SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH, JESSE MARK, MARY BIRDSELL and EMILY CHAN
-and-
ROBERT GLEGG
APPLICATION UNDER s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. C.43
RE: HAZEL FLORES and ARMANDO FLORES
-and-
ROBERT GLEGG
APPLICATION UNDER section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, as amended, and rr. 14.05(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, as amended.
BEFORE: S. F. Dunphy J.
COUNSEL: Linda Plumpton and Tosh Weyman for the Applicants JFCY et al.
Adam J. Wygodny, for the Applicants Hazel and Armando Flores
P. James Zibarras, for the Respondent
HEARD: December 15, 2021
corrected reasons for decision1
1I have before me two parallel applications pursuant to s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. C.43 seeking to have Mr. Glegg determined to be a vexatious litigant. I am granting the two applications and find that Mr. Glegg has persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted vexatious proceedings and conducted proceedings in a vexatious manner. An order shall issue in both applications pursuant to s. 140 of the COJA, the particulars of which I shall describe further below.
2By his own admission, Mr. Glegg has spent “thousands and thousands of hours” of his time pursuing his personal conception of justice against people he views as wrongdoers and whom he alleges conspired to take his daughter away from him. He admits an intention to “litigate this to the end of the earth”. He has formed the unshakable view that his numerous setbacks in court have been the result of conspiracies to commit fraud on the court. He has not been at all reticent to express that view before those same courts who have nevertheless ruled against him. He has deployed his very considerable financial resources to pursue an ever-expanding web of family proceedings, attempted criminal proceedings, attempted administrative disciplinary proceedings and latterly in civil proceedings in both Ontario and Florida all premised on the same events and the very same theories approached from different angles.
3These proceedings share the common thread that they arise from Mr. Glegg’s bitter disappointment that his sixteen-year-old daughter decided to leave his sole custody and emancipate herself in April 2016. He has persuaded himself that his daughter’s decision can only be the result of some form of brainwashing and cannot conceive of the possibility that she could have reached this decision of her own free will regardless of the assistance or even encouragement she may have received from others along the way.
4Numerous courts have heard him out on these issues over and over again. Adverse results have been appealed all without making a dent in his firmly-held belief in the justice of his cause and his grim determination to continue with his personal crusade for vindication come what may. These claims and his relentless pursuit of them bear all the classic hallmarks of a vexatious litigant, albeit one with the financial resources to pursue his quest on a far grander scale than most.
5It is long past time for Mr. Glegg to turn the page and move past what has clearly become an all-consuming obsession. In the words of Brown J.A. rejecting one of his recent appeals, “I see no reason why Ontario courts should devote any more resources to the appellant's custody-related litigation that this court ended in 2017.”2
Background facts
6The underlying facts of this case are comparatively simple even if the labyrinth of resulting litigation is not. To protect privacy, I am not using the proper names of Mr. Glegg’s daughter (“O.G.”) or that of her mother and her step-father. Formal orders when taken out shall use the correct legal names.
7Mr. Glegg and his former wife were married in 1998 and had a daughter – O.G. – in July 1999. The couple separated in 2001 before their daughter’s second birthday. For the next 13 years, the family law proceedings that ensued appear to have been quite uneventful. A separation agreement was negotiated and amendments entered into from time to time. The parents agreed to share joint custody of their daughter but primary residence was with the mother.
8The divorce was pronounced in 2002 and the mother re-married in 2003 ultimately having two children with her new husband. Over time, O.G. grew close to her stepfather and her new siblings. In 2006 the divorced couple agreed to reside within a 15-kilometer radius around an agreed location to facilitate access for both. To this point, the separation and divorce proceedings were comparatively amicable and conflict-free.
9In 2013, O.G.’s mother and her husband decided to move with their family to Florida. O.G. did not accompany her mother on this move. Both parents agreed to modify their arrangements in practice to provide for O.G. to reside primarily with her father but subject to regular visits to or with her mother. At this point, O.G. was fourteen years of age. No formal changes to their separation agreement were made.
10About a year later, O.G. did not return from a visit to her mother in August 2014. She was upset about her father telling her that she would see less of her mother during the coming school year than she expected. During the course of her visit, O.G. enrolled in a local Florida high school and O.G. wrote to her father. that she would not be returning to live with him as originally planned.
11Needless to say, this unilateral change in living arrangements did not go over well. An order was made ex parte in Toronto for O.G.’s return and granting Mr Glegg sole custody on an interim basis. That order was then recognized in Florida. Further proceedings ensued in Ontario and in Florida culminating in the forcible return of O.G. to Ontario in early October 2014.
12The cause of the relatively protracted proceedings was the unwillingness of the fifteen year old O.G. to return to her father’s residence. Trimble J.’s decision to return O.G. to her father referred to some of the events that followed. He noted that Mr. Glegg’s reaction to the situation was “extreme”. He went to Florida, camped out on the driveway of his former spouse’s home and pleaded with his daughter to come back, something that she adamantly refused to do. As Trimble J. noted, “if his aim was to convince O.G. to come home, it was counter-productive”.
13Trimble J. was also quite critical of O.G.’s mother for having encouraged O.G. in her decision to stay, in having “abdicated the decision [to stay] wholly to O.G.” and failing to do anything meaningful to discourage O.G. from making the decision. He found that through these actions or inactions, the mother “abandoned her function as a parent, especially one bound by the Separation Agreement”. He did not make a final determination regarding custody, ruling that this was a matter that could be pursued after O.G. had returned.
14Mr. Glegg continues to characterize this episode as an “abduction”. During the course of the proceedings that ultimately led to the return of O.G. he claimed that she had been brainwashed by his former spouse and at one point in the various proceedings that followed sought to introduce into evidence the “expert” opinion of a psychiatrist who had never met O.G. that she was suffering from Stockholm syndrome. None of those extreme conclusions are remotely warranted by the actual events and the actual decisions of the judge who ultimately granted him the order that he wished. The concept of an “abduction” has little to do with the actions of a willful teen who had spent the majority of her time with her father in the preceding year and, only a few days into a brief visit with her mother, announced her intention to stay with her mother and maintained that decision despite her father having free access to the home she was staying in and his pleading with her while camping in the driveway to return home with him. However improper the mother’s actions may have been in the context of an existing Separation Agreement, the reasons of Trimble J. make it quite clear that O.G. was not a mere wallflower during these events without any capacity to form or express opinions, wishes or desires of her own. Nevertheless, Mr. Glegg continues to characterize those events in the same inaccurate but highly-charged language of an abduction to this day in the material filed by him in response to these applications. He has not allowed the actual decision of Trimble J. (who ultimately granted him the relief he sought) to temper his black and white view of the events and he continues to apply the same distorted view to the subsequent events.
