11 total
The court imposed a 36-month sentence for child sexual assault, exceeding the Crown's submission.
The accused, B.M., pleaded guilty to one count of sexual assault on E.N., committed between November 2015 and November 2016, when E.N. was 15 years old and B.M. was 33-34.
The incidents involved fellatio and vaginal intercourse, occurring at the family business where B.M. was a long-time employee and E.N. worked.
The court found B.M. to be in a position of trust and engaged in grooming behavior.
The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 2 years less one day, while the defence proposed 12-15 months.
The court, emphasizing the gravity of sexual offenses against children and the high moral culpability of the offender, imposed a sentence of 36 months (3 years) custody, along with a 10-year s. 109 order, a DNA order, a 20-year SOIRA order, and a s. 743.21 order, exceeding the Crown's submission.
The accused was acquitted of sexual assault and interference charges against his step-grandson due to reasonable doubt.
The defendant, C.R., was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference involving his step-grandson, T.C., then 10-11 years old.
The trial judge, sitting without a jury, assessed the credibility and reliability of both the complainant's and the accused's testimony.
Despite finding the complainant generally credible and the allegations highly likely, the judge found that inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, coupled with the absence of serious flaws in the accused's denial, prevented the Crown from proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The accused was acquitted.
The accused received a 240-day conditional sentence for accessing child pornography due to exceptional mitigating circumstances.
The accused, Gerry Hawes, pleaded guilty to accessing child pornography contrary to Section 163.1(4.1) of the Criminal Code.
The court considered aggravating and mitigating factors, including the low number of images, the accused's lack of prior record, mental health issues, and significant collateral consequences.
The Crown sought 90 days' incarceration, while the defence sought a 120-day conditional sentence.
The court found the mandatory minimum sentence unconstitutional and determined that a conditional sentence could meet the principles of denunciation and deterrence given the exceptional circumstances.
The court imposed a 240-day conditional sentence, followed by 24 months' probation, a DNA order, forfeiture of the laptop, a 5-year s. 161 order, and a 10-year SOIRA order.
Appeal of over 80 conviction dismissed; intoxilyzer functioning properly despite use of external printer.
The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level over .80, arguing that the intoxilyzer was not proven to be functioning properly because the technician used an external printer and did not check the internal printer.
The Summary Conviction Appeal Court upheld the trial judge's finding that the intoxilyzer was in proper working order.
The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere and dismissed the appeal.
The accused was acquitted of historical sexual assault charges due to reasonable doubt stemming from inconsistencies in the child complainant's evidence.
The accused was charged with sexual touching and sexual assault of a child complainant between September 1, 2004 and December 31, 2009.
The Crown proceeded summarily and the trial took place before a judge of the Ontario Court of Justice.
The complainant, who was nine years old at trial, testified that she was touched inappropriately on two occasions during babysitting visits to the accused's home when she was approximately two or three years old.
The accused denied all allegations.
The judge applied the R. v. W.D. analysis and found that while the complainant's evidence had some credible features, it was subject to significant frailties including questionable memory of specific details from five or six years prior, a prior admission of fabricating stories for attention, and multiple discrepancies between her trial testimony and prior statements to police, preliminary inquiry evidence, and her mother's recollection.
The judge concluded that the totality of the evidence left reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on both charges.
The accused was acquitted of all driving offences due to reasonable doubt.
The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle, failure to stop at the scene of an accident, and failing or refusing to comply with a breath sample demand.
The Crown relied on evidence of the accused striking a parked car with considerable force, post-accident physical characteristics, and the accused's failure to provide suitable breath samples.
The accused's defence was that the accident resulted from being blinded by oncoming high-beam headlights, that she did not leave the scene with requisite intent, and that she was unable to provide suitable samples due to respiratory problems.
The court found reasonable doubt on all three charges and dismissed them.
Committal for first degree murder quashed; evidence insufficient to infer sexual assault.
The applicant sought certiorari to quash a preliminary inquiry committal to trial for first degree murder under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code, arguing there was no evidence the killing occurred while committing or attempting to commit sexual assault.
The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence suggesting a sexual motive, including prior romantic interest, communications between the parties, and statements made during a “Mr. Big” undercover operation.
The court held that while there was some evidence the accused murdered the deceased, the evidence did not reasonably support an inference that the murder occurred in connection with a sexual assault.
The preliminary inquiry judge therefore exceeded jurisdiction by committing the accused to trial for first degree murder.
The committal was quashed and the matter remitted with direction to commit the accused to trial for second degree murder.
Crown appeal dismissed; trial judge's comment about witness perjury raised reasonable apprehension of bias.
The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that allowed an appeal from a conviction for obstructing justice and ordered a new trial.
The summary conviction appeal judge found that a comment made by the trial judge early in the examination-in-chief, suggesting a key witness was committing perjury, raised a reasonable apprehension of bias.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, agreeing that the trial judge's comment, combined with the summary dismissal of a mistrial motion without hearing submissions, supported a reasonable apprehension of bias.
Criminal harassment conviction overturned as evidence did not establish victim reasonably feared for her safety.
The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment of his daughter.
The Court of Appeal found that the evidentiary record did not support the essential ingredient that the accused's conduct caused the victim reasonably to fear for her safety.
The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.
Sentence appeal dismissed; trial judge made no error in rejecting a conditional sentence for knife threat.
The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge, arguing that a conditional sentence should have been granted.
The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge gave careful and extensive reasons for rejecting a conditional sentence on the facts of the case, which involved the threat of a knife against a vulnerable victim.
Finding no error in principle, the Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal.
Appeal allowed and new trial ordered where trial judge failed to separately analyze mens rea for welfare fraud.
The appellant was convicted of welfare fraud for failing to disclose a loan from his cousin used to make car payments.
On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to consider his subjective understanding of the disclosure requirements, given his lack of commercial sophistication and language barriers.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge improperly merged the actus reus and mens rea analyses and failed to determine if the appellant knowingly failed to disclose the loan.
A new trial was ordered.