Nicole Stoner

The accused, Roger Craig Short, facing a third trial for first-degree murder, brought several pretrial applications, including one to preclude the Crown from using his testimony from the second trial.

The Crown also brought applications, such as for leave to call more than five expert witnesses and to admit evidence of prior discreditable conduct and post-offence conduct.

The court granted leave for additional expert witnesses, ruled on the admissibility and editing of statements to persons in authority and a reporter, and determined the scope of prior discreditable conduct and post-offence conduct evidence.

Crucially, the court exercised its common law exclusionary power to prevent the Crown from cross-examining the accused on his second trial testimony, finding that the previous trial judge's error in forcing counsel to continue, coupled with counsel's inadequacies, created a miscarriage of justice and undermined trial fairness.

The accused brought an application seeking the trial judge's recusal, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias based on the judge's findings of fact in previous pre-trial motions.

The accused argued that the judge's findings were palpably unreasonable and consistently favoured the prosecution.

The court dismissed the application, finding it was an attempt to reargue decided issues and that the allegations of bias were without merit.

The offender pleaded guilty to pointing a firearm at his common-law spouse's face during a domestic dispute, possession of a firearm while prohibited, possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, possession of Oxycodone, and breach of probation.

The offence occurred in the presence of a two-year-old child and resulted in a four-hour police standoff.

The court imposed an exemplary sentence emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, with a global sentence of four years (three years for pointing the firearm, one year consecutive for possession while prohibited, and two years consecutive for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm), less enhanced pre-sentence custody credit.

A lifetime firearms prohibition was imposed.

The defendant, J.R.M., was charged with multiple counts of assault, mischief, and sexual assault.

He pleaded guilty to one count of assault and one count of mischief.

The trial proceeded on the remaining charges of sexual assault and assault against his former common-law partner, M.D. The court meticulously reviewed the evidence, focusing on the complainant's credibility and reliability, which was found to be significantly compromised due to admitted lies to police under oath, inconsistencies, and potential ulterior motives related to a plea agreement for other charges.

Applying the principles of reasonable doubt and the analytical framework for credibility, the court found that the Crown failed to prove the essential elements of the remaining offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

Consequently, the defendant was acquitted of all sexual assault and assault charges against M.D.

M.G. was convicted of invitation to sexual touching of his two-year-old daughter.

The court considered mitigating factors (age, no prior record, employment, learning disabilities) and aggravating factors (victim's age and vulnerability, abuse of trust, minimization of actions, aggressive post-disclosure conduct).

The primary sentencing objectives were denunciation and deterrence.

The court rejected the defence's request for an intermittent sentence and imposed a 22-month custodial sentence, followed by 12 months of probation with specific conditions, a 20-year SOIRA order, a DNA order, a communication prohibition during custody, and a 10-year s. 161 order prohibiting employment/volunteering with minors and internet communication with minors.

The accused was charged with theft of a motor vehicle over $5,000, uttering threats to cause death, and operating a motor vehicle while disqualified.

The only contested issue at trial was the identity of the perpetrator.

Although the court treated the in‑dock eyewitness identifications as unreliable and gave them little weight, it relied on circumstantial evidence including the accused’s clothing, physical condition, proximity to the crash scene, the presence of pliers used to break the vehicle window, the absence of footwear, and the timing of police pursuit and arrest.

Considering the totality of the circumstantial evidence, the court found the Crown had proven identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused were charged with numerous counts of fraud over $5,000 arising from an alleged large-scale Ponzi scheme involving losses approaching three million dollars.

They applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter alleging unreasonable delay, as approximately 1788 days (about 60 months) would elapse between charge and trial.

The court applied the pre‑Jordan analytical framework from Smith, Askov, and Morin, assessing the overall delay, waiver, reasons for delay, and prejudice to the accused.

Most of the delay was attributed to inherent case complexity, defence actions including efforts to secure counsel and legal aid funding, and neutral factors such as co‑accused delay, while institutional delay was found to account for 18.5 months.

Balancing the limited institutional delay against the serious nature of the alleged fraud and the societal interest in a trial on the merits, the court held the delay was not unreasonable and declined to grant the extraordinary remedy of a stay.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle, failure to stop at the scene of an accident, and failing or refusing to comply with a breath sample demand.

The Crown relied on evidence of the accused striking a parked car with considerable force, post-accident physical characteristics, and the accused's failure to provide suitable breath samples.

The accused's defence was that the accident resulted from being blinded by oncoming high-beam headlights, that she did not leave the scene with requisite intent, and that she was unable to provide suitable samples due to respiratory problems.

The court found reasonable doubt on all three charges and dismissed them.