R. v. C.P. and F.P., 2024 ONSC 6101

COURT FILE NO.: 148-23

DATE: 2024-11-04

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

C.P. and F.P.

Defendants

J. Moser and H. Donkers, for the Crown

P. Millar, for the Defendant C.P.

C. Zeeh and V. Strugurescu, for the Defendant F.P.

HEARD: March 27 to June 4, 2024 at London; submissions on sentence heard October 1, 2024

RESTRICTION ON PUBLICATION

By court order made under s. 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code, information that may identify the person or persons described in this judgment as the complainants may not be published, broadcasted, or transmitted in any manner. This judgment complies with this restriction so that it can be published.

heeney j.:

OVERVIEW:

[1] To the outside world, the P. family seemed like a large, active and happy household. They were practicing Mormons, and attended services regularly, as well as catering at church events and participating in other activities. The seven children were involved in volunteer work. The father of the family, the defendant F.P. [“F”] taught at various post-secondary institutions, and coached varsity volleyball. The mother of the family, the defendant C.P. [“C.”] was a stay-at-home mother, who home-schooled the children, while earning extra money as a piano teacher. Visitors to the home found the children to be scrupulously obedient and well-behaved.

[2] But behind closed doors, it was a different story. The four complainant children are D1 [Daughter 1], born in 1997, D2, born in 1999, S1 [Son 1], born in 2002, and D3, born in 2004. They described being subjected to relentless physical and sexual abuse by their parents, including incest, sexual assault, forcible confinement and other physical, sexual and psychological abuse, which haunted virtually their entire childhood and adolescence, until they escaped the family home in March, 2020, never to return. It should be noted that their three other siblings, who are first, second and fifth in the sib-line, did not participate in these proceedings, either as complainants or witnesses, and nothing further will be said about them.

[3] The indictment charged the two accused with a total of 41 criminal offences, although four of those were agreed by counsel to be redundant, leaving 37 remaining counts to be considered by the jury. Following a trial that lasted more than 9 weeks, the jury convicted C. on 18 counts, and F. on 15 counts. Two charts listing these convictions are set out below. They include brief summaries of the facts underlying each conviction, but I will be making more detailed factual findings as each count is discussed.

C.’S CONVICTIONS:

Count	Section #	Victim	Summary of facts underlying conviction
1	271(1)	S1	Groping S1’s genitals
3	279(2)	S1	Tying S1 up while groping him
4	152	S1	Forcing S1 to digitally penetrate her and perform cunnilingus on her
5	271	S1	Forcing S1 to have sexual intercourse with her
6	155(1)	S1	Incest, related to count 5
7	266	S1	Throwing a large pot of water on S1
13	279(2)	D3	Locking D3 in sheds on many occasions
14	279(2)	D3	Forcing D3 to stand in the kitchen without a shirt on for hours
15	266	D3	Pulling D3’s hair, punching her and ripping off her shirt
16	266	D3	Choking D3 while forcing her to drink Tabasco sauce and/or liquid soap
18	271	D1	F. having vaginal intercourse with D1 after her birthday party at 5 years old, while C. watched (joint with F.)
21	279(2)	D1	Binding her wrists and legs and not allowing her to leave the room after the vaginal intercourse in count 18 (joint with F.)
23	271	D1	Penetrating her vagina and bum with a dildo as a reward for D1’s work on the gingerbread castle
24	152	D1	Inviting D1 to put a sex toy in C.’s vagina in the same incident as count 23
25	266	D1	Punching D1
31	266	D2	Injuring D2’s nose multiple times
32	279(2)	D2	Locking D2 in a cupboard for several days
41	245(1)(b)	All or any of the complainants	Forcing them to ingest Tabasco sauce and liquid soap on multiple occasions

F.’S CONVICTIONS:

Count	Section #	Victim	Summary of facts underlying conviction
8	271	S1	Manually stimulating S1’s penis on multiple occasions
9	273	S1	Anal penetration in February 2020 causing a wound to his anus
10	271	S1	Anal intercourse on other occasions
13	279(2)	D3	Locking her in sheds on multiple occasions
17	266	D3	Slapping and other assaults on D3
18	271	D1	F. having vaginal intercourse with D1 after her birthday party at 5 years old (joint with C.)
21	279(2)	D1	Binding her wrists and legs and not allowing her to leave the room after the vaginal intercourse in count 18 (joint with C.)
22	155	D1	Incest, related to count 18
26	266	D1	Tying her up in basement in early 2020
27	152	D2	Showing her pornography and making her manually stimulate him
35	279(2)	D2	Tying her up repeatedly in London
36	272(1)(c)	D2	Tying her up in basement, nude, with fishing line that cut into her wrists
38	271	D2	Tying her up with nylons and having forced vaginal intercourse
39	346	D2	Extorting D2 to have intercourse with him (in the same incident as count 38) by threatening to do something to D3
40	155	D2	Incest, related to count 38

[4] This court must now determine a fit and just sentence for each offender for these many crimes.

[5] The Crown submits that for C., the appropriate sentence is a total of 30 years incarceration, less an adjustment of 5 years based on the totality principle, for a net sentence of 25 years. She would be entitled to a credit for 58 days of pre-sentence custody, enhanced on a 1.5 to 1 ratio bringing it to 87 days. Mr. Millar, counsel for C., submits that the appropriate sentence is 11 ½ years incarceration, reduced to 10 years based on the totality principle, less pre-sentence custody. He also seeks a reduction arising out of the strict terms of house arrest that his client lived under while on bail.

[6] As to F., the Crown submits that the appropriate sentence is a total of 37 years incarceration (the sentencing chart they filed incorrectly added it up to 36), less an adjustment for totality of 7 years, for a net sentence of 30 years. The Crown stated that F. is entitled to a credit for pre-sentence custody of 1,040 days, enhanced at 1.5 to 1, bringing it to 1,560. However, this calculation was done as of the date of sentencing submissions, October 1, 2024. F. has continued to be in custody since then, entitling him to a further credit of 34 days up to today’s date, bring his total pre-sentence custody to 1,074 days. Enhanced on a 1.5 to 1 ratio, this results in a total credit of 1, 611 days, or 4 years 151 days.

[7] Ms. Strugurescu, counsel for F., submitted that an appropriate sentence would be 31.5 years incarceration, less an adjustment for totality of 12 years, resulting in a net sentence of 19.5 years, less a credit for pre-sentence custody.

[8] The usual ancillary orders would be in addition to the above.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES:

[9] There are several sections of the Criminal Code that must be taken into account in passing sentence. The first is s. 718, which lists the purpose and principles of sentencing:

718 The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:

(a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;

(b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;

(c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary;

(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;

(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and

(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community.

[10] Next is s. 718.01, which has particular relevance to the case at bar, since it involves abuse of victims under 18 years of age:

718.01 When a court imposes a sentence for an offence that involved the abuse of a person under the age of eighteen years, it shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of such conduct.

[11] The proportionality principle is embodied in s. 718.1:

718.1 A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.

[12] Section 718.2 requires the court to consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances in passing sentence, and to increase or decrease the sentence in accordance with those factors. This section specifically provides that the following are deemed to be aggravating circumstances:

• Evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a person under the age of 18 years;
• Evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a member of the offender’s family;
• Evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a position of trust in relation to the victim.

[13] Subsections (b) and (c) s. 718.2 also codify the principles of parity and totality, respectively, in the following terms:

(b) a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances;

(c) where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh;

[14] The manner in which these provisions are to be applied by a sentencing judge, and the overall approach to be taken when dealing with sexual offences against children, underwent a fundamental evolution with the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 424. At the outset, Wagner C.J. and Rowe J., speaking for the court, set out three overarching points that they wished to convey. The first dealt with the standard of review for sentencing, and the second with sentencing ranges imposed by appellate courts. But it was the third point, at para. 5, that sent the powerful message that sentences for these crimes must increase:

Third, we send a strong message that sexual offences against children are violent crimes that wrongfully exploit children’s vulnerability and cause profound harm to children, families, and communities. Sentences for these crimes must increase. Courts must impose sentences that are proportional to the gravity of sexual offences against children and the degree of responsibility of the offender, as informed by Parliament’s sentencing initiatives and by society’s deepened understanding of the wrongfulness and harmfulness of sexual violence against children. Sentences must accurately reflect the wrongfulness of sexual violence against children and the far-reaching and ongoing harm that it causes to children, families, and society at large.

[15] The decision is massive in scope, and it is not necessary to review every point made in detail. I will, however, summarize some of the more salient comments that are most relevant to the task before this court.

[16] First, the court recognized, at para. 50, that “[t]o effectively respond to sexual violence against children, sentencing judges need to properly understand the wrongfulness of sexual offences against children and the profound harm that they cause.” That wrongfulness and harmfulness flows from, among other things, the following:

• Sexual violence against children is wrongful because it invades their personal autonomy, violates their bodily and sexual integrity, and gravely wounds their dignity [para. 51];
• Sexual violence can interfere with children’s self-fulfillment and healthy and autonomous development to adulthood precisely because children are still developing and learning the skills and qualities to overcome adversity. For this reason, even a single instance of sexual violence can “permanently alter the course of a child’s life” [para. 58];
• Sexual violence causes additional harm by damaging relationships with families and caregivers [para, 60];
• The ripple effect gives rise to secondary victims, including families, caregivers and society as a whole [paras. 63-4];
• Children are most vulnerable and at risk at home and among those they trust. Thus, sexual violence against children can all too often be invisible to society, and go unreported [paras 66-7].

[17] As the court noted, at para. 74, it follows from this discussion that sentences must recognize both the harm such offences cause and the wrongfulness of sexual violence. They must fully reflect the “life-altering consequences” that can and often do flow from it.

[18] This approach has a direct impact on how the courts should interpret and apply the proportionality principle codified in s. 718.1. The court said this, at para. 75:

In particular, courts need to take into account the wrongfulness and harmfulness of sexual offences against children when applying the proportionality principle. Accurately understanding both factors is key to imposing a proportionate sentence (R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 773(S.C.C.), at paras. 43-44). The wrongfulness and the harmfulness impact both the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. Taking the wrongfulness and harmfulness into account will ensure that the proportionality principle serves its function of “ensur[ing] that offenders are held responsible for their actions and that the sentence properly reflects and condemns their role in the offence and the harm they caused” (Nasogaluak, at para. 42).

[19] Similarly, in assessing the gravity of the offence for purposes of imposing a commensurate sentence, “courts must recognize and give effect to (1) the inherent wrongfulness of these offences; (2) the potential harm to children that flows from these offences; and, (3) the actual harm that children suffer as a result of these offences” [para. 76].

[20] While the court declined to pronounce on a national starting point or sentencing range for sexual offences against children, it did provide guidance to sentencing courts on a number of points:

• Courts can and sometimes need to depart from prior precedents and ranges in order to impose a proportionate sentence. In particular, Parliament’s decision in 2015 to increase maximum sentences for such offences should shift the range of proportionate sentences correspondingly [para. 108-9];
• It flows from this that courts should be reluctant to rely upon “dated” precedents [para. 110];
• There is no requirement for there to be “rare or special circumstances” in order to impose a substantial sentence, as long as such a sentence is proportionate [para. 112];
• Mid-single digit penitentiary terms for sexual offences against children are normal, and upper-single digit and double-digit penitentiary terms should be neither unusual nor reserved for rare or exceptional circumstances. Substantial sentences can be imposed even where there was only a single instance of sexual violence and/or a single victim [para. 114];
• Sexual violence against children should be punished more severely than sexual violence against an adult [para. 116];
• It is an error of law to treat sexual interference as less serious than sexual assault [para. 120];
• The higher the risk of reoffending, the more the court needs to emphasize the need to separate the offender from society, in order to protect vulnerable children from wrongful exploitation and harm. The risk of reoffending is also relevant to the objective of rehabilitation [para. 122-4];
• A breach of trust is likely to increase the harm to the victim and the gravity of the offence, and also inhibits children from reporting sexual violence. Accordingly, all other things being equal, an offender who abuses a position of trust to commit a sexual offence should receive a lengthier sentence than an offender who is a stranger to the child [paras. 125-130];
• Sexual violence against children that is committed on multiple occasions and for longer periods of time should attract significantly higher sentences that reflect the full cumulative gravity of the crime. If a conviction for a single charge includes multiple instances of sexual violence, the sentencing judge should give weight to this factor and not analogize it to a single instance case [para. 132-3];
• The moral blameworthiness of the offender is enhanced when the victim is particularly young and thus even more vulnerable to sexual violence. At the same time, courts must impose proportionate sentences where the victim is an adolescent, particularly in cases involving adolescent girls [para. 135-6];
• The degree of physical interference is a recognized aggravating factor, in that it reflects the degree of violation of the victim’s bodily and sexual integrity. Penetration can create a risk of disease and pregnancy, and may also cause physical pain and injuries to the victim [paras. 138-9];
• However, an excessive focus on the physical act can lead courts to underemphasize the emotional and psychological harm to the victim. Sexual violence that does not involve penetration is still “extremely serious” and can have a devastating effect on the victim [para. 142];
• Courts are strongly cautioned not to downgrade the wrongfulness of the offence or the harm to the victim where the sexually violent conduct does not involve penetration, fellatio or cunnilingus, but instead touching or masturbation. It is an error to understand the physical interference factor in terms of a hierarchy of physical acts [para. 144-6];
• The child victim’s participation is not a legally relevant consideration at sentencing. While it may represent the absence of an aggravating factor, such as violence, it is not a mitigating factor [para. 150].

