Joel Rockwood Levine

This appeal arose from a tragic boat accident involving multiple fatalities and injuries.

The Court of Appeal addressed three consolidated appeals: liability of government respondents, interpretation of the Marine Liability Act's monetary cap, and costs.

The court upheld the motion judge's finding that the boat operators were solely liable for the accident, dismissing the appeal against the government respondents.

It also affirmed that the Marine Liability Act's monetary cap for maritime claims for loss of life or personal injury does not include costs and interest.

While leave to appeal the quantum of costs and the Sanderson Order was denied, leave was granted on one specific costs issue, resulting in both estates being held jointly and severally liable for one plaintiff's costs.

This decision addresses costs following summary judgment motions in two consolidated actions stemming from a fatal boating accident.

The court had previously found the individual defendants (Comrie and Monteiro Estates) liable for the accident, while dismissing claims against the government defendants (Canada, Ontario, and Leamington).

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the successful plaintiffs (Algra and Feltham) against the individual defendants.

Crucially, the court also granted a Sanderson order, directing the individual defendants (Comrie and Monteiro Estates) to jointly and severally pay the costs of the successful government defendants.

The court found it reasonable for the plaintiffs to have sued multiple defendants given the complex facts, lack of eyewitnesses, and the individual defendants' attempts to shift blame to the government entities.

The plaintiffs brought a successful motion for leave to file a late expert report and affidavit.

The court determined the costs of that motion.

Finding that the relief granted to the plaintiffs was an indulgence to ensure trial fairness, and noting the unreasonable delay by plaintiffs' counsel in delivering the report, the court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the defendants' costs of the motion.

The defendants were awarded a total of $18,000 in costs.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a summary judgment decision that found it liable for negligence in failing to keep an inmate reasonably safe while housed at Millhaven Institution, a maximum security penitentiary.

The inmate was assaulted by three other inmates in his cell during a prison strike.

The motion judge granted summary judgment on liability, finding the Crown negligent in its placement of the inmate, failure to maintain surveillance, failure to respond to cell alarms, and failure to prevent cell access.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge exceeded his authority by making unjustified findings of fact on an inadequate evidentiary record and applying an incorrect legal standard for causation.

The defendant Attorney General of Canada moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' negligence claim arising from a severe assault on the plaintiff inmate by three other inmates at Millhaven Institution.

The court found that Correctional Service Canada (CSC) breached its duty of care by placing the non-violent plaintiff with highly violent offenders, failing to enforce cell door protocols, ignoring the plaintiff's emergency cell alarm, and lacking adequate video surveillance.

The court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial on liability because the evidence overwhelmingly established CSC's negligence and causation.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiffs on liability, with damages to be determined at a subsequent trial.

The defendant Department of National Defence moved for a stay of the plaintiff's action pursuant to s. 91(2) of the Canadian Forces Members and Veterans Re-Establishment and Compensation Act.

The plaintiff alleged she was sexually assaulted by a military officer during a pre-enlistment physical examination.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff was not a member of the military at the time of the alleged assault and that her injuries were not aggravated by her subsequent brief military service.

Therefore, the statutory bar under s. 9 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act did not apply, and the action could proceed.

The plaintiffs, family members of a deceased correctional officer, brought an action against the employer under the Family Law Act.

After the action was set down for trial, the defendant moved for leave to amend its statement of defence to argue the claims were barred by the Public Service Labour Relations Act and the collective agreement, and for leave to bring a summary judgment motion.

The court partially granted the motion to amend, allowing references to the Family Law Act and Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, but refused amendments relying on the collective agreement, finding the essential character of the claims did not fall within its scope.

The motion for leave to bring summary judgment was dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to amend their statement of claim to add the Attorney General of Canada as a defendant in a motor vehicle accident action alleging host liability.

The proposed defendant argued the amendment was barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court applied the discoverability doctrine and the principles governing motions to add parties under Rule 5.04(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

It found the plaintiffs had provided a reasonable explanation for not discovering the potential liability of the proposed defendant until the examination for discovery of the existing defendant.

Leave to amend was granted with permission for the proposed defendant to plead a limitations defence.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action by the motion judge.

The motion judge had dismissed the action because the appellant failed to pay security for costs into court as required by a previous order.

The Court of Appeal found a proper basis for the motion judge's conclusion and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent due to unfounded public allegations against respondent's counsel.

Following a successful motion dismissing the action for failure to deposit security for costs and pay outstanding costs orders, the defendant sought costs of the action.

The court found that the self‑represented plaintiff repeatedly abused and maligned defence counsel and ignored prior court warnings regarding unfounded allegations.

The misconduct was characterized as wilful and harmful to the integrity of the court and its officers.

The court held that punitive costs on a substantial indemnity basis were necessary.

Costs were fixed at $25,000 and the action was dismissed with costs payable forthwith.

Following a status hearing under Rule 48.14(8) of the Rules of Civil Procedure concerning potential dismissal for delay, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The defendant had sought dismissal of the action due to delay, while the court instead facilitated an agreement on a timetable for further steps to move the matter toward trial.

The plaintiff, who had previously been self‑represented and had made allegations against opposing counsel, later sought costs.

The court concluded that awarding costs to the plaintiff would reward inappropriate conduct and noted that dismissal was a legitimate request under the rule.

No costs were awarded.

The Crown sought costs for an initial pleadings motion, motions for leave to appeal, and the appeal, claiming success in having portions of the action struck and obtaining a stay.

The respondent argued for costs, asserting general success.

The Divisional Court found success on the appeal was divided and awarded no costs for the appeal or leave motions.

However, the court found the respondent achieved substantial success on the original motion and awarded the respondent costs of the motion fixed at $27,000, reduced by 25% to reflect partial success.

The plaintiff, a soldier, was assaulted by fellow soldiers in Afghanistan and later in Canada.

He was diagnosed with PTSD and awarded a disability pension under the Pension Act.

He subsequently sued the Crown for damages for intentional infliction of mental suffering, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence.

The Crown moved to strike the claim under ss. 8 and 9 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, or to stay it under s. 111(2) of the Pension Act.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that claims relating directly to the assault and the failure to prevent hazing were barred by s. 9 to prevent double recovery.

However, claims relating to post-assault conduct were not plainly barred.

The remaining action was stayed pending the exhaustion of the plaintiff's pension remedies.

The infant plaintiff was seriously injured when struck by a train at a railway crossing.

The plaintiffs sued the railway company, the municipality, and the federal government for negligence.

The federal government successfully moved to strike the claim against it on the basis that it owed no private law duty of care to the plaintiffs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal, affirming that under the Railway Safety Act, the federal government's statutory duties are owed to the public at large, not to individuals, and thus fail the proximity requirement for a private law duty of care.

The applicant was injured in a rear-end motor vehicle accident and sought payment for 99 active rehabilitation treatment sessions and four treatment plans.

The insurer denied the treatment plans, arguing the duration and cost were excessive.

The arbitrator found that the applicant required supervised active rehabilitation to return to his pre-accident heavy labour job and that the duration of the program was reasonable.

However, the arbitrator reduced the hourly rate from the claimed $150 to $60 per session, noting the treatment was provided in a group setting rather than one-on-one.

The arbitrator also awarded interest on overdue payments and a $1,000 special award, finding the insurer unreasonably withheld payments by unilaterally reducing the rate for approved treatment without a valid basis.