Neha Chugh

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences against four teenage and pre-teenage girls, and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the complainants' credibility or her conclusion that they had not colluded.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the sentence and reduced the global sentence from eight years and four months to eight years, noting that the trial judge had imposed a sentence exceeding the Crown's submission on totality.

Following a guilty verdict on sexual offences involving a child complainant, the Crown disclosed a previously withheld statement from the complainant.

The statement contained new allegations and an admission of a prior false allegation against the accused.

The accused applied for a mistrial.

The court granted the application, finding that re-opening the trial and reconsidering the complainant's credibility in light of the new evidence would create a reasonable apprehension of bias given the court's prior positive credibility findings.

A mistrial was ordered as the only remedy capable of curing the prejudice and preserving trial fairness.

The accused, previously found not criminally responsible for aggravated assault, appeared before the Ontario Review Board for an annual review hearing.

The hospital and the accused's counsel submitted that he no longer posed a significant threat to public safety, a position ultimately adopted by the Attorney General.

The Board found that the accused had made sustained progress, was stabilized on medication, and had not acted violently in years.

Applying the Winko threshold, the Board concluded the accused no longer posed a significant threat and ordered an absolute discharge.

The appellant was convicted of possession for the purpose of weapons trafficking under section 100 of the Criminal Code for possessing 43 handguns, parts, and high-capacity magazines.

He was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

The appellant applied for bail pending appeal, raising three grounds: insufficient reasons, a Villaroman error regarding the inference of guilt, and failure to apply the proper test for knowledge and control of items in a motor vehicle.

The motion judge found that while the appeal grounds met the low threshold of not being frivolous, the proposed appeal was extremely weak and the public interest in the immediate enforcement of the conviction for this serious firearms trafficking offence outweighed the appellant's interest in reviewing the conviction.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent, B.S.L., on charges including sexual assault and uttering threats.

The appeal raised two grounds: first, that the trial judge erred by failing to act as a gatekeeper against inadmissible evidence of other sexual activity under s. 276 of the Criminal Code; and second, that the trial judge relied on speculation and conjecture to make adverse credibility findings about the complainant, particularly regarding an audio recording.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no legal error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or credibility findings, and that the defence's questioning about the recording's date did not constitute s. 276 evidence.

The accused, James Scott Gallan, brought an application under s. 278.93 of the Criminal Code to determine the admissibility of certain records (videos and text messages from the complainant's phone) in his sexual assault trial.

The Crown objected, arguing an application was necessary despite the complainant's prior consent to police obtaining the information.

The court ruled that the complainant's consent to police disclosure did not waive the need for a s. 278.93 admissibility application, rejecting the reasoning in R. v. Martiuk.

The court then proceeded to rule on the admissibility of specific messages, admitting some relevant to the complainant's credibility and motive to fabricate, while excluding others deemed to have high privacy interest and marginal probative value, such as those related to the complainant's mental health or irrelevant content.

The accused was charged with three counts of sexual assault and one count of forcible confinement against his former common-law partner.

The Crown applied to admit the complainant's evidence on each sexual assault count as similar fact evidence for the others, which the court dismissed due to the similarities being merely generic.

Applying the W.D. framework, the court acquitted the accused of the sexual assault charges because, although his evidence had frailties, it could not be entirely rejected, leaving a reasonable doubt.

However, the court rejected the accused's evidence regarding the forcible confinement charge, accepted the complainant's evidence, and found the accused guilty on that count.

The applicant, a transgender person, brought a motion under s. 638(1)(b) of the Criminal Code to challenge prospective jurors for cause at her upcoming sexual assault trial.

The applicant argued that there was a widespread bias against transgender people in the community that could taint juror impartiality.

The court found that the applicant met the onus to establish a realistic possibility that bias or prejudicial attitudes exist in the community with respect to transgender people, and that these attitudes could affect juror impartiality.

The motion was granted, allowing for a specific challenge for cause question to be posed to prospective jurors.

The appellant, A.R., appealed a 20-year prison sentence for 30 offences of physical, sexual, and psychological abuse against five of their six children.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence proportionate and fit, falling within the range for extensive child abuse cases with a sexual component.

The court affirmed the sentencing judge's application of the totality principle, which involved imposing individual sentences that added up to a fit total, consistent with Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence.

In a child protection proceeding, the father brought a motion to vary a temporary care and custody order to have the children placed in his care.

The children had previously been placed in the interim care of the Society after being removed from the mother's care.

The court applied the test for varying a temporary placement order, finding that the father's consistent and positive access, along with his viable plan for the children's care, constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court determined it was in the children's best interests to be placed in the temporary care and custody of the father, subject to Society supervision and a gradual integration plan, while maintaining the mother's access.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for temporary care and custody of two children.