[21] Equipped with the benefit of that guidance, I will now move to the task at hand.

PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENDER:

[22] The starting point in determining a fit and proper sentence is a consideration of the personal circumstances of the offender.

[23] I will begin with C.. She requested a pre-sentence report, so I have more information as to her background than I do with respect to F., who did not.

[24] She was born in June, 1969, and is currently 55 years of age. Her father was an architect and urban planner, who moved the family from Halifax, where she was born, to Toronto so he could complete his master’s degree. Her mother was a nurse in emergent surgical care and pediatrics. After her parents completed their education, the family moved to Newfoundland, and remained there until she was 10. Thereafter they relocated to Edmonton, Alberta, where she remained until she was 25.

[25] She described having a normal childhood, where her mother was “strict in many ways but also fun”. She denied any domestic violence, but also stated that her mother occasionally used corporal punishment, typically wielding a wooden spoon. She also described her mother as “opinionated” who voiced her opinion in a “direct and abrasive manner”, and who was “judgmental” especially regarding life choices.

[26] However, her long-term friend, who was interviewed for purposes of the report, painted a darker picture. She described C. as experiencing “physical, emotional and verbal abuse” at the hands of her mother. She stated that C. and her brother “protected each other and did what they did to survive [the abuse]”. In my view, this provides a glimpse into the genesis of C.’s abusive behaviour now before the court, since it is common knowledge that an abused child frequently becomes an abuser themselves in later life.

[27] C. met F. when she was fifteen years old at a Model United Nations Conference. They became romantically involved at age 21, and were married in 1994. She converted to Mormonism one year before the marriage, because it was a requirement of the church that she do so. Her brother described her as “subservient” to her husband, as the Mormon religion favoured the needs of men and emphasized gender norms. Her marriage to F. was described as “abusive”. Both he and C.’s long-time friend described how phone calls to C. had to be on speaker, so that F. could listen in. Her brother stated that she nearly died after giving birth to her second or third child, but her husband insisted that she bear more children. She ultimately had seven children, born between 1995 and 2004.

[28] The family relocated from Alberta to Mississauga, where F. was a facilities manager for the Church of Latter Day Saints (the formal name for the Mormon Church). Although the three eldest children had attended public school while in Alberta, C. decided to homeschool the children after relocating to Ontario. Her explanation for doing so was that “she was struggling to manage her five children with their differing schedules while pregnant with her sixth child and ‘constantly ill’”. I have difficulty accepting this. Accepting that she was struggling to manage her five children, and constantly ill, why would she choose to home-school them, where she would be required to “manage” them 24 hours each day, 7 days a week, rather than enjoy the respite of having her school-age children off at school every weekday? It seems to me that this decision is more logically explained as enabling the pattern of control and chronic abuse of the children, hidden behind the walls of their home, that is reflected in the convictions before the court.

[29] The family lived in Mississauga for one year, then moved to Cambridge for a year, then Waterloo (3 ½ years), followed by Brampton (8 years), until relocating to London in 2016, where F. had obtained employment at a college. She admitted that child protection services were called in Waterloo, and said it was due to concerns that she was “overwhelmed and had too many kids”.

[30] She reported a positive relationship with her children, and said she frequently prioritized the needs of her family, often to her own detriment. In hindsight, she said F. wanted her “all to himself” in terms of attention, physical needs and sexual desires. She denied physically or sexually assaulting the children and said that most conflict was due to disagreements about money, or the children not helping with household chores or following her “rules”. She described the family meeting after her two daughters returned from Greece, that ended in allegations of physical violence and controlling behaviours perpetrated by her. This led to her being told by F. to remain in her room for the next two months, and ultimately to her exclusion from the family home, after CAS began to investigate the allegations.

[31] In terms of education and employment, she obtained her secondary school diploma in Alberta, reportedly with above average grades. She took a two-year pre-university course of study. She became involved in the band and choir, and took courses in vocal, piano and music theory, in which she reportedly excelled. She did one year at a university in Edmonton, and one year in Toronto. When she returned to Alberta, with her now-husband F., she took, but did not complete, a degree program in archeology. She achieved her Journeyman and Red Seal Cook certifications, and put that to use in later years, catering large events.

[32] She has no substance-abuse issues, and no prior criminal record.

[33] The author of the report summarized by concluding that C. was raised in a relatively happy home but also experienced some abuse at the hands of her mother. She presents as an intelligent and articulate woman with many academic and vocational achievements. She is motivated to complete additional post-secondary education and is currently working on a degree in human resources. She is currently unemployed and is financially supported by her brother.

[34] She did not accept responsibility for the abuse of her children, and repeatedly offered alternate accounts of what occurred or denied any wrongdoing. She framed her daughter D2 as being manipulative, and as having influence over the other victims. She depicted herself as the victim of an abusive marital relationship where she was forced to prioritize the wellbeing of her ex-husband and children at the cost of her own needs and desires.

[35] She has chronic health issues, including a mix of Type 1 and 2 diabetes, anemia, vitamin B12 and D deficiencies and obesity. She is on a number of medications, including insulin.

[36] As to F., I received some limited information as to his background from counsel during sentencing submissions but have mostly relied on his testimony at trial. He was born in Chile in 1967 and is currently 57 years of age. The family relocated to Peru because a dictator took over in Chile, and later came to Canada in 1976. He described his father as being a “good man” but had a very firm hand, and there was always the threat of the belt, although nothing ever happened. His father was an accountant while his mother was a nurse but was unable to upgrade her credentials in Canada.

[37] He is well-educated, having received a bachelor’s degree in business and later a master’s degree, and was working on a doctorate. I have already described how he met and married C. and relocated to Toronto where he obtained a job as a facilities manager. After 2 ½ years he obtained employment at a university, coaching men’s volleyball, with promises of teaching. He became active in the LDS in Waterloo and became a Branch President. In August, 2007, he made a cold call to a university in Toronto and obtained a teaching position. After commuting for a while, the family relocated to Brampton. He remained at that job until 2013, when he went to Medicine Hat and became head coach of women’s volleyball, coupled with teaching duties. That was followed by a teaching position at a college in London in 2014, in sports marketing and branding, which he kept until 2019. The family relocated to London in 2016.

[38] As can be seen, F. was away from home much of the time, leaving C. in sole control of the household and the children.

[39] He has no criminal record and no substance abuse issues.

[40] He filed several letters of support, which will be dealt with later in these reasons.

[41] While in custody, he has completed a number of programs including anger management. He has also been severely assaulted by other inmates at least four times, causing broken ribs and a temporary loss of vision. He is not seeking a Duncan credit relating to his time in pre-sentence custody, but that has been factored into his calculation of the final sentence after the totality reduction.

[42] Often the background and personal circumstances of an offender provide some insight into how it is that they ended up before the court. For example, where an offender steals, in order to feed an uncontrollable addiction, that may provide at least some explanation for their criminal behaviour, although not an excuse for it. Here, there is nothing in the background of either offender that does so. They had generally positive upbringings, and obtained a good education, were active in their church and were productive members of society. Except for the reported abuse of C. by her mother, and later by F., there is no apparent nexus between their background circumstances and the criminal behaviour that brings them before the court.

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES:

[43] There are a number of aggravating circumstances that must be taken into account in arriving at an appropriate sentence. Since the same factors generally apply to both offenders, I will deal with them together.

1. Most of the offences involved abuse of a person under 18 years of age, which is deemed to be an aggravating circumstance under s. 718.2(a)(ii.1). The exceptions are the following counts against F.: 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40 which victimized D2. These events all occurred in London, and she was 18 years of age for all but the first 15 months that they lived in London.
2. All of the offences involved abuse of a member of the offender’s family, which is deemed to be an aggravating circumstance under s. 718.2(a)(ii). This factor is further enhanced by the fact that the abuse occurred in the various family homes where the children resided, and where they were entitled to feel safe.
3. All of the offences involved an egregious abuse of a position of trust, which is deemed to be an aggravating circumstance under s. 718.2(a)(iii). The victims are the children of the offenders and looked to them for care and protection. The harmfulness of this breach is enhanced by the fact that the children were taught to strictly obey their parents, and not to ever disclose to outsiders what went on in the home. Furthermore, the children were home-schooled, which deprived them of regular access to sex education and contact with teachers and counsellors. All of this increased their vulnerability, caused the children to be unaware that the abuse they were suffering was even wrong, and deterred them from telling anyone about what was happening. Indeed, none of the victims told anyone outside the family about the abuse that their parents were perpetrating, until S1 started calling the Children’s Help Line in 2019. He was, however, careful not to reveal his identity.
4. The nature of the offences include offences that involve a degree of violation of the victims’ bodily and sexual integrity of the highest order.
5. Some of the offences were perpetrated when the victims were very young, of an age in the mid-single digits, which enhances the harmfulness of the offences and the moral blameworthiness of the offenders.
6. The sexual violence inflicted by both offenders on D2, D1 and S1 occurred over a very long period of time. Some were isolated incidents, but some, particularly those that victimized S1, happened on multiple occasions. The physical abuse, such as unlawful confinement, was relatively constant. The earliest sexual assault was in or about 2002, when D1 was only 5 years old, when C. helped to bind her hands and feet and otherwise aided and abetted F. to vaginally penetrate her. C. continued to abuse the children in one way or another for the next 17 years, until she was made to leave the family home in August of 2019. F. did so for the next 18 years, until the children escaped the family home in February of 2020.
7. The sexual assault in 2002 gives rise to another aggravating factor. It is clear that each offender knew, or was willfully blind to, what the other was doing during those many years thereafter, given their complicity in the brutal sexual assault on D1 when she was only 5 years old. D2 testified that C. tracked the girls’ periods and menstrual cycles and got angry with F. if he had sex with her at certain times. S1 testified that F. was present, watching, while C. forced him to have sexual intercourse with her. It is an aggravating factor that each offender was not only abusing the victims themselves, but also did nothing to protect the children from the abuse that the other was perpetrating.
8. The offences have had a devastating impact on the victims. The victim impact statement of D1 indicates that the relentless physical, psychological and sexual abuse she endured has given her complex PTSD, anxiety and depression. She has chronic pain from the countless physical assaults. She still struggles if she hears noises in the night or sees someone who reminds her of her parents. She is still afraid that they are coming to get her and will punish her for speaking out about what they did to her.

D2’s statement states that the years of psychological, sexual and physical abuse at the hands of her parents have stolen her childhood and continues to impact her life as an adult. She suffers from nightmares and flashbacks of horrific events. At times she can only sleep by crawling underneath her bed and sleeping on the floor. She has panic attacks that render her unable to function. She states that her parents used religion as a weapon, and the trauma she has endured has caused her to lose any relationship she had with God. She has spent years in therapy to deal with significant mental health issues, to build a sense of self, and work to heal from the trauma and pain her parents have caused.

D3’s statement speaks of not only the physical pain that she had to bear for many years, but also the constant fear, anxiety and uncertainty of never knowing when it might happen again. This has left her with wounds that may never heal.

S1 did not file a victim impact statement, but testified at trial as to his involvement in counselling and therapy to deal with the impact of the abuse perpetrated on him by both parents. When speaking about his abuse by C., he commented how she used his body as a “sex toy”, and stimulated him to get him to have an erection. He said it was a constant battle not to be aroused, and as a survivor that is something he deals with in therapy. It was evident from his testimony that he has learned to distance himself from the acts of sexual abuse, in that they were things that happened to his body, as opposed to something he was involved in as a person. For example, he said several times, in talking about the regular sexual abuse he suffered at the hands of C., that “she had sex with my body”. Although that seems like an odd way of putting it, it is evident that this is a coping mechanism he has developed to help him deal with the trauma of having been exploited and abused by his own mother. 9. It goes without saying that these crimes have served to tear this family completely apart, and that is also an aggravating factor.

[44] Before moving to a consideration of mitigating circumstances, I wanted to deal with the comments that each offender was invited to make after sentencing submissions were completed. I do so here because, as will be seen, they are neither an aggravating nor a mitigating factor.

[45] As to C., she read from a pre-prepared letter, where she said that “with every breath” she denies all wrongdoing, except the occasional and minor administration of Tabasco sauce, and “can’t understand” why the children would say these things. It was a reiteration of similar things she said on the witness stand at trial, which, insofar as the convictions that were registered against her are concerned, were completely rejected by the jury, and which I completely reject as well. I found her comments, both at trial and at the sentencing hearing, to be melodramatic, contrived and thoroughly unconvincing.

