Krista Leszczynski

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding no violation of his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter, specifically claiming that his statement 'I don't know who' to call should have prompted police to facilitate his understanding, and that police improperly directed him to call a specific lawyer.

The summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were reasonable and supported by the evidence, as the appellant had indicated he understood his rights and was not directed to call a specific lawyer.

The accused brought an application seeking the trial judge's recusal, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias based on the judge's findings of fact in previous pre-trial motions.

The accused argued that the judge's findings were palpably unreasonable and consistently favoured the prosecution.

The court dismissed the application, finding it was an attempt to reargue decided issues and that the allegations of bias were without merit.

The accused was charged with multiple offences, including aggravated assault against a three-month-old infant and assault with a weapon against his girlfriend, following a domestic dispute.

The Crown relied heavily on the girlfriend's videotaped police statement, which she recanted at trial.

Applying the W.D. framework, the court found the accused guilty of simple assault for intentionally dropping the infant's bassinette and for placing a pillow over his girlfriend's face.

However, the court acquitted the accused of aggravated assault and uttering threats, finding reasonable doubt regarding the cause of the infant's severe head injuries and the exact words spoken during the pillow incident.

The accused, a member of the Walpole Island First Nation and former Canadian Armed Forces member, was convicted of gun trafficking in 2015 and received a 10-year firearms prohibition.

He subsequently pled guilty to transporting a firearm in a careless manner while hunting.

He applied for a Section 113 exemption to permit hunting for sustenance purposes.

The court granted the exemption, finding that sustenance hunting for Indigenous persons must be interpreted broadly to recognize cultural and traditional significance, and that the accused had demonstrated a genuine need to hunt as part of his cultural identity and role as a family provider.

The court imposed conditions on the exemption and sentenced the accused to a suspended sentence with probation.

The accused pleaded guilty to robbery committed on February 1st, wherein she entered a bank wearing a disguise, presented a note demanding money, threatened to shoot, and obtained cash before being arrested hours later.

The court imposed a joint submission sentence of two and a half years imprisonment less time served (120 days), finding the submission within the appropriate range of two to three years.

The court considered mitigating factors including early guilty plea, cooperation with police, and recognition of victim impact, balanced against aggravating factors including the threat of violence and prior record for violence.

A concurrent 30-day sentence was imposed for breach of probation, a lifetime firearms prohibition was ordered under section 109 of the Criminal Code, and a DNA order was made as the offence is a primary DNA offence.

The accused, jointly charged with unlawful confinement and aggravated assault, brought applications to sever counts on the indictment.

One accused was additionally charged with attempted murder and several counts of possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking.

The accused argued that trying the drug charges together with the violent offences would cause severe prejudice and propensity reasoning.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the drug charges provided the context and motive for the violent offences, as the victim was a competing drug dealer.

The court held that the interests of justice favoured a single trial, and any potential prejudice could be addressed through proper jury instructions.

The Crown applied to remove defence counsel due to a conflict of interest after the same lawyer had represented both an accused and a key Crown witness who later provided incriminating statements.

The accused sought a stay of proceedings or exclusion of the witness’s evidence under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter, arguing police inducements and delayed disclosure compromised their fair trial rights.

The court found that while police comments undermining the witness’s confidence in her lawyer were inappropriate, the accused could not rely on alleged Charter breaches affecting the witness, and no actual prejudice to their ability to make full answer and defence was established.

The court declined to grant a stay or exclude the witness’s evidence but held the conflict required removal of counsel.

The accused would need to obtain new counsel and a new trial date.

The accused was tried on an eight-count indictment alleging sexual offences against a child.

The Crown proceeded only on four counts of sexual touching, with the sexual assault counts subsumed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The complainant provided detailed testimony describing repeated incidents in which the accused touched her vagina while she slept in his bed during visits to his residence.

The court found the complainant to be a credible and consistent witness and rejected the accused’s denials, noting his evasive answers during cross‑examination and admissions that corroborated aspects of the complainant’s account.

Applying the framework in R. v. W. (D.), the court concluded the Crown proved the offences beyond a reasonable doubt.