The mother opposed the motion, seeking the children's return, while the father sought a graduated access plan.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the children were at risk of harm in the mother's care due to her escalating mental health issues, paranoid behaviour, and refusal to cooperate with the Society.

The court granted the Society's motion, placing the children in temporary Society care with access at the Society's discretion.

The offender, a 22-year-old first-time offender, was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference against his 14-year-old cousin.

The offences involved digital penetration while the victim was sleeping, constituting an opportunistic breach of trust.

Applying the principles from R. v. Friesen, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for sexual offences against children.

The court rejected a conditional sentence and imposed a 15-month custodial sentence followed by two years of probation, along with ancillary orders including a lifetime SOIRA registration and a 10-year section 161 prohibition.

The appellant, Jeremey Ceasor, appealed a sentencing judge's decision regarding pre-sentence custody credit.

After pleading guilty to weapons offences, he was released on bail.

He was later charged with breaching his release order and pleaded guilty, with parties proposing time served (33 days).

However, his guilty plea to the breach charge was subsequently struck.

The defence sought to apply the 33 days of pre-sentence custody to the earlier weapons charges, but the sentencing judge denied this.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that section 719(3) of the Criminal Code does not permit "banking" custodial time for unrelated offences, and credit must relate to the specific offence under consideration.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, assault, and theft following a visit by the complainant to his home.

The complainant alleged severe physical and sexual violence, including the accused placing his fist in her vagina and shaving her pubic hair while she slept.

The accused testified and denied the allegations, claiming the complainant attacked him.

The court applied the W.D. framework to assess credibility and found significant inconsistencies and reliability issues in the complainant's evidence, exacerbated by heavy drug and alcohol consumption.

Finding the accused's evidence raised a reasonable doubt, the court acquitted him on all counts.

The accused was convicted of two counts of sexual assault against his daughter, occurring over several years.

The court weighed aggravating factors, including the extreme breach of trust and lack of remorse, against mitigating factors such as the accused's lack of a prior record and the comparatively low-level nature of the sexual conduct.

The court sentenced the accused to 27 months' imprisonment, emphasizing the principles of deterrence and denunciation for sexual offences against minors.

The accused, R.T., was charged with sexual touching, sexual assault, and voyeurism against his daughter.

The court assessed the credibility of both the complainant and the accused, finding the complainant to be a credible witness and the accused's testimony not credible.

The court found the accused guilty of two counts of sexual assault (counts 2 and 4), with the related sexual touching counts (1 and 3) conditionally stayed on the Kienapple principle.

The accused was found not guilty of voyeurism (count 5) because the entry into the bathroom, though a breach of privacy, was not "surreptitious" as required by the Criminal Code.

The respondent parents in a child protection proceeding brought motions seeking a defined access schedule and the removal of the children's aid society's discretion regarding access.

The children had been apprehended twice, and two of the parents were facing criminal charges related to the care of the children.

The court ordered that access proceed according to a defined schedule but preserved the society's discretion to vary the schedule when necessary to promote the children's best interests, protection, and well-being.

The accused, Julian Justinico, was charged with sexual assault and breaking and entering to commit sexual assault against the complainant, SD.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including the accused's conduct and statements at a party prior to the assault, and DNA evidence found on the complainant's genitals.

The defence challenged the admissibility of similar act evidence and the reliability of DNA evidence for identity.

The court found the accused's prior conduct admissible as an admission and for animus/motive, and concluded that the DNA evidence, combined with other circumstantial evidence and the absence of benign explanations for transfer, established identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

Luc White pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess/sell unstamped tobacco products and possession of property obtained by crime.

The Crown sought 12 months custody.

The defence sought a 90-day intermittent sentence and a 9-month conditional sentence.

The court considered aggravating and mitigating factors, as well as sentencing principles including parity and restraint.

The court imposed a 90-day intermittent sentence for count 2 and a 9-month concurrent conditional sentence for count 3, with strict conditions.

The accused stood trial on historical sexual offence allegations said to have occurred when the complainant was approximately seven years old during babysitting visits with a family member.

The court applied the W.D. framework and the governing approach to children's evidence, recognizing that peripheral inconsistencies about time and place may carry less significance when childhood events are recalled in adulthood.

However, major conflicts between the complainant's account and other evidence, particularly documentary evidence about where the accused lived during the relevant period and inconsistencies with other family witnesses, undermined the reliability of the identification and surrounding circumstances.

Although the court found the complainant credible and did not conclude she fabricated the allegations, the Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.