[46] She has a right to continue to proclaim her innocence despite her conviction for these many crimes, and it is not an aggravating factor that she does so. It is simply the absence of the mitigating factor that an acceptance of responsibility and an acknowledgement of the harm done to the victims would have represented. It does, however, minimize the significance of the sentencing objective of rehabilitation, since rehabilitation cannot be realized without an acceptance by the offender of responsibility for their wrongful conduct, and a commitment to address the underlying issues that led to the criminal behaviour through counselling and other rehabilitative measures. As stated in the pre-sentence report, “[s]he has failed to provide any insight into how her behaviours have impacted her children, instead choosing to deny their experience and portray herself as the victim.”

[47] In addition, this lack of insight into her own wrongful behaviour potentially enhances the risk of reoffending, although I do not see that as a compelling concern in this case.

[48] As to F., he was offered the opportunity to address the court before sentence is passed and declined to do so. This is an entirely neutral factor on sentencing, since it is not an aggravating factor to fail to acknowledge and accept responsibility for his actions, nor did he say anything that would represent an impediment to rehabilitation.

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES:

[49] The first mitigating circumstance is that neither offender has a prior criminal record. Normally this means that the offender can be given some credit for having lived a law-abiding life up until they committed the offence that brought them before the court. That factor is greatly diminished here, given that they have been found to have been engaged in this pattern of abuse since 2002.

[50] By way of mitigation, both parties have filed letters of support from family and friends, many of whom have acted as their sureties, attesting to their good character. As to C., two long-time friends described her as being a kind, compassionate, trustworthy, and creative person, who seeks to be a positive and caring influence on those around her. Her brother said that, throughout her life, C. consistently demonstrated a deep commitment to the well-being of others and has made significant contributions to her community. She has always been the first to lend a hand to friends, family, and strangers alike, and given to those in need.

[51] One of her sureties, who has only known her since 2019, stated that C. always puts other people’s needs above her own, and is truly thankful and appreciative for any little thing that someone does for her. She is incredibly forgiving, never bitter or resentful. Another of her sureties, who is a friend of 37 years, wrote a lengthy letter of support that said similar things, stating that she has never known anyone with such strength and capacity to persevere and show such a high degree of kindness.

[52] Her sister-in-law focussed on C.’s efforts to improve herself since being charged in these proceedings. That includes enrolling in full-time online university studies and participating in psychological therapy. She also wrote about the extensive restrictions on C.’s liberty while she has been on bail, including suffering bruising of her lower leg from the ankle bracelet.

[53] Another surety befriended C. when she moved to London in 2016. She described the challenges of C.’s bail conditions, and opined that C. is trustworthy, hard-working and cares about everyone around her.

[54] The final letter filed by C. was from a friend who has known her since they lived in Waterloo about 15 years ago. She described C. as incredibly nurturing, with a voice that was sweet and full of love. She saw in C. a mother who wanted her children to have all that they needed to be successful and good people. She described C. as outgoing, hardworking, bubbly, kind-hearted and the absolute epitome of motherly.

[55] As to F., he filed three letters of support. The first was from a friend who has known F. since 1989. He describes F. as a calm and peaceful person, who was always respectful of others around him, and who works hard and contributes to society.

[56] Another supporter has known F. for over 30 years, as his college volleyball mentor and Church leader. He wrote of F.’s care and concern for his mother, visiting her weekly after his father’s death and providing for her care. He described F. as dedicated, personable, enthusiastic, organized, cooperative, appreciative, honest, willing to listen and inspiring.

[57] Finally, a letter was filed by a personal friend of 19 years. He said he had been to their Brampton and London homes and witnessed his devotion to family and God. He was impressed by the many facilities F. provided to the children, such as the food storage and musical instruments, and said F. was a good provider.

[58] These letters of support must be considered by the court. However, the primary concern is the weight to be attributed to them. In R. v. J.F., 2021 ONSC 7613, Carey J. was sentencing an offender who had been convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault and incest, relating to having sexual intercourse with his daughter between the ages of 11 and 15. At para. 47, he commented upon the weight to be given to the many letters of support that had been filed, attesting to the good character of the offender:

The background here does lead to discussion of the mitigating weight to be given to the good character letters that have been received in this sentencing hearing. While J.F. has no criminal record and the support of much of his family, as indicated in the Presentence Report and eight character letters, these are not particularly strong mitigating factors. Incest and sexual assault typically occur in private and are committed by those who have secured their victim’s trust as well as those in the community who know them. Trust is not usually given to those who have breached it publicly in the past: see R. v. P.(T.), [2006] O.J. No. 428 (S.C.), at para. 30.

[59] In the decision cited by Carey J., R. v. P. (T.), [2006] O.J. No. 428 (S.C.J.), Glass J. was also sentencing an offender for sexual assault, and said this, at para. 30:

The letters of good character filed on behalf of Mr. P. do not come as a surprise to [the Crown attorney] because sexual assault is a more private type of offence not advertised by a person committing it. The court should not place a great deal of weight in them.

[60] I agree entirely with those observations. As I stated at the outset of these reasons, the evidence is clear that, to the outside world, the family appeared to be a large, active and happy household, but behind closed doors, it was a different story. It was, for these four victims, a house of horrors, where they were subjected to years of ongoing physical, sexual and psychological abuse by their parents. One could characterize this as a Dr. Jekyll/Mr. Hyde scenario, where the offenders present as caring parents to the outside world, while being tormentors of their children in the privacy of their home.

[61] To read of C. being described as “the absolute epitome of motherly” was particularly shocking, given that we know from the findings of the jury that her chronic maltreatment of the four victims bordered on the sadistic.

[62] I do take from these letters of support that the offenders are capable of doing good deeds, as exemplified by their volunteerism, and can be kind and caring to others. However, that does not mitigate the horror of what they have done to their own children. At best, it can be considered as a hopeful sign for their prospects of rehabilitation.

[63] The letters of support filed by C. referred to onerous terms of bail, and that can be a mitigating circumstance on sentencing. Mr. Millar asked for a credit of 1 day’s incarceration for every day she spent wearing an ankle bracelet but provided no authority for that proposition. The Crown does not disagree that some credit should be given and relied on a case filed by Mr. Millar to provide a suggested approach. In R. v. T.M., 2022 ONSC 4976, the offender had been subject to onerous terms of bail for 510 days, and received 54 days credit, which amounts to roughly 1 day for every 10 days spent on bail.

[64] It is well established that time spent under stringent bail conditions, especially under house arrest, must be taken into account as a relevant mitigating circumstance: R. v. Downes, 2006 CanLII 3957 (ON CA), [2006] O.J. No. 555 (C.A.), at para. 33. The amount of credit to be given is within the discretion of the trial judge, and a rigid formula is to be avoided.

[65] I was given very little information by counsel as to the terms of bail that C. was under, except that it was 986 days as of the date of sentencing submissions, which was 34 days ago. From the material in the court file, it appears that she was required to be in the residence of her surety, either in London or in Kingston, 24 hours per day, with limited exceptions. These exceptions were varied from time to time, and included having one hour per day for exercise, attending religious services, 3 hours for shopping on Saturdays, or other outings in the company of her surety. In the variation order dated March 11, 2022, she was ordered to wear a GPS monitoring bracelet.

[66] I agree that being under house arrest represents a significant limitation on her liberty, although the terms are not particularly severe. It is a mitigating circumstance that should be factored into the final global sentence that is passed.

[67] As to F., I have already mentioned that, while in custody, he has completed a number of programs including anger management. He has also been severely assaulted by other inmates at least four times, sustaining relatively severe injuries, including broken ribs, and a detached retina in his left eye. He is not seeking a formal Duncan credit relating to his time in pre-sentence custody, but that has been factored into his calculation of the proposed final sentence after the totality reduction. These are mitigating circumstances that must be taken into account in arriving at the final sentence, and I will do so when I discuss his global sentence.

TOTALITY:

[68] Before considering the appropriate sentence for each conviction, it is necessary to address the issue as to how to apply the principle of totality. During submissions, I was presented with a chart by the Crown that listed each count upon which a conviction was registered, with the proposed sentence in one column, followed by a different number in the next column entitled “Sentence Adjusted for Totality”, where most of the sentences had modest reductions. I pointed out that it would be logically impossible to consider whether any given sentence required adjustment for totality until the combined sentence for all counts, including consecutive sentences, had been determined. The Crown was content that I take whatever approach I felt was appropriate.

[69] The question was not pursued further by the Crown. Counsel for C. made a deduction for totality after the proposed sentence for each offence was given. Counsel for F. submitted a chart with two columns similar to that of the Crown. No submissions were made by defence counsel as to the approach I should follow so, at the time, it seemed to be a non-issue. However, in preparing my reasons, it became apparent that there is a divergence in the caselaw as to the proper approach to be taken. As will be seen below, it is necessary to address this issue now, since it will determine the methodology I follow in my reasons.

[70] The court in Friesen identified this divergence at paras. 157-8:

The principle of totality requires any court that sentences an offender to consecutive sentences to ensure that the total sentence does not exceed the offender’s overall culpability (see Criminal Code, s. 718.2(c); M. (C.A.), at para. 42). While this principle is applied throughout Canada, there have been divergences in the methodology used by various appellate courts. Some jurisdictions require the sentencing judge to decide what would be a fit sentence for each offence before considering totality (see, e.g., Hutchings, at para. 84; R. v. Adams, 2010 NSCA 42, 255 C.C.C. (3d) 150 (N.S. C.A.), at paras. 23-28; R. v. Punko, 2010 BCCA 365, 258 C.C.C. (3d) 144 (B.C. C.A.), at para. 93; R. v. Draper, 2010 MBCA 35, 253 C.C.C. (3d) 351 (Man. C.A.), at paras. 29-30; R. c. V. (J.), 2014 QCCA 1828 (C.A. Que.), at para. 28; R. v. Chicoine, 2019 SKCA 104, 381 C.C.C. (3d) 43 (Sask. C.A.), at paras. 66-68). In other jurisdictions, sentencing judges start by determining an overall fit sentence and then impose individual sentences adding up to the total (R. v. Ahmed, 2017 ONCA 76, 136 O.R. (3d) 403 (Ont. C.A.)).

If the sentences here had been imposed consecutively, as arguably they should have been, then it would have been necessary to apply totality. As noted above, the sentences were imposed concurrently, and thus, totality did not arise. As these issues, while important, were not argued, we leave their consideration for another day.

[71] The Ahmed decision cited by the Supreme Court, above, followed the earlier decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Jewell (1995), 1995 CanLII 1897 (ON CA), 100 C.C.C. (3d) 270 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 27, where Finlayson J.A., speaking for the court, outlined the following approach:

In my view, the appropriate approach in cases such as the two under appeal is to first, identify the gravamen of the conduct giving rise to all of the criminal offenses. The trial judge should next determine the total sentence to be imposed. Having determined the appropriate total sentence, the trial judge should impose sentences with respect to each offence which result in that total sentence and which appropriately reflect the gravamen of the overall criminal conduct. In performing this function, the trial judge will have to consider not only the appropriate sentence for each offence, but whether in light of totality concerns, a particular sentence should be consecutive or concurrent to the other sentences imposed.

[72] However, sixteen years later, in R. v. Smith, 2011 ONCA 564 at fn.2, the Ontario Court of Appeal stated that the proper approach to applying the totality principle is “unsettled”:

The proper approach to sentencing an offender for multiple offences is unsettled. The courts of appeal of various provinces have set out two competing approaches. One requires a sentencing judge to fix an appropriate global sentence first and then assign sentences for each individual offence and designate them concurrent or consecutive to fit within the already determined global sentence: see R. v. Jewell (1995), 1995 CanLII 1897 (ON CA), 83 O.A.C. 81 (Ont. C.A.). The alternative approach requires a sentencing judge first to assign fit sentences for each offence and designate those sentences as concurrent or consecutive and only then, as a final step, consider the total sentence to ensure it does not offend the principle of totality: see R. v. Adams (2010), 2010 NSCA 42, 291 N.S.R. (2d) 206 (N.S. C.A.), R. v. Wozny (2010), 2010 MBCA 115, [2011] 2 W.W.R. 630 (Man. C.A.). Here, the trial judge followed the approach set out by this court in Jewell.

[73] With great respect, the approach in Jewell appears to be at odds with the wording of s. 718.2(c) of the Code, which requires consideration of the totality principal “where consecutive sentences are imposed”. Thus, the combined sentence, which is arrived at after determining the length of each individual sentence and whether it should be concurrent or consecutive, must first be calculated. If, and only if, at least one sentence is to be consecutive, the court must then apply s. 718.2(c), and decide whether the combined term of imprisonment, which results from adding up all of the sentences, is unduly long or harsh. If it is, then the total sentence must be reduced to a lower, global sentence.

[74] Simply put, I cannot know whether the combined sentence is unduly long or harsh until I know what each individual sentence amounts to.

[75] Jewell, on the other hand, requires the court to first determine the appropriate global sentence, and then work backward to make each individual sentence fit. In doing so, the court would only then decide which would be consecutive and which would be concurrent, in order to arrive at the desired final number. On my reading, that is not how the section is written.