15Perell J. summarized the treatment of this alleged “abduction” incident by Ontario courts quite accurately as follows :
…it is not the case as submitted by Mr. Glegg that the judicial findings in Ontario confirm that [O.G.]was abducted by her mother nor is it the case that as a result of the abduction in Florida that Mr. Glegg was granted sole custody. There has been no finding in Ontario that [O.G.] was abducted in Florida. At paragraph 24 of her decision, Justice Kiteley stated that she did not intend to make findings as to whether [O.G.] had been abducted. The Court of Appeal also did not make a finding. The most that can be said is that because of a breach of the Separation Agreement, the Ontario Court made temporary orders that Mr. Glegg have sole custody and then after a mediation the parties consented to the fifth amendment to the Separation Agreement that provided for the parents’ respective custody and access rights.3
16Family disputes are seldom black and white affairs. There were missteps and errors of judgment on all sides. However, what Mr. Glegg’s continued mis-description of this episode displays in quite stunning colour is his entire lack of self-awareness as to his own role in the incident and his inability to conceive of the idea that his academically sharp and independent-minded daughter might also have used those same intellectual skills to develop a mind of her own.
17O.G. – now 21 years of age – provided an affidavit in these proceedings. She described the incident of her father coming to her mother’s Florida home with police at his side giving her fifteen minutes to pack and go as “one of the scariest and most stressful moments of my life”.
18By Mr. Glegg’s own account, his relationship with O.G. did not emerge unscathed from this incident. This is hardly a surprising observation. According to O.G., her attempts to discuss the incident and explain her side of the story to her father after their return to Canada were met with an abrupt refusal on his part to discuss the matter at all or to permit her to receive counselling about the matter.
19There can be no serious dispute that the relationship between custodial father and maturing teen daughter was already frayed before this incident and it continued to deteriorate still further afterwards. As O.G. matured and became more assertive about her own wishes, her father became more fixated on his own conception of his absolute parental right to control her. When the immovable object of an absolutist conception of parental authority clashes with the unstoppable force of teen rebellion, sparks inevitably fly. There was already fresh dry powder abundantly present in this relationship. All that was needed was a spark that time would not long fail to provide for the inevitable explosion to occur.
20The interim custody arrangement ordered by Trimble J. was not ultimately litigated. Both parents engaged in a lengthy mediation process to resolve the custody issue. An amendment to the separation agreement and a consent order of Miller J. emerged from this process in March 2015 confirming Mr. Glegg as having sole custody for the remainder of O.G.’s minority.
21Shortly after this consent order was reached, Mr. Glegg told his daughter that she would be changing schools from the private school that she had attended until then to a public school the following school year. Whatever the reasons for the change, O.G. was quite intensely unhappy with that decision but was unable to persuade her father to relent. This episode did little to smooth over the rough edges developing in their relationship.
22The aftermath of this dispute ultimately led to O.G. needing treatment for a medical emergency about which I shall say no more. The conflict with her father was very clearly exacting a heavy emotional toll upon her.
23O.G. turned sixteen in July 2015. Thereafter, she had the legal capacity to withdraw from parental control regardless of the stipulations made concerning her in a Separation Agreement. That summer, she toured the University of Miami and began to pursue the process of seeking admission for the 2016-2017 academic year (without keeping her father abreast of this development). There is no doubt that O.G. kept these plans from her father just as there is no doubt that she told her mother about her intentions and met with no resistance at the very least and received active support and encouragement from her at the most. Crucially, there can be no objective doubt – despite Mr. Glegg’s refusal to accept it – that this was a plan that O.G. ardently desired and played the dominant role in pushing. The suggestion that O.G. was an unwitting cog in plans devised for her by others has been roundly rejected by every judge that has had reason and occasion to examine the question.
24That fall, O.G. began attending the new school she was enrolled in by her father. O.G. had accumulated a number of advanced placement credits and she carefully planned her Grade 11 curriculum at the new school to allow her to attain her graduation diploma a year early. Her father appears to have been unaware of the consequence of her selection of courses until later in the academic year.
25In February 2016, O.G. learned that she had been accepted into the engineering program at the University of Miami with a scholarship. Mr. Glegg learned of this development from her shortly afterwards and was furious. He attempted to prohibit his daughter from following her plans and the (verbal) battles were intense. The rift between them widened at an accelerating pace.
26On April 13, 2016, Mr. Glegg began proceedings against his former spouse alleging a breach of the separation agreement and the consent order of Miller J. He also began proceedings in Miami to compel the University of Miami to disclose his daughter’s application records to him. He received these early the following month before his daughter was able to take steps to bar him from interfering.
27That evening, father and daughter had a rather bitter (verbal) fight regarding her desire to graduate from school that year and enroll in University. The legal proceedings against her mother undoubtedly also weighed in the scales of causes of what followed since O.G.’s subsequent affidavits and cross-examination transcripts leave little doubt that she considered that her father was bullying her mother with legal proceedings using his superior financial resources to do so. O.G. left home that evening and did not return. She stayed at the home of friends of her mother whom she had known well since childhood, the Flores’ (applicants in this proceeding). She is now quite completely estranged from him.
28On April 22, 2016 O.G. delivered a letter to her school principal stating that she had withdrawn from parental control. On April 25, 2016 she retained the applicant JFCY to represent her.
29On April 28, 2016 she sought and obtained an emancipation declaration from Kiteley J. confirming that she had withdrawn from parental control. Mr. Mark of JFCY represented her in this appearance. Kiteley J. described O.G. as a “remarkable young woman” about whom she had “no hesitation in making the order”. The order was made ex parte, Kiteley J. having accepted the submission that the parents were not entitled to notice of the proceeding.
30O.G. began attending the University of Miami in the fall of 2016 (and has since graduated).
