Giovanna Asaro

The decision addresses a motion by Robyn Lynn Minifie for disclosure and production of documents from the Diocese’s investigation into allegations of sexual assault by Lawrence Paquette.

The court orders the Diocese to provide particulars of the investigation documents and affirms that a pre-trial conference brief is settlement privileged, requiring its destruction and removal from the court file.

The ruling clarifies the scope of settlement privilege and the process for challenging privilege claims in civil litigation.

This appeal arose from a tragic boat accident involving multiple fatalities and injuries.

The Court of Appeal addressed three consolidated appeals: liability of government respondents, interpretation of the Marine Liability Act's monetary cap, and costs.

The court upheld the motion judge's finding that the boat operators were solely liable for the accident, dismissing the appeal against the government respondents.

It also affirmed that the Marine Liability Act's monetary cap for maritime claims for loss of life or personal injury does not include costs and interest.

While leave to appeal the quantum of costs and the Sanderson Order was denied, leave was granted on one specific costs issue, resulting in both estates being held jointly and severally liable for one plaintiff's costs.

The representative plaintiffs, I.P. and M.P., brought a motion for court approval to discontinue a proposed class action against the Jesuit Fathers of Upper Canada and other related entities, without costs and without notice to putative class members.

The proposed class action, initiated in 2015, alleged sexual abuse of children at the Holy Cross Mission.

The plaintiffs and 27 other putative class members had individually settled their claims outside of the class proceeding framework.

The court granted leave to discontinue the action but required the Merchant Law Group, as putative class counsel, to provide notice of the discontinuance to all putative class members, including those who had settled, through website posting, newspaper publication, and direct delivery of the reasons for decision.

The court emphasized the need for transparency and protection of vulnerable class members, noting that the individual settlements and counsel fees were not disclosed for court approval.

This decision addresses costs following summary judgment motions in two consolidated actions stemming from a fatal boating accident.

The court had previously found the individual defendants (Comrie and Monteiro Estates) liable for the accident, while dismissing claims against the government defendants (Canada, Ontario, and Leamington).

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the successful plaintiffs (Algra and Feltham) against the individual defendants.

Crucially, the court also granted a Sanderson order, directing the individual defendants (Comrie and Monteiro Estates) to jointly and severally pay the costs of the successful government defendants.

The court found it reasonable for the plaintiffs to have sued multiple defendants given the complex facts, lack of eyewitnesses, and the individual defendants' attempts to shift blame to the government entities.

This is an appeal from an order striking the appellant’s action as an abuse of process.

The appellant claimed the motion judge erred in concluding the action was a collateral attack on prior family court orders.

The Court of Appeal found no error, concluding the action entirely paralleled the basis upon which the appellant challenged those orders in Family Court and was a clear attempt to relitigate issues from the child protection proceeding.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought negligence actions following a fatal nighttime boating accident where a pleasure craft struck a breakwater, resulting in three deaths and two serious injuries.

The plaintiffs sued the estates of the vessel's operator and owner, as well as the federal, provincial, and municipal governments.

On summary judgment motions for liability, the court found the operator and the owner/master jointly and severally liable, apportioning fault equally at 50 percent each, due to their failure to keep a proper lookout, travelling at an unsafe speed, and the operator's impairment.

The actions against the government defendants were dismissed, as the court found that the existing navigation lights were visible and any alleged failures regarding the breakwater's illumination or background lighting did not cause or contribute to the collision.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action as an abuse of process, the moving parties sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found that elevated costs were warranted because the plaintiff made unfounded allegations that the moving parties obtained a warrant to apprehend children based on false evidence.

The court fixed costs at $19,000 on a substantial indemnity basis, payable by the plaintiff.

The Ottawa Children's Aid Society and Kristine Pearce brought a Rule 21 motion to dismiss an action and strike the statement of claim filed by the plaintiff, M. E.-H. The defendants argued the action constituted an abuse of process as an impermissible collateral attack on prior child protection orders, and alternatively, that the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff alleged negligence, Charter breaches, misfeasance in public office, breach of confidentiality, nervous shock, and defamation, stemming from the apprehension of his children and the subsequent child protection proceedings.

The court granted the defendants' motion, dismissing the action on both grounds, finding it to be an abuse of process and that the claims lacked a reasonable cause of action, particularly noting that a Children's Aid Society owes no duty of care to parents in child protection matters.

The plaintiff father brought an action against the Children's Aid Society of Ottawa (CAS) for negligence, Charter breaches, and misfeasance in public office, alleging improper conduct during child protection and adoption proceedings that occurred while he was facing a murder charge for which he was ultimately acquitted.

The CAS moved to strike the action.

The court granted the motion, finding the action was an abuse of process as a collateral attack on valid Family Court orders.

The court also held that the claims disclosed no reasonable cause of action, as the CAS owes a duty of care only to the children, not the parents, and the Charter and misfeasance claims were bound to fail.