[76] I find support for this position in Friesen at para. 158, quoted above. There, the court said, “[i]f the sentences here had been imposed consecutively, as arguably they should have been, then it would have been necessary to apply totality.” It follows from those comments that totality need only be considered after the decision has been made to impose a consecutive sentence.

[77] Fortunately, the Supreme Court of Canada, which, in Friesen, deferred consideration of this issue “for another day”, has now revisited it.

[78] In R. v. Bertrand Marchand, 2023 SCC 26 at paras. 91-2, Martin J., speaking for the majority, said this:

The sentencing judge first determined the just and appropriate sentence for each offence individually. Next, she considered whether the sentences ought to be consecutive or concurrent. Only after doing this did she consider the principle of totality in s. 718.2(a), which ensures that “the cumulative sentence rendered does not exceed the overall culpability of the offender” (R. v. M. (C.A.) 1996 CanLII 230 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, at para. 42; see also R. v. Hutchings 2012 NLCA 2, 316 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 211, at para. 84, and Desjardins v. R. 2015 QCCA 1774, at paras. 37-42, which have endorsed a similar approach).

I agree with the sentencing judge’s approach in this case and believe it has benefits over the alternative manner of simply setting a global amount for multiple offences. This sequential approach ensures a separate consideration of the fit and appropriate punishment of each offence. Given the separate objectives and distinct criteria for the luring offence, it was appropriate to examine each offence individually [TRANSLATION] “in order to understand properly the weight this offence contributes to the offender’s moral blameworthiness” (Rayo, at para. 55).

[79] At para. 99, Martin J. clarified how sentences are to be adjusted when they are found to offend the principle of totality:

The effect of the totality principle is to require a judge to ensure that the series of sentences are, in aggregate, “just and appropriate” (see M. (C.A.), at para. 42; Criminal Code, s. 718.2(c)). This involves taking “one last look at the combined sentence” to assess whether it is “unduly long or harsh, in the sense that it is disproportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender” (Hutchings, at paras. 42 and 84; Laguerre v. R. 2021 QCCA 1537, at para. 43; M. (C.A.), at para. 42). If the principle of totality is offended, the sentences can be adjusted by making some concurrent, or if this does not achieve a just and appropriate sentence, by reducing the length of one or more sentences (Desjardins, at para. 34).

[80] I propose to consider each count individually and arrive at what I conclude is a fit and proper sentence for that count. I will, in addition, determine at that time whether that sentence should be concurrent or consecutive to the others. When all counts have been considered, I will calculate what the combined effective sentence turns out to be and will then decide whether a reduction is necessary in accordance with s. 718.2(c). If a reduction is appropriate, I will then pronounce a global sentence for all counts.

[81] However, in compliance with the court’s direction in Jewell, I will also determine afterwards what the final individual sentences for each count will be, based on a totality adjustment, so that the final sentence adds up to the global sentence I have arrived at. This may include reducing some sentences, or making some sentences concurrent that were originally determined to be consecutive, as Bertrand Marchand suggests.

THE SENTENCE FOR EACH COUNT BEFORE TOTALITY:

[82] I will now determine what the appropriate gross sentence will be for each offender on each count where a conviction has been entered. When I mention the sentences proposed by the Crown and by defence counsel on each count, I will be referring to the gross sentence proposed, before totality is considered. The sentence after totality will be addressed later in these reasons.

[83] All sentences will be consecutive unless I specify that they will be concurrent.

[84] I will begin with C.

Count #1 -

[85] This is a conviction for sexual assault on S1. Given the fact that there are many other counts of sexual assault and other sexual offences on the indictment, the Crown prepared a chart that particularized each count, so that the accused, their counsel and the jury would know precisely what event or events each count related to. I began my charge to the jury on each count with a description as to the factual allegations that this count related to, which was taken from that chart, so that, in the event of a conviction, there would be little or no ambiguity as to the factual basis for the jury’s verdict.

[86] Accordingly, the jury was instructed that count #1 relates to the allegation that C. touched S1’s penis and other parts of his body several times each month, while they lived in Brampton and, later, London from 2011 until C. left the home in August, 2019.

[87] Section 724(2) of the Criminal Code provides as follows:

(2) Where the court is composed of a judge and jury, the court

(a) shall accept as proven all facts, express or implied, that are essential to the jury’s verdict of guilty; and

(b) may find any other relevant fact that was disclosed by evidence at the trial to be proven, or hear evidence presented by either party with respect to that fact.

[88] In R. v. S.P., 2024 ONCA 211 at para. 38, Coroza J.A., speaking for the court, elaborated on the fact-finding role of the judge following a conviction by a jury:

When executing this task, the law does not require the trial judge to take the view of the evidence most favourable to the accused: see R. v. Roncaioli, 2011 ONCA 378, 271 C.C.C. (3d) 385, at para. 59; R. v. Nelson, 2014 ONCA 853, 318 C.C.C. (3d) 476, at para. 56, citing Ferguson .

[89] S1 testified at trial that C. touched his crotch and played with his penis since he was a little toddler, from around age 8 to 11, until about a month before the CAS became involved in the summer of 2019. Walking past her to put a dish in the sink, she would say “come here”, and touch him. During “consequences”, which was a term used in the family for the punishment or abuse that would follow any perceived misbehaviour by the children, C. would take S1’s clothing off, grab his penis and try to humiliate him by saying “Oh, look at this little thing”.

[90] He was often tied up, either to a beam, or to what he called “the stupid wooden stool”, while C. groped his genitals. He called the stool “the hotseat”, where he got all of his punishments.

[91] In finding C. guilty on this count, as particularized, the jury clearly accepted S1’s evidence, and completely rejected the evidence of C., who denied having ever touched S1’s penis or other private parts.

[92] I find as a fact that C. touched S1’s penis and crotch on multiple occasions over the course of 7 to 10 years, essentially as he has described.

[93] The Crown proposes a sentence of 5 years incarceration for this offence. The defence argues for a 2-year sentence, given that C. is a first offender. I have already pointed out that the effect of the mitigating circumstance of having no prior criminal record is much diminished, given the fact that this criminal behaviour went on for so many years.

[94] The Supreme Court in Friesen cautioned courts not to downgrade the seriousness of a sexual offence on the basis that only “touching” is involved, as opposed to more intrusive sexual contact. It also indicated that mid-single digit penitentiary terms for sexual offences against children are normal.

[95] Given the aggravating factors outlined above, and in particular the egregious breach of trust involved, as well as the fact that this criminal act was repeated on multiple occasions over many years, a substantial sentence is called for. The fact that this sexual touching was done not only for the apparent sexual gratification of the offender, but also as a means of humiliating S1, only adds to the wrongfulness of the act.

[96] I am satisfied that a 5-year penitentiary sentence for this offence is entirely appropriate.

Count #3 -

[97] This is a conviction for unlawful confinement. The jury was told that this count relates to the allegation that, during the same time frame and at the same locations identified in counts #1, C. tied S1’s hands to stop him from moving.

[98] Given the jury’s guilty verdict, I find as a necessary implication that they accepted S1’s evidence as to being tied up, on the stool and elsewhere, during many of these episodes of sexual groping.

[99] The Crown proposes a sentence of one year, concurrent to count #1. The defence agreed, making this essentially a joint submission. I agree that it represents the appropriate sentence on count #3.

Count #4 -

[100] This is a conviction under s. 152 of the Code for invitation to sexual touching. The victim, again, is S1. The jury was told that this relates to the allegation that C. made S1 rub her vagina and perform cunnilingus on her.

[101] In this regard, S1 testified that C. regularly took his hand and made him rub her vagina. Sometimes she made him give her oral sex. She got on top of him and put her vagina on his face. This only happened on rare occasions, maybe five times in total. I find as a fact that this happened.

[102] The Crown asks for a sentence of 5 years, consecutive to the other counts. The defence asks for a 3-year sentence, consecutive to the other counts, but concurrent with count #5.

[103] The aggravating factors already outlined support a mid-single digit penitentiary sentence of 5 years for this count, and I so conclude. While S1 was only made to perform oral sex on around five occasions, that is still considerably more than a single event. Both counsel agree that it should be consecutive to the other counts. The remaining question is whether it should be concurrent or consecutive to the sentence on count #5. I will deal with that below.

Count #5 -

[104] This is another conviction for sexual assault on S1. The jury was instructed that both this count and count #6 relate to S1’s allegation that C. had vaginal sexual intercourse with him on several occasions, while they were living in London, sometime in 2013 and 2014. The family did not, in fact, live in London during that time frame, and it was later clarified for the jury that the indictment actually specified, for every count on the indictment, that it happened “at the City of London or elsewhere in the Province of Ontario”. They were instructed that neither the place nor the time of the offence were essential elements that the Crown had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.

[105] S1 testified that, during some instances where C. was touching his body parts, she wanted to have sex with him. She would stimulate him to get him hard, and got on top of him, with her vagina on his penis, so that his penis was inside her. He described a specific incident in Brampton following a swimming competition, where she dragged him out of bed in the middle of the night, brought him to the master bedroom, put him on the bed, touched him to get him hard, and “then started having sex with my body”. F. was there, in the room, watching. Part way through, the bed broke. He described another incident of sexual intercourse with C. that occurred in London, following an incident involving cleaning the fish tank, where C. threw water on him. I will discuss the fish tank incident later in these reasons.

[106] When asked to give a number for how often she had sexual intercourse with him, he said he would put it at 150 times, although he then clarified that not all of those occasions would have included sexual intercourse. That number did, however, exclude casual instances of being touched. In cross-examination, he agreed that he had told the police there was sexual intercourse with his mother maybe three times. He explained that that was the three times that he could remember at that time, and that he should have been more clear to the police.

[107] I found S1 to be a credible witness, who was clearly doing his best to describe a multitude of horrible things that had happened to him over the course of virtually his entire childhood and adolescence. At times, however, he had a difficult time remembering precise details of specific events, particularly where the same type of abuse happened multiple times over the course of time.

[108] Given my instructions to the jury, it is a necessary implication that C. had sexual intercourse with S1 “on several occasions”. They obviously rejected the testimony of C. completely, given that she denied having had sexual intercourse with S1, and, indeed, denied ever having touched him sexually in an inappropriate manner. As to how often that occurred, I independently find as a fact that she did so on at least 3 occasions.

[109] The Crown proposes a sentence of 9 years, consecutive to the other counts. The defence proposes 5 years, concurrent with count #4.

[110] In J.F., referred to above, the accused was convicted of three counts of sexual assault with his daughter, while she was between the ages of 11 and 15. The assaults progressed from fondling to full intercourse on multiple occasions. He received a 9-year sentence. I R. v. P.B., 2019 ONCA 13, the offender was convicted of incest, sexual assault, sexual interference and other offences, occurring when his daughter was approximately 11 years old. The sentence imposed was 8 years incarceration, less a credit for time served.

[111] In the recent decision of Muszynski J. in R. v. T.A.A., 2024 ONSC 1350, the accused was found guilty on 8 counts of sexual abuse related to his biological daughter, when she was between the ages of 6 to 12 years old. The trial judge found that there were four separate incidents of sexual abuse, three of which involved intercourse. The offender had a prior record of one count of sexual interference with his stepdaughter. The sentence imposed was 10 years incarceration, concurrent on all counts.

[112] Most of the caselaw provided by counsel is primarily relevant to the consideration of the global sentence, after application of the totality principle, that should be imposed for all of the many counts the offender has been convicted of. I will be considering those authorities below. For now, I do agree that a 9-year sentence for a mother having had forcible sexual intercourse with her son on at least three occasions would be within the appropriate range of sentence, albeit towards the high end. However, I have concerns that the Crown is, as will be discussed below, seeking 7-year consecutive sentences against F. for having had forcible sexual intercourse with each of his two daughters, D1 and D2. Parity requires that a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. Here, the offences, the offenders (i.e., both offenders being parents of the victims) and the circumstances are identical in both situations. The only difference is that in one case, the offender is female and the victim is male, while in the other the genders are reversed.

[113] That should not, in my view, make a difference. As will be seen below, I agree that 7-year sentences are appropriate for F.’s two convictions for sexual assault involving intercourse with his two daughters. C.’s sentence should be no different. She will be sentenced to 7 years on this count. The remaining question is whether the 5-year sentence imposed on count #4 should run concurrently with this sentence.

[114] Friesen, at para. 155, succinctly sets out the general rule to be followed, when determining whether a sentence should be concurrent or consecutive:

The decision whether to impose a sentence concurrent with another sentence or consecutive to it is guided by principles. While the issue warrants further discussion in another case, the general rule is that offences that are so closely linked to each other as to constitute a single criminal adventure may, but are not required to, receive concurrent sentences, while all other offences are to receive consecutive sentences (see, e.g., R. v. Arbuthnot, 2009 MBCA 106, 245 Man. R. (2d) 244 (Man. C.A.), at paras. 18-21; R. v. Hutchings, 2012 NLCA 2, 316 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 211 (N.L. C.A.), at para. 84; R. c. Desjardins, 2015 QCCA 1774 (C.A. Que.), at para. 29).

