Phillip Andrew Malcolm Millar

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on a defamation action arising from a Facebook post published by the defendant, a municipal councillor, and also sought dismissal of a counterclaim alleging Charter breaches, malicious prosecution, misfeasance in public office, and reprisal.

The court held that the online post conveyed defamatory imputations of dishonesty, profiteering, and mental instability against the plaintiff, a senior executive of a child welfare agency, and that no genuine issue requiring a trial arose on any pleaded defence, including justification, fair comment, responsible communication, qualified privilege, statutory immunity, Charter-based arguments, or reprisal under the Human Rights Code.

Applying Hryniak, the court found the paper record sufficient for a fair and proportionate adjudication.

The plaintiff recovered $25,000 in general damages and $8,000 in aggravated damages, while punitive damages and permanent injunctive relief were refused.

The counterclaim was summarily dismissed as meritless and unsupported by evidence.

The appellant challenged dangerous-driving-causing-death conviction and a four-year sentence.

The court rejected alleged legal and evidentiary errors, dismissing both appeals except to correct wording of the driving prohibition to six years backdated.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay damages for sexually assaulting the respondent after administering the drug temazepam without her knowledge.

The appellant argued the trial judge ignored relevant evidence, provided insufficient reasons, and erred in applying the rule in Browne v. Dunne.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge conducted a thorough credibility assessment, provided extensive reasons capable of appellate review, and properly applied the rule in Browne v. Dunne because the appellant failed to put his version of events to the respondent during cross-examination.

In this post-verdict decision following a 20-day jury trial in a historical sexual assault case, the court addressed four issues: (1) whether to amend the statement of claim to reflect the jury's verdict exceeding the pleaded amounts; (2) whether to set aside or reduce the $1,000,000 punitive damages award against the estate; (3) whether the defendant organization should be held severally rather than jointly liable; and (4) the appropriate pre-judgment interest rates.

The plaintiff was awarded $400,000 in general and aggravated damages, $940,000 for past income loss, and $50,000 for future counselling, with the jury apportioning liability 75% to the estate and 25% to the organization.

The court upheld the jury verdict in all respects, granting the amendment to the pleading, refusing to interfere with the punitive damages award, maintaining joint and several liability, and awarding pre-judgment interest at 5% on non-pecuniary damages from June 1992 and 2% on pecuniary damages from June 1992, calculated bi-annually.

The appellant law firm appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding $4,700 to the respondent marketing agency for breach of contract.

The trial judge found the appellant terminated the marketing services agreement without providing the required 30 days' notice.

On appeal, the appellant argued the contract was formed via email without a termination clause and alleged a denial of procedural fairness during closing submissions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to conclude the written contract sent later governed the relationship and that no procedural fairness breach occurred.

The offenders, a mother and father, were convicted of multiple counts of severe physical and sexual abuse, including incest, sexual assault, and unlawful confinement, committed against four of their children over nearly two decades.

The court applied the principles from Friesen, emphasizing the profound harm caused by sexual violence against children and the egregious breach of trust.

After applying the totality principle to the numerous consecutive sentences, the mother was sentenced to a global term of 17 years and 8 months, and the father to a global term of 21 years.

The applicant, the Prime Minister of Canada, sought to quash a subpoena compelling him to testify at the criminal trial of the respondent, who was charged with assault with a weapon for throwing gravel at the applicant during a campaign event.

The court quashed the subpoena on three independent grounds: the respondent failed to show the applicant was likely to give material and necessary evidence; the subpoena was an abuse of process intended for political purposes rather than legal ones; and the applicant enjoyed absolute parliamentary privilege providing testimonial immunity while Parliament is in session.

The defendant, E.R., was charged with sexual assault.

The central issue was whether the complainant, Ms. Mathewson, consented to the sexual activity and whether E.R. had an honest but mistaken belief in her consent.

The court found Ms. Mathewson's evidence regarding lack of consent unreliable due to inconsistencies and accepted E.R.'s detailed and corroborated account of consensual activity.

The court concluded that Ms. Mathewson had capacity to consent and did so through affirmative conduct, and E.R.'s belief in her consent was honest and reasonable.

E.R. was found not guilty.

The accused, charged with dangerous driving causing death after his commercial truck collided with a car, brought a Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings.

He alleged the Crown breached his section 7 rights by releasing the truck to its owner, thereby losing or destroying material evidence regarding the truck's weight and braking capacity.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding the accused failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that the evidence was lost or destroyed, noting the defence had multiple opportunities to inspect the vehicle and had in fact obtained an expert report.

On an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, the moving defendants sought dismissal of claims arising from allegations of intimate partner abuse, reports to police, communications with a municipal supervisor, social media posts, and confidential letters sent to public officials and others.

The court held that the impugned expressions related to matters of public interest because they concerned allegations of abuse involving a person responsible for a public initiative addressing violence against women.

The plaintiff established substantial merit only for defamation, while the other pleaded torts lacked a real prospect of success; however, most impugned expressions were protected by valid defences, principally qualified privilege.