(a) Court and administrative proceedings conducted by Mr. Glegg since April 28, 2016
31I shall attempt to faithfully follow the complicated strands of litigation that soon erupted following O.G.’s withdrawal from the custody and control of her father. These events (through to August 2019) are summarized in the decision of Perell J. in Glegg v. Glass, 2019 ONSC 6623 at paras. 26-104 and I would incorporate his summary by reference here. Justice Perell’s decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal in a decision of Brown J. A. (Glegg v. Glass, 2020 ONCA 833. I would also incorporate by reference the summaries of events contained in the decisions of Kiteley J. (Glegg, 2016 ONSC 5292) and by Benotto J.A. in R.G. v. K.G., 2017 ONCA 108. All three decisions contain useful and detailed descriptions of the various twists and turns in the numerous proceedings that followed O.G.’s decision to exercise her undoubted common law and statutory right to withdraw from the custody and control of her parents and her father’s dogged attempts to overturn that decision on the basis of, among other things, his firmly held belief that his daughter’s decisions were not her own but those in effect imposed upon her by others acting as a conspiracy.
32As will be readily apparent from a review of these Superior Court and Court of Appeal decisions, Mr. Glegg has raised time and again the same theme: his wife and others brainwashed O.G. and breached the Separation Agreement and the order of Miller J. The courts have all been duped by fraudulent affidavits or representations made by some or all of the parties who have conspired with each other to violate his rights under his separation agreement along the way. Time and again, courts have determined that the core of these claims is without merit and runs against the brick wall of long-established public policy described in Frame v. Smith, 1987 CanLII 74 (SCC), [1987] 2 SCR. Time and again the courts have noted that these allegations have been raised in one form or another but not made out by Mr. Glegg.
(i) April 29, 2016, proceedings before Fitzpatrick J
33Acting without counsel (Mr. Glegg had counsel and the means to pay for services), Mr. Glegg sought and obtained an ex parte order amending Miller J.’s order extending the previously-made apprehension order allowing him to apprehend O.G. It does not appear that he had yet received a copy of Kiteley J’s order. Police desisted from efforts to enforce this order when the age of O.G. and the order of Kiteley J. was brought to their attention.
(ii) May 12, 2016, proceeding before Gibson J.:
34On May 12, 2016, something of an omnibus hearing was convened before Gibson J. Mr. Glegg sought a declaration that his former spouse had breached the order of Miller J.. His former spouse brought a motion to set aside the order of Fitzpatrick J.. O.G. acting through Mr. Mark (who represented her before Kiteley J.) brought a motion seeking to set aside the order of Miller J. that awarded her father sole custody and seeking a legal representation order. Gibson J. released his decision on June 2, 2016, accepting O.G.’s motion for representation, dissolving the order of Miller J. and the order of Fitzpatrick J.
35Gibson J. also dismissed as moot Mr. Glegg’s motion for an order regarding the alleged breach of Miller J.’s order by his former spouse, noting that “Mr. Glegg's persistence with the motion amounted to a self-absorbed attempt to have a judicial imprimatur validating his particular perspective” (at para. 21). This comment applies continues to apply with added force today.
36By way of foreshadowing themes relevant to this application, Gibson J. commented adversely upon Mr. Glegg’s submissions (at para. 21) in the following language:
Mr. Glegg’s submission are replete with exaggerated and pejorative language (for example, his assertion, unsubstantiated by any expert or other evidence, that [O.G.] suffers from "Stockholm syndrome"; that " the Respondent has shown an utter lack of respect for the sole custody terms of the Final Order, and continues to illegally influence [O.G.] in disastrous ways, and that [O.G.] continues to be deeply in the throes of Stockholm syndrome, continually acceding to the Respondent's perverse will"; that "[O.G.’s mother], through a series of psychologically savage actions, dating back to the kidnapping of our daughter ... has deliberately, without an utter shred of remorse or caring for [O.G.], attempted to destroy [O.G.] for her own unknown and unfathomable selfish reasons"). The Court's concern is with [O.G.’s] best interests and future welfare, not in indulging Mr. Glegg's desire to re-plough old ground in a continuing recrimination against the Respondent.
37A notice of appeal of Gibson J.’s decision was filed on June 30, 2016. Gibson J. issued an order for costs against Mr. Glegg on July 18, 2016, which decision was promptly added to the pending Notice of Appeal.
38The appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal in R.G. v. K.G., 2017 ONCA 108 referred to below.
(iii) August 18, 2016, motion to reconsider before Kiteley J.
39A motion by Mr. Glegg seeking to be added as a party respondent to the proceeding and requesting that her April 28 order be set aside was heard by Kiteley J. on August 18, 2016. By this time, O.G. had already moved into residence at the University of Miami and her classes were scheduled to commence a few days later.
40Kiteley J.’s reasons were released on August 22, 2016 (Glegg, 2016 ONSC 5292). She dismissed Mr. Glegg’s motion to be added as a respondent but found that at all events she would dismiss Mr. Glegg’s claim for custody based on her assessment of the whole body of evidence of O.G. whose evidence she summarized as follows (at para. 36):
On the basis of that evidence, I draw the following conclusions. First, my impression of [O.G.] at the time of the hearing on April 28, 2016 is reinforced. She is articulate, thoughtful, and intelligent. She is a remarkable young woman of whom both parents should be proud. Second, she has sound reasons for wanting to accelerate her university entrance and to attend a university in Florida. Third, at age 17, her wishes and preferences must be respected. Going to university in Florida is in her best interests and her father would not permit that plan to unfold. I need not consider the father’s request for a temporary or permanent custody order but on this record, I must dismiss it.
41Kiteley J.’s decision noted the number of times the issue of custody of O.G. had already been dealt with the by the court and that the issue would also be before the Court of Appeal in the up-coming appeal of Gibson J.’s decision.
42Of particular importance to the theme of Mr. Glegg’s continual re-litigation of decided matters:
a. Kiteley J. rejected the argument that O.G.’s mother had influenced her daughter’s decision finding that such evidence “does not bear on capacity, there is no evidence that [O.G.] has been under a disability or is incapable of exercising her right to withdraw from parental control”: (Glegg, 2016 ONSC 5292 at para. 20);
b. Kiteley J. rejected evidence of an expert psychiatrist suggesting that there was a “trauma bond” between mother and daughter akin to Stockholm syndrome, concluding that this evidence was of “no evidentiary value” and that Mr. Glegg’s evidence on the subject was “likewise of no evidentiary value except to demonstrate how deeply committed the father is to his perspective and how he rejects any other view”: (Glegg, 2016 ONSC 5292 at para. 32); and
c. Kiteley J. found that O.G.’s wishes and preferences “must be respected” and that going to University in Florida “is in her best interests and her father would not permit that plan to unfold”: (Glegg, 2016 ONSC 5292 at para. 35)
43Her decision was also appealed and was scheduled to be heard by the Court of Appeal in conjunction with Mr. Gregg’s appeal from the earlier decision of Gibson J.
