Diane M. Lahaie

The accused, Aurèle Guindon, faced eleven counts of sexual exploitation, sexual interference, and sexual assault involving three adolescent boys he employed for property maintenance.

The court found the accused guilty on seven counts of sexual exploitation involving two complainants (D.M. and Z.M.), while acquitting him on four counts related to a third complainant (B.M.) due to concerns about witness testimony tainting.

The central issue was credibility, with the court finding the testimony of D.M. and Z.M. credible and reliable, and rejecting the accused's denials.

The court applied the factors for determining a position of trust or authority under section 153 of the Criminal Code, concluding that such a relationship existed and that the accused's actions were for a sexual purpose.

The applicant, Vernon Hall, brought a Charter application seeking to exclude evidence or a stay of proceedings, alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 9, 10(a), 10(b), and 11 of the Charter during a border interception and subsequent arrest for human smuggling.

The court found that the initial stop and towing of the vessel were lawful under the Customs Act and Canada Shipping Act, akin to a secondary border inspection, and therefore, the applicant's section 10(b) rights were not triggered at that stage.

The court also found no arbitrary detention, no unlawful search incident to arrest, and that the lost video evidence did not impact the applicant's right to make full answer and defence or the integrity of the justice system.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the information being sworn to the anticipated end of trial was 23 months and 8 days.

The court deducted 4 months and 24 days for defence delay, resulting in a net delay of 18.5 months, which exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown argued COVID-19 constituted exceptional circumstances but failed to provide evidence of its specific impact on this case or steps taken to mitigate delay.

The court found the delay unreasonable and granted the stay of proceedings.

The accused was charged with two counts of impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm contrary to section 255(2) of the Criminal Code and two counts of operating a motor vehicle causing an accident resulting in bodily harm while blood alcohol concentration exceeded 80 mg/100 mL contrary to section 255(2.1).

The trial court found that the accused caused a collision at a complex intersection after consuming approximately 9.67 standard alcoholic beverages.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving was between 105 and 155 mg/100 mL, that his ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol, and that he caused the accident resulting in significant bodily harm to the victims.

The accused's testimony regarding his alcohol consumption was found to be inconsistent, illogical, and unreliable.

The court convicted on all counts.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood and impaired operation of a motor vehicle.

The trial proceeded on a blended basis with a Charter application.

The court addressed four issues: whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to make a breath demand under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code; whether the section 254(3) demand was reasonable despite lack of evidence of officer training; whether the accused's section 10(b) Charter rights were breached when not permitted to dial counsel directly; and whether the Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found the officer had reasonable suspicion, the demand was lawful, no Charter breach occurred, and the Crown proved both offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was convicted on both counts.

The accused was charged with undertaking to communicate with a public office holder for payment and failing to file a return with the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying, contrary to section 5(1) of the Lobbying Act.

This is a strict liability offence.

The central issue was whether the accused, as an employee of a lobbying firm, was required to file an individual return under section 5(1) or whether the corporation's filing obligation under section 7 applied.

The court found that the accused, as an individual consultant lobbyist, was required to file a return within 10 days of undertaking to communicate with public office holders on behalf of a third-party client for payment.

The court rejected arguments that the exception in section 5(6) applied or that section 7 was the governing provision.

The applicant challenged the constitutionality of the Lobbying Act on two grounds: first, that the offence and punishment provisions conflict with rights granted in the English Bill of Rights, 1689, and second, that the provisions infringe freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The applicant, a paid consultant lobbyist, failed to file a prescribed return disclosing lobbying activities on behalf of a client.

The court rejected both constitutional challenges, finding that the legislation does not impede the right to petition government and does not restrict freedom of expression, as it only imposes reporting obligations on paid lobbyists while preserving the ability of clients and individuals to lobby directly without restriction.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mgs per 100 mls of blood.

The trial proceeded as a blended voir-dire with Charter application arguments.

The court found that the accused was arbitrarily detained in violation of section 9 of the Charter and was not advised of the reason for detention or his rights to counsel in violation of sections 10(a) and 10(b).

The officer detained the accused without reasonable grounds to suspect he was the driver, handcuffed him, searched him, and obtained inculpatory statements without proper caution or rights advisement.

The court excluded all evidence obtained as a result of these breaches under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the administration of justice would be brought into disrepute by admission of the evidence.

An acquittal was entered on both counts.

A comprehensive trial judgment in a youth criminal justice matter involving multiple counts of trafficking in persons under 18, procuring prostitution, sexual assault, child pornography, forcible confinement, uttering threats, and related offences.

The court heard evidence from 22 civilian witnesses and 6 police officers regarding incidents involving five complainants.

The defendant was found guilty on the majority of counts, with acquittals entered on certain counts relating to assault causing bodily harm, unlawful confinement, and administering a stupefying drug where evidence was insufficient or unreliable.

The judgment provides detailed factual findings for each complainant and applies relevant statutory provisions and case law to determine guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault contrary to section 268 of the Criminal Code following a hockey game in a non-contact senior men's league in Ottawa.

During the final 47 seconds of a game between the Pirates and Tiger-Cats, the accused delivered a deliberate blindside hit to the complainant's head, causing severe injuries including facial lacerations, missing teeth, and a concussion.

The court found that the accused intentionally delivered the hit in retaliation for a missed penalty call at the blue line moments earlier.

The court rejected the accused's claim that the contact was an unavoidable collision and found that the accused's actions fell so far outside the acceptable conduct in a non-contact league that consent could not be given.

The accused was convicted of aggravated assault.