James Zibarras

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their summary judgment motion, arguing the respondent's claim was time-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 rather than the Real Property Limitations Act.

The court held the claim, as pleaded, sought recovery of an interest in land or damages in lieu of that interest and therefore fell under the 10-year limitation period in the Real Property Limitations Act.

The court rejected new appellate arguments about contractual performance because those issues were not raised on the summary judgment motion.

It confirmed that an appeal from a failed summary judgment motion is not a vehicle for advancing fresh issues.

The appeal was dismissed, with costs awards to both responding parties and costs to the appellant on the stay motion.

The defendants brought a motion to stay the proceeding on the ground that the plaintiffs breached the obligation to immediately disclose a settlement agreement with co-defendant Liam Buck that changed the adversarial landscape of the litigation.

The plaintiffs disclosed the settlement on March 17, 2023, but did not provide full details of the agreement, including that Buck would recant his prior evidence.

The court found that the disclosure was inadequate and that the failure to immediately and forthrightly disclose an agreement changing the adversarial orientation constitutes an abuse of process.

The court granted the stay as required by Handley Estate v. DTE Industries Limited, despite acknowledging the harshness of the remedy and the absence of prejudice to the moving parties.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered whether an order consolidating two actions and dismissing a summary judgment motion was final or interlocutory, and whether to stay the operation of the schedule in the motion judge’s order pending appeal.

The court found the order to be final, as it disposed of the limitation defence under the Real Property Limitations Act, and stayed the order pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed motions to reconsider its earlier refusal to grant leave to appeal two decisions related to an arbitral award and its enforcement.

Dr. Bokhari argued that the panel may have been unaware that a key precedent (Aroma) was under reserve at the time of the refusal.

The court held that the relevant rules did not permit reconsideration based on subsequent jurisprudence, only on new facts, and that the interests of justice did not favour reconsideration.

The motions were dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed motions to reconsider its earlier refusal to grant leave to appeal two decisions related to an arbitral award and its enforcement.

Dr. Bokhari argued that the panel may have been unaware that a key precedent (Aroma) was under reserve at the time of the refusal.

The court held that the relevant rules did not permit reconsideration based on subsequent jurisprudence, only on new facts, and that the interests of justice did not favour reconsideration.

The motions were dismissed.

The appellant, Toronto Wholesale Produce Association (TWPA), appealed a trial judgment finding it breached a Sale and Maintenance Agreement (SMA) with the respondent, ID Inc., regarding the conversion of a billboard to a digital sign.

The trial judge had awarded ID Inc. damages for lost profits, finding the SMA had not expired and that TWPA had waived or was estopped from relying on the expiry provision.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in her contractual interpretation by injecting a fault concept into the plain language of the SMA, which clearly stated the agreement would terminate if a permit was not obtained within 360 days.

The Court also found no evidence to support waiver or estoppel.

ID Inc.'s cross-appeal regarding an alleged separate oral agreement was dismissed, as the trial judge correctly applied the objective test for contract formation.

The action against TWPA was dismissed.

ID Inc. appealed the dismissal of its claim against StrategyCorp, which arose from a dispute over the transformation of a billboard to a digital sign and a related consulting agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding that StrategyCorp did not intentionally interfere with ID Inc.'s economic relations, the consulting agreement was conditional on a separate agreement that never materialized, StrategyCorp had repudiated the agreement which ID Inc. accepted by silence, and StrategyCorp did not breach its duty of good faith.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Applicants sought the appointment of a receiver over several respondent companies, including those jointly owned and those solely controlled by one of the individual respondents, due to alleged misappropriation of funds, mortgage defaults, and corporate oppression.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the statutory bases for appointing a receiver (Courts of Justice Act, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, Business Corporations Act) were not met.

The court determined there was no underlying action for interlocutory relief, no irreparable harm shown given the sufficient value of the secured property, and the request for relief against solely-owned companies was brought too late.