(iv) Appeals to Court of Appeal November 22, 2016
44Both appeals (from the decisions of Gibson J. and Kiteley J.) were heard together on November 22, 2016. On February 9, 2017, the Court of Appeal released reasons written by Benotto J.A. dismissing both appeals (R.G. v. K.G. et al., 2017 ONCA 108.
45Although the part of the decision of Kiteley J. denying Mr. Glegg standing on his daughter’s application to withdraw from his custody was reversed, that error was found to have been cured by the re-hearing application where the father had a full opportunity to present his case and Kiteley J. issued an informed and considered decision considering O.G.’s best interests and finding that the requested declaration was necessary and appropriate.
46The decision of Benotto J.A. is instructive because of the parallels that can be drawn between the issues dealt with in that decision and the matters that continue to be raised in the proceedings giving rise to these applications. Mr. Glegg sought to introduce fresh evidence on the appeal to establish that his daughter was “not acting of her own free will, but rather has been brainwashed by her mother, who is essentially her captor” (at para. 36). Benotto J.A. rejected this application noting that these issues had been raised in the hearings before Gibson J. and Kiteley J. already concluding (at para. 40)) that “the father's continued pursuit of this issue confirms O.G.'s position that he is obsessed with controlling her and that this has blinded him to the reality that it is he, not her mother, who is the reason that she withdrew from parental control. It also reinforces the strength of the findings in the courts below.”
47Benotto J.A.’s conclusion also warrants repeating (at para. 67):
This appeal demonstrates the importance of the emerging movement to incorporate the voice of the child in all matters concerning minors. The degree to which the court will follow the wishes of the child will depend upon the age and level of maturity of the child and will be subject to the judge's discretion as she seeks to determine the child's best interests. When, as here, the child is months away from her 18th birthday, a continuation of litigation involving her indicates more about the parent's needs than the child's. (emphasis added)
(v) Proceedings before Kurz J re support
48Meanwhile, O.G. brought family-law proceedings in Provincial Court seeking support payments from her father and brought a motion in interim support. Mr. Glegg for his part brought a motion seeking summary dismissal of her support claim. In his April 26, 2017, decision regarding costs of those two motions (O.G. v. R.G., 2017 ONCJ 266), Kurz J. summarized the blizzard of preliminary issues that he had been required to resolve before that January 16, 2017 hearing could take place (at para. 27):
I must add that O.G. was successful in five of six procedural motions brought by R.G. before the hearing of this motion. Those procedural motions were argued in writing or by conference call. In four of them, the costs were reserved to the hearing of this motion. Those motions were for
a stay of proceedings until the hearing of the appeal of the orders of Justices Kiteley and Gibson in the Ontario Court of Appeal. That motion was dismissed with costs reserved to the hearing of this motion;
leave to bring a summary judgment motion before serving and filing an answer and financial statement. That motion was dismissed with costs reserved to the hearing of this motion;
leave to adjourn the motions and to question O.G. in Florida prior to the hearing of the motions. That relief was granted on consent. However many of the terms of the adjournment and questioning were not on consent. One term of the adjournment, the payment of O.G.’s second term tuition, was very favourable to her. No costs were ordered or reserved;
leave to question O.G.’s mother and require her to produce certain disclosure prior to the hearing of the motion. That motion was dismissed at the same time that I determined the terms of the adjournment for the questioning of O.G., again with no order as to costs.
leave to question a third party, Hazel Flores. That motion was dismissed and costs reserved to the hearing of this motion;
an order to file evidence of the court ordered receivership of a company in which R.G. has an interest, after the argument of the motion was completed. The motion was dismissed and costs reserved to the hearing of this motion.
49Kurz J. released his reasons on Mr. Glegg’s motion for summary dismissal and his daughter’s motion for interim support on March 1, 2017 (O.G. v. R.G ., 2017 ONCJ 153). He dismissed Mr. Glegg’s motion. Having dismissed Mr. Glegg’s motion, Kurz J. went on to grant judgment to O.G. on the issue of her entitlement to support, ordering the amount to be fixed following a subsequent hearing. Interim support in the amount of $6,500 was ordered to be paid.
50On April 26, 2017, Kurz J. released his decision and reasons regarding the costs of the summary dismissal and support motions decided on March 1, 2017. He reviewed the pre-hearing conduct of Mr. Gregg and made the following comments among others:
a. “The fact that the numerous procedural steps that R.G. took were unnecessary and significantly added to the time, complexity and costs of this proceeding is self-evident…party status is not a license to litigate without concern for the financial consequences” (at para. 33); and
b. In response to the O.G.’s argument that a higher scale of costs should apply due to Glegg’s persisting in raising issues such as “Stockholm Syndrome” that had already been decided against him before, Kurz J. found (at para. 38) “I do not find bad faith. Instead I find highly unreasonable behaviour…If R.G. continues to raise them in this proceeding, the bad faith argument will likely become appropriate” (at para. 38-39).
51This decision was appealed. An appeal from a judgment of a provincial court judge lies to Superior Court and the appeal was heard by Gray J. on September 18, 2017. The appeal was granted in part as Kurz J. was found to have committed an error by granting summary judgment to O.G. after dismissing the summary dismissal motion of Mr. Glegg. The matter was ordered to proceed to trial and the amount of interim support ordered was reduced $5,300 per month. O.G. ultimately abandoned the support proceedings a few months after turning 18 and the legal services provided by JFCY for O.G. came to an end.
