Andrew T.G. Sadler

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings under s.11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 24 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial courts.

The primary source of delay was an 11-month period for forensic analysis of seized electronic devices.

The court found that while some defence delay existed, the Crown failed to demonstrate that the remaining delay was justified by "particular complexity" or that a concrete plan was implemented to minimize the delay.

Consequently, the prosecution was stayed.

The accused, Marshall Hardy-Fox, pleaded guilty to kidnapping and accessory after the fact in connection with the death of Lee Chiodo, who was kidnapped and murdered over a drug debt by co-accused David Hui and Musab Saboon.

Hardy-Fox, a drug addict with no prior criminal record, acted as the driver during the kidnapping and later cooperated with the police, testifying against Hui and Saboon.

The Crown sought a total sentence of 6-8 years, while the defence argued for time served (21 months) plus probation, emphasizing Gladue factors and the accused's cooperation.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the drug-related nature of the offences and the use of a firearm, alongside significant mitigating factors such as the accused's lack of record, early guilty plea, remorse, assistance to the prosecution, and Indigenous background (Gladue factors).

The judge imposed a sentence of 3 years and 8 months (44 months) for kidnapping and 2 years concurrently for accessory after the fact.

With 21 months credit for pre-sentence custody and restrictive bail conditions, the remaining custodial sentence was 23 months, followed by a 3-year probation order.

The appellant appealed her conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient, particularly regarding credibility findings in a Charter application.

The Charter application alleged arbitrary detention and sought exclusion of evidence, claiming the traffic stop was solely for a roadside sobriety test.

The trial judge dismissed the Charter application, finding the traffic stop lawful based on observed Highway Traffic Act infractions and that the breath demand complied with the Criminal Code.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, deferring to the trial judge's credibility findings and concluding that the reasons were sufficient, finding no basis to interfere with the rulings.

Benjamin Marki was found guilty by a jury of two counts of second-degree murder, one count of intentionally or recklessly causing damage by fire to a residence, and one count of improperly interfering with human remains.

The convictions stemmed from the brutal stabbing deaths of two victims, Wilfred Potts and Anne Chuchmuch, followed by the deliberate setting of fire to their residence and Ms. Chuchmuch's body.

The court considered the mandatory life sentence for murder and determined the parole ineligibility period, taking into account the offender's character, the nature and circumstances of the offences, the jury's recommendations, and Gladue factors.

The court imposed a life sentence with no parole eligibility for 20 years on each murder count, to be served concurrently, along with time served for the arson and indignity to human remains charges.

Mr. Milani was convicted of multiple home invasion sexual assaults and related offences committed between 1985 and 1987.

The court determined a fit sentence, considering the Kienapple principle for multiple convictions, the circumstances of the four incidents, the offender's background, and the profound impact on victims.

The Crown sought 20 years to life, while the defence proposed 5-8 years.

The court imposed a global sentence of 20 years imprisonment, along with ancillary orders including a lifetime weapons prohibition, communication prohibition with victims, DNA sample submission, and sex offender registration.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, unlawful confinement, uttering threats, and theft under $5,000.

The charges stemmed from an incident involving the accused and the complainant at a motel.

The court found the complainant's evidence unreliable due to severe intoxication and memory impairment from alcohol and drugs.

The accused's statement to police provided a plausible alternative explanation.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused was acquitted on all counts.

The accused applied to have the trial judge call Leoncia Roundhead as a witness in a jury trial for aggravated assault, arguing the Crown had an oblique motive for not calling her, that the defence was prejudiced by relying on her being called, and that the jury was led to believe she would testify.

The court denied the application, finding no oblique motive and that the Crown's opening did not create a firm expectation.

However, the court ordered several accommodations for the defence, including making the witness available for an interview, allowing cross-examination without meeting Canada Evidence Act s. 9 requirements if called by the defence, and permitting comment on the Crown's decision not to call her during closing arguments.

The Crown applied for a review of a Justice of the Peace's decision to release the accused on a recognizance with a surety.

The accused was charged with two break and enters, one involving a severe assault.

The Crown argued the Justice of the Peace erred in law, made an inappropriate decision, and that new evidence justified detention.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding the Justice of the Peace properly considered the tertiary ground, the strength of the Crown's case, the gravity of the offences, and Gladue principles in crafting a strict release plan with a strong surety.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for assaulting his common-law spouse.

The conviction relied entirely on the trial judge's assessment of the credibility of the appellant and the complainant.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge misapprehended material evidence regarding the parties' intoxication and the physical altercation, and subjected the appellant's evidence to a stricter level of scrutiny than the complainant's.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay in his prosecution for murder and break and enter.

The total delay from arrest to the scheduled trial date was over 53 months.

The court analyzed the periods of delay, noting that significant portions were attributable to the applicant's difficulties in retaining counsel of choice and his subsequent challenges to the jury roll.

The court concluded that the institutional delay was not unreasonable in the circumstances and that the societal interest in a trial on the merits outweighed the applicant's s. 11(b) interests.

The application was dismissed.

The applicants, who were facing separate jury trials, brought a pre-trial 'Kokopenace' application challenging the constitutionality of the 2015 Thunder Bay jury roll.

They sought a publication ban on the proceedings under s. 648 of the Criminal Code or, alternatively, under the common law Dagenais/Mentuck test.

The court granted a partial publication ban to prevent potential jurors from drawing adverse inferences against the applicants, specifically prohibiting the publication of their identities, the facts of the allegations, and the fact that one applicant had previously brought a similar application.

The accused, charged with murder, sought to relitigate a pre-trial ruling that found his police statement voluntary.

The original trial judge retired before the trial commenced, and the accused argued the new trial judge was not bound by the previous ruling under the Criminal Code.

The court held that the situation was analogous to rulings made by a case management judge or after a mistrial, where previous rulings remain binding unless it is in the interests of justice to relitigate.

Finding no new evidence or change in circumstances, the court dismissed the application and upheld the voluntariness ruling.

The applicants, two Aboriginal men facing murder charges, challenged the 2015 Thunder Bay jury roll, arguing it violated their ss. 11(d) and 11(f) Charter rights due to inadequate inclusion of on-reserve Aboriginal residents.

The court applied the Supreme Court of Canada's test from R. v. Kokopenace, focusing on whether the state made reasonable efforts to provide a fair opportunity for a broad cross-section of society to participate.

The court reviewed the extensive efforts made by the province, including pilot projects, increased questionnaires, and follow-ups, and concluded that the state had met its constitutional obligation.

The application was dismissed.

The applicants, two Aboriginal men facing murder charges, brought a pre-trial application challenging the representativeness of the 2015 Thunder Bay jury roll under ss. 11(d) and 11(f) of the Charter.

They argued the state failed to make reasonable efforts to obtain source lists and deliver jury notices to on-reserve First Nations residents.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada's framework in Kokopenace, the court reviewed the state's efforts, including the creation of an Aboriginal Jury Coordinator position, pilot projects offering compensation to bands for lists and delivery, and follow-ups on returned mail.

The court found that the state made reasonable efforts and provided a fair opportunity for a broad cross-section of society to participate, dismissing the application.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired operation of a motor vehicle contrary to ss. 253(1)(a) and 255 of the Criminal Code.

The appeal alleged that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and improperly applied the credibility analysis required by R. v. W.(D.).

The Superior Court reviewed the trial reasons and concluded that the trial judge properly assessed credibility in the context of all the evidence, including independent eyewitness testimony, and gave adequate reasons for rejecting the accused’s testimony.

The court found no misapprehension of evidence, no shifting of the burden of proof, and no palpable or overriding error.

The conviction was therefore upheld.