Vern Brewer

The defendants, Gerald Lougheed Jr. and Patricia Sorbara, were charged with corruptly promising employment or appointment to Andrew Olivier to induce him to withdraw his candidacy or refrain from becoming a candidate in the Sudbury by-election, contrary to section 96.1(e) of the Election Act.

Sorbara was also charged with agreeing to employ two of Glenn Thibeault's staff to induce Thibeault to become a candidate.

Following a directed verdict application at the end of the Crown's case, the court found that Olivier was not a "candidate" under the Election Act as he was only seeking the Liberal Party nomination, not running in an election to the Legislative Assembly.

The court also found that once Thibeault committed to running, it became impossible for Olivier to become the Liberal candidate, and therefore the defendants could not be convicted of inducing him to refrain from becoming one.

Regarding the Thibeault count, the court found that the agreement to employ campaign staff did not constitute bribery as defined in the Act and did not offend the Act's purpose of ensuring fair elections.

Directed verdicts of acquittal were entered for both defendants on all counts.

The appellant, a former designated public office holder, appealed his convictions and $50,000 fine for three counts of illegal lobbying under the Lobbying Act.

The Superior Court of Justice overturned the conviction on count three, finding that his communications regarding an existing government grant did not constitute prohibited lobbying.

However, the court upheld the convictions on counts one and two, agreeing that his activities on behalf of an energy policy institute constituted prohibited consultant lobbying.

The global fine was reduced to $45,000 to reflect the overturned conviction, but the court found no error in principle in the sentencing judge's approach.

The accused, as the directing mind of a construction company, orchestrated a scheme to assemble and transfer approximately $1.7 million to his personal account in Lebanon while the company was insolvent and unable to pay subcontractors, suppliers, employees, and statutory trust obligations.

The court found that the accused knowingly relied on false financial statements, a sham share sale, a fabricated shareholder deposit, and false pretences to obtain credit, bonding, and financing, and then diverted trust and company funds offshore.

Applying the governing fraud principles, the court held that the Crown proved deceit, deprivation, and subjective knowledge of the risk of deprivation beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court convicted the accused on ten counts including fraud, obtaining credit by false pretence, bankruptcy offences, laundering proceeds of crime, forgery, and uttering forged documents.

The accused was charged with undertaking to communicate with a public office holder for payment and failing to file a return with the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying, contrary to section 5(1) of the Lobbying Act.

This is a strict liability offence.

The central issue was whether the accused, as an employee of a lobbying firm, was required to file an individual return under section 5(1) or whether the corporation's filing obligation under section 7 applied.

The court found that the accused, as an individual consultant lobbyist, was required to file a return within 10 days of undertaking to communicate with public office holders on behalf of a third-party client for payment.

The court rejected arguments that the exception in section 5(6) applied or that section 7 was the governing provision.

The applicant challenged the constitutionality of the Lobbying Act on two grounds: first, that the offence and punishment provisions conflict with rights granted in the English Bill of Rights, 1689, and second, that the provisions infringe freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The applicant, a paid consultant lobbyist, failed to file a prescribed return disclosing lobbying activities on behalf of a client.

The court rejected both constitutional challenges, finding that the legislation does not impede the right to petition government and does not restrict freedom of expression, as it only imposes reporting obligations on paid lobbyists while preserving the ability of clients and individuals to lobby directly without restriction.

Following convictions for multiple drug trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, laundering, and weapon offences, the Crown applied for forfeiture of large amounts of cash, vehicles, equipment, scales, a prohibited knife, and ammunition seized during a search.

The court relied on the trial findings, affidavit evidence, and the statutory inference in s. 462.39 of the Criminal Code to conclude on a balance of probabilities that the property had been obtained with proceeds of crime.

The court rejected competing ownership claims as vague, uncertain, and improbable, and found a pattern of nominee ownership with no credible lawful explanation for the assets.

Mandatory and discretionary forfeiture orders were granted for all listed property.

Following execution of a search warrant at a residence, police discovered drugs, digital scales, large quantities of bundled cash exceeding one million dollars, and numerous assets including vehicles and recreational equipment.

The accused was charged with several offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act as well as possession of proceeds of crime and money laundering offences under the Criminal Code.

The Crown relied on constructive possession and circumstantial evidence demonstrating knowledge and control over the drugs, cash, and property located throughout the residence and garage.

The court rejected defence evidence that another individual owned the drugs and money and accepted expert evidence on drug trafficking practices.

The court concluded the only reasonable inference was that the accused was engaged in mid‑ to high‑level drug trafficking and that the assets were acquired using proceeds of crime.

The accused applied under s. 462.34(4)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code for the release of seized funds to pay legal expenses in defending multiple drug and property-related charges.

The Crown conceded the accused owned the seized funds and that no other person had a lawful interest in them but argued the accused had “other means” to fund his defence because he had been granted legal aid.

The court held that the existence of a legal aid certificate constitutes “means” available within the meaning of s. 462.34(4), unless the accused demonstrates that the level of funding imperils the right to a fair trial.

Finding no evidentiary basis that the legal aid funding created such a risk, the court concluded the statutory preconditions were not met.

The application for restoration of seized funds for legal expenses was dismissed.

The accused brought a pre‑trial application seeking leave to cross‑examine the affiant and sub‑affiant on an Information to Obtain supporting a search warrant.

The defence alleged that the ITO relied improperly on confidential informants, lacked sufficient detail regarding their reliability, and contained misleading or inflammatory statements.

The court applied the governing principles from Garofoli and Pires concerning leave to cross‑examine affiants.

It held that the applicant failed to establish a basis that the proposed cross‑examination would likely elicit evidence undermining the existence of reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant.

Leave to cross‑examine was therefore denied.

The accused brought a Garofoli application challenging the constitutional validity of a search warrant executed at his residence, arguing that the information to obtain the warrant failed to establish reasonable and probable grounds and relied improperly on confidential informants.

The accused sought exclusion of seized evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging breaches of ss. 7, 8, 9, and 11(d).

The court assessed the reliability of the confidential informant’s information using the Debot framework—credibility, compellability, and corroboration—and reviewed the totality of the circumstances.

It held that the issuing justice had sufficient credible and reliable evidence to support the warrant, including detailed observations from the informant, partial police corroboration, and the accused’s criminal history involving weapons.

Even if minor inaccuracies existed in the ITO, they were not materially misleading and did not undermine the statutory preconditions for issuing the warrant.

The Crown appealed an Ontario Court of Justice order appointing amicus curiae for a self‑represented accused charged with failing to file income tax returns under s. 238(1) of the Income Tax Act.

The trial judge had appointed amicus on the basis that the accused struggled to understand disclosure and court procedure, and that the appointment could improve trial fairness and efficiency.

On appeal, the Superior Court held that the proper test is whether appointment of amicus is necessary to prevent a failure of justice.

The court found the case was simple, the potential penalties modest, and the accused capable of understanding the proceedings with assistance from the court and existing resources.

The appointment of amicus was therefore unnecessary and the order was quashed.

The accused, a husband and wife, were charged with defrauding Human Resources Development Canada of over $70,000 in Canada Pension Plan disability benefits.

The Crown alleged they failed to report the husband's return to self-employment and subsequent employment after he suffered a catastrophic injury in 1998.

The court found that the wife, who signed the initial application while under severe stress, did not have the requisite intent to commit fraud.

The court also found that the husband, whose business operated at a loss and who had limited understanding of the reporting requirements, lacked the subjective awareness required for the mens rea of fraud.

Both accused were acquitted.