Alexandra Shelley

This decision addresses whether solicitor-client privilege was waived by implication in a real estate dispute involving overlapping claims against a realtor and a lawyer.

The court found that, due to the plaintiff’s virtually identical allegations in two related actions, fairness and consistency required a finding of implied waiver of privilege.

The motion to compel disclosure of the lawyer’s advice and file was granted.

The plaintiff in a complex family trust dispute brought motions on the eve of trial for further documentary production, further examinations for discovery, and leave to amend her Statement of Claim.

The motions sought to introduce new allegations that the defendants covered up and settled claims of sexual misconduct against the family patriarch, Frank Stronach.

The court dismissed both motions, finding no evidence that the requested documents existed, that the new allegations were irrelevant to the pleaded claims of corporate mismanagement, and that amending the pleadings three weeks before a scheduled seven-week trial would cause non-compensable prejudice and delay.

The appellant, Robert Glegg, appealed judgments declaring him a vexatious litigant and associated costs orders.

The underlying litigation stemmed from his daughter's withdrawal from parental control, with Glegg initiating numerous proceedings, including tort claims against the respondents (family friends and a legal aid clinic with its lawyers), alleging they conspired to assist his daughter's mother in "brainwashing" her.

The application judge declared Glegg a vexatious litigant, stayed his existing proceedings, and barred him from commencing further related proceedings without leave, also ordering full indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Glegg's appeal, affirming that his claims were an abuse of process and a collateral attack on previously determined facts, specifically that his daughter acted of her own free will.

The court upheld the vexatious litigant declaration, the permanent stay of actions, the prohibition on future litigation without leave, and the full indemnity costs award.

The plaintiff appealed a decision declining to certify a negligent misrepresentation class action against underwriters of a secondary public offering.

A statutory misrepresentation claim against the issuer had already been certified on consent.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the certification judge erred in concluding that a class proceeding was not the preferable procedure.

The Court held that resolving the common issues of duty of care, truth of the representation, and negligence in a single proceeding would significantly advance the claims, promote judicial economy, and improve access to justice compared to individual actions.

The respondent retailers brought a motion to strike an application by an animal rights organization and its founder, who sought a declaration that the use of glue traps by members of the public violates the animal cruelty provisions of the Criminal Code and the OSPCA Act.

The court found that the applicants did not meet the threshold for public interest standing, as a declaratory application was not a reasonable and effective means to bring the issue to court when other avenues, such as private prosecutions or complaints to enforcement bodies, had not been pursued.

The motion to strike was granted in part.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim regarding the unauthorized discharge of a mortgage held in his self-directed RRSP.

The court found that the plaintiff's claim against the third-party mortgagors was statute-barred under the Real Property Limitations Act, meaning the plaintiff suffered no recoverable loss from the defendants' actions.

Alternatively, the court found that the plaintiff had actually agreed to the discharge in 2007.

The action was dismissed, but the successful defendants were denied costs due to their failure to properly document the discharge and inform the plaintiff.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision striking his defence and granting judgment to the respondent for a credit card debt of $10,840.17.

The appellant argued that the respondent increased his credit limit without his express consent, contrary to regulations under the Bank Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Deputy Judge did not err in accepting the respondent's evidence that the appellant had authorized the increases via internet and telephone banking.

The defence had no meaningful chance of success at trial.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside an order quashing its appeal of a decision that refused to certify class action claims against certain defendants while certifying claims against others.

The Divisional Court held that under section 30 of the Class Proceedings Act, where an action is certified against some defendants but not others, the plaintiff requires leave to appeal the refusal.

Applying binding appellate authority, the court found that allowing an appeal as of right would unduly delay the certified proceeding.

The motion was dismissed.

This is a costs endorsement on appeal from a Superior Court judgment.

The unsuccessful appellants (Essar entities and GIP entities) were ordered to pay costs to the successful respondents (the Monitor and Algoma Steel).

The parties agreed on the quantum of costs but disagreed on whether liability should be several or joint and several.

The court awarded costs on a several basis, allocating 25% to GIP and 75% to Essar, finding that GIP had a more limited role with different issues and less oral argument time than Essar.

The plaintiff sought to appeal an order that certified a class proceeding against some defendants but dismissed the certification motion against the defendant underwriters, allowing those claims to proceed individually.

The underwriters brought a motion to quash the appeal, arguing that leave to appeal was required under s. 30(2) of the Class Proceedings Act.

The plaintiff argued it had an appeal as of right under s. 30(1).

The Divisional Court held that because a class proceeding was certified and the claims against the underwriters were not dismissed on the merits but merely directed to proceed individually, the order was procedural and leave to appeal was required.

The motion to quash was granted.

However, the court granted the plaintiff's cross-motion for an extension of time to seek leave to appeal, finding the proposed appeal had some merit.

A CCAA monitor brought an oppression action under the Canada Business Corporations Act against the parent company (Essar Global) and related entities, alleging that a port transaction transferring critical assets to an Essar-controlled entity was oppressive to Algoma's stakeholders (trade creditors, employees, pensioners, and retirees).