[115] The defence argues that, in the way the evidence came out, there was a conflation of events, involving digital/oral penetration and vaginal penetration. Oral and digital vaginal stimulation are often part and parcel of a continuing sequence of events that culminates with sexual intercourse. Thus, even though they represent different sexual acts, if they are closely linked to each other, they may well constitute a single criminal adventure.

[116] S1 consistently described C. getting “on top” of him whenever she wanted to have “sex with me”. He also said, on those “rare occasions” that she put her vagina on his face and made him give her oral sex, that she was on top of him. I am not satisfied that he was necessarily describing completely separate and discrete incidents, as opposed to ones that began with oral sex and progressed to sexual intercourse as one continuous sequence of events. He was never asked that question, either in direct or cross-examination.

[117] Accordingly, I am of the view that the 5-year sentence on count #4 should run concurrently with the 7-year sentence on count #5. The sentence on count #5 shall be consecutive to the sentences imposed on the other counts.

Count #6 -

[118] This is a conviction for incest, contrary to s. 155, and relates to the acts of sexual intercourse with S1, the son of C., dealt with in count #5.

[119] The Crown proposes that the sentence be 9 years, concurrent to the sentence on count #5. The defence proposes 5 years, concurrent to count #5.

[120] This is a separate and distinct crime to count #5, because it involves the additional delict that flows from the abhorrent act of having sexual intercourse with one’s own child, as opposed to a victim who is unrelated. For that reason, a stay, as contemplated by R. v. Kienapple, 1974 CanLII 14 (SCC), [1975] 1 S.C.R. 729 is not appropriate. However, since it arises out of the same, single criminal adventure, it is appropriate that the sentence run concurrently with the sentence imposed for the sexual assault itself. The Crown agrees with this position, having conceded that the sentence should be concurrent.

[121] In my view, the appropriate sentence for this count should the same as that imposed for the sexual assault itself. While the concurrent nature of this sentence means that there is no additional punishment imposed, one could consider the fact that the victim was the child of the offender as an aggravating factor that further justifies the imposition of a 7-year sentence on the offender on count #5.

[122] Thus, C. is sentenced to 7 years on count #6, to run concurrently with the sentence imposed on count #5.

Count #7 -

[123] This is a conviction for the included offence of common assault. The count, as charged, accused C. of assault on S1 with a weapon, namely hot liquid. The jury was instructed that this count relates to S1’s allegation that C. dumped a pot full of hot water on him in the kitchen at their home in London, following an argument between S1 and his brother over cleaning the fish tank. They were further instructed that if they were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that C. did, without justification, throw a pot of water at S1, but are not satisfied that the water was hot and was therefore not a weapon, they should find her guilty of the included offence of common assault.

[124] That is what the jury did. I find that it is a necessary implication from the jury’s verdict that C. threw a large pot of water on S1, but the water was not hot. She did not do so to break up a fight between S1 and his brother, because the fight was already broken up. The Crown had conceded that C.’s actions would not have constituted an assault if she threw the water to break up a fight. It is also a necessary implication from the jury’s verdict that the water did not actually cause any foreseeable injury to S1, because if it did, it would have met the definition of a weapon.

[125] The Crown proposes a sentence of 6 months imprisonment, consecutive. The defence proposes 3 months consecutive. Given the relatively minor nature of this offence, I agree with the defence that 3 months consecutive is appropriate.

Count #13 -

[126] The next count on the indictment where a conviction was registered against C. was count #13. This is a joint charge with F., of unlawful confinement of D3, contrary to s. 279(2) of the Code. I will deal with the sentence to be imposed against each offender on this and all other jointly charged offences as I come to them.

[127] The jury was instructed that this count relates to the allegation that C. and F. repeatedly locked D3 in the shed for perceived misbehaviour.

[128] D3 testified that she was locked into many sheds at the various houses where the family resided, by both C. and F., although C. did it more frequently because she was home all the time. This was done as a form of punishment, or “consequence”, for any perceived misbehaviour, such as not loading the dishwasher properly, backtalking her mother, or not doing her schoolwork properly. The sheds could be locked or unlocked, but either way you could not leave because that would lead to a worse consequence.

[129] The longest time she was locked in a shed was with her brother, for probably a day and a half, from the morning of one day until the afternoon of the next. They were given no food or water, but S1 snuck them some bread with Nutella and some fruit.

[130] D3 was an excellent witness, who gave her evidence in a clear and convincing manner and who was not seriously challenged on cross-examination. The jury clearly believed her, and rejected the testimony of C. and F., who both denied ever having locked her up.

[131] The Crown proposes a sentence of 6 months consecutive. The defence proposes 1 month consecutive. In my view, the position of the defence is too low. Locking a child up in a shed, repeatedly, on many occasions over a long period of time, is tantamount to treating the child like an animal. It is dehumanizing and degrading. I accept the Crown’s submission that 6 months consecutive is appropriate, for each offender.

Counts #14 and 15 -

[132] These two counts are against C. alone. Count #14 is unlawful confinement of D3, contrary to s. 279(2) of the Code. Count 15 relates to the same incident and is one of common assault contrary to s. 266.

[133] The jury was told that these counts relate to an incident where C. was upset with D3 for failing to be polite and invite a guest into their house. As punishment, C. pulled D3’s hair, scratched, punched, and kicked her. She ripped off D3’s shirt and made her stand in the kitchen, in her bra, for several hours.

[134] D3 testified to this incident, and the essence of her testimony is summarized in the preceding paragraph. C. denied having struck D3. She said the incident was about D3 wearing a purple crop top shirt that came down quite low. C. said she told her to take it off, and when D3 refused, C. took it off of her, and told her to go upstairs. She denied telling D3 to stand in the kitchen. The jury clearly rejected C.’s evidence and accepted D3’s as to what happened.

[135] I conclude that, by necessary implication, the jury found that this incident did occur as described above.

[136] The Crown proposes that the sentence on count #14 be concurrent to count #15. The sentence on count #15 would be consecutive to the other counts. Defence counsel agrees with this position.

[137] The Crown asks for 1 month on count #14, and 6 months on count #15. The defence agrees with the proposal for 1 month on count #14 but proposes 3 months on count #15. I agree with the defence that 3 months is a proportionate sentence for a relatively minor assault of this nature, that did not cause any real injury.

Count #16 -

[138] This is another count of common assault by C. on D3. The jury was instructed that this count relates to the allegation that C. forced D3 to swallow Tabasco sauce and liquid soap and, during the course of doing so, she choked D3 to the point of unconsciousness. This count only deals with the choking aspect of the event. Administering a noxious substance is a separate count, count #41, and will be dealt with later.

[139] “Hot saucing” the complainants was a regular routine for C., whereby she would force them to ingest Tabasco sauce or liquid dish soap as a “consequence” for perceived misbehaviour. D3 testified that C. held her face so you couldn’t move, and if you didn’t swallow, C. took her thumbs and pressed on your throat so you had to swallow. This pressing sometimes compressed her breathing, so D3 choked until everything went black and she lost consciousness. This happened 4 or 5 times.

[140] C. admitted administering a few drops of Tabasco sauce on the tongue on occasion for purposes of correction but denied ever having choked D3. The jury clearly rejected her testimony and accepted that of D3. I am of the same view. I find that this event happened, essentially as outlined above.

[141] The Crown proposes 6 months, consecutive to the other counts. The defence proposes 2 months, consecutive. In my view, the defence position fails to take account of the seriousness of the assault, and the repetitive nature of it. Choking someone to the point of unconsciousness is a serious and highly dangerous assault, and merits more than a token sentence. I find that the Crown’s proposal is reasonable and proportionate, and I accept it.

Counts #18 and 21 –

[142] These two counts are against both offenders jointly, and relate to the same event, so I will deal with them together. Count #18 is sexual assault on D1. Count #21 is unlawful confinement of D1, whereby her wrists and legs were bound to facilitate the sexual assault in count #18.

[143] The jury was instructed that these counts relate to the allegation that, to punish D1 for putting on sparkly nail polish after a birthday party, F. made D1 get undressed, and then tied her to the bed and vaginally penetrated her, while C. watched. F. was implicated as the principle, i.e., the party who actually penetrated D1 with his penis. C. was implicated as an aider and abettor.

[144] D1 testified that this was the earliest incident she was in court to speak about. It happened when she was 5 or 6 years old. She had a kid’s birthday party and stole some sparkling nail polish from one of the loot bags. She was caught and it was taken away. She was taken to F. and C.’s bedroom, where she was put on the bed and was made to undress. She tried moving about to get off the bed, so F. tied her arms to the bed above her head. Then both C. and F. tied her legs to the other end of the bed. C. told her if she was a good girl she would get a present. F. then put his penis into her vagina and moved back and forth until he collapsed on her. She remembered it feeling like she had a hole in her body, and he was shoving something huge in it. C. touched D1’s shoulders and ran her fingers through her hair as this was happening.

[145] I am satisfied that the jury’s verdict of guilty with respect to both offenders necessarily implies that F. had vaginal intercourse with D1, and that C. aided or abetted in that act. The jury also completely rejected the denials of both offenders. If it were necessary to find the facts on these counts independently, I would arrive at the same conclusions. D1’s evidence on this was compelling and graphic, and I believe her, despite her young age at the time of the event. I was left with no reasonable doubt by the testimony of the offenders.

[146] The Crown proposes 7 years consecutive for F. on count #18, and 1 year on count #21, concurrent to the sentence on count #18. The defence proposes 6 years on count #18 and 6 months on count #21, concurrent to the sentence on count #18.

[147] In view of the very young age of D1 at the time, the wrongfulness of this sexual assault is at the very extreme end of the range. Had the Crown asked for more than 7 years, I would have strongly considered it. As it is, I am satisfied that a sentence of 7 years on count #18 is within the appropriate range for such a heinous crime, and I accept the Crown’s position. The sentence on count #21 will be 1 year, concurrent to the sentence on count #18.

[148] As to C., the Crown proposes 3 years on count #18, consecutive, and 1 year on count #21, concurrent to the sentence on count #18. The defence proposes 1 year consecutive on count #18, and 1 month concurrent on count #21. The defence analogizes C.’s position to that of the mother of the child victim in Friesen, who was told by the accused to bring the child into the bedroom, so they could both perform oral sex on her, and so that he could have intercourse with her. The mother was compliant with his demands.

[149] This argument is not of much assistance without knowing what sentence the mother received for her part in this sexual assault, assuming that she was charged. I was not provided with this information, and it is not referenced in the reported decisions on this case. In any event, there is no evidence that C. was ordered or directed by F. to help him sexually assault their young child.

[150] As an aider and abettor to F.’s sexual assault of D1, C. is, of course, equally as guilty of the crime as the principal. However, for purposes of sentencing, s. 718.1 directs that the sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. Here, there are few offences that approach the gravity of helping to facilitate, or encouraging, the rape of one’s own 5-year-old daughter. The breach of trust is off the scale, in terms of severity. That militates in favour of a substantial sentence. On the other hand, it was F. who committed the ultimate act of vaginal penetration, not C., so her degree of responsibility would be less than his. Not a great deal less, however, since she was not just an innocent bystander, but instead actually assisted in the sexual assault by helping to bind D1’s feet, making it easier for him to carry out the awful deed, and by encouraging D1’s cooperation by stroking her and bribing her with a present if she was a good girl. She did so when she should have been protecting her young daughter from sexual predation by F., not helping to facilitate it.

[151] The Crown’s proposal of 3 years incarceration is just less than half of the sentence I am imposing on F. I am satisfied that it is proportionate to the extreme gravity of this offence, and the degree of responsibility of C. as an aider and abettor, and I accept it. As to count #21, the defence submission of one month concurrent is entirely disproportionate to the seriousness of unlawfully confining such a young child to facilitate a vaginal sexual assault. I accede to the Crown’s submission of 1 year, concurrent to the sentence on count #18.

Count #23 -

[152] The next count against C. is count 23, sexual assault on D1. She was charged with sexual assault with a weapon, but the jury found her guilty of the included offence of sexual assault.

[153] The jury was instructed that this count relates to the incident that allegedly happened after D1 made a gingerbread castle and C. was happy with how it turned out. D1 went to the bathroom, and C. came in and “rewarded” D1 by putting a dildo into D1’s vagina, into her bum and on top of her breasts.

[154] D1 testified to this event, as summarized in the preceding paragraph. The jury clearly accepted that this event happened, and completely rejected the denials of C.

[155] The jury was instructed that if they were satisfied that C. sexually assaulted D1 by putting the dildo in her vagina but were not satisfied that the dildo was a weapon, as I defined it for them, they should convict her of the included offence of sexual assault. They did so.

[156] I find the facts to be essentially as summarized above.

[157] The Crown proposes 4 years incarceration, consecutive to the other counts. The defence argues for 2 years consecutive.

[158] This is, of course, a serious breach of trust, and a violation of D1’s sexual integrity that merits a substantial sentence. Given that this is a single incident, as opposed to some of the other counts which involve many incidents over long periods of time, I am satisfied that a fit and just sentence is 3 years, consecutive to the other counts.

