for CI #1 (due to informer privilege and lack of reliance by the affiant), and handling notes for CI #6 (finding no sufficient evidentiary foundation to establish relevance for a Garofoli application, despite alleged irregularities in the search).

The appellant, a permanent resident and recognized convention refugee, appealed his conviction for possessing a weapon for a dangerous purpose.

He argued his guilty plea was invalid due to ineffective assistance of duty counsel regarding immigration consequences and lack of intent due to intoxication.

The court found that duty counsel had advised the appellant to seek immigration advice and that the appellant had signed an acknowledgment of potential immigration consequences.

The court declined to find ineffective assistance of counsel due to lack of evidence on the standard of care.

It also rejected the argument that the plea was uninformed due to the appellant's own failure to seek advice, distinguishing it from cases where erroneous advice was given.

The court further dismissed the intoxication argument, finding the appellant admitted to possessing the weapon.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to uttering threats, theft, and fraud.

He appealed the one-year custodial sentence imposed for uttering threats, which arose from Twitter posts expressing support for ISIS and offering to ensure 'something happens' if given Canadian addresses.

The appellant, an Aboriginal man with Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder, had already served the sentence.

The Superior Court of Justice exercised its discretion to hear the moot appeal.

The court found the sentencing judge erred in principle by overemphasizing denunciation and deterrence based on public sensitivity to terrorism, noting the appellant's cognitive limitations, lack of sophistication, and the limited public alarm caused by his actions.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to time served (four months).

The accused, charged with attempted murder and aggravated assault, brought an O'Connor application seeking third-party records from the investigating police service.

The requested records included the training records of the interrogating officers and gang intelligence information regarding several witnesses.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the officers' training was irrelevant to the voluntariness of the accused's statements, which depends on the officers' actual conduct.

The court also held that the gang intelligence information was protected by informer privilege and that compelling its production would improperly conscript the police to conduct investigations on behalf of the defence.

The applicant sought a stay of a one-year driving prohibition imposed following convictions for impaired driving and failing to provide a breath sample, pending appeal under s. 261 of the Criminal Code.

The applicant argued the appeal had arguable merit based on an alleged Charter breach arising from prolonged post-arrest detention (“over holding”) and that the licence suspension created hardship affecting employment.

The court accepted that the appeal met the low threshold of having some arguable merit, given potential evidentiary gaps regarding the applicant’s condition during detention.

However, the applicant failed to establish real hardship, as he remained employed and was able to obtain transportation to work.

The court held that mere inconvenience does not satisfy the hardship requirement for a stay of a driving prohibition pending appeal.

The accused applied pre‑trial for a change of venue under s. 599 of the Criminal Code and, in the alternative, leave to challenge prospective jurors for cause under s. 638(1)(b).

The applications were based on historical publicity relating to the accused’s prior murder conviction more than 25 years earlier in the same district.

The court held that dated and limited media coverage did not establish a reasonable likelihood that the accused could not receive a fair trial before an impartial jury in the local venue.

The accused also failed to demonstrate a realistic potential for juror partiality across the jury district.

Both the change of venue and challenge for cause applications were dismissed.