The defendants Valiollah Onsori-Saisan and Skymark Capital Corporation brought a motion to set aside a Mareva injunction, originally obtained ex parte by the plaintiff Maxol Wealth Investments Inc., which arose from a syndicated mortgage fraud.

The moving parties argued the plaintiff failed to make full and frank disclosure, the injunction was overly broad in capturing a non-party business account (Pomanar Dessert Inc.), and the plaintiff's undertaking for damages was insufficient.

The court dismissed the motion to set aside the injunction, finding that the moving parties' own evidence strengthened their connection to the fraudulent scheme.

However, the court granted, on consent, a further release of funds from the Pomanar account for the moving parties' legal defence, subject to the plaintiff's costs being paid first.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff on a substantial indemnity basis.

ID Inc. brought a motion to quash part of an appeal by the Toronto Wholesale Produce Association (TWPA), arguing the appeal was out of time because the judgment for damages was "pronounced" earlier than the final judgment date.

The TWPA opposed and brought a cross-motion for an extension of time if necessary.

The Court of Appeal dismissed ID Inc.'s motion, finding that there was only a single judgment, not two, and therefore the appeal was not out of time.

The TWPA's cross-motion was dismissed as moot.

The appellant, Money Gate Corporation, appealed the dismissal of its motion seeking distribution of proceeds from a property sale, asserting an unregistered assignment of a second mortgage.

The motion judge found the appellant failed to provide sufficient evidence regarding the source of funds for the alleged assignment, concluding no enforceable assignment was acquired.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision to dismiss the motion or in the discretionary costs order, noting the appellant's failure to file a cost outline.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The plaintiff, ID Inc., and the defendants, Toronto Wholesale Produce Association (TWPA) and StrategyCorp., sought costs following a trial.

ID Inc. was awarded damages against TWPA and sought partial indemnity costs for the trial and substantial indemnity costs for an interest motion.

StrategyCorp., whose claim was dismissed, sought full indemnity costs against ID Inc. The court awarded ID Inc. partial indemnity costs of $641,891.66 against TWPA, with reductions for certain disbursements and a 15% reduction for divided success on issues.

The court denied substantial indemnity costs for the interest motion, awarding partial indemnity instead, with further reductions for excessive time and unnecessary attendance.

StrategyCorp. was awarded partial indemnity costs of $665,354.31 against ID Inc., with reductions for time spent on an unscheduled summary judgment motion and a separate OIC complaint.

The court declined to award costs against ID Inc.'s principal personally or to direct TWPA's payment to ID Inc. to first satisfy StrategyCorp.'s costs.

The plaintiff, ID Inc., sought pre- and post-judgment interest at a contractual rate of 26.8% per annum following a successful breach of contract claim against Toronto Wholesale Produce Association (TWPA).

The court had previously awarded damages for lost profits and maintenance.

The key issues were whether ID Inc. was entitled to the contractual interest rate without amending its pleading, and if an amendment was necessary, whether leave should be granted.

The court found that ID Inc. was entitled to the contractual interest rate under common law, as the parties had agreed to and contemplated this rate in their Sale and Maintenance Agreement (SMA), and the TWPA was not prejudiced despite the delay in formally pleading it.

The court awarded ID Inc. pre- and post-judgment interest at 26.8% on the total damages.

The defendant brought a motion for an order requiring the plaintiff, a corporation, to post security for costs.

The plaintiff claimed impecuniosity, arguing it had no assets or income.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient disclosure regarding its financial viability and its shareholders' ability to borrow, thus failing to establish impecuniosity.

The court also assessed the merits of the plaintiff's negligence claim, finding it did not have a good chance of success, and considered the defendant's delay in bringing the motion.

Applying a holistic approach, the court granted the motion, ordering the plaintiff to post $25,000 in security for costs on a partial indemnity scale within 90 days.

