Neha Chugh

The appellant was convicted of possession for the purpose of weapons trafficking under section 100 of the Criminal Code for possessing 43 handguns, parts, and high-capacity magazines.

He was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

The appellant applied for bail pending appeal, raising three grounds: insufficient reasons, a Villaroman error regarding the inference of guilt, and failure to apply the proper test for knowledge and control of items in a motor vehicle.

The motion judge found that while the appeal grounds met the low threshold of not being frivolous, the proposed appeal was extremely weak and the public interest in the immediate enforcement of the conviction for this serious firearms trafficking offence outweighed the appellant's interest in reviewing the conviction.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent, B.S.L., on charges including sexual assault and uttering threats.

The appeal raised two grounds: first, that the trial judge erred by failing to act as a gatekeeper against inadmissible evidence of other sexual activity under s. 276 of the Criminal Code; and second, that the trial judge relied on speculation and conjecture to make adverse credibility findings about the complainant, particularly regarding an audio recording.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no legal error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or credibility findings, and that the defence's questioning about the recording's date did not constitute s. 276 evidence.

The accused, James Scott Gallan, brought an application under s. 278.93 of the Criminal Code to determine the admissibility of certain records (videos and text messages from the complainant's phone) in his sexual assault trial.

The Crown objected, arguing an application was necessary despite the complainant's prior consent to police obtaining the information.

The court ruled that the complainant's consent to police disclosure did not waive the need for a s. 278.93 admissibility application, rejecting the reasoning in R. v. Martiuk.

The court then proceeded to rule on the admissibility of specific messages, admitting some relevant to the complainant's credibility and motive to fabricate, while excluding others deemed to have high privacy interest and marginal probative value, such as those related to the complainant's mental health or irrelevant content.

The applicant, a transgender person, brought a motion under s. 638(1)(b) of the Criminal Code to challenge prospective jurors for cause at her upcoming sexual assault trial.

The applicant argued that there was a widespread bias against transgender people in the community that could taint juror impartiality.

The court found that the applicant met the onus to establish a realistic possibility that bias or prejudicial attitudes exist in the community with respect to transgender people, and that these attitudes could affect juror impartiality.

The motion was granted, allowing for a specific challenge for cause question to be posed to prospective jurors.

The appellant, A.R., appealed a 20-year prison sentence for 30 offences of physical, sexual, and psychological abuse against five of their six children.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence proportionate and fit, falling within the range for extensive child abuse cases with a sexual component.

The court affirmed the sentencing judge's application of the totality principle, which involved imposing individual sentences that added up to a fit total, consistent with Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence.

In a child protection proceeding, the father brought a motion to vary a temporary care and custody order to have the children placed in his care.

The children had previously been placed in the interim care of the Society after being removed from the mother's care.

The court applied the test for varying a temporary placement order, finding that the father's consistent and positive access, along with his viable plan for the children's care, constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court determined it was in the children's best interests to be placed in the temporary care and custody of the father, subject to Society supervision and a gradual integration plan, while maintaining the mother's access.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for temporary care and custody of two children.

The mother opposed the motion, seeking the children's return, while the father sought a graduated access plan.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the children were at risk of harm in the mother's care due to her escalating mental health issues, paranoid behaviour, and refusal to cooperate with the Society.

The court granted the Society's motion, placing the children in temporary Society care with access at the Society's discretion.

The appellant, Jeremey Ceasor, appealed a sentencing judge's decision regarding pre-sentence custody credit.

After pleading guilty to weapons offences, he was released on bail.

He was later charged with breaching his release order and pleaded guilty, with parties proposing time served (33 days).

However, his guilty plea to the breach charge was subsequently struck.

The defence sought to apply the 33 days of pre-sentence custody to the earlier weapons charges, but the sentencing judge denied this.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that section 719(3) of the Criminal Code does not permit "banking" custodial time for unrelated offences, and credit must relate to the specific offence under consideration.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, assault, and theft following a visit by the complainant to his home.

The complainant alleged severe physical and sexual violence, including the accused placing his fist in her vagina and shaving her pubic hair while she slept.

The accused testified and denied the allegations, claiming the complainant attacked him.

The court applied the W.D. framework to assess credibility and found significant inconsistencies and reliability issues in the complainant's evidence, exacerbated by heavy drug and alcohol consumption.

Finding the accused's evidence raised a reasonable doubt, the court acquitted him on all counts.

The accused was convicted of two counts of sexual assault against his daughter, occurring over several years.

The court weighed aggravating factors, including the extreme breach of trust and lack of remorse, against mitigating factors such as the accused's lack of a prior record and the comparatively low-level nature of the sexual conduct.

