Neil Riley

During a trial for assault and assault with a weapon, the Crown moved to amend the indictment to substitute 'a female person' for the named victim, as the Crown's lay witnesses could not identify the victim by name and police hearsay evidence was excluded.

The court initially granted the motion, finding no prejudice to the accused's ability to meet the case.

However, after the accused and the named victim testified for the defence, firmly establishing her identity, the court reversed its ruling to avoid confusing the jury.

The accused was arrested without a warrant for drug trafficking following a confidential informant tip and several days of police surveillance.

Searches incident to arrest, including a strip search at the police station, yielded a loaded handgun, cash, and drugs.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of his ss. 8 and 9 rights, arguing the police lacked reasonable grounds for the arrest.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the totality of the circumstances, including the corroborated tip and surveillance observations, provided objectively reasonable grounds for the arrest and subsequent searches.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a motion for a non-suit on the classification of the murder.

The accused argued that the victim was already dead when the acts constituting the alleged sexual assault occurred, and therefore s. 231(5)(b) of the Criminal Code could not apply.

The court dismissed the motion, applying the 'single transaction' principle from R. v. Paré and R. v. Westergard, which holds that the exact sequence of the murder and the underlying offence is irrelevant as long as they form a continuous sequence of events.

The court found sufficient evidence to leave the charge of first-degree murder with the jury.

The Crown sought to admit a confession made by the accused to undercover police officers during a 'Mr. Big' operation.

The accused applied to exclude the evidence, arguing that the surreptitious recording authorizations were invalid, that his right to silence under s. 7 of the Charter was violated, and that the confession should be excluded under common law principles of abuse of process and prejudicial effect.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused was not in the functional control of the state, the police conduct was not abusive, the confession was highly reliable, and the wiretap authorizations were validly issued.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a constitutional challenge to s. 184.2 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the provision permitting one‑party consent wiretap interceptions with prior judicial authorization is unconstitutional because it lacks an after‑the‑fact notice requirement.

Relying on R. v. Tse, the accused argued that accountability and reviewability require notice to persons whose private communications have been intercepted.

The Crown argued that the provision remains constitutional because it requires prior judicial authorization based on reasonable grounds.

The court held that the Charter’s s. 8 requirements are satisfied by prior judicial authorization and that the absence of a notice provision does not render s. 184.2 unconstitutional.

The constitutional application was dismissed.