Jennifer Lynne Armenise

The appellant, Dinis DaSilva, appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sentence, which included a lifetime SOIRA order.

The appeal against conviction argued that the trial judge misapplied the burden of proof by neglecting the R. v. W.(D.) analysis, particularly concerning the complainant's inconsistent testimony (a five-year-old's police statement versus an eight-year-old's trial testimony).

The court found that the trial judge properly applied the criminal standard of proof and adequately addressed the inconsistencies, concluding that the conviction was reasonable.

The appeal against sentence challenged the lifetime SOIRA order, arguing it should have been for ten years given the summary prosecution.

The court dismissed the appeal against conviction but allowed the appeal against sentence, quashing the lifetime SOIRA order and replacing it with a 10-year order.

The accused, N.J., was charged with sexual assault.

The central issue was consent, assessed through the credibility and reliability of the complainant, J.H., and the accused.

The court rejected the accused's implausible testimony, finding it undermined his credibility.

Despite some minor inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, her testimony was found to be clear, concise, cogent, logical, and plausible, corroborated by text messages and a nurse practitioner's report.

The court found the Crown proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt and registered a conviction.

The appellant, Patience Meadows, appealed his conviction for Assault Causing Bodily Harm.

The trial judge had found Meadows guilty, relying significantly on an utterance made by Meadows as circumstantial evidence of an intent for "payback" inconsistent with self-defence.

On appeal, the court upheld the trial judge's finding that Meadows made the utterance and that the Crown's failure to cross-examine on it did not breach the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

However, the appellate court found that the trial judge erred by concluding that the utterance had no other reasonable inference than an intent for physical retribution.

The court identified alternative reasonable inferences, such as an intent to pursue legal action or an expression of anger, which were consistent with innocence.

As the Crown failed to neutralize these alternative interpretations, the conviction could not stand beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed, and the conviction was set aside.

The appellant, A.I., appealed his convictions for one count of assault and three counts of sexual assault.

The appeal primarily argued that the trial judge misapplied the rule in Browne v. Dunn by finding two breaches where none existed and by failing to allow counsel to respond to these findings.

The court found that the trial judge erred in concluding there were Browne v. Dunn breaches and in giving no weight to defence witness statements based on these erroneous findings.

Credibility was central to the trial, and the erroneous findings undermined the credibility assessment.

The appeal was granted, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Thomy Baez-Eusebio, appealed his convictions for assault, possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, and uttering threats, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the principles of R. v. W.(D.) and provided insufficient reasons.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons, though brief, were sufficient in context and clearly explained the pathway to conviction by rejecting the appellant's evidence and accepting the Crown witnesses' accounts, which were consistent with video evidence.

The court found the inconsistencies in Crown witness testimony to be minor and peripheral.

The appellant, Robin Titcombe, appealed his convictions for impaired driving and refusal to provide a breath sample.

He raised four grounds: unlawful breath demand, inappropriate inference of guilt from refusal, misapprehension of evidence regarding reasonable grounds for arrest and demand, and failure to apply the proper test for impaired operation.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings that the breath demand was lawful, the adverse inference from refusal was properly drawn, reasonable and probable grounds existed for the arrest and demand, and the "slight impairment" test was correctly applied based on the totality of evidence.

The appellant, Andrew Liverance, appealed a s. 810 peace bond imposed by a Justice of the Peace.

The appeal focused on whether the original hearing adhered to principles of natural justice and whether there was a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Superior Court found that the Justice of the Peace failed to provide the unrepresented appellant with a fair hearing by denying him the opportunity to make submissions, curtailing cross-examination, providing incorrect procedural guidance, and refusing an adjournment to call witnesses and present evidence.

The court also found a reasonable apprehension of bias, as the Justice of the Peace appeared to have decided the case before all evidence and submissions were complete.

The peace bond was quashed, and no new hearing was ordered.

The applicant, S.Q., charged with serious domestic offences, sought to vary his bail conditions due to improved mental health and an impending return to work.

The Crown opposed significant variations, arguing S.Q. continued to pose a risk to the complainant.

The court found a material change in circumstances, triggering its jurisdiction to review the bail conditions.

