Delna Contractor

The appellant, a unionized employee of the Ontario Public Service, commenced a civil action against her employer and union alleging workplace discrimination and harassment.

The motion judge dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the essential character of the dispute arose from the collective agreement and was therefore within the exclusive jurisdiction of a labour arbitrator or the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.

On appeal, the appellant argued that section 46.1 of the Human Rights Code granted the court concurrent jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that section 46.1 does not override the exclusive jurisdiction of labour arbitrators where the dispute arises from a collective agreement and no independent civil wrong is pleaded.

The plaintiff, a unionized employee, commenced a civil action against her employer (the Crown) and her union (AMAPCEO) alleging discrimination and harassment arising from her employment.

The defendants moved to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the dispute fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of grievance arbitration or the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) due to the collective agreement.

The court granted the motion, holding that the essential character of the dispute arose entirely from the employment relationship governed by the collective agreement, and the plaintiff's claims did not present an independent civil wrong to "piggyback" human rights claims in court.

The court affirmed that the HRTO remains an available forum for the plaintiff's human rights complaints.

The plaintiff, a neighbour, sued the estate of John Zigomanis in negligence after a house explosion caused by John's son, Paul, who lived in the house and died in the explosion.

The defendant estate trustee brought a motion to determine a question of law, arguing the estate did not own the house and owed no duty of care.

Relying on a companion decision, the court found that legal title had reverted to Paul prior to the explosion, and the estate's payment of utility bills did not create a relationship of proximity.

The court concluded the estate owed no duty of care and dismissed the claim against it.

The defendant, Gail MacDonald (Trustee of John's Estate), brought a motion for a determination of a question of law under Rule 21.01(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff, Giovanni Zambri, claimed negligence and liability under the Occupiers' Liability Act following an explosion at a house.

The core issue was whether John's Estate owed a duty of care or was an occupier, given that a prior decision (Spies J.'s Decision) retroactively established Paul Zigomanis (John's son) as the legal and beneficial owner of the house at the time of the explosion.

The court found that John's Estate, not being the owner or trustee at the time of the explosion, did not owe a duty of care, nor was it an occupier under the Act.

Consequently, the plaintiff's claim against John's Estate was dismissed.

This is a costs endorsement on appeal from a Superior Court judgment.

The unsuccessful appellants (Essar entities and GIP entities) were ordered to pay costs to the successful respondents (the Monitor and Algoma Steel).

The parties agreed on the quantum of costs but disagreed on whether liability should be several or joint and several.

The court awarded costs on a several basis, allocating 25% to GIP and 75% to Essar, finding that GIP had a more limited role with different issues and less oral argument time than Essar.

A CCAA monitor brought an oppression action under the Canada Business Corporations Act against the parent company (Essar Global) and related entities, alleging that a port transaction transferring critical assets to an Essar-controlled entity was oppressive to Algoma's stakeholders (trade creditors, employees, pensioners, and retirees).

The trial judge found the monitor had standing as a complainant, the action was properly brought as an oppression remedy rather than a derivative action, and the port transaction and its change of control provision were oppressive.

The court granted a remedy modifying the transaction to remove the change of control veto and provide Algoma with termination rights after GIP's loan was repaid.

The appellants appealed on multiple grounds, including standing, characterization of the claim, reasonable expectations analysis, and the appropriateness of the remedy.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment in all respects.

In the context of CCAA proceedings, the Board of Directors of Essar Steel Algoma Inc. brought a motion seeking to resume regular board meetings, receive confidential information, and be paid outstanding fees.

The Board had been previously disengaged due to an information sharing protocol and a prior court endorsement because the parent company was a bidder.

Although the parent company was no longer a bidder, the court dismissed the motion to reengage the Board, finding that the existing governance arrangements were functioning well and reengaging the Board could disrupt the restructuring.

However, the court granted the Board's request to have its independent counsel paid and included in discussions regarding the directors' potential liability.

The defendant abandoned its motion for an interlocutory injunction after failing to obtain interim relief.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing it had made an offer to settle that it beat due to the abandonment.

The court held that under Rule 49, a responding party is not automatically entitled to substantial indemnity costs upon beating an offer, and such an award requires reprehensible conduct, which was absent here.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs fixed at $17,500.

Following an oppression action within CCAA proceedings, the court determined costs claims by Algoma and GIP.

The Essar Defendants agreed to pay $1.7 million in costs to the Monitor.

Algoma sought partial indemnity costs against the Essar Defendants, largely for extensive e-discovery disbursements.

The court rejected the argument that Algoma should be denied costs because it was aligned with the Monitor, finding Algoma's participation and document production were