Count #24 -

[159] This count arises out of the same incident as count #23. It is invitation to sexual touching, contrary to s. 152 of the Code. The jury was instructed that this count relates to the allegations that, after inserting the dildo into D1’s vagina, C. took a different sexual toy and told D1 to do the same thing to her.

[160] D1 testified that after C. used the dildo on her, C. took a different one and said D1 had to use it on her. D1 did what she was told and put the sex toy into C.’s vagina, rubbed it inside her legs and touched her breasts with it. C. wasn’t happy with the way it turned out, because D1 wasn’t using the toy properly. As a consequence, D1 got a haircut where most of her hair on the back was shaved off, so she looked like a boy.

[161] Once again, the factual basis for this count was made clear, and the jury’s finding of guilty necessarily implies that they found as a fact that this event occurred.

[162] The Crown proposes 4 years concurrent to the sentence on count #23. The defence proposes 3 years concurrent. I am of the view that this offence is of equal gravity as count #23 and should be treated the same. Since they constituted one continuous criminal adventure, the sentences should run concurrently. Accordingly, the sentence on count #24 will be 3 years, concurrent to the sentence on count #23.

Count #25 -

[163] This count was for assault on D1 with a weapon, namely a blunt object, contrary to s. 267(a) of the Code. The jury found C. guilty of the included offence of common assault.

[164] The jury was instructed that this count related to the allegation that C. and D1 were working on a wedding cake. C. punched D1 and then threw a heavy object, which she called a cake pan spinner, and struck her on the face, dislocating her jaw.

[165] D1 testified that she and C. were doing a wedding cake together at their house in Brampton. The couple wanted mauve icing, but D1 did not get it right. C. was angry, and punched D1 in her face on the right side. She then picked up a cake pan spinner, which is white and heavy, and threw it at D1. D1 turned, but not fast enough, and it hit her face and dislocated her jaw.

[166] It is an express finding of the jury that C. assaulted D1. However, it is a necessary implication from their not guilty verdict on the count, as charged, of assault with a weapon, that she did not do so with a weapon.

[167] On the evidence, I find that the assault on D1 consisted of the initial punch to her face.

[168] The Crown proposes a sentence of 3 months consecutive. The defence proposes 1 month consecutive. For this single-event assault, I agree with the position of the defence.

Count #31 -

[169] The next count upon which C. was found guilty is count #31, which is assault causing bodily harm against D2, contrary to s. 267(b) of the Code. The jury found her not guilty as charged, but guilty of the included offence of common assault, contrary to s. 266.

[170] The jury was instructed that this count relates to the allegation that C. injured D2’s nose by pushing her to the floor and hit her on other occasions causing further injury to her nose. The various injuries to her nose are alleged to be reflected in hospital records from January 26, 2008, massage records from January 27, 2009, and in the evidence and observations of Cynthia Ibanez.

[171] D2 testified that it was normal to get hit by C. as a consequence. She got hit all the time. She described one incident when they lived in Waterloo where C. pushed her to the wooden floor, and she struck her nose on the floor, injuring it. She had to seek medical attention.

[172] This, like the preceding count and others we have dealt with, is an example of the jury doing what they are entitled to do, as the finders of fact: accept some, but not all, of what a witness said. It is a necessary implication from their verdict of guilty to common assault that they found as a fact that C. assaulted D2 by applying force to her nose but did not cause her bodily harm in so doing. Bodily harm was defined for the jury as any hurt or injury that interferes with a person’s health, comfort or psychological well-being. The harm must be something that is more than brief, fleeting or minor in nature.

[173] Thus, I find that the underlying facts for this conviction are an intentional blow to the nose that did not cause bodily harm to D2. I accept D2’s evidence and independently find that she was struck on the nose by C., more than once, although bodily harm was not caused as a result.

[174] The Crown proposes 9 months consecutive. The defence proposes 1 month consecutive. The Crown’s proposal would make sense if the offender had been found guilty as charged. However, the jury has clearly found that there was no injury that was more than brief, fleeting or minor in nature. In view of the fact that this happened more than once over a period of time, I find that an appropriate sentence is 3 months.

Count #32 -

[175] In this count, C. is charged with unlawful confinement of D2, contrary to s. 279(2) of the Code. It relates to the multiple allegations that C. locked D2 in cupboards for extended periods of time.

[176] Both the Crown and defence counsel agree that a sentence of 6 months consecutive is appropriate. I accept that joint submission.

Count #41 -

[177] This is the final count against C. where a finding of guilt was rendered by the jury. It is that she did, with intent to aggrieve or annoy another person (namely the four complainants or any of them), administer a noxious thing, namely a liquid, contrary to s. 245(1)(b) of the Code. The jury was instructed that this count relates to the allegations that C. repeatedly poured Tabasco sauce and liquid soap into the mouths of S1, D3, D1 and/or D2.

[178] All four complainants testified that C. routinely made them swallow Tabasco sauce or liquid dish soap, or sometimes both, as a consequence of perceived bad behaviour. They also witnessed her doing the same thing to the other complainants. She squeezed their jaws to make them open their mouths and swallow. The quantities were large, equivalent to a whole mouthful of sauce or soap. If you threw up, C. made you eat your own vomit. D3 said this was one of the worst consequences she had to endure. She would rather be hit 100 times than being forced to swallow Tabasco sauce and soap. She described it as “awful, horrible”.

[179] Given the list of questions the jury was asked to consider as they deliberated on this count, the following facts are essential to the jury’s finding of guilt on this offence:

• That C. did administer Tabasco sauce and/or liquid soap to one or more of the complainants;
• That she did so with intent to irritate, hurt and upset them;
• That Tabasco sauce and soap is capable of aggrieving or annoying a person when administered into their mouth; and,
• That C. did not administer only a few drops, by way of reasonable correction, as she testified she did, but instead administered significant quantities that far exceeded what would be reasonable in the circumstances.

[180] To supplement those implied essential facts, I find, in addition, that C. administered both Tabasco sauce and liquid soap to all four complainants, on a regular basis over the course of many years. I also accept the testimony of the complainants that if they threw up after swallowing the sauce or soap, they were made to eat their own vomit.

[181] Given the way this count was framed, the maximum punishment is 2 years incarceration. The Crown proposes 6 months consecutive. The defence proposes 1 month consecutive.

[182] In my view, this offence calls for a meaningful sentence. It must serve the objectives of general deterrence, to send a message that corporal punishment of this kind no longer has any place in our society. It also must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. C.’s conduct amounts to nothing less than an ongoing campaign of torture against her own children. The fact that she would make the children eat their own vomit illustrates the degree of her depravity.

[183] Since the victims of this crime were both under the age of 18 for most of the time, and were members of the offender’s own family, those two factors constitute aggravating factors, pursuant to s. 718.2(a)(ii) and (ii.1). Furthermore, since this amounts to abuse of a person under the age of 18, the court must give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence.

[184] I find that a sentence of 6 months consecutive, as proposed by the Crown, is fit and just in the circumstances.

[185] I will now move to a consideration of the counts against F. where guilty verdicts were rendered.

Count #8 -

[186] This is a count of sexual assault on S1, contrary to s. 271 of the Code. The jury was instructed that this count relates to the allegation that F. touched S1’s penis, face and other parts of his body, starting when he was 8 or 9 years old in Brampton, and continuing regularly in both Brampton and in London, often involving him sitting on a stool.

[187] S1 testified that F. had been touching his penis, crotch, balls and inner thighs since as long as S1 could remember. He would grab, pull, caress, rub and stimulate. Sometimes the goal was to make S1 hard, sometimes just to feel him. Sometimes it happened twice a week, sometimes nothing for a month or two, and sometimes 10 to 20 times in a week.

[188] F. denied every having touched S1 in a sexually inappropriate manner. Clearly, his evidence was rejected by the jury.

[189] I find as a fact that F. did touch S1’s penis, crotch, scrotum, and inner thighs on multiple occasions over a period of about 9 years.

[190] The Crown proposes a sentence of 5 years. The defence proposes 3 years.

[191] As I have already noted, Friesen cautions courts against downgrading a sexual offence because it only involves touching, as opposed to oral sex or intercourse. It also states that mid-single digit penitentiary terms for sexual offences against children are normal. While 3 years might be appropriate for an offence of this nature that occurred on one occasion, or perhaps a very few, this count represents many instances of sexual assault over a period of many years. The offender treated his son like a sexual plaything, whom he could touch and fondle anytime he felt like doing so. Friesen holds that sexual violence against children that is committed on multiple occasions and for longer periods of time should attract significantly higher sentences that reflect the full cumulative gravity of the crime.

[192] In my view, the mid-single digit sentence of 5 years proposed by the Crown reflects the gravity of this crime and the degree of the responsibility of the offender.

Count #9 -

[193] This is a count under s. 273(1) of the Code, that F. did, in committing a sexual assault on S1, wound him. The jury was instructed that it relates to the allegation that F. had anal intercourse with S1, in or about February, 2020, which was allegedly a punishment after the dogs got loose when S1 was walking them. He said that he was bleeding from his anus afterward and was therefore wounded by the assault. He later sought medical attention for an injury to his anus.

[194] S1 testified to this effect. F. denied it, and his denial was clearly rejected by the jury.

[195] This count relates to a single event, and the factual basis for the charge was clear. I find as a fact that F. did sexually assault S1 by anally penetrating him, which caused him to bleed. This constituted a wound, which was defined for the jury as injuring someone in a way that breaks or cuts or pierces or tears the skin or some part of the person’s body. It must be more than something trifling, fleeting or minor, such as a scratch.

[196] The Crown proposes 10 years, concurrent to the sentence imposed on count #10. The defence proposes 9 years, concurrent to count 10.

[197] When considering the parity principle, it is important that an offender be treated the same as similar offenders committing similar offences in similar circumstances. In discussing the appropriate sentence for C. for having had vaginal sexual intercourse with S1 on at least 3 occasions, I referred to a few comparable cases, as well as the Crown’s proposed sentences for F.’s sexual assaults on D1 and D2 and arrived at a sentence of 7 years. Here, F. has been convicted of having anal intercourse with S1, on one occasion only. That would have militated in favour of a slightly lower sentence than 9 years, but for the fact that this anal intercourse caused wounding to S1. This manifested itself in bleeding from the anus for several months, until he sought medical attention, and an “anal fissure” was discovered and successfully treated. I am satisfied that one offsets the other, such that a sentence of 9 years is appropriate. In accordance with the positions of the Crown and defence, this sentence will be concurrent to the sentence to be imposed on count #10.

Count 10 -

[198] This is another count of sexual assault by F. on S1. The jury was told that it relates to the many alleged incidents of anal intercourse by F. on S1 between the first one, which he described, up to but not including the last one in or about February, 2020, since the latter one is covered by count #9.

[199] S1 said the first time it happened was in Brampton, where F. put his penis in S1’s bum. As he put it, “he fucked me”. He described in graphic detail what it felt like and said there was often blood coming from his anus afterward. S1 wouldn’t move while he was being penetrated and was “like a dead fish”. He said it happened once a month or every two months.

[200] Given the jury’s verdict, it is a necessary implication that they found, as a fact, that F. had anal intercourse with S1, and that they rejected F.’s denials in this regard. As to how often it happened, I find as a fact that it happened many times over a period of years, from in or about 2015 or 2016 at Brampton, up to and including 2019 when they lived in London.

[201] The Crown asks for a 10-year sentence, to run concurrently with the 9-year sentence on count #9. The defence proposes a 9-year sentence and agrees it should run concurrently with the sentence on count #9.

[202] In my view, these sexual assaults are particularly egregious, involving domination, humiliation, pain and physical injury, that happened many times over a period of years. It was obvious from the manner in which S1 described these events that he has been psychologically scarred. A double-digit penitentiary sentence is entirely warranted, to express society’s denunciation for such conduct, and to deter others from similar behaviour.

[203] I agree that a sentence of 10 years on this count, to run concurrent to the sentence on count #9, is appropriate.

Count #13 -

[204] This is a joint charge with C., of unlawful confinement of D3, involving locking D3 in sheds on many occasions. I have already concluded, above, that a sentence of 6 months consecutive is appropriate, for each offender.

Count #17 -

[205] This is a conviction for common assault on D3. The jury was instructed that this relates to the allegations that on multiple occasions in Brampton and London, F. assaulted D3 by hitting her in the face and neck, pushing her and twisting her arm.

[206] Both the Crown and defence counsel propose a sentence of 6 months consecutive on this count. I agree that that is appropriate.

Counts #18 and 21 -

[207] These are joint charges with C., of sexual assault on D1 and unlawful confinement, arising out of the fact that she was tied up to facilitate the assault. I have already concluded, above, that a sentence for F. of 7 years on count #18 is appropriate, to run consecutive to other sentences. The sentence on count #21 will be 1 year, concurrent to the sentence on count #18.