Applying the Supreme Court's "ladder principle" from *R. v. Antic* and *R. v. Zora*, the court maintained a non-communication order, two sureties, and a residence condition requiring S.Q. to live with a surety (allowing him to reside at his own home with a new tenant surety).

However, the court removed the electronic monitoring and the requirement for constant supervision outside the residence, deeming them disproportionate and not the least onerous conditions necessary to attenuate the identified risk.

Additional conditions prohibiting weapons, alcohol, and non-prescription drugs were imposed.

B.S., a 31-year-old inmate with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), applied for a bail review under s. 520(1) of the Criminal Code.

He cited his medical condition and the COVID-19 pandemic as new evidence constituting a material change in circumstances since his initial detention order.

The Crown conceded jurisdiction but argued for continued detention on secondary grounds due to public safety risks, B.S.'s criminal record, and prior breaches of recognizance.

The court, acknowledging the reverse onus on B.S., found that while B.S. was not an ideal candidate for release, his proposed surety plan, combined with his motivation to avoid jail due to his vulnerability to COVID-19, sufficiently attenuated the risk of further offences or interference with the administration of justice.

The court emphasized that reducing prison populations where reasonable and safe is in the public health interest during the pandemic.

The detention order was set aside, and B.S. was released on a surety with house arrest conditions.

The applicant sought a de novo review of his detention order under s. 520(1) of the Criminal Code, having previously consented to detention.

Facing charges including assault with a weapon, uttering threats, and robbery, and being in breach of a conditional sentence, the onus was on the applicant to justify release.

The court considered the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention, noting the applicant's lengthy criminal record and his provision of a materially false affidavit.

Despite the proposed surety and the risks associated with COVID-19 in correctional facilities, the court found the applicant failed to persuade it that he should be released, citing his disrespect for the law and substantial likelihood of breaching conditions.

The application for release was dismissed, and the detention order was maintained.

C.O., charged with serious offences including sexual assault and breach of probation, applied for a bail review after consenting to detention.

The application was based on new evidence, including a proposed surety and the risks posed by the COVID-19 pandemic in correctional facilities.

The Crown opposed release due to C.O.'s lengthy criminal record and public safety concerns.

The court found material changes in circumstances, including the new surety plan and the pandemic's impact on detention conditions and trial delays.

Despite C.O.'s significant criminal history, the court was satisfied that the proposed surety plan, offering 24/7 supervision, sufficiently attenuated public safety risks.

The court also considered the COVID-19 pandemic as a factor tipping the balance in favour of release, vacating the detention order and releasing C.O. on a $10,000 recognizance with specific conditions.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay charges against the accused for "Over 80" due to an infringement of the accused's right to trial within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's calculation of delay, interpretation of a s. 11(b) waiver, and the impact of defence counsel's illness and death.

The Superior Court dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the three-month waiver period, the seven-month exceptional circumstance for counsel's illness/death, and the two-month counsel preparation time, which resulted in a net delay exceeding the Jordan presumptive ceiling.

At a preliminary inquiry into a charge of first-degree murder, the Crown alleged that the accused intentionally shot his wife following marital discord and separation discussions.

The defence argued the shooting was accidental, occurring during a struggle over a firearm as the accused attempted suicide.

The court found sufficient evidence of intentional shooting based on the common sense inference from pointing and firing a loaded handgun at close range, forensic evidence regarding trigger force and muzzle proximity, circumstantial evidence of the victim's incapacity at the time of shooting, and evidence of animus.

The court also found some evidence of forcible confinement based on ante-mortem and peri-mortem injuries and the time gap between the victim's final text and the 911 call.

The accused was committed to trial for first-degree murder.

The accused brought a third‑party records application under s. 278.3 of the Criminal Code seeking production of child protection and foster care agency records relating to the complainant in a prosecution for sexual offences.

The accused argued the records were necessary to support a defence theory that the complainant fabricated allegations to facilitate removal from the foster home and to challenge credibility.

Applying the two‑stage framework for production of third‑party records, the court found the records were likely relevant and reviewed them in camera.

After balancing the accused’s right to make full answer and defence against the complainant’s privacy and equality interests under s. 278.5(2), the court concluded the records had minimal or no probative value.

Production was therefore refused and the records remained sealed.