Dr. Toby Rose

The appellant, a youth at the time of the offence, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder and his sentence as an adult to life imprisonment with a ten-year parole ineligibility period.

The conviction appeal raised issues regarding the admission of text messages, the reasonableness of the verdict, the lack of a Vetrovec warning, and jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors by the trial judge and concluding the verdict was reasonable.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in relying on unproven aggravating factors to impose an adult sentence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the adult sentence, finding the Crown had rebutted the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness and that a youth sentence would be insufficient to hold the appellant accountable.

The accused threw a heavy trailer hitch from a moving vehicle, striking the victim in the abdomen and rupturing her small bowel.

The victim, who suffered from advanced liver disease, underwent surgery but died five months later from complications including peritonitis and pneumonia.

The accused pleaded guilty to aggravated assault but contested the manslaughter charge, arguing his actions did not cause her death or that delayed medical treatment broke the chain of causation.

The court found that the blunt force trauma was a significant contributing cause that accelerated her death, and that no intervening act severed legal causation.

The accused was found guilty of manslaughter.

The accused, a taxi driver, was charged with manslaughter following a fatal collision with a longboarder.

The Crown alleged the accused intentionally veered into the victim in a fit of road rage, while the accused claimed he was unaware of the victim's presence and the collision resulted from a momentary lapse of attention or a mechanical 'bump steer'.

The court rejected the accused's evidence, finding that he intentionally steered his taxi into the curb lane knowing the victim was beside him.

The court concluded this conduct constituted a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person, finding the accused guilty of manslaughter based on the unlawful acts of assault and dangerous driving.

The accused was convicted of manslaughter by a jury after his pregnant wife drowned in a bathtub.

Because the jury's route to the verdict was ambiguous, the court was required to make findings of fact for sentencing.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused surreptitiously administered lorazepam to his wife to incapacitate her, allowing him to pursue an extramarital affair and access pornography.

The court rejected the defence theory that the victim knowingly took the drug, concluding the accused's actions directly contributed to her incapacitation and death.

The applicant, charged with accessory after the fact to murder, applied for judicial interim release.

The charges arose from an execution-style shooting in downtown Toronto where the applicant allegedly acted as the getaway driver.

The Crown was seeking certiorari to reinstate a first-degree murder charge.

The court denied bail, finding that while the primary and secondary grounds might be manageable with a strict supervision plan, detention was necessary under the tertiary ground to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice given the gravity and circumstances of the offence.

The Crown applied to admit the ante mortem statements of the deceased in a first-degree murder trial.

The deceased had made statements to friends and family about the breakdown of her marriage and her husband's resulting anger and behaviour.

The court held that the statements were admissible under both the traditional state of mind exception and the principled approach to hearsay, as they were relevant to animus and motive, and met the threshold for reliability.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice claim following the death of a mother from post-partum haemorrhaging hours after a caesarean section.

The trial judge found that while one anaesthetist breached the standard of care by failing to promptly notify an obstetrician of the patient's deteriorating condition, this breach did not cause her death, which the judge attributed to an untreatable blockage in her lung caused by disseminated intravascular coagulopathy (DIC).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings on the cause of death and lack of causation were supported by the evidence and did not amount to palpable and overriding errors.

A dissenting judge would have ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge's cause of death theory was unsupported by the evidence and not advanced by either party.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals for second degree murder and attempted murder.

The trial judge had ruled that the Crown could not call alibi evidence in reply to the defence's alternate suspect theory, forcing the Crown to call the evidence in-chief and prejudicing its case.

The trial judge also excluded the Crown's expert evidence regarding the type of instrument used to inflict the fatal wound, erroneously concluding it would not assist the jury.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in both rulings, which had a material bearing on the acquittals, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a jury trial.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, particularly stopped timepieces, to establish the appellant had the exclusive opportunity to commit the offence before leaving for work.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to conduct an independent review of the evidence in his jury instructions, instead merely reading the parties' positions.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge failed to relate the evidence to the key issues and improperly instructed the jury to apply the reasonable doubt standard to a specific piece of evidence (the timepieces).

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

A young offender was convicted of manslaughter by a jury for his involvement in the fatal group beating of a 20-year-old victim.

The young offender was 15 years old at the time of the offence.

The Crown sought the maximum youth sentence of three years, while the defence sought time served plus probation.

The court applied the Ferguson principles to determine the facts for sentencing, finding that the young offender assisted in getting the victim into a car, prevented his escape at the park, and helped abandon him at the ringleader's home, where he died of internal bleeding.

The court rejected the defence of duress, finding the young offender had safe avenues of escape.

Emphasizing accountability and rehabilitation, the court sentenced the young offender to 2.5 years, with 18 months remaining to be served (10 months in closed custody and 8 months under community supervision).

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a motion for a non-suit on the classification of the murder.

The accused argued that the victim was already dead when the acts constituting the alleged sexual assault occurred, and therefore s. 231(5)(b) of the Criminal Code could not apply.

The court dismissed the motion, applying the 'single transaction' principle from R. v. Paré and R. v. Westergard, which holds that the exact sequence of the murder and the underlying offence is irrelevant as long as they form a continuous sequence of events.

The court found sufficient evidence to leave the charge of first-degree murder with the jury.

The accused, Leon Alexander and Edmund Benjamin, were charged in relation to the stabbing deaths of Andy James and Brandon Ramdeen following a boat cruise.

The Crown alleged that Alexander stabbed James or was a party to the stabbing, and that both accused participated in a group assault on Ramdeen during which he was fatally stabbed by another individual.

The trial judge found that while Alexander assaulted James, he did not stab him and his actions were not a significant contributing cause of death.

The judge also found the identification evidence regarding the assault on Ramdeen to be unreliable.

Both accused were acquitted of all charges.

The appellant appealed his manslaughter conviction arising from the shooting death of his friend.

The Crown's case at trial relied heavily on expert evidence regarding gunshot residue and bullet trajectory to prove the appellant, rather than the deceased, fired the handgun.

On appeal, the Court found that the expert opinions were significantly undermined during cross-examination, leaving no reliable evidence to exclude the reasonable possibility of a self-inflicted injury.

The Court of Appeal concluded the jury's verdict was unreasonable, allowed the appeal, and entered an acquittal.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a stabbing during an altercation.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in summarizing the pathologist's evidence regarding the deceased's mobility after being stabbed, and in instructing the jury on self-defence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge's summary of the pathologist's evidence left an inaccurate impression and constituted reversible error.

The Court also found the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury that a person defending themselves cannot be expected to weigh to a nicety the exact measure of necessary defensive action.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of his common law partner.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to give a limiting instruction regarding a lay witness's testimony, gave an inadequate limiting instruction regarding a forensic pathologist's testimony, and that the verdict was unreasonable due to insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the jury instructions and concluding there was a substantial body of circumstantial evidence to support the jury's verdict.

The respondent was convicted of manslaughter after stabbing his landlady 107 times while intoxicated.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of 11 years, deducting pre-trial custody for a net sentence of 4.5 years.

The Crown appealed, arguing the sentence was manifestly unfit and that the trial judge erred by treating the 8 to 12 year range for 'aggravated manslaughter' established in R. v. Clarke as an immutable cap.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while subcategorizing manslaughter is not a useful sentencing approach, the trial judge did not fetter his discretion and imposed a fit sentence based on all relevant circumstances.