Count #22 -

[208] This is a conviction for incest, arising out of F.’s vaginal sexual assault on his daughter, D1, dealt with in count #18. The Crown proposes 7 years, concurrent to the sentence on count #18. The defence proposes 6 years, concurrent.

[209] Whether the sentence is 6 or 7 years makes no practical difference, since it will run concurrently with the 7-year sentence on count #18. Be that as it may, I accept the Crown’s position.

Count #26 -

[210] This is a count of common assault, contrary to s. 266 of the Code. The jury was instructed that it related to the allegation that D1 was not handing over enough of her money, and as a punishment F. took her downstairs, and tied her arms and waist to a burgundy pole and left her there.

[211] The jury’s guilty verdict necessarily implies that this event happened.

[212] Both the Crown and the defence propose a sentence of 6 months consecutive to the other counts. I agree that this is appropriate.

Count #27 -

[213] This is a conviction under s. 152 of the Code, for invitation to sexual touching. The jury was instructed that this relates to the allegation that, when D2 was very young, F. showed her pornography of someone giving a man a hand job, and then directed her to do the same to him. According to D2’s evidence, this happened before they moved to Waterloo, so she was less than 5 years of age at the time.

[214] Once again, the jury’s guilty verdict necessarily implies that this event happened.

[215] The Crown proposes a sentence of 4 years, consecutive. The defence proposes 2 years.

[216] The most significant aggravating factors are the very young age of D2 at the time, and the egregious breach of trust that is involved. However, it was an isolated incident, and did not involve a violation of the victim’s bodily and sexual integrity. It also does not appear to have caused any psychological harm, in that D2 does not recall being scared at the time and said “it was just something to do”.

[217] I find that a sentence of 2 years is appropriate, consecutive to the other counts.

Count #35 -

[218] This is a conviction for unlawful confinement of D2, contrary to s. 279(2) of the Code. The jury was instructed that it is a global count, relating to any instances where F. allegedly bound D2 up by rope or other means, or otherwise confined her while they were living in London.

[219] D2 described in her testimony being tied up with by F. when they resided in Waterloo, and many times since then, including when they resided in London. I find as a fact that F. tied up D2 with rope on many occasions over a number of years.

[220] Both the Crown and defence agree that the appropriate sentence for this count is 6 months consecutive. I agree.

Count #36 -

[221] On this count, F. was found guilty of sexual assault causing bodily harm, contrary to s. 272(1)(c) of the Code. The jury was instructed that it relates to an incident in London, after C. left the home, where F. allegedly tied D2, nude, to a beam in the basement, with fishing line which cut into her wrists.

[222] D2 described F. having done this to her, in or around January 2020. She was naked, and her hands were tied above her head in the basement with fishing line. The fishing line cut into her wrists, which caused a lot of pain, but only a little bit of blood.

[223] Again, it is a necessary implication from the jury’s verdict that they found as a fact that this event did occur. There was the intentional application of force by F. in tying her hands to the beam, which was done in circumstances of a sexual nature, in that it violated D2’s sexual integrity to be tied up while nude. She suffered bodily harm to her wrists as a result.

[224] The Crown proposes 2 years consecutive. The defence proposes 1 year. I am satisfied that both proposals are within the appropriate range. The sentence will be 18 months, consecutive to the other counts.

Count #38 -

[226] Count #38 charges that F., in committing a sexual assault on D2, used a weapon, namely a binding object, contrary to s. 272(1) of the Code. The jury was instructed that this count relates to an incident that allegedly happened during March 2020, before D2 and her siblings left home for good. She alleged that F. threatened to hurt D3 if D2 didn’t have sex with him. He bound her hands and ultimately had forcible sexual intercourse with her.

[227] D2 testified that this happened after C. had left the family home. F. demanded to have sex with her, but she told him she didn’t want to. F. told her he was going to hurt D3 or have D3 go to stay with C. or put her in foster care, if she didn’t agree to have sex. He tied D2’s arms up with nylons, put a sock in her mouth, got on top of her and had intercourse with her.

[228] The jury found F. not guilty of sexual assault with a weapon but convicted him of the included offence of sexual assault. It is a necessary implication from that verdict that F. did have forcible sexual intercourse with D2 on this occasion, but that the nylons did not constitute a weapon.

[229] The Crown proposes 7 years, consecutive. The defence proposes 6 years. I agree with the Crown’s position. The fact that violence and coercion were used to force D2 into having intercourse with him is an aggravating factor. While the coercion is the subject-matter of count #39, which will be dealt with below, counsel are agreed that the sentence on that count will be concurrent to the one on count #38, so there will be, as a practical matter, no additional punishment for that. It is, therefore, appropriate to consider it as an aggravating factor on this count.

Count #39 -

[230] This is a conviction for extortion, contrary to s. 346(1) of the Code. It relates to the same incident discussed in count #3, but focusses on the allegation that F. threatened to hurt D3 unless D2 had sex with him.

[231] It is a necessary implication from the jury’s guilty verdict that F. used threats toward D3 to induce D2 to have sex with him, and I so find.

[232] The Crown proposes 3 years, concurrent to the sentence on count #38. The defence proposes 2 years. Once again, both proposals are within the appropriate range in these circumstances, and the sentence will have no practical impact since it will run concurrently with the 7-year sentence just imposed. The sentence on this count will be 2 ½ years, concurrent to count #38.

Count #40 -

[233] This is a conviction for incest, arising out of the same incident dealt with in count #38, where F. had forcible sexual intercourse with his daughter.

[234] The Crown proposes 7 years, concurrent to the 7-year sentence imposed on count #38. The defence proposes 6 years, to run concurrently. I agree that the crime of having sexual intercourse with one’s own daughter demands a significant denunciatory sentence and should match the 7-year sentence imposed for the sexual assault itself. It will, however, run concurrently to the sentence imposed on count #38.

[235] That completes the list of counts to be considered. According to my calculations, the cumulative sentence imposed on C., taking account of those which are to be served consecutively and those to be served concurrently, is 20 years and 10 months. The cumulative sentence imposed on F. is 34 years and 6 months. I will now move to a consideration of the principle of totality.

TOTALITY APPLIED:

[236] I have already referred to authorities that outlined some considerations to be brought to bear when applying s. 718.2(c) and determining whether the combined sentence is unduly long or harsh. I find additional guidance in the words of Paciocco J.A., in R. v. M.V., 2023 ONCA 724, at para. 100:

The principle of totality “requires a sentencing judge who orders an offender to serve consecutive sentences for multiple offences to ensure that the cumulative sentence rendered does not exceed the overall culpability of the offender”: R. v. M.(C.A.), 1996 CanLII 230 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, at para. 42. This principle must be observed in appropriate cases to preserve the principle of proportionality and to reflect the fact that where sentences are combined, the functional value in imposing the sentences can generally be achieved without multiplying fit sentences: R. v. Johnson, 2012 ONCA 339, 285 C.C.C. (3d) 120, at paras. 15-25. Simply put, an offender is not typically going to need to fully serve each component for the principles and goals of sentencing to be satisfied.

[237] Chief Justice Lamer, speaking for the court in R. v. M.(C.A.), 1996 SCC 230, described the totality principle, at para. 42:

In the context of consecutive sentences, this general principle of proportionality expresses itself through the more particular form of the “totality principle”. The totality principle, in short, requires a sentencing judge who orders an offender to serve consecutive sentences for multiple offences to ensure that the cumulative sentence rendered does not exceed the overall culpability of the offender. As D. A. Thomas describes the principle in Principles of Sentencing (2nd ed. 1979), at p. 56:

The effect of the totality principle is to require a sentencer who has passed a series of sentences, each properly calculated in relation to the offence for which it is imposed and each properly made consecutive in accordance with the principles governing consecutive sentences, to review the aggregate sentence and consider whether the aggregate sentence is “just and appropriate”.

Clayton Ruby articulates the principle in the following terms in his treatise, Sentencing, supra, at pp. 44-45:

The purpose is to ensure that a series of sentences, each properly imposed in relation to the offence to which it relates, is in aggregate “just and appropriate”. A cumulative sentence may offend the totality principle if the aggregate sentence is substantially above the normal level of a sentence for the most serious of the individual offences involved, or if its effect is to impose on the offender “a crushing sentence” not in keeping with his record and prospects.

[238] It need hardly be said that the facts before the court approach the extreme end of the spectrum of chronic parental physical and sexual abuse of one’s own children, although clearly there are cases that are even worse. Some of those will be referred to below. These facts are, at least, the most egregious that I have encountered during my 26 years on the bench. In order to get a sense of what sentence is appropriate to recognize the overall culpability of the offender, I will start by reviewing other cases that also approach the same end of the spectrum.

[239] I have already referred to R. A.R. (supra), where the offender inflicted a campaign of terror on five of his six children, involving repeated acts of physical, sexual, and psychological abuse. He was convicted of 30 offences and was sentenced to 20 years in prison. That sentence was upheld by the Court of Appeal.

[240] In R. v. D.H., 2022 MBPC 36, 2022 CarswellMan 493 (Man. P.C.), the offender pleaded guilty to incest, two counts of sexual interference and two counts of making child pornography. He relentlessly sexually exploited his eldest daughter from ages three through twelve, and his youngest daughter over a one-year period when she was five. There were acts of sexual abuse against the oldest daughter on an almost daily basis, including fellatio, and vaginal intercourse. The youngest daughter was subjected to attempted vaginal and anal penetration by the offender’s penis. The police seized almost 600 still photographs and videos depicting the offender abusing his daughters. The Static 99 predictive tool indicated that he was not a high risk to reoffend.

[241] The cumulative sentence was 37 years incarceration. This was reduced to 23 years after application of the totality principle.

[242] In R. v. E.A.V., 2022 ONCJ 545, the offender pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault and sexual interference, for having sexually assaulted and impregnated his 12-year-old stepdaughter. He raped his victim approximately once a week for 8 times in total, ejaculating inside of her. There were also many instances of digital penetration and cunnilingus. He received a sentence of 18.5 years, less a credit for pre-sentence custody, but the trial judge commented that, but for an unusual set of mitigating factors, a sentence of well over 20 years would have been warranted.

[243] In R. v. J.A.C. (1995), 1995 CanLII 635 (ON CA), 26 O.R. (3d) 462, [1995] O.J. No. 3229 (C.A.), the offender was convicted on six counts of gross indecency, three counts of indecent assault, two counts of assault causing bodily harm, one count of rape, one count of buggery, one count of sexual assault and two counts of sexual intercourse with a female under 14. The offender had physically and sexually abused the stepchildren in two of his three marriages in a series of assaults over the course of 16 years. The physical assaults included beating the children with his fists, belts, a wooden spoon and, on one occasion, a buggy whip. The sexual assaults on the children included sexual intercourse, fellatio, cunnilingus and attempted anal intercourse. In imposing a global sentence of 30 years, the trial judge characterized this case as one of the worst offences involving the worst offender.

[244] The Court of Appeal agreed with that characterization but held that the trial judge erred in failing to apply the totality principle. The sentence was reduced to 21 years.

[245] In R. v. M. (C.A.), 1996 CanLII 230 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, the offender pleaded guilty to numerous counts of sexual assault, incest and assault with a weapon relating to a pattern of sexual, physical and emotional abuse inflicted upon his children over a number of years. The brutality of the physical abuse exceeded what is present in the case at bar, and included beatings with his fists, kicking with steel-toed boots, and whipping with a wet electrical cord or with a leather belt that had a buckle that would cut the flesh away. The sexual abuse included forcing them to perform fellatio on him, digital penetration, full sexual intercourse, and permitting his friends to have intercourse with his young daughter in exchange for money.

[246] The trial judge imposed a global sentence of 25 years. This was reduced to 18 years and 8 months by the B. C. Court of Appeal, based on a perceived ceiling limiting fixed-term sentences to a total of 20 years. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the 25-year sentence.

[247] Finally, in R. v. J.S., 2018 ONCA 675, the offender pleaded guilty to counts of possessing, making and distributing child pornography, sexual assault with a weapon and three counts of sexual interference. His three nieces (six-month old twins and a four-year-old) had been left in his care during the summer, while his sister-in-law worked outside the home. He sexually abused them, recorded the abuse, and posted some of it to his website. The sexual abuse included fellatio, cunnilingus, attempted penetration of the anal and vaginal areas with an erect penis, and insertion of various objects into a child’s anus. An extensive child pornography collection involving other children was also seized.

[248] The offender was sentenced to 18 years, less pre-trial custody. The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal, noting that the sentence imposed, while lengthy, was not demonstrably unfit.

[249] I should note that counsel for C. filed a number of other authorities, generating lower sentencing numbers, which I do not need to review, because they all dealt with abuse of a single victim and are, therefore, distinguishable from the case at bar.

[250] The cases above indicate that an appropriate global sentence for physical and sexual abuse of several children of the offender, over the course of many years, can range, in years, from the high teens to well into the twenties. I should note that two of those decisions, J.A.C. and M. (C.A.). are dated. Friesen tells us that sentences for these crimes “must increase” and cautioned against placing too much reliance upon sentences that were imposed prior to 2015.