The court sentenced the accused to 27 months' imprisonment, emphasizing the principles of deterrence and denunciation for sexual offences against minors.

The accused, R.T., was charged with sexual touching, sexual assault, and voyeurism against his daughter.

The court assessed the credibility of both the complainant and the accused, finding the complainant to be a credible witness and the accused's testimony not credible.

The court found the accused guilty of two counts of sexual assault (counts 2 and 4), with the related sexual touching counts (1 and 3) conditionally stayed on the Kienapple principle.

The accused was found not guilty of voyeurism (count 5) because the entry into the bathroom, though a breach of privacy, was not "surreptitious" as required by the Criminal Code.

The respondent parents in a child protection proceeding brought motions seeking a defined access schedule and the removal of the children's aid society's discretion regarding access.

The children had been apprehended twice, and two of the parents were facing criminal charges related to the care of the children.

The court ordered that access proceed according to a defined schedule but preserved the society's discretion to vary the schedule when necessary to promote the children's best interests, protection, and well-being.

The accused, Julian Justinico, was charged with sexual assault and breaking and entering to commit sexual assault against the complainant, SD.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including the accused's conduct and statements at a party prior to the assault, and DNA evidence found on the complainant's genitals.

The defence challenged the admissibility of similar act evidence and the reliability of DNA evidence for identity.

The court found the accused's prior conduct admissible as an admission and for animus/motive, and concluded that the DNA evidence, combined with other circumstantial evidence and the absence of benign explanations for transfer, established identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

Luc White pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess/sell unstamped tobacco products and possession of property obtained by crime.

The Crown sought 12 months custody.

The defence sought a 90-day intermittent sentence and a 9-month conditional sentence.

The court considered aggravating and mitigating factors, as well as sentencing principles including parity and restraint.

The court imposed a 90-day intermittent sentence for count 2 and a 9-month concurrent conditional sentence for count 3, with strict conditions.

The respondent brought a motion to remove the applicant's counsel and for equal parenting time.

The applicant brought a counter-motion for interim custody, access, and child support.

The court dismissed the motion to remove counsel.

Finding that the applicant was the primary parent prior to separation, the court granted interim custody to the applicant and specified access to the respondent, subject to conditions regarding alcohol consumption and smoking.

The respondent was also ordered to pay interim child support and a share of section 7 expenses.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, brought a motion challenging the validity of a DNA warrant issued under s. 487.05 of the Criminal Code.

The accused argued that after excising certain impugned statements from the Information to Obtain (ITO), there were no longer reasonable grounds to believe he was a party to the offence.

The court conducted a sub-facial review and found that even with the excisions, the ITO contained sufficient information to meet the standard for issuing the warrant.

The court also allowed amplification evidence that corrected good faith omissions by the police.

Furthermore, the court held that even if a s. 8 Charter breach had occurred, the DNA evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) as its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The motion was dismissed.

The accused brought a pre‑trial Charter application seeking exclusion of evidence obtained after their arrests for alleged human smuggling and related conspiracy offences under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and Criminal Code.

They argued the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest them, rendering the detention arbitrary under s. 9 of the Charter and the subsequent searches unreasonable under s. 8.

The court held that the directing officer possessed both subjective and objectively reasonable grounds based on the totality of the circumstances, including information from U.S. authorities, phone records linking smugglers to a Cornwall residence, and surveillance of a Toronto‑registered vehicle connected to that address.

The arrests were therefore lawful.

In any event, the court held the evidence would not have been excluded under s. 24(2) because the officers acted in good faith and the evidence was reliable and essential to prosecuting a serious human‑smuggling offence.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine whether Mie-Tha Lah, a conditionally accredited Karen interpreter, was competent to provide interpretation services for the accused in a trial for impaired driving contrary to section 253(1)(a) and operating a motor vehicle with more than the legal limit of alcohol in blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused's counsel objected to the interpreter's qualifications.

The court found the interpreter competent to provide interpretation services meeting constitutional standards under section 14 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, applying the test established in R. v. Tran.

The accused subsequently pleaded guilty to the section 253(1)(b) charge and was sentenced.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit.

The central issue was whether the trial judge erred in law regarding the statutory requirement under s. 254(2)(b) of the Criminal Code that a roadside breath demand be made “forthwith” after the officer forms reasonable suspicion of alcohol in the body.

Crown counsel at trial conceded that the roadside demand had not been made forthwith.

The trial judge nevertheless admitted subsequent breathalyzer results after conducting a Charter s. 24(2) analysis and convicted the accused.

The appeal court held that once the Crown conceded the statutory precondition was not met, the roadside screening results and the subsequent breathalyzer results were inadmissible.

The conviction was set aside and an acquittal entered.