Raymond Williams

The accused was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder for the stabbing deaths of a father and son in their home.

The mandatory sentence is life imprisonment.

The Crown sought a parole ineligibility period of 20 years, while the defence sought 16 years.

The court considered the brutal nature of the offences, the vulnerability of the victims, the accused's background, and the impact of pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court set the period of parole ineligibility at 18 years concurrent on each count, commencing from the date of arrest.

The accused was charged with first degree murder of Nickolas Pasowisty and second degree murder of James Pasowisty following a violent altercation at the victims' residence where the accused had gone to purchase marijuana.

The accused admitted to stabbing both victims but claimed he acted in self-defence after being attacked.

The court rejected the accused's evidence, finding it inconsistent with the physical evidence, blood spatter analysis, and pathology findings.

The court found the accused guilty of second degree murder for both victims, concluding the Crown disproved self-defence and provocation beyond a reasonable doubt, but failed to prove the unlawful confinement required to elevate the murder of Nickolas to first degree murder.

The accused, Wyatt Hallahan, was charged with assaulting a police officer.

The defence admitted the actus reus but argued involuntary intoxication, claiming the accused unknowingly and involuntarily consumed a mystery intoxicant in addition to alcohol.

The court found the accused's behaviour inconsistent with alcohol intoxication and accepted that he did not voluntarily ingest any drugs.

The court concluded that the accused's intoxication was involuntary, thereby negating the voluntariness of his actions, and acquitted him.

The accused, Gerry Hawes, pleaded guilty to accessing child pornography contrary to Section 163.1(4.1) of the Criminal Code.

The court considered aggravating and mitigating factors, including the low number of images, the accused's lack of prior record, mental health issues, and significant collateral consequences.

The Crown sought 90 days' incarceration, while the defence sought a 120-day conditional sentence.

The court found the mandatory minimum sentence unconstitutional and determined that a conditional sentence could meet the principles of denunciation and deterrence given the exceptional circumstances.

The court imposed a 240-day conditional sentence, followed by 24 months' probation, a DNA order, forfeiture of the laptop, a 5-year s. 161 order, and a 10-year SOIRA order.

The Crown applied for certiorari with mandamus in aid to quash a preliminary hearing judge's decision discharging the accused on firearms offences.

The accused was the driver of a vehicle in which a loaded handgun was found under the passenger seat.

The reviewing court found that the preliminary hearing judge committed a jurisdictional error by failing to consider the whole of the circumstantial evidence, including the accused's evasiveness and evidence of drug dealing, which could reasonably support an inference of constructive possession.

The discharge was quashed and the matter remitted with a direction to commit the accused to trial.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a motion for a non-suit on the classification of the murder.

The accused argued that the victim was already dead when the acts constituting the alleged sexual assault occurred, and therefore s. 231(5)(b) of the Criminal Code could not apply.

The court dismissed the motion, applying the 'single transaction' principle from R. v. Paré and R. v. Westergard, which holds that the exact sequence of the murder and the underlying offence is irrelevant as long as they form a continuous sequence of events.

The court found sufficient evidence to leave the charge of first-degree murder with the jury.

The Crown sought to admit a confession made by the accused to undercover police officers during a 'Mr. Big' operation.

The accused applied to exclude the evidence, arguing that the surreptitious recording authorizations were invalid, that his right to silence under s. 7 of the Charter was violated, and that the confession should be excluded under common law principles of abuse of process and prejudicial effect.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused was not in the functional control of the state, the police conduct was not abusive, the confession was highly reliable, and the wiretap authorizations were validly issued.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a constitutional challenge to s. 184.2 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the provision permitting one‑party consent wiretap interceptions with prior judicial authorization is unconstitutional because it lacks an after‑the‑fact notice requirement.

Relying on R. v. Tse, the accused argued that accountability and reviewability require notice to persons whose private communications have been intercepted.

The Crown argued that the provision remains constitutional because it requires prior judicial authorization based on reasonable grounds.

The court held that the Charter’s s. 8 requirements are satisfied by prior judicial authorization and that the absence of a notice provision does not render s. 184.2 unconstitutional.

The constitutional application was dismissed.