[251] The sentence must, of course, be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. Friesen directs the court to consider the wrongfulness and the harmfulness of the offence in considering and applying the proportionality principle, because they affect both the gravity of the offence and the offender’s degree of responsibility.

[252] Here, the acts of the offenders violated the personal autonomy, bodily integrity, and sexual integrity of the three oldest victims in an ongoing and relentless campaign of abuse. This abuse effectively stole their childhoods from them and left them with psychological wounds that may well be permanent. Even the youngest victim, D3, who was spared any sexual abuse but did suffer chronic physical and psychological abuse, continues to live in constant fear, anxiety, and uncertainty of never knowing when it might happen again, and said that this has left her with wounds that may never heal. The children’s family has been torn apart and will never be put back together.

[253] The wrongfulness of the offences is self-evident in the many acts of sexual depravity perpetrated by the offenders, as outlined above. The three oldest victims were, essentially, used by F. as sexual playthings. The same can be said of C., with respect to two of those victims, but in particular with respect to S1. This wrongfulness is enhanced because their blameworthy conduct lies not only in what they, themselves, did to the children, but also because of their failure to protect their children from what the other was doing. I have already mentioned that the earliest act of sexual abuse, in or about 2002, was a joint crime, where F. had vaginal intercourse with his 5-year-old daughter, while C. aided or abetted in the act. S1 testified that F. was present, watching, when C. got on top of him and forced him to have intercourse with her. It is clear that both parties were aware of, or willfully blind to, the most egregious acts of abuse that the other was perpetrating, and yet did nothing to protect the children from it.

[254] The wrongfulness and moral blameworthiness of these offences is enhanced by the strict regime of discipline that prevailed in the household, reinforced by religious dictates that demanded that the children strictly respect and obey their parents. They were taught never to tell anyone outside the home what was happening within. Their ability to do so was further restricted by the fact that the offenders chose to have C. home-school the children. As I have already mentioned, this deprived them of contact with teachers and counsellors, which might have led to earlier disclosure of the abuse, as well as sex education, which would have made them aware of concepts such as bodily and sexual integrity. This led the victims, for the most part, to be unaware that what their parents were doing to them was even wrong. This left the children highly vulnerable, and both offenders took full advantage of that vulnerability.

[255] In short, the degree of moral blameworthiness and the degree of responsibility of both offenders is enormous. These crimes did not arise out of a momentary lapse of judgment, but instead amounted to a conscious decision to hurt, torment and violate these vulnerable children many times, in many different ways, over many years.

[256] Given the nature of these offences, the court must give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence. Both objectives demand a very lengthy penitentiary sentence, within the range I have discussed.

[257] The risk of reoffending is an important consideration, since it informs the court whether lengthy detention is necessary to protect the public. Here, I have been provided with no evidence as to the likelihood of the offenders committing similar offences in the future. Taking a common-sense view of the matter, these crimes victimized their own children, but no-one outside the family. Even within the family, the youngest child, D3, was not victimized sexually, but only physically and psychologically. When one couples that with the fact that the prospects of them having any more children in the future are negligible to non-existent, I am led to conclude that the risk of reoffending is not a compelling consideration. However, it should not preclude the imposition of a very significant sentence.

[258] Rehabilitation is also an objective that merits consideration, although in this case it is less significant. I have already observed that C. has demonstrated no insight into her behaviour, and how she has harmed her children. As to F., it is difficult to assess his prospects for rehabilitation one way or the other. In any event, I do not consider that the objective of assisting in the rehabilitation of the offenders should stand in the way of a substantial sentence, one which recognizes the harm done to the victims and society’s denunciation of such horrific abuse.

[259] A substantial sentence will also serve to reinforce the message of deterrence that is embodied in the Friesen decision, that crimes such as these will be met with substantial sentences, so as to reflect the wrongfulness of sexual violence against children and the far-reaching and ongoing harm that it causes to children, families, and society at large.

[260] I will now determine just how substantial those sentences will be. I will begin with F.

[261] The sentences already pronounced against F. are, indeed, significant. They add up to 34.5 years. Each individual sentence is justifiable, in view of the gravity of the offences in question and his complete responsibility for them. However, given that they add up to 34.5 years because most of them are consecutive, the totality principle dictates that the global sentence that is ultimately imposed for all of his wrongful conduct must not be harsh or unduly long.

[262] I am satisfied that a sentence of 34.5 years is unduly long and harsh and must be reduced. The Crown had proposed a cumulative sentence of 37 years and proposed that it be reduced to 30 years after adjustment for totality. Defence counsel had proposed a cumulative sentence of 31.5 years, and proposed that it be reduced to 19.5 years, after adjustment for totality. This figure included a reduction for the harsh prison conditions that he has endured in pre-sentence custody, which included four severe beatings by his fellow inmates.

[263] F. is 57 years of age. A 30-year sentence as proposed by the Crown would, theoretically, mean that he would be 87 years of age at the time of his release. However, the reality is that he will be eligible for parole after serving 1/3 of his sentence, and is entitled to statutory remission, leading to early release after serving 2/3 of his sentence.

[264] The most serious offences committed by this offender are count #10 (10 years for multiple acts of anal intercourse with S1, concurrent with count #9); count #18 (7 years for vaginal intercourse with D1 when she was 5 years old, concurrent with counts #21 and #22); and, count #38 (7 years for vaginal intercourse with D2, which was induced by threats to harm D3, concurrent with counts #39 and #40). These total 24 years. A sentence of 30 years would be substantially above the sentences imposed individually for these offences, and considerably higher than the total when they are treated consecutively.

[265] Having considered all of the above, including the authorities referred to, I have concluded that the global sentence that is proportionate to the overall culpability of this offender, and his high degree of responsibility, is 22 years. From that, I will deduct one year due to the harsh conditions he endured during pre-sentence custody, including four severe beatings, resulting in a net sentence, after totality is taken into account, of 21 years. His pre-sentence credit, on a 1.5 to 1 ratio, was calculated in para. 6 above to be 4 years and 151 days. Thus, his remaining sentence is 16 years and 214 days.

[266] I now move to a consideration of the appropriate global sentence to be imposed on C.

[267] The Crown had proposed a cumulative sentence of 30 years and proposed that it be reduced to 25 years after adjustment for totality. Defence counsel had proposed a cumulative sentence of 11.5 years, and proposed that it be reduced to 10 years, after adjustment for totality. I have calculated, above, the cumulative sentence to be 20 years and 10 months.

[268] Sentencing is an individualized exercise, and she is entitled to a separate assessment of her sentence from that of F. However, parity is always an important consideration in determining a sentence, which includes a consideration not only of other decided cases, but also the sentences meted out to an offender’s co-accused.

[269] In this case, the circumstances surrounding these offences are identical in both cases, as are the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Both parties are equally guilty of an egregious breach of trust. Both parties took advantage of the vulnerable situation in which the victims found themselves in committing these horrible crimes.

[270] The most serious offences committed by this offender are count #1 (5 years for repeated sexual assaults on S1, concurrent to count #3); count #5 (7 years for vaginal intercourse with S1 on at least 3 occasions, concurrent to count #5 (cunnilingus) and 6); count #18 (3 years for aiding and abetting in F.’s vaginal intercourse with D1, concurrent to count #21); and, count #23 (3 years for vaginally penetrating D1 with a dildo, concurrent to count #24). These total 18 years. While the cumulative sentence for all counts of 20 years and 8 months is substantially higher than the individual sentences for each one of these counts, it is only modestly higher than the 18-year total for these most serious offences.

[271] F.’s crimes are more serious in terms of the number of sexual victims, in that he sexually violated two of his daughters and his son with his penis. C. sexually violated her son with her vagina, aided or abetted in F.’s vaginal intercourse with D1, and sexually violated D1 herself with a dildo, while inviting D1 to do the same to her. However, I find that C.’s overall culpability is little different than that of F.

[272] While C. sexually victimized one less victim, one cannot ignore all of the other crimes she committed against her children. Indeed, the evidence was clear that the victims saw C. as their primary tormentor, and it was their complaints against her that first emerged, when the victims reluctantly, and incrementally, began to disclose the horrors they had been enduring. S1 testified that “F. was nothing compared to C. She is the one in my nightmares and flashbacks. F. is not.”

[273] An offender is not entitled to an automatic discount on the basis of totality. A sentence is to be reduced only where the cumulative sentence is unduly long or harsh. The reduction should be no more than is necessary to arrive at a number that is commensurate with the offender’s overall culpability. In my view, the cumulative sentence I have arrived at, of 20 years and 10 months, is unduly long or harsh, but only by a relatively modest amount.

[274] I conclude that a fit and proper global sentence, that is proportionate to her overall culpability and her high degree of responsibility, is 18 years. From that, I will deduct 4 months, relating to the time she spent under house arrest while on bail, to arrive at a final global sentence of 17 years and 8 months. She is entitled to a credit of 58 days of pre-sentence custody, enhanced on a 1.5 to 1 ratio, bringing it to 87 days. Rounding that number up to 3 months, her net sentence is 17 years and 5 months.

[275] The adjusted sentences for each offender that add up to the global sentences that I have arrived at, are as follows. All sentences are consecutive unless indicated as concurrent.

C.:

Count	Sec. #	Gross Sentence	Sentence After Totality
1	271(1)	5 years	4 years
3	279(2)	1 year concurrent to #1	1 year concurrent to #1
4	152	5 years concurrent to #5	5 years concurrent to #5
5	271	7 years	5 years
6	155(1)	7 years concurrent to #5	5 years concurrent to #5
7	266	3 months	3 months
13	279(2)	6 months	6 months
14	279(2)	1 month concurrent to #15	1 month concurrent to #15
15	266	3 months	3 months
16	266	6 months	6 months
18	271	3 years	3 years
21	279(2)	1 year concurrent to #18	1 year concurrent to #18
23	271	3 years	3 years
24	152	3 years concurrent to #23	3 years concurrent to #23
25	266	1 month	1 month
31	266	3 months	1 month
32	279(2)	6 months	6 months
41	245(1)(b)	6 months	6 months
Total		20 years 10 months	17 years 8 months (17 years 5 months after PSC)

F.:

Count	Sec. #	Gross Sentence	Sentence After Totality
8	271	5 years	3 years
9	273(1)	9 years concurrent to #10	6 years concurrent to #10
10	271	10 years	6 years
13	279(2)	6 months	6 months
17	266	6 months	6 months concurrent to #13
18	271	7 years	5 years
21	279(2)	1 year concurrent to #18	1 year concurrent to #18
22	155	7 years concurrent to #18	5 years concurrent to #18
26	266	6 months	3 months
27	152	2 years	1 year
35	279(2)	6 months	3 months
36	272(1)(c)	18 months	12 months
38	271	7 years	4 years
39	346	2.5 years concurrent to #38	2.5 years concurrent to #38
40	155	7 years concurrent to #38	4 years concurrent to #38
Total		34 years 6 months	21 years (16 years 214 days after PSC)

[276] The final issue to be dealt with is ancillary orders. Counsel have agreed as to what count or counts each order relates to, and they will be reflected in the orders themselves, so I do not need to specify them here.

ANCILLARY ORDERS:

[277] An order will go that both offenders produce a sample of their DNA forthwith.

[278] An order will go that both offenders will be registered under the Sex Offenders Information Registration Act for life.

[279] An order will go pursuant to s. 109 of the Code prohibiting both offenders from possessing any weapons or ammunition for life.

[280] An order will go pursuant to s. 743.21 of the Code prohibiting both offenders from communicating, directly or indirectly, with the four victims, while in custody.

[281] The Crown has requested an order under s. 161(1) of the Code, as contemplated in subsections (a), (a.1), (b) and (c). The following two orders were unopposed, and orders will go as follows, effective for life:

• under ss. (a.1), prohibiting both offenders from being within two kilometers of any dwelling house where the four victims in this case ordinary reside or are employed;
• under ss. (b), prohibiting both offenders from seeking, obtaining or continuing any employment, whether or not it is remunerated, or becoming or being a volunteer in a capacity that involves being in a position of trust or authority towards persons under the age of 16 years.

[282] Orders were also sought under ss. (a), prohibiting the offenders from attending a public park or public swimming area where persons under the age of 16 years are, or can reasonably be expected to be, present, or a daycare centre, schoolground, playground or community centre; and, under ss. (c), prohibiting them from having any contact, including communication by any means, with a person who is under the age of 16 years, unless the offender does so under the supervision of a person whom the court considers appropriate.

[283] I agree with Mr. Millar that the prohibition in ss. (c) is broad enough to prohibit an offender from interacting with a person under 16 who works as a sales clerk in a store, and simply sets the offender up for failure. An order under ss. (a) would prevent the offenders from taking a walk on a public hiking trail. Orders under this section are a form of punishment, and thus they must be a necessary and proportionate response to the crimes before the court. In view of the facts of this case, where no-one outside the family was ever victimized, I am not persuaded that these latter two orders are necessary.

T. A. Heeney J.

Released: November 4, 2024

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

C.P. and F.P.

Defendants

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

T. A. Heeney J.

Released: November 4, 2024