The appellant, a former ward of the Children's Aid Society (CAS), appealed the dismissal of her action for damages and a contempt motion.

Her action alleged negligence, defamation, breach of privacy, and wrongful disclosure of her youth criminal proceedings and a pre-disposition report by the CAS to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the contempt appeal, finding no court orders were disobeyed.

However, it partially allowed the summary judgment appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in dismissing the claim regarding the wrongful disclosure of youth criminal proceedings records under the Young Offenders Act and Youth Criminal Justice Act, stating that a legislative offence does not preclude a civil action for damages.

The issue of the Society's liability for damages related to this disclosure was remitted for further proceedings.

The plaintiff, a former Crown ward, brought an action against the Children's Aid Society of Toronto and the Crown, alleging negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, defamation, and breach of privacy regarding her time in care and the contents and disclosure of her child-in-care file.

The defendants moved for summary judgment.

The court granted the motions and dismissed the action, finding no evidence to support the plaintiff's claims of wrongful diagnosis or failure to act on abuse complaints.

The court also held that the society's record-keeping was mandated by law, protected by qualified privilege, and that the Crown owed no fiduciary or non-delegable duty regarding the society's day-to-day care or record-keeping.

The plaintiffs brought a successful motion for leave to file a late expert report and affidavit.

The court determined the costs of that motion.

Finding that the relief granted to the plaintiffs was an indulgence to ensure trial fairness, and noting the unreasonable delay by plaintiffs' counsel in delivering the report, the court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the defendants' costs of the motion.

The defendants were awarded a total of $18,000 in costs.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing her action against the York Children's Aid Society arising from child protection proceedings involving her daughter.

The appellant claimed she suffered significant losses and damages and sought to continue the action with witness testimony at trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's dismissal, finding no error in his analysis that certain claims disclosed no cause of action and that others lacked evidentiary support.

The appeal was dismissed without costs.

The defendants moved to quash the plaintiffs' appeal from a Master's decision, arguing that the Superior Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction and that the appeal should be heard by the Divisional Court.

The plaintiffs contended that the Courts of Justice Act was inapplicable due to their Indigenous status and sought an adjournment, which was denied.

The court granted the defendants' motion, quashing the appeal on jurisdictional grounds, and awarded full indemnity costs to the successful defendants due to the unmeritorious nature of the appeal route chosen by the plaintiffs.

The defendant children's aid society and its employees brought a Rule 21 motion to strike the plaintiff father's claim for negligent investigation and bad faith.

The plaintiff alleged the defendants conducted a biased and negligent investigation into allegations of sexual abuse, leading to unwarranted child protection proceedings.

The court reviewed conflicting jurisprudence on whether a children's aid society owes a duty of care to a parent under investigation.

Applying the Anns test, the court found it was not plain and obvious that no duty of care existed or that the defendants' alleged conduct fell within the statutory immunity for good faith actions.

The motion to strike was dismissed, allowing the claim to proceed to trial.

Following dismissal of claims against several defendants in a civil action, the court determined the appropriate costs awards.

Multiple defendants sought substantial indemnity costs on the basis that the plaintiff had advanced serious and unfounded allegations attacking their integrity.

The court reviewed the governing principles for costs under s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01, emphasizing reasonableness and the expectations of the parties.

Although the allegations were serious and unsupported, the court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding the self‑represented plaintiff appeared misguided rather than malicious.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded to the successful defendants in varying amounts, payable within 30 days.

The self‑represented plaintiff commenced a new action against numerous parties, including her former employer, its insurers, opposing counsel, and her own former lawyers, arising from circumstances surrounding her termination and the settlement of an earlier wrongful dismissal action.

Multiple defendants brought motions to strike the statement of claim or obtain summary judgment, arguing the action was barred by abuse of process, the prior settlement and release, limitation periods, and failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The court held that the plaintiff was attempting to re‑litigate issues resolved in the earlier action and that many claims were legally untenable, including claims against opposing counsel and insurers who owed no duty of care to an adverse party.

Claims alleging breach of privacy, breach of confidence, defamation, Charter violations, and Human Rights Code violations were also found to disclose no reasonable cause of action.

The statement of claim was struck against most defendants without leave to amend and summary judgment was granted dismissing the remaining claims of conspiracy and extortion against them.

The moving parties, a Children's Aid Society and its employees, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the responding party father's claims of slander, intentional wrongdoing, and negligence.

The claims arose from the Society's handling of false allegations made by the mother and police that the father was a terrorist and cult leader.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the slander claim, as the alleged defamatory statements were written, not spoken.

However, the court dismissed the motion regarding the negligence and intentional tort claims, finding that the Society may owe a duty of care to a parent in a negligent investigation context, and that evidence of potential bad faith precluded the application of statutory immunity or the Syl Apps immunity doctrine.

The matter was directed to proceed to trial.