Terrance A. Platana

This action arose from a motor vehicle accident.

The primary issue at trial was whether the vehicle owner, Crystal Vincent, had given implied consent to Riley Sabourin, an unlicensed driver, to possess her vehicle at the time of the accident.

The court considered the long-term relationship between the defendants, Ms. Vincent's knowledge of Mr. Sabourin's past unauthorized driving, her failure to secure keys, and her general admonishments rather than explicit prohibitions.

The court found that Ms. Vincent failed to discharge her onus to prove lack of implied consent, concluding that Mr. Sabourin was justified in deeming he had implied consent.

The court determined costs following its decision that the applicant, A.R., lacked standing to seek access to her adopted child.

The respondents, M.B. and E.B., sought substantial indemnity costs.

The court considered the factors under Rule 24(11) of the Family Law Rules, including the importance and complexity of issues, parties' behaviour, counsel rates, time spent, and the applicant's limited financial means.

The court found the case not overly complex, noted some unreasonableness in the applicant's conduct, and deemed the respondents' claimed hours excessive.

It disallowed certain disbursements and ultimately awarded the respondents $20,000 for fees plus HST, and $611.22 for disbursements plus HST, significantly less than the amount sought.

The appellant, Neil Robert Keefe, appealed his assault conviction, arguing the trial judge failed to properly apply the R. v. W.(D.) credibility analysis and to engage in a proper self-defence analysis.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge, despite not using the exact W.(D.) language, correctly applied the burden of proof and reasonable doubt standard.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's implicit rejection of self-defence, as her credibility findings indicated the appellant was the aggressor, thus negating an "air of reality" for the defence.

Benjamin Marki was found guilty by a jury of two counts of second-degree murder, one count of intentionally or recklessly causing damage by fire to a residence, and one count of improperly interfering with human remains.

The convictions stemmed from the brutal stabbing deaths of two victims, Wilfred Potts and Anne Chuchmuch, followed by the deliberate setting of fire to their residence and Ms. Chuchmuch's body.

The court considered the mandatory life sentence for murder and determined the parole ineligibility period, taking into account the offender's character, the nature and circumstances of the offences, the jury's recommendations, and Gladue factors.

The court imposed a life sentence with no parole eligibility for 20 years on each murder count, to be served concurrently, along with time served for the arson and indignity to human remains charges.

The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's action for lack of jurisdiction, arguing no real and substantial connection to Ontario and a California choice-of-law clause.

The plaintiff, residing in Ontario, contended the defendants carried on business in Ontario through third-party retailers and marketing.

The court, adopting prior rulings, found no actual presence of the defendants in Ontario and that the claims arose from a California-governed contract, thus dismissing the action for want of jurisdiction.

The offender, C.R.A., was convicted of sexual assault involving vaginal penetration of an intoxicated and sleeping friend.

The court considered aggravating factors including three prior sexual assault convictions, lack of remorse, and the victim's vulnerability.

Mitigating factors included the offender's history of sexual abuse, struggles with substance abuse, and family support.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court sentenced C.R.A. to four years in penitentiary, along with a DNA order, a lifetime weapons prohibition, and a 20-year Sex Offender Registry Order.

The Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the Defendants' counterclaim and set-off defence, was dismissed.

This decision addresses the Defendants' claim for costs.

The court, applying Rule 57.01, found the Defendants' claimed costs of over $67,000 to be excessive, noting the motion's complexity was not as high as claimed and much of the work could be used at trial.

The court awarded the Defendants partial indemnity costs of $35,000.00 plus HST and disbursements of $600.00 plus HST, representing a 35% reduction from full indemnity.

The applicant, David Safronuk, sought court directions regarding the validity of his deceased father's testamentary documents, the removal of his brother, Steven Safronuk, as co-estate trustee, and orders for Steven to produce estate-related documents.

The court determined that both the formal will and a subsequent handwritten document (codicil) were valid.

Steven Safronuk was removed as estate trustee due to an irreconcilable inability to cooperate with the applicant and potential conflicts of interest regarding estate assets.

Steven was ordered to produce the testamentary documents and bank statements.

This decision addresses costs following the dismissal of the defendant's motion to compel the plaintiff to answer undertakings and re-attend for examination.

The motion was dismissed due to its late timing and the defendant's counsel's delay and discourteous conduct.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing the motion was brought inappropriately late.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs, finding the defendant's counsel's conduct inappropriate but not rising to the level warranting substantial indemnity, and applied the principles of reasonableness and access to justice under Rule 57.01 and the Courts of Justice Act.

This is a pre-trial application by the Crown in a criminal proceeding against Keith Ritchie, who is charged with drug trafficking and criminal organization offenses.

The Crown sought to admit the sworn statement of Salvatore Larizza, a deceased witness, and the transcript of a guilty plea entered by co-accused Frank Muzzi.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay, finding that the Larizza statement met the criteria of necessity (due to death) and threshold reliability (due to circumstances of making and corroborative evidence).

However, while the fact of Muzzi's guilty plea was admissible, the underlying facts from its transcript were not, as the Crown failed to establish necessity for Muzzi's testimony.

The application to admit the Larizza statement and the fact of Muzzi's guilty plea was allowed, but the transcript of Muzzi's plea facts was dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion seeking an order for the plaintiff to answer undertakings from an examination for discovery and re-attend for further examination.

The undertakings concerned financial records for the plaintiff's business, which the plaintiff deemed irrelevant, having provided Canada Revenue Agency notices of assessment.

