Phillip Andrew Malcolm Millar

The appellant challenged dangerous-driving-causing-death conviction and a four-year sentence.

The court rejected alleged legal and evidentiary errors, dismissing both appeals except to correct wording of the driving prohibition to six years backdated.

In this post-verdict decision following a 20-day jury trial in a historical sexual assault case, the court addressed four issues: (1) whether to amend the statement of claim to reflect the jury's verdict exceeding the pleaded amounts; (2) whether to set aside or reduce the $1,000,000 punitive damages award against the estate; (3) whether the defendant organization should be held severally rather than jointly liable; and (4) the appropriate pre-judgment interest rates.

The plaintiff was awarded $400,000 in general and aggravated damages, $940,000 for past income loss, and $50,000 for future counselling, with the jury apportioning liability 75% to the estate and 25% to the organization.

The court upheld the jury verdict in all respects, granting the amendment to the pleading, refusing to interfere with the punitive damages award, maintaining joint and several liability, and awarding pre-judgment interest at 5% on non-pecuniary damages from June 1992 and 2% on pecuniary damages from June 1992, calculated bi-annually.

The defendant, E.R., was charged with sexual assault.

The central issue was whether the complainant, Ms. Mathewson, consented to the sexual activity and whether E.R. had an honest but mistaken belief in her consent.

The court found Ms. Mathewson's evidence regarding lack of consent unreliable due to inconsistencies and accepted E.R.'s detailed and corroborated account of consensual activity.

The court concluded that Ms. Mathewson had capacity to consent and did so through affirmative conduct, and E.R.'s belief in her consent was honest and reasonable.

E.R. was found not guilty.

The appellant, K.C., appealed a sexual assault conviction under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The appeal centered on the trial court's failure to properly administer oaths or affirmations to key witnesses, including the complainant and the appellant, despite statutory requirements.

The Court of Appeal found that the casual "promises" to tell the truth made by witnesses did not constitute a functional equivalent of an oath or affirmation.

Consequently, the court determined that the procedural irregularity could not be cured by the Criminal Code's proviso, as it prejudiced the accused in a case turning entirely on witness credibility.

The conviction appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, A.B., appealed his conviction for sexual assault following a judge-alone trial.

The trial judge found the complainant was incapable of consenting due to intoxication and that the appellant did not have an honest but mistaken belief in consent.

On appeal, A.B. argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, failed to apply the W.(D.) principle, and did not properly consider the possibility of consensual sexual contact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence and that the trial judge correctly applied legal principles, including the assessment of consent and honest but mistaken belief.

The accused, a member of the Walpole Island First Nation and former Canadian Armed Forces member, was convicted of gun trafficking in 2015 and received a 10-year firearms prohibition.

He subsequently pled guilty to transporting a firearm in a careless manner while hunting.

He applied for a Section 113 exemption to permit hunting for sustenance purposes.

The court granted the exemption, finding that sustenance hunting for Indigenous persons must be interpreted broadly to recognize cultural and traditional significance, and that the accused had demonstrated a genuine need to hunt as part of his cultural identity and role as a family provider.

The court imposed conditions on the exemption and sentenced the accused to a suspended sentence with probation.

The accused was charged with failing to remain at the scene of a motor vehicle collision and provide her name and address contrary to section 252(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of her section 10(a) and (b) rights.

The court found that police deliberately misled the accused regarding the extent of her jeopardy during a police interview to extract an admission of driving.

The court excluded the accused's statements as a result of the Charter breach.

However, the court convicted the accused on the basis of care and control of the vehicle independent of driving, finding that as the vehicle owner, she had a duty to ensure her name and address were provided at the scene of the collision.

At a preliminary hearing, the court considered whether there was sufficient evidence to commit four accused persons to trial on various charges related to marijuana production and trafficking conspiracies.

The court discharged two accused (Tuan Vu and Thu Tran) on conspiracy charges, finding that while they may have facilitated or furthered the commission of crimes, the evidence was insufficient to establish they were parties to the formation of the conspiracy agreement itself.

The court applied the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. J.F., which restricts party liability in conspiracy cases to conduct that aids or abets the formation of the agreement.

The court also discharged one accused (Cong Nguyen) on a count involving a warehouse conspiracy, finding that merely selling equipment with knowledge it would be used for illegal purposes does not constitute conspiracy.

Two accused were committed to trial on trafficking and conspiracy counts.