The plaintiff, ID Inc., sued the Toronto Wholesale Produce Association (TWPA) and StrategyCorp for breach of contract, interference with economic relations, and conspiracy regarding a project to convert a static billboard at the Ontario Food Terminal to a digital sign.

The plaintiff alleged an oral agreement for a share of advertising revenue and a written Sale and Maintenance Agreement (SMA).

The court found no oral agreement existed but held that the TWPA breached the SMA and its duty of good faith by waiving a 360-day permit condition and then secretly contracting with a competitor.

Claims against StrategyCorp for interference, conspiracy, and breach of confidence were dismissed.

The plaintiff was awarded damages for lost profits on the construction and maintenance of the sign.

Following a trial where the plaintiffs' claims were dismissed and the defendants' counterclaim was granted in part, the parties made submissions on costs.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs based on the plaintiff's oppressive conduct and a prior award of punitive damages.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs to the defendants, finding it would result in double compensation, and instead awarded partial indemnity costs subject to a significant discount for time spent on unsuccessful allegations.

The court also awarded substantial indemnity costs to a defendant to the counterclaim who successfully defended against unproven allegations of fraud.

The plaintiff, the former President of a family-run painting corporation, brought an action for oppression and wrongful dismissal after being terminated and removed as a director.

The defendants counterclaimed for breach of fiduciary duty, alleging the plaintiff misappropriated corporate funds, redirected rebates, and performed cash jobs for personal benefit.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the plaintiff's claims, finding his termination was justified for cause due to his dishonest conduct.

The court granted the counterclaim in part, ordering the plaintiff to pay $470,000 for redirected rebates and cash jobs, refund unauthorized transfers, disgorge profits, and pay $75,000 in punitive damages for reprehensible self-dealing.

Money Gate Corporation (MGC) brought a motion for an extension of time to file its notice of appeal and a declaration that it had an appeal as of right under s. 193(c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), or alternatively for leave to appeal under s. 193(e).

The underlying matter involved a receivership where a motion judge had dismissed MGC's claim for payment from the proceeds of a property sale, finding no valid assignment of a second mortgage and that MGC was not the registered owner.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension of time, finding MGC's grounds of appeal not frivolous and no real prejudice to the responding parties.

Crucially, the court declared that MGC had an appeal as of right under s. 193(c) of the BIA, concluding that the motion judge's order finally determined MGC's economic interests in the property proceeds, distinguishing it from a mere priorities dispute.

This is a costs endorsement following motions by three groups of defendants to strike the plaintiff's fresh as amended statement of claim.

The court had previously substantially granted the motion by the 1Plus12 Corporation defendants, dismissed the motions by the Ricci and Karp defendants to strike the statement of claim against them, and struck the plaintiff's affidavit.

This endorsement determines the costs payable between the parties.

The 1Plus12 defendants were awarded $17,000 in partial indemnity costs from the plaintiff, as they were substantially successful.

The Ricci defendants were awarded $9,000 in partial indemnity costs from the plaintiff, despite their motion to stay being dismissed, due to the necessity of responding to allegations of criminal conduct that were struck.

No costs were awarded to or against the Karp defendants, as their motion to strike the claim against them was dismissed, although they succeeded in striking the plaintiff's affidavit.

The appellant, Robert Glegg, appealed judgments declaring him a vexatious litigant and associated costs orders.

The underlying litigation stemmed from his daughter's withdrawal from parental control, with Glegg initiating numerous proceedings, including tort claims against the respondents (family friends and a legal aid clinic with its lawyers), alleging they conspired to assist his daughter's mother in "brainwashing" her.

The application judge declared Glegg a vexatious litigant, stayed his existing proceedings, and barred him from commencing further related proceedings without leave, also ordering full indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Glegg's appeal, affirming that his claims were an abuse of process and a collateral attack on previously determined facts, specifically that his daughter acted of her own free will.

The court upheld the vexatious litigant declaration, the permanent stay of actions, the prohibition on future litigation without leave, and the full indemnity costs award.