(vi) March 27, 2018: Mr. Glegg’s attempts to institute private criminal prosecutions
52Mr. Glegg opened a new front in his legal war on March 27, 2018, swearing out a criminal information accusing his former spouse of having abducted O.G., acted in violation of court orders and committed perjury contrary to s. 289, s. 127 and s. 131(1) of the Criminal Code. This step was followed by a press release issued by Mr. Glegg on April 25, 2018 entitled “Parents who abduct their children are criminals”. Mr. Glegg’s press release noted that he had spent “more than $1 million in legal fees to no avail”. At the pre-enquete phase of the information, the Crown intervened before the Justice of the Peace and directed a stay of the criminal proceedings instituted by Mr. Glegg. In so directing, the Crown took the position that the claim that there had been an abduction was legally unsustainable in light of the subsequent litigation.
53Mr. Glegg then applied to Superior Court seeking declaratory relief to set aside the stay of proceedings entered by the Crown, pleading a breach of his rights under s. 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Crown countered with a summary dismissal application. That hearing came on before Conlan J. on June 18, 2018. In reasons released on June 20, 2018 (HMTQ v. Glegg, 2018 ONSC 3861) Conlan J. found that Mr. Glegg’s application had no reasonable chance of success and dismissed it.
54It is to be noted that this proceeding was premised on the themes of abduction of O.G., culpable breach of subsequently dissolved court orders and various falsehoods allegedly contained in affidavits of O.G.’s mother relating to the process by which O.G. made her application to the University of Miami.
55Mr. Glegg was not happy with the refusal of the Canadian criminal system to take up the prosecution he desired. On Sunday, June 24, 2018 – four days after the rejection of his initiative by Conlon J.- Mr. Glegg made a walk-in complaint to the Fort Lauderdale police seeking to report what he described as abduction and perjury by O.G.’s mother. The police report of this interview does not indicate whether Mr. Glegg disclosed his attempt to pursue a private prosecution of those same offences in Canada without success only four days earlier. Mr. Glegg eventually retained a lawyer in Florida to assist him in pursuing this complaint. After a number of follow-up interviews, the Fort Lauderdale Police also closed the file as lacking probable cause with an endorsement “Supervisor Rev. No Investigations Warranted” on August 29, 2018. When cross-examined about this attempt to secure the prosecution of his former spouse, Mr. Glegg testified that “based on the lies that were told, they decided not to lay charges”.
56The decision of Conlon J. was appealed to the Court of Appeal. Mr. Glegg applied unsuccessfully to have a five-judge panel convened to hear his appeal. This appeal was heard on November 12, 2020 and pursuant to reasons released on February 19, 2021 was dismissed (R. v. Glegg, 2021 ONCA 100).
(vii) May 10, 2018: Mr. Glegg’s attempts to institute disciplinary proceedings before the Law Society
57Six months after O.G. withdrew her application for further child support, Mr. Glegg filed a complaint (without the assistance of a lawyer) seeking to institute disciplinary proceedings against Mr. Mark and Ms. Chan of JFCY. Both complaints noted that he had a lawyer but specifically declined to authorize the Law Society investigators to speak to his lawyer.
58His May 10, 2018, complaint against Mr. Mark alleged that in the course of representing O.G. Mr. Mark had brought a support claim seeing $75,000 per month premised on false allegations that O.G. had left home involuntarily and in so doing had willfully and knowingly lied with respect to Mr. Glegg’s character and conduct and willfully and knowingly directed O.G. to “egregiously and repeatedly lie about me in a number of affidavits that she swore in 2016”. He asked that Mr. Mark be disbarred.
59His May 11, 2018, complaint against Ms. Chan that alleged that she “was cognizant of, and complicit in” the lies allegedly perpetrated by Mr. Mark and that she “willfully and knowingly directed and assisted” O.G. to repeatedly lie about him in affidavits sworn in 2016. He asked that Ms. Chan also be disbarred.
60When cross-examined about this proceeding, Mr. Glegg testified that he initiated the complaints “after I learned that JFCY was representing [his ex-wife] in the criminal proceedings with the Crown”. JFCY did not appear in the proceedings before Conlon J. or the before the Court of Appeal.
61On July 4, 2018, the Law Society sent letters to each of Mr. Mark and Ms. Chan enclosing their response to Mr. Glegg closing both cases on the basis that there was “no reasonable suspicion” that either solicitor had engaged in professional misconduct.
(viii) July 24, 2018: Mr. Glegg’s Florida proceeding against O.G.’s mother and her husband
62On July 24, 2018, Mr. Glegg filed a civil complaint seeking USD$9.6 million in compensatory and punitive damages for intentional interference with custody rights and for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Among other things, the complaint alleges that O.G.’s mother convinced her to leave home and seek emancipation in April 2015 so she could attend university in Miami, that she intentionally lied, that the Ontario orders emancipating O.G. “are not enforceable or recognizable in the State of Florida and violate principles of comity as well as substantive and procedural due process”. In support of the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, Mr. Glegg pleaded that the defendants’ actions in interfering with his custodial rights, in orchestrating O.G.’s enrollment in the University of Miami and encouraging O.G.’s emancipation proceedings in Canada “were so outrageous and extreme in degree as to arouse the resentment of an average member of the community so that such member would exclaim “outrageous!””.
63The defendants moved for summary dismissal of the claim before filing a response to it. That motion was dismissed by the court on February 2, 2019. After the defendants filed their response, Mr. Glegg moved for judgment on his own claim. On June 13, 2020, the 17th Circuit Court of Florida denied Mr. Glegg’s motion for partial summary judgment on his claim. With respect to the claim of intentional interference with his custody rights, the Florida court noted that summary judgment was inappropriate because the tort requires demonstration of “intentional interference with the custodial parent-child relationship by a third party non-parent” and O.G.s mother was clearly not a non-parent (her co-defendant husband not being excluded on that basis at least) and because a determination of the nature of the plaintiff’s custody rights would be “dependent on an unraveling of numerous court rulings from judges in both Canada and Florida”. The Court reserved its judgment on the first count as regards the second defendant (O.G.’s step-father).
64The Florida proceeding is, I am advised, heading to trial at some point next year. This proceeding also generated related proceedings in Ontario to enforce a series of Letters Rogatory that is reviewed below.
(ix) July 10, 2019: Mr. Glegg’s attempt to enforce Florida Letters Rogatory in Ontario
65On June 10, 2019, Mr. Glegg sought and obtained the issuance of Letters Rogatory from the Florida court in Mr. Glegg’s suit against O.G.’s mother and her husband. The Letters Rogatory directed to the Ontario courts sought production of identified categories of documents against JFCY and three other lawyers or law firms (Mr. Lorne Glass, Ms. Linda Sapiano and Ms. Christina Doris).
