Adam J. Wygodny

The applicant sought fourteen substantive heads of relief including declarations of trust, fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, production of records, and claims for general, punitive, aggravated and exemplary damages under the Business Corporations Act and Substitute Decisions Act.

The court found the application was improperly prepared with excessive materials, non-compliant factums, missing compendium, and unrealistic time estimates.

The court granted limited relief: an order requiring the respondent to account for her time as power of attorney for property, production of corporate books and records by both parties, and monthly disclosure obligations.

The court declined to remove the respondent as director and declined to declare a purchase money resulting trust, finding credibility issues could not be resolved on the paper record.

The remaining relief was adjourned and the court noted a trial may be required.

The plaintiffs brought an ex parte motion seeking a Mareva injunction, an interim order for the recovery of personal property, an order freezing assets, and leave to issue a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against the defendants.

The motion alleged extensive fraud, conversion, and other torts by the primary defendant, Yueh-Tang Yang, involving millions of dollars and real estate, and a serious risk of asset dissipation.

The court granted most of the requested relief, finding a prima facie case of fraud and a demonstrated risk of asset dissipation, satisfying the criteria for the extraordinary remedies sought.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for delay under Rule 24.01.

The action arose from a commercial lease dispute where the plaintiffs alleged the defendant unlawfully changed the locks on a garage.

The plaintiffs commenced the action in 2016 but took no steps between December 2018 and May 2023.

The court found the delay of over four years to be inordinate and inexcusable, noting the self-represented plaintiff's failure to communicate with the defendant.

Given the significant delay and lack of evidence regarding document preservation, the court found actual prejudice and a substantial risk that a fair trial was no longer possible.

The action was dismissed.

The applicants brought a motion to declare Ronald Hitti a vexatious litigant under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act and, alternatively, to prohibit him from making further motions without leave under Rule 37.16.

The court reviewed Hitti's persistent and acrimonious conduct, including repeated unsuccessful motions, failure to pay multiple costs awards, and abusive correspondence.

The court found that Hitti's conduct met the criteria for vexatious litigation, granted the relief sought, declared him a vexatious litigant, and prohibited him from bringing further motions without leave.

Costs were awarded against Hitti.

The appellant, Robert Glegg, appealed judgments declaring him a vexatious litigant and associated costs orders.

The underlying litigation stemmed from his daughter's withdrawal from parental control, with Glegg initiating numerous proceedings, including tort claims against the respondents (family friends and a legal aid clinic with its lawyers), alleging they conspired to assist his daughter's mother in "brainwashing" her.

The application judge declared Glegg a vexatious litigant, stayed his existing proceedings, and barred him from commencing further related proceedings without leave, also ordering full indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Glegg's appeal, affirming that his claims were an abuse of process and a collateral attack on previously determined facts, specifically that his daughter acted of her own free will.

The court upheld the vexatious litigant declaration, the permanent stay of actions, the prohibition on future litigation without leave, and the full indemnity costs award.

The moving parties, Park Lawn Corporation and J. Bradley Green, brought an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss a defamation counterclaim, which was denied.

The responding party, Kahu Capital Partners Ltd., sought costs for the motion.

The court exercised its discretion under s. 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act to award partial indemnity costs to the responding party, finding that the moving parties engaged in unnecessary provocative litigating in the public domain and opportunist cost-mongering.

Park Lawn Corporation and its CEO, J. Bradley Green, brought an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss a defamation counterclaim filed by Kahu Capital Partners Ltd. The counterclaim arose after Green made allegedly defamatory statements about Kahu Capital in a trade newsletter, accusing the firm of complicity in the alleged wrongdoings of Park Lawn's former CEO.

The court dismissed the anti-SLAPP motion, finding that while the statements related to a matter of public interest, there were grounds to believe the counterclaim had substantial merit and that the moving parties had no valid defence.

The court concluded that the harm suffered by Kahu Capital outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

Following a decision declaring the respondent a vexatious litigant and staying his underlying civil claims as an abuse of process, the court determined the scale and quantum of costs.

The court awarded full indemnity costs to both groups of applicants for both the applications and the underlying civil actions, citing the respondent's extreme, baseless claims and his well-funded, obsessive litigation campaign.

Costs were fixed at $53,175.37 for the Flores applicants and $195,970.46 for the JFCY applicants.

The applicants, including a legal clinic and family friends, brought applications under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act to have the respondent declared a vexatious litigant.