The trial judge found the monitor had standing as a complainant, the action was properly brought as an oppression remedy rather than a derivative action, and the port transaction and its change of control provision were oppressive.

The court granted a remedy modifying the transaction to remove the change of control veto and provide Algoma with termination rights after GIP's loan was repaid.

The appellants appealed on multiple grounds, including standing, characterization of the claim, reasonable expectations analysis, and the appropriateness of the remedy.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment in all respects.

The plaintiff sought to certify a class action against a mining corporation, its executives, and its underwriters for misrepresentations in a short form prospectus related to a secondary public offering.

The corporate defendants consented to certification of the statutory misrepresentation claims.

However, the underwriters opposed certification of the common law negligent misrepresentation and negligence claims against them.

The court certified the action against the corporate defendants but dismissed the certification motion against the underwriters, finding that a class proceeding was not the preferable procedure due to the inevitability of individual trials on reliance and damages, and that the negligence claim failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action as it was subsumed by the negligent misrepresentation claim and did not establish a novel duty of care.

Following an oppression action within CCAA proceedings, the court determined costs claims by Algoma and GIP.

The Essar Defendants agreed to pay $1.7 million in costs to the Monitor.

Algoma sought partial indemnity costs against the Essar Defendants, largely for extensive e-discovery disbursements.

The court rejected the argument that Algoma should be denied costs because it was aligned with the Monitor, finding Algoma's participation and document production were critical to the case.

The court awarded Algoma $1,138,809.19 in costs.

GIP's claim for costs against the Monitor was dismissed with no order as to costs, as the court found success between the Monitor and GIP was divided.

The applicants (Algoma) sought two declarations: (i) that amounts owing under a promissory note from Portco to Algoma had been set off against amounts Algoma owed to Portco under a Cargo Handling Agreement; and (ii) that Algoma's right to terminate related Port Agreements was not subject to Portco's payment of the GIP Loan, which was tied to the set-off amounts.

The court granted the first declaration, finding that equitable set-off applied given the close connection between the parties and transactions, and the manifest inequity of requiring Algoma to pay Portco while the parent company (EGFL) failed to pay the promissory note.

However, the court denied the second declaration, holding that it would contradict a prior oppression judgment and an assignment agreement which explicitly required the GIP Loan to be paid in full in cash before Algoma could terminate the Port Agreements.

Motions for leave to appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing a motion to require Algoma to resume payments under a Cargo Handling Agreement in the context of CCAA proceedings.

The applicants sought to invoke section 11.01(a) of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to compel payment for post-filing services.

The motion judge had dismissed the motion three times on the same legal grounds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the leave motions, finding no prima facie merit due to issue estoppel and no significance to the practice, as the issues were specific to the unique agreements underlying the Port Transaction.

The CCAA monitor of Algoma brought an oppression action under the CBCA against Algoma's parent company, Essar Global, regarding a transaction that transferred Algoma's critical port facilities to a related entity.

The court found that the monitor had standing to bring the action on behalf of creditors.

The court held that the port transaction and a change of control clause giving Essar Global a veto over any buyer of Algoma violated the reasonable expectations of creditors and were oppressive.

The court rejected the business judgment rule defence and ordered the deletion of the change of control clause and amended the agreements to allow Algoma to terminate them after a third-party loan is repaid.

The plaintiff hired the defendant general contractor for a home renovation on a cost-plus basis.

After becoming concerned about costs, the plaintiff hired a cost consultant who discovered a fraudulent invoicing scheme, including inflated sub-trade accounts and double-counted HST.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment for civil fraud and to pierce the corporate veil to hold the sole shareholder personally liable.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the contractor committed civil fraud and the shareholder used the corporation as an instrument of fraud.

The defendants' counterclaim for unpaid invoices was largely dismissed due to lack of supporting documentation.

In the context of a CCAA proceeding, Port of Algoma Inc. (Portco) brought a motion seeking an order compelling the debtor, Essar Steel Algoma Inc., to make post-filing payments under a Cargo Handling Agreement and for an administrative charge.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it premature as the Monitor was directed to commence an oppression proceeding regarding the underlying related party transactions.

The court also rejected Portco's renewed arguments under section 11.01(a) of the CCAA, noting they had been decided in a prior motion, and declined to lift the stay of proceedings, emphasizing that doing so would be contrary to the interests of the stakeholders and the restructuring process.

This decision approves two class action settlements against Furukawa and Fujikura defendants for price-fixing in the automotive wire harness systems (AWHS) industry.

The court certified the class actions for settlement purposes, finding that the requirements of the Class Proceedings Act were met.

The settlements, for $2.3 million (Furukawa) and $1,083,280 (Fujikura), were deemed fair and reasonable and in the best interests of the class, based on detailed affidavit evidence from class counsel.

The court also approved class counsel's legal fees, calculated as a 25% contingency plus disbursements and taxes, consistent with retainer agreements and prior jurisprudence.