3 total
Accused acquitted of historical sexual assaults due to reasonable doubt but convicted of forcible confinement.
The accused was charged with three counts of sexual assault and one count of forcible confinement against his former common-law partner.
The Crown applied to admit the complainant's evidence on each sexual assault count as similar fact evidence for the others, which the court dismissed due to the similarities being merely generic.
Applying the W.D. framework, the court acquitted the accused of the sexual assault charges because, although his evidence had frailties, it could not be entirely rejected, leaving a reasonable doubt.
However, the court rejected the accused's evidence regarding the forcible confinement charge, accepted the complainant's evidence, and found the accused guilty on that count.
Reasonable doubt on consent required an acquittal.
Criminal trial for sexual assault arising from sexual activity between former intimate partners who continued to cohabit after their separation.
The central issue was whether the complainant subjectively consented to intercourse said to have begun while she was asleep, and whether the evidentiary record left a reasonable doubt on consent.
Applying the credibility framework in W. (D.) and the consent principles in Ewanchuk and the Criminal Code, the court found the complainant's evidence problematic in several respects, including surrounding communications, asserted fear, and evidence of another sexual encounter admitted under s. 276.
The court held that the Crown failed to prove absence of consent beyond a reasonable doubt and entered an acquittal.
Acquittal set aside after trial judge misapplied reasonable grounds analysis.
The Crown appealed an acquittal on charges of impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol.
The trial judge held that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and demand breath samples under the Criminal Code and excluded the intoxilyzer results under s. 24(2) of the Charter following a finding of a s. 8 breach.
On appeal, the court held that whether facts amount to reasonable and probable grounds is a question of law reviewable on a correctness standard.
The appeal judge found the trial judge erred by focusing on the absence of certain physical indicia of impairment rather than assessing the totality of the circumstances.
The officer’s observations, including erratic driving, failure to stop for police, and the odour of alcohol, met the threshold for reasonable and probable grounds.
