Ronald M. Laliberté

The applicant, charged with making an explosive substance, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a violation of his s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 33 months and 22 days, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for the Superior Court.

After deducting defence-caused delay, the net delay remained above the ceiling.

However, the court found that the Covid-19 pandemic constituted an exceptional circumstance that justified the delay, as it caused a seven-month suspension of court operations.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The accused, A.J., brought an application under section 276 of the Criminal Code to admit evidence of the complainant's prior sexual activity with the accused in a sexual assault trial.

The Crown and counsel for the complainant opposed the admission, arguing it was not relevant or significantly probative.

The court found the evidence admissible, determining it was not adduced to support "twin myths," was relevant to the issue of consent and credibility given the differing accounts of the parties' relationship, consisted of specific instances of sexual activity, and had significant probative value not substantially outweighed by prejudice.

The court emphasized the accused's right to make full answer and defence and the need for a complete factual picture.

The Crown sought to admit portions of Jill Gil's bail hearing testimony under the principled approach to hearsay.

Jill Gil, the grandmother of accused Marcus Gil, was unavailable to testify at trial.

The court found that while the necessity criterion for hearsay was met due to her unavailability, the threshold reliability was not established.

The court also determined that the Crown's cross-examination of Jill Gil at the bail hearing was primarily a discovery mechanism, which was improper and would render the admission of such evidence unfair to the accused.

Consequently, the court ruled against the admission of Jill Gil's bail hearing testimony.

This ruling addresses final jury instructions in a criminal trial.

The court decided not to leave the partial defence of provocation to the jury due to a lack of air of reality, specifically regarding the absence of an identifiable indictable offense by the victim and suddenness.

However, the court found an air of reality for self-defence, warranting its submission to the jury, based on the accused's belief of threatened force and purpose of protection, despite concerns about the reasonableness of the force used.

A 'rolled-up' instruction, combining provocation, intoxication, fear, and suddenness for the mental intent of murder, was granted.

Limiting instructions were provided for the accused's after-the-fact conduct, clarifying its relevance to self-defence and intoxication but not to the intent for murder.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder, brought a pre-trial application (voir dire) to exclude his statement to the police, arguing that his Charter rights (ss. 7, 8, 9) were breached due to a warrantless entry into a dwelling house for his arrest.

The court found that the police lawfully entered the dwelling based on the occupant's invitation and that the accused was found in plain view.

Consequently, no Charter breach occurred.

Even if a breach had been established, the court determined that admitting the statement would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute under s. 24(2) of the Charter, considering the good faith of the police, the minor nature of any potential breach, and society's interest in adjudicating serious offences on their merits.

The application was dismissed, and the statement was deemed admissible.

The accused was charged with two counts of dangerous driving causing death after his minivan, which was positioned perpendicularly across the eastbound lane near the crest of a blind hill, was struck by a motorcycle.

The collision resulted in the deaths of the motorcycle operator and passenger.

The court found that while the accused's driving was objectively dangerous, the Crown failed to prove the requisite objective mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court concluded that the accused's conduct amounted to a momentary lapse in judgment due to his unfamiliarity with the road and the lack of warning signs, rather than a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person.

The accused was acquitted of both counts.

The applicant, Darlene D’Silva, residing in Alberta, sought to vary a 2011 child support order against the respondent, James King, residing in Ontario, under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act, 2002.

She requested retroactive and prospective increases, Section 7 special expenses, and imputation of income to the respondent.

The respondent resisted, citing frustration of access and disputing income imputation.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the respondent ceasing to pay travel costs, which was a condition for the lower support amount.

However, the court rejected the applicant's claim for extensive retroactive support and high income imputation, finding no blameworthy conduct by the respondent and potential hardship.

The court imputed income to the respondent at $37,000 annually, effective June 1, 2018, after a 6-month period to arrange alternative care for his elderly parents, recognizing his legal duty of care under the Criminal Code.

Prospective child support was set at $534.00 per month, with special expenses shared proportionally (Applicant 53%, Respondent 47%).

No retroactive support was awarded.

The accused was tried on a twelve-count indictment alleging various acts of domestic violence against his former partner, including assault, assault with a weapon, mischief, and uttering threats.

The trial primarily hinged on credibility, with the complainant detailing multiple incidents of physical abuse and the accused denying all allegations.

Applying the W.D. framework, the court found the accused's testimony lacked credibility and reliability, while the complainant's evidence was supported by extrinsic evidence such as photographs of her injuries and prior consistent statements.

The accused was found guilty on eight counts, acquitted on three counts due to reasonable doubt, and one count was stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The accused, charged with sexually assaulting his former partner, brought an application under section 276 of the Criminal Code to adduce evidence of a subsequent consensual sexual encounter with the complainant.

The accused argued the evidence was relevant to the complainant's credibility and her assertion that she feared him after the alleged assault.

The court granted the application, finding the evidence related to a specific instance of sexual activity, was relevant to the core issues of consent and credibility, and had significant probative value that was not substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice.

The respondent mother brought a motion seeking temporary sole custody of the child, Lana.

The applicant father opposed, arguing to maintain the existing parental arrangement where he was the child's primary caregiver.

The court considered the effect of a prior reconciliation on a Nunavut interim custody order, the concept of material change in circumstances, and the child's best interests, emphasizing stability and the status quo.

The court found compelling reasons to re-examine the child's best interests as a temporary measure, noting significant changes in the child's life since moving to Ontario and the mother's guilty pleas to assault charges against the father.

The motion for sole custody was dismissed, and the child remained in the father's primary care, with an increase in the mother's access time.

The moving party brought a motion to change a prior family law order regarding child support.

She argued that the adult child’s return to studies and the parenting time arrangements for the other child constituted a material change in circumstances justifying increased support.

The court held that the adult child was no longer entitled to support because he was not enrolled in full‑time studies and had reached the age of majority.

Regarding the other child, the court found the evidence supported shared parenting rather than the alleged reduced time with the responding party, and the moving party failed to prove a material change in circumstances.

The motion to vary the support order was therefore unsuccessful.

The applicant brought a motion seeking a final order fixing ongoing child support and section 7 expenses and determining arrears pursuant to a prior order governing annual recalculation of support.

The respondent agreed with certain expense amounts but argued his income had changed and effectively sought to alter the mechanism used to calculate support.

The court held that, absent a proper motion to vary and proof of a material change in circumstances, the court would not vary the existing support order.

The respondent remained bound by the terms of the earlier order.

Child support and proportional section 7 expense payments were fixed based on the respondent’s 2013 income.