Even where some expressions arguably lacked a valid defence, the plaintiff failed on the s. 137.1(4)(b) weighing exercise because the demonstrated harm was comparatively modest and the public interest in protecting reporting and advocacy concerning intimate partner violence was strong.

The action was dismissed against the moving defendants.

The appellant, K.C., appealed a sexual assault conviction under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The appeal centered on the trial court's failure to properly administer oaths or affirmations to key witnesses, including the complainant and the appellant, despite statutory requirements.

The Court of Appeal found that the casual "promises" to tell the truth made by witnesses did not constitute a functional equivalent of an oath or affirmation.

Consequently, the court determined that the procedural irregularity could not be cured by the Criminal Code's proviso, as it prejudiced the accused in a case turning entirely on witness credibility.

The conviction appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, A.B., appealed his conviction for sexual assault following a judge-alone trial.

The trial judge found the complainant was incapable of consenting due to intoxication and that the appellant did not have an honest but mistaken belief in consent.

On appeal, A.B. argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, failed to apply the W.(D.) principle, and did not properly consider the possibility of consensual sexual contact.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence and that the trial judge correctly applied legal principles, including the assessment of consent and honest but mistaken belief.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault following the hospitalization of his two-month-old son with severe injuries, including multiple bone fractures and brain trauma.

The Crown relied on expert medical evidence to argue the injuries were inflicted by intentional force.

The defence presented competing expert testimony suggesting the injuries could have resulted from a stroke, infection, and metabolic bone disease.

The court found the defence experts raised a reasonable doubt regarding the cause of the injuries and acquitted the accused.

The appellant appealed his conviction and 18-month conditional sentence for sexual assault.

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 10(b) Charter application regarding his right to counsel and misapprehended evidence in finding the complainant was unconscious and incapable of consenting.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant waived his right to counsel was supported by the evidence.

The court also held that the trial judge properly assessed the evidence, including the appellant's statement to police and witness testimony, to reasonably conclude the complainant was unconscious.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The applicant sought to amend his human rights application to add disability as a ground of discrimination, alleging he was terminated without cause after suffering a workplace injury and filing a WSIB claim.

The Tribunal granted the request, finding that the proposed amendment was connected to the original allegations and that the respondent would suffer no prejudice given the early stage of the proceeding.

The accused, a member of the Walpole Island First Nation and former Canadian Armed Forces member, was convicted of gun trafficking in 2015 and received a 10-year firearms prohibition.

He subsequently pled guilty to transporting a firearm in a careless manner while hunting.

He applied for a Section 113 exemption to permit hunting for sustenance purposes.

The court granted the exemption, finding that sustenance hunting for Indigenous persons must be interpreted broadly to recognize cultural and traditional significance, and that the accused had demonstrated a genuine need to hunt as part of his cultural identity and role as a family provider.

The court imposed conditions on the exemption and sentenced the accused to a suspended sentence with probation.

The appellant was convicted of historic sexual offences committed both as an adult and as a young offender.

The trial judge conducted a single trial for both the adult and youth indictments and admitted evidence across the indictments as similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the Youth Criminal Justice Act precludes the joint trial of adult and youth indictments.

The Court also held that the trial judge erred in his similar fact evidence ruling by failing to account for the 30-year gap and the appellant's age difference, and erred in admitting a videotaped statement without affording the appellant an opportunity to cross-examine the witness on her demeanour.

The defendant Department of National Defence moved for a stay of the plaintiff's action pursuant to s. 91(2) of the Canadian Forces Members and Veterans Re-Establishment and Compensation Act.

The plaintiff alleged she was sexually assaulted by a military officer during a pre-enlistment physical examination.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff was not a member of the military at the time of the alleged assault and that her injuries were not aggravated by her subsequent brief military service.

Therefore, the statutory bar under s. 9 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act did not apply, and the action could proceed.

The applicant, a gas station attendant, alleged she was terminated because of her sex (pregnancy) and family status.

The respondent failed to comply with disclosure rules and was barred from calling witnesses or presenting documentary evidence.

Despite this, the Tribunal found the applicant failed to establish discrimination.

The evidence showed her termination resulted from performance issues and a dispute over whether she had to pay for a customer's gas 'drive-off', rather than her recently discovered pregnancy, which the terminating manager was not proven to know about.

Sentencing decision following convictions on both an adult indictment and a Youth Criminal Justice Act indictment for numerous historical sexual offences against children.

The court applied the Kienapple principle to stay duplicative counts, then imposed a youth sentence focused on accountability, rehabilitation, and reintegration under s. 38 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, while emphasizing denunciation and deterrence on the adult indictment because the offences involved a child victim and breach of trust.

The court treated the absence of intercourse and threats, the offender's lack of record, and collateral consequences as mitigating factors, but found the repeated sexual assaults and resulting harm required substantial custodial terms.

A 12-month youth custodial sentence plus 6 months' supervision was ordered consecutive to a 4-year adult penitentiary sentence, along with multiple ancillary orders.