Vanessa Garcia

This decision addresses whether a conditional discharge is appropriate for two counts of assault against a former intimate partner.

The accused, D.M., was found guilty of two assaults but acquitted of more serious charges involving weapons.

The Court carefully considered the facts, the accused’s background, completion of a Partner Assault Response Program, and the principles of sentencing under the Criminal Code, including denunciation and deterrence in intimate partner violence cases.

The Court concluded that a conditional discharge with two years probation and counselling was appropriate, emphasizing the individualized nature of sentencing and the importance of balancing public interest with rehabilitation.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the Respondent for sexual assault.

The appeal raised four grounds: wrongful admission and use of section 276 evidence (prior sexual activity), erroneous reliance on "implied consent," misapplication of the "de minimis" principle, and failure to apply or provide sufficient reasons regarding the decision in R. v. Chase concerning the sexual purpose of the touching.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred in admitting certain evidence, it was not material to the acquittal, which was based on reasonable doubt regarding the sexual assault.

The court also clarified that implied consent does not apply to sexual assault and upheld the trial judge's reasoning on the de minimis principle and the application of Chase.

The defendant, Matthew Pecore, brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking a stay of charges for sexual assault due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the information being sworn to the anticipated end of trial was 27 months and 7 days, which is below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court matters.

The delay was primarily attributed to new memories from the complainant leading to further charges and a change in trial complexity and dates, including a direct indictment moving the case to Superior Court.

The court found that while the new disclosure inevitably caused delay, it was not attributable to the fault of any party, and the overall delay was not "markedly unreasonable" when balancing the interests of the accused, victims, and public confidence in the justice system.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The appellant, Patience Meadows, appealed his conviction for Assault Causing Bodily Harm.

The trial judge had found Meadows guilty, relying significantly on an utterance made by Meadows as circumstantial evidence of an intent for "payback" inconsistent with self-defence.

On appeal, the court upheld the trial judge's finding that Meadows made the utterance and that the Crown's failure to cross-examine on it did not breach the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

However, the appellate court found that the trial judge erred by concluding that the utterance had no other reasonable inference than an intent for physical retribution.

The court identified alternative reasonable inferences, such as an intent to pursue legal action or an expression of anger, which were consistent with innocence.

As the Crown failed to neutralize these alternative interpretations, the conviction could not stand beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed, and the conviction was set aside.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and breach of probation involving a 13-year-old complainant.

The appeal focused on whether the trial judge erred in applying the "mistaken belief in age" defence under s. 150.1(4) of the Criminal Code, specifically whether the appellant took "all reasonable steps" to ascertain the complainant's age.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant failed to take all reasonable steps, considering various contextual factors such as the age difference, complainant's appearance, living situation, and the appellant's suspicions about her online profile.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his Garofoli application.

The core issue was the credibility of a first-time confidential informant whose information was corroborated by police surveillance and other evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in the assessment of the informant's credibility or the overall reliability of the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court rejected an overly granular approach to assessing informant credibility factors, emphasizing a holistic assessment.

The appellants, Joshua and Jordan Powell, appealed their convictions for assault causing bodily harm and mischief (Jordan only) stemming from a group altercation.

They raised five grounds of appeal, including unreasonable verdicts, misunderstanding of mens rea, deficient reasons, improper rejection of exculpatory police statements, and erroneous rejection of a witness's testimony based on unraised bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both conviction appeals, finding that the trial judge's verdicts were reasonable, the mens rea for assault causing bodily harm was correctly applied, the reasons were sufficient, and the handling of exculpatory statements and witness credibility did not infringe the appellants' rights or legal principles.

The accused was charged with second-degree murder following a shooting at a nightclub.

The accused admitted to shooting the deceased but claimed self-defence, arguing he feared for his life due to the deceased's history of violence and gang affiliation.

The court rejected the self-defence claim, finding the accused's response unreasonable given his role in instigating the confrontation and introducing a concealed firearm.

The court also rejected the partial defence of provocation, finding the accused did not lose self-control.

The accused was found guilty of second-degree murder.

The appellant, Ali Fahad, appealed his conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in finding that the Crown proved a lawful Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand, given the absence of evidence regarding the exact words used by the officer and errors in police notes and advice.

The court found that while exact words are not always necessary, the absence of evidence of the demand's content, coupled with the officer's errors, rendered the conviction unreasonable.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.