66The respondents to this application were both sets of counsel that had represented O.G. in her Ontario legal proceedings (Mr. Glass was succeeded by JFCY in representing O.G.) while the other two counsel had represented O.G.’s mother in some of those Ontario proceedings.
67The Notice of Application came on for a hearing on October 28, 2019. Perell J. issued lengthy reasons for decision rejecting the application to enforce the Letters Rogatory on November 18, 2019: (Glegg v. Glass, 2019 ONSC 6623). He found that enforcement of the Letters Rogatory would be contrary to public policy in Ontario both because the Florida cause of action in support of which the Letters were issued is forbidden in Ontario following the Frame v. Smith line of cases and because enforcement would violate solicitor-client privilege.
68Features of this decision that find an echo in these applications:
a. The “covert” nature of O.G.’s application to attend University in Florida was explicitly raised as was the prospect of others planning with O.G. for her to complete her education in Florida and text messages revealing that Mrs. Flores had helped arrange for O.G. to receive legal advice: at paras. 50-52; and
b. The question of Mr. Glegg’s position that a fraud had been committed on the courts was discussed and Perell J. concluded that the alleged fraud amounted to little more than accounts of others reflecting a different perspective and that “the competing narratives have been before the court and the competing narratives were in evidence before Justices Kiteley and Gibson and before the Court of Appeal”: at para. 84.
69This decision was also appealed. The Court of Appeal rejected the appeal with reasons delivered on December 22, 2020 (Glegg v. Glass, 2020 ONCA 833).
(x) July 19, 2019, Claim against Flores’
70On July 19, 2019, Mr. Glegg issued a statement of claim naming Mr. and Mrs. Flores as defendants. These two are the friends of O.G.’s mother who took her in when she left her father’s home in April 2016 and one of the two sets of applicants seeking to have Mr. Glegg declared a vexatious litigant.
71The claim pleads a number of torts, all arising from the same essential fact situation:
a. Inducing breach of contract by means of an “Unlawful Scheme”;
b. Conspiracy to breach a contract; and
c. Conspiracy to commit fraud by participating in an “Unlawful Scheme, the purpose of which was to convince and instruct the Child to emancipate herself and then characterize the emancipation as “involuntary”, including by filing false and misleading affidavits, in order to defraud the Court into ordering millions of dollars in child support”.
72The core of the allegations against the Flores is the “Unlawful Scheme” described in the claim. This scheme so described originated in the 2014 “abduction” of O.G. (not imputed to the Flores’) followed by a course of conduct that “ultimately resulted in the Child’s improper removal, for a second time”. The Flores’ were alleged to have participated with O.G.’s mother and step-father as co-conspirators in a scheme that involved, among other things, “alienating the Child from Clegg…unilaterally and secretly initiating, processing and completing and signing an application in the Child’s name to the University of Miami…convincing the Child to leave the sole custodian’s home…convincing and assisting the Child ..to file an ex parte emancipation application…causing the Child to move to the Defendants’ residence…causing the Child to move to Florida…causing the Child to file false and misleading affidavits….committing perjury…”.
(xi) Claims against JFYC
73On August 2, 2019, Mr. Glegg initiated a claim against JCFY which was amended in October 2020 to add other individual lawyers working at JCFY as additional defendants. This claim seeks $2.5 million in damages plus $1 million in punitive damages for fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, conspiracy to breach a contract, abuse of process, intrusion on seclusion, intentional infliction of mental suffering and civil conspiracy.
74The facts pleaded in support of this broad array of claimed torts are essentially the same as those pleaded against the Flores’ and O.G.’s mother and step-father:
a. Despite sole custody provisions of the amended Separation Agreement, O.G.’s mother allegedly enrolled O.G. in the University of Miami and swore an allegedly false affidavit in April 2016 denying having done this;
b. The parties are alleged to have conspired to seek the emancipation of O.G. through an ex parte process using false affidavits and representations to the court allegedly to prevent the release of records from the University – which Mr. Glegg already had – that would have disclosed the alleged perjury of O.G.’s mother; and
c. The parties fraudulently brought a child support claim alleging involuntary emancipation despite knowing that O.G.’s life with Mr. Glegg was not unbearable, counselled O.G. to swear false affidavits and represented to the court that her actions were independent.
75Both the JFCY and the Flores defendants brought their respective applications to have Mr. Glegg declared a vexatious litigant soon afterwards (the Flores’ application is dated December 11, 2019 and the JFCY application is dated January 9, 2020). The hearing of both applications was delayed somewhat by the pandemic before both were directed to be heard together before me on December 15, 2021.
(xii) Settlement Offers by Mr. Glegg in relation to Flores and JFCY actions
76Although settlement negotiations and offers are normally privileged, all sides concurred in advising me that Mr. Glegg confirmed on the record that he offered early on to settle both the Flores and JFCY actions in return for agreements to disclose documents and evidence. Whether explicitly or implicitly, such evidence would clearly be intended for potential use in the Florida proceeding against O.G.’s mother and stepfather.
Issues to be decided
77Breaking the test in s. 140 of the COJA into its constituent elements, the following are the issues to be determined on these two applications:
a. Has Mr. Glegg persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted vexatious proceedings in any court?
b. Has Mr. Glegg persistently and without reasonable grounds conducted a proceeding in a vexatious manner?
c. If so, what order is appropriate in the circumstances?
Analysis and discussion
(i) Has Mr. Glegg persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted vexatious proceedings in any court?
78The criterion in s. 140(1)(a) of the COJA applies to proceedings instituted by Mr. Glegg and not those to which he has been obliged to respond. Thus Mr. Glegg’s pursuit of the defence of the support claim cannot be relied upon to reach conclusions on this branch of the vexatious litigant test.