The defendant delayed over a year in bringing the motion, despite repeated attempts by the plaintiff's counsel to arrange for continuation of examinations.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the defendant's delay inappropriate and noting the significant potential for trial delay.

The court emphasized that the defendant had ample opportunity for discovery and was not precluded from cross-examining on financial records at trial, applying principles of proportionality and orderly progress of the action.

Applicants sought a declaration under the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992 that the respondents had effectively resigned as attorneys for property and personal care under powers of attorney granted by the grantor.

The respondents had signed a resignation notice stating that the resignation would become effective when delivered to the grantor and her five children, but the notice was not delivered to all of them.

The court considered the statutory framework governing resignation of attorneys under ss. 11 and 52 of the Act and the evidence regarding whether the attorneys had acted under the powers.

The court held that, regardless of statutory conditions, the respondents imposed their own express condition in the resignation document requiring delivery to all five children.

Because that condition was not satisfied, the resignation was ineffective.

Following a lengthy civil trial involving multiple plaintiffs arising from a motor vehicle incident, the plaintiffs’ claims against several defendants—including a transportation company, police officers, and the provincial Crown—were dismissed.

The successful defendants sought substantial costs after a 56‑day trial and extensive pre‑trial litigation.

The court applied s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rules 49 and 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing fairness and reasonableness in fixing costs rather than a strict accounting exercise.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity basis up to the defendants’ settlement offers and on a substantial indemnity basis thereafter, with adjustments made for excessive claims and unnecessary attendance of junior counsel.

The court also held the plaintiffs jointly and severally liable for the liability portion of the defendants’ costs, while allocating damages‑related costs severally among individual plaintiffs.

Requests for a Sanderson order and third‑party costs were denied.

A costs decision arising from a multi‑plaintiff bus accident action where one plaintiff settled prior to trial.

The settling plaintiff sought costs based on a proportional share of a collective liability account and individual damages account maintained for all plaintiffs.

The defendants disputed various docketed entries, including costs relating to unrelated proceedings, unsuccessful motions, and non‑taxable disbursements.

Applying the discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and the factors in Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court emphasized proportionality between the settlement value and the requested costs.

The court rejected the full amount sought and instead fixed a global costs award considered fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

Following a 24‑year marriage, the applicant sought divorce, spousal support, equalization of net family property, and relief concerning the matrimonial home and pension interests.

The court addressed whether the applicant could waive the survivor benefit under the respondent’s pension, the proper valuation of the matrimonial home, entitlement to occupational rent, and spousal support.

The court held that the pension survivor benefit constituted property that must be included in the equalization calculation and could not be waived for that purpose.

The matrimonial home was valued at $224,500 and ordered listed for sale unless the respondent purchased the applicant’s interest.

Occupational rent was denied, but ongoing spousal support was ordered based on need and the parties’ financial circumstances.

Following a marriage of approximately 13.5 years, the respondent spouse sought spousal support after the parties resolved custody, access, child support, and equalization.

The respondent argued entitlement on compensatory and non‑compensatory bases, claiming he sacrificed career advancement and assumed caregiving responsibilities while the applicant advanced her career and earned significantly more income.

The court applied s. 15.2(4) and (6) of the Divorce Act and considered leading authorities on spousal support entitlement.

The court found no evidence that the respondent suffered economic disadvantage due to the marriage or its breakdown and concluded he remained economically self‑sufficient.

The respondent’s claim for spousal support was therefore dismissed.

The plaintiffs moved to set aside a registrar’s order dismissing their action for delay under rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure after failing to set the action down for trial by a deadline established at a status hearing.

Applying the contextual approach articulated in Court of Appeal jurisprudence, the court considered factors including the explanation for delay, inadvertence in missing the deadline, promptness in bringing the motion, and prejudice to the defendants.

Although the affidavit evidence explaining the delay was limited, the record demonstrated the action had progressed through discoveries and expert reports and that counsel’s failure to meet the deadline was inadvertent rather than deliberate.

The defendants filed no evidence of prejudice and other related actions arising from the same accident remained active.

Balancing the relevant considerations and the principle favouring determination on the merits, the court set aside the registrar’s dismissal order but declined to award costs due to the plaintiffs’ responsibility for the missed deadline.

Following the breakdown of a 12-year marriage, the applicant sought spousal support, enforcement of equalization and costs, and related relief.

Evidence showed the applicant worked part-time during the relationship while performing primary domestic responsibilities and contributing all earnings to the household, while the respondent had historically earned high income in mining-related employment but failed to comply with prior support and disclosure orders.

The court found the respondent intentionally under‑employed and imputed income based on his historical earnings.

Applying the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, the court fixed ongoing spousal support and confirmed significant arrears.

The court also enforced outstanding cost awards through the Family Responsibility Office.

The accused brought a motion under s. 629 of the Criminal Code challenging the jury panel on the basis that the jury roll for the Thunder Bay district was not representative due to inadequate inclusion of First Nations persons living on reserves.

The motion relied on prior decisions criticizing the process for obtaining band lists and argued that insufficient changes had been made to address systemic underrepresentation.

The court reviewed evidence regarding steps taken by the Ministry of the Attorney General and local court officials, including revised procedures, outreach to band councils, offers to meet with communities, and efforts to clarify Privacy Act concerns.

Applying jurisprudence on representativeness and the sheriff’s duty of reasonable diligence under the Juries Act, the court held that reasonable efforts had been made despite continued refusals by some band councils to provide lists.

The accused failed to establish partiality or misconduct by the sheriff.