The respondent had engaged in years of relentless litigation across multiple jurisdictions following his teenage daughter's decision to withdraw from his custody, repeatedly alleging abduction, fraud, and conspiracy against anyone involved.

The court found that the respondent persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted vexatious proceedings and conducted them in a vexatious manner, continually attempting to re-litigate issues already decided against him.

The applications were granted, the respondent was declared a vexatious litigant, and he was prohibited from instituting or continuing related proceedings without leave of the court.

The bankrupt, his father, and a creditor (his former partner) brought overlapping motions in a bankruptcy proceeding.

The court ordered equitable set-off of multiple costs awards made in family and bankruptcy proceedings between the bankrupt and the creditor, effective September 28, 2018.

The court dismissed the father's claim for a charge over the balance of the costs award, finding that solicitor's liens and charging orders do not apply to non-lawyers who fund litigation.

The balance of the costs award was ordered payable to the bankruptcy trustee.

The court also dismissed the creditor's request for a stay of enforcement and declined to dismiss the creditor's civil action for delay at this stage.

The applicant, a representative plaintiff in a U.S. class action regarding unsolicited telemarketing voicemails, sought to enforce Letters of Request to compel the respondent Ontario corporation to attend a deposition.

Following delays in obtaining a protective order in the U.S. action, the applicant moved to add a U.S. defendant as a party to the application and to impose an outside date for the deposition.

The court granted the order, adding the U.S. defendant as a necessary party and setting an outside date of February 4, 2022, for the completion of the deposition.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision enforcing a settlement agreement.

The core issue was the interpretation of an email clause regarding the direction of share purchase monies, specifically whether the phrase 'Subject to any contrary direction by His Honour' allowed the motion judge to direct funds into court for creditors.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation, finding it was open to him based on the record.

The appellants' application to introduce fresh evidence was dismissed as irrelevant or already dealt with by the settlement terms.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The applicant sought to schedule a motion to add Regal Automotive Group, Inc. as a party to an application enforcing letters of request from a US court.

The court established a timetable for the delivery of materials, cross-examinations, and factums leading up to the motion hearing on November 29, 2021.

The Superintendent of Financial Services issued a Notice of Proposal to revoke the mortgage broker and agent licences of the applicants.

The applicants requested a hearing, but their licences expired before the hearing took place and were not renewed.

The Chief Executive Officer of FSRA brought a motion arguing that the Tribunal no longer had jurisdiction to revoke the expired licences.

The Tribunal agreed, finding that the Notice of Proposal had become moot, and dismissed the proceedings pertaining to the individual applicants.

The applicant brought an application under the Evidence Act and Canada Evidence Act to compel the respondent to attend an examination for a proceeding in the United States District Court.

The court ordered the respondent to attend the examination via videoconference, conditional upon the applicant delivering $7,500 in attendance money and a protective order.

Costs of the motion were awarded to the respondent in the fixed amount of $1,000.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated September 3, 2019.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties fixed in the amount of $2,500.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Penny J. dated December 20, 2019.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties in the fixed amount of $4,762.00.

The plaintiff obtained an ex parte Mareva injunction and Certificate of Pending Litigation against the defendants, alleging fraudulent and deficient electrical work during a home renovation and claiming the defendants were dissipating assets to avoid judgment.

On the motion to continue the injunction, the court dissolved the orders, finding the plaintiff failed to make full and frank disclosure regarding available insurance and the extent of deficiencies.

Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to establish a strong prima facie case or a serious risk of asset dissipation, as the evidence of fraud and intent to hide assets was largely speculative and contradicted by the defendants' evidence.

The defendant property manager brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff condominium corporation's action as a nullity.

The defendant argued that the plaintiff failed to comply with the notice requirements under s. 23(2) of the Condominium Act, 1998 before commencing the action.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the action against the property manager for breach of contract and negligence was not the type of action caught by s. 23(1) of the Act, and therefore the notice requirements did not apply.

Furthermore, the court held that the action commenced with the filing of the Statement of Claim, not the Notice of Action, and that the plaintiff had provided sufficient notice to the owners prior to filing the Statement of Claim.

The appellant appealed a Master's decision to discharge a certificate of pending litigation (CPL).

The Master had discharged the CPL on the basis of the appellant's material non-disclosure of a "no registration" clause in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) when obtaining the CPL ex parte.

The appellate court upheld the Master's decision, finding no reversible error in the Master's application of the law regarding the duty of full and frank disclosure on ex parte motions.

The court affirmed that failure to make full and frank disclosure of a material fact is sufficient grounds to set aside an ex parte order.