79Henry J.’s decision in Re Lang Michener and Fabian, 1987 CanLII 172, 59 O.R. (2d) 353 is often cited as the leading authority regarding the definition of “vexatious proceeding” for the purposes of s. 140 of the COJA. Henry J. summarized the principles to be extracted from the jurisprudence as follows:
From these decisions the following principles may be extracted:
(a) the bringing of one or more actions to determine an issue which has already been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction constitutes a vexatious proceeding;
(b) where it is obvious that an action cannot succeed, or if the action would lead to no possible good, or if no reasonable person can reasonably expect to obtain relief, the action is vexatious;
(c) vexatious actions include those brought for an improper purpose, including the harassment and oppression of other parties by multifarious proceedings brought for purposes other than the assertion of legitimate rights;
(d) it is a general characteristic of vexatious proceedings that grounds and issues raised tend to be rolled forward into subsequent actions and repeated and supplemented, often with actions brought against the lawyers who have acted for or against the litigant in earlier proceedings;
(e) in determining whether proceedings are vexatious, the court must look at the whole history of the matter and not just whether there was originally a good cause of action;
(f) the failure of the person instituting the proceedings to pay the costs of unsuccessful proceedings is one factor to be considered in determining whether proceedings are vexatious;
(g) the respondent's conduct in persistently taking unsuccessful appeals from judicial decisions can be considered vexatious conduct of legal proceedings.
80Mr. Glegg’s very significant financial resources and his eagerness to deploy them in pursuit of his quest for vindication have ensured that he fails to satisfy the sixth of the criteria listed by Henry J. As far as I am aware Mr. Glegg has not failed to pay the various cost awards made against him in the listed proceedings. With that exception, his behaviour in instituting and pursing the multiple strands of litigation listed above satisfies each of the other criteria listed by Henry J.
81The core elements of Mr. Glegg’s complaints have all been determined against him in prior proceedings and are continually re-stated and re-packaged in the next case without regard to final decisions made. In particular, lower courts have found and appeal courts have upheld:
a. that O.G.’s was not under some disability when she decided to withdraw from parental control;
b. “Stockholm syndrome” has been repeatedly alleged and rejected;
c. O.G.’s decision to attend the University of Miami was in her best interest and must be respected;
d. O.G. has “voted with her feet” and was capable of determining her own future;
e. that Mr. Glegg had been afforded the opportunity to be heard twice and no further hearings are needed to grant him procedural fairness;
f. “the continuation of litigation involving [O.G.} indicates more about the parent’s needs that the child’s”;
g. The documents sought by Mr. Glegg for the purposes of the Florida litigation are presumptively protected by solicitor-client privilege and their compelled production would be contrary to public policy as would obtaining evidence that Mr. Gregg “plainly intends to use to attack orders made by Ontario courts”; and
h. Costs awards against Mr. Glegg have been made and affirmed as final.
82None of the outstanding litigation could credibly proceed without seeking indirectly to attack some or all of the foregoing conclusions that are now res judicata in Ontario as regards Mr. Glegg. The core of Mr. Glegg’s liability claims in the outstanding actions are matters that have already been decided or which Mr. Glegg failed to raise when he ought to have done so. Issues relating to the custody and emancipation of O.G. have been finally decided and cannot be collaterally attacked simply by mixing and matching different combinations of alleged “conspirators”. Mr. Glegg’s damages claims in the two Ontario actions that remain are primarily focused on the legal costs he has incurred in the various proceedings he has either launched or intervened in as well as the one case in which he was a respondent. Costs orders have been made against him and seeking to recover as “damages” the amounts paid in orders made against him amounts to a collateral attack on those orders which are now final. Finally, Mr. Glegg has offered on the record to settle both Ontario actions on terms that amount to an end run around the affirmed decision of Perell J. in relation to public policy and the disclosure of evidence to pursue a collateral attack in another jurisdiction against final decisions in this jurisdiction.
83While Mr. Glegg suggests that some or all of these decisions are the result of fraud being practiced on the court that he can now prove based on additional evidence gathered, I remain entirely unpersuaded of this.
84Mr. Glegg has been alleging that his opponents have lied to and misled the courts that have ruled against him for many years, each time failing to prove his claim. The “smoking gun” instances of alleged perjury to which I was directed were nothing of the sort. For example, O.G.’s mother denied and continues to deny that she submitted O.G.’s application to the University of Miami but admits that she agreed to be financially responsible for her daughter’s application were she accepted. The two statements are not mutually exclusive. All of the judges in this jurisdiction before whom this battle royal appeared were keenly aware of the high conflict nature of the dispute as it evolved in 2016 and later in particular. They included some of the most experienced family law jurists in this jurisdiction whose immunity to having the wool pulled down over their eyes I can safely take judicial notice of. They were aware of the narratives and selective presentation of information that all sides practiced, including quite notably Mr. Glegg himself.
85It is also noteworthy that Rule 59.06(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure does provide for a process to set aside judgments and decisions that are actually shown to be infected by fraud or perjury. Mr. Glegg has frequently raised the spectre of prior court decisions being infected by fraud and perjury but has never succeeded in setting any of them aside on that basis or in introducing fresh evidence that might enable such a claim to be made out. Fraud does unravel all, but strict compliance with the process for doing so is required.
86The process for setting aside orders infected by fraud does not extend to authorizing collateral attacks on final decisions advanced in completely different proceedings that re-package in a slightly modified format essentially the same core complaints made and rejected in the original proceeding with no new evidence that is reasonably capable of being so characterized.
87Mr. Glegg appears to attribute every adverse decision to lies being told by others to the court and appears utterly unable to accept that courts have simply reached final decisions after a fair procedure that he happens to disagree with. That too is an attribute of a vexatious litigant.
88Examining the arc of all of this litigation, and in particular Mr. Glegg’s reaction to explicit but adverse findings on the core building blocks of the thesis he has been relentlessly pursuing in each of these cases, the descriptors “persistent and unreasonable” to describe his pursuit of these proceedings are both apt and unavoidable.
89Despite the enormous amount of drafting creativity that Mr. Glegg and his legal advisers have shown in attempting to re-surface old allegations in new packaging, the fact of the matter is that all of the claims continue to be little more than that: an old claim in a new package. Bringing claims whose foundations have all been fundamentally determined in final decisions of this court is unreasonable and amounts to a clear abuse of process.
90Mr. Glegg has had multiple opportunities to have his say in court. He has been heard. He has not prevailed. The “new evidence” loudly proclaimed is nothing of the sort. It is time to move on. The vexatious nature of Mr. Glegg’s litigation onslaught cumulatively and individually is at this point self-evident.
(ii) Has Mr. Glegg persistently and without reasonable grounds conducted a proceeding in a vexatious manner?
91In my view, Mr. Glegg’s conduct of the litigation – both as plaintiff/applicant and as respondent to proceedings instituted by others (i.e. the support litigation before Kurz J.) also demonstrates that he has conducted these proceedings in a vexatious manner.
92I have highlighted some but not all of the adverse comments made by the various judges before whom Mr. Glegg’s various claims have come, including references to his repeated use of extreme language and his repetition of theories that have already been rejected. On more than one occasion, proceedings or positions taken by him in proceedings have been described by the relevant court or administrative body as unreasonable. The Law Society complaints were so characterized when the decision was taken not to proceed with them. Multiple judges referred to his persistent attempts to characterize his daughter as being an unwitting victim of Stockholm syndrome in similar language. There is ample evidence to support those characterizations.
93There are other comments that I have not highlighted in my review of the multiple proceedings that include references to his outbursts in court and occasional inability to restrain himself from intervening even when he had experienced counsel representing him. These are indicia of a legal dispute evolving into an obsession. From my review of the entirety of the record the parties have placed before me, the conclusion that Mr. Glegg is obsessed with pursuing his unique view of how and why he has become so totally estranged from his daughter is inescapable.
94Mr. Glegg admits to having devoted a huge amount of money in pursuing his various litigation claims – the suggestion that he has attempted to wear down his opponents through financial attrition is not at all out of place if a global view of the matter is brought to bear. His claims have a cumulative sense to them. The allegations made in the proceeding before Gibson J. are largely repeated and amplified before Kiteley J. These are in turn largely echoed in the Florida claim where similar claims are largely rolled forward in the Flores and JFCY actions. Adverse decisions are appealed. Adverse appellate decisions are essentially ignored or put down to “lies” told by adversaries.
95Every step in every proceeding is aggressively pursued, sometimes on multiple fronts. He sought a five judge panel from the Court of Appeal for one appeal. The record of his litigation shows multiple applications to introduce fresh evidence none of which were successful. He has been to the Court of Appeal on three separate occasions all on issues directly related to essentially the same set of facts relating to his daughter’s decision to leave his control. No decision is ever received as a final or fair one – setbacks are not final, just invitations to try again in a slightly different format.
96Evidence has frequently been presented by Mr. Glegg in a highly selective manner using extreme and pejorative language. This is particularly evident in essentially all of his accounts of events in relation to his daughter. Nowhere in the narrative constructed by him does he appear to take any account of the letters and essays she wrote that contradicted his “Stockholm syndrome” thesis. Her affidavits, school essays and University application essay painted a very different but complete picture of the thought processes leading up to her decision to emancipate herself to get away from what she perceived – with examples at the ready - as his oppressive influence on her life. Instead, his daughter is presented in his affidavits almost as an inanimate object capable of doing no more than following the nefarious designs of others who are seeking to harm him. None of the defendants to the Flores or JFCY claims had met Mr. Glegg more than a single time outside the context of the litigation in which they were involved but all are alleged to have tried to harm him.
97I have no hesitation in reaching the conclusion that Mr. Glegg has persistently and unreasonably conducted proceedings in a vexatious manner.
(iii) What order is appropriate in the circumstances?
98In my view, the applicants have both demonstrated that Mr. Glegg fits the description of a vexatious litigant described in s. 140(1)(a) and (b) of the COJA. At this point, Mr. Glegg’s use of the litigation system amounts to an unhealthy combination of an obsessive pursuit of vindication and a burning need to exact revenge. The purpose of s. 140 of the COJA is to prevent the abuse of the courts process. The judicial system and the public must be protected from further abuse by him. Neither the public nor the innocent targets of his claims should be required to bear the trouble and expense of fending off this unreasonable onslaught. Mr. Glegg as well needs to be protected from himself at this point even if he is well able to bear the costs that he himself is incurring. Our Court of Appeal has recognized the special need for this type of relief in the family law context where emotions run as deep as they do in Ballentine v. Ballentine, 2003 CanLII 27775 (ON CA). It is clear to me that this war will not end unless a stop is put to it or his opponents have been bled white. Orders must go declaring Mr. Glegg to be a vexatious litigant, staying the existing proceedings and barring the commencement of further proceedings absent leave of the court.
Disposition
99In the result I make the following orders:
a. I find that Mr. Glegg has persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted vexatious proceedings and conducted court proceedings in a vexatious manner;
b. An order shall be made in the terms of s. 140(1)(c) and (d) of the COJA prohibiting Mr. Glegg from instituting any proceeding in any court and ordering that any proceeding previously instituted by him shall not be continued against or involving any person if such proceeding is any way related to, arising from or concerning directly or indirectly (i) the custody, emancipation from parental control or support of his daughter O.G.; or (ii) any alleged breaches of any separation agreement or related orders involving his former spouse except by leave of a judge of the Superior Court of Justice.
c. Leave of the court to institute or continue any such proceeding shall be obtained in the following manner:
i. Leave shall be sought by way of a motion in writing accompanied by an affidavit not exceeding ten pages in length (formatted pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure) that (i) outlines the merits of the proposed proceeding or step; (ii) explains the extent of all unpaid amounts outstanding under any costs awards against Mr. Glegg; and (iii) attaches a copy of these reasons and the order made pursuant hereto;
ii. In the discretion of the judge deciding the application in writing, the application may be (i) rejected without an oral hearing; or (ii) directed to be heard by way of an application to be presented on the basis of a full application record served on the responding or proposed responding parties as the case may be and made returnable on a date to be fixed by the court.
d. The applicants in both proceedings shall be entitled to their costs. The scale and amount of such costs shall be addressed in written submissions uploaded to caselines by the applicants on or before January 7, 2022 and responded to by Mr. Glegg on or before January 14, 2022. Written submissions shall be limited to ten pages excluding any relevant settlement offers or outlines of costs. Cases need not be attached but shall instead be listed in a hyperlinked table of cases. I am to be notified through the court office when submissions have been uploaded. If the parties are able to agree upon costs or on a revised timetable for delivering submissions, they need only notify me through the motions office of the fact of their agreement and any required endorsements as the case may be.
S. F. Dunphy J.
Date: December 29, 2021
Clerical and typographical corrections made and finalized on January 24, 2022.
Footnotes
- These reasons for decision have been amended to correct certain clerical and typographical errors.
- Glegg v. Glass, 2020 ONCA 833 at para. 65.
- Glegg v. Glass, 2019 ONSC 6623 at para. 83