Julie Evans

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a motion for a non-suit on the classification of the murder.

The accused argued that the victim was already dead when the acts constituting the alleged sexual assault occurred, and therefore s. 231(5)(b) of the Criminal Code could not apply.

The court dismissed the motion, applying the 'single transaction' principle from R. v. Paré and R. v. Westergard, which holds that the exact sequence of the murder and the underlying offence is irrelevant as long as they form a continuous sequence of events.

The court found sufficient evidence to leave the charge of first-degree murder with the jury.

The Crown sought to admit a confession made by the accused to undercover police officers during a 'Mr. Big' operation.

The accused applied to exclude the evidence, arguing that the surreptitious recording authorizations were invalid, that his right to silence under s. 7 of the Charter was violated, and that the confession should be excluded under common law principles of abuse of process and prejudicial effect.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused was not in the functional control of the state, the police conduct was not abusive, the confession was highly reliable, and the wiretap authorizations were validly issued.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a constitutional challenge to s. 184.2 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the provision permitting one‑party consent wiretap interceptions with prior judicial authorization is unconstitutional because it lacks an after‑the‑fact notice requirement.

Relying on R. v. Tse, the accused argued that accountability and reviewability require notice to persons whose private communications have been intercepted.

The Crown argued that the provision remains constitutional because it requires prior judicial authorization based on reasonable grounds.

The court held that the Charter’s s. 8 requirements are satisfied by prior judicial authorization and that the absence of a notice provision does not render s. 184.2 unconstitutional.

The constitutional application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired contrary to s. 253(a) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued there was insufficient evidence that he was in care or control and that the trial judge misapplied the law after finding the statutory presumption of care or control rebutted.

The appeal court held that the trial judge properly conducted a risk-of-danger analysis considering the totality of the circumstances, including the accused’s position in the driver’s seat of a running vehicle and the potential for him to place the vehicle in motion while impaired.

The court concluded that intent to drive is not required where the circumstances demonstrate a realistic risk that the impaired accused could set the vehicle in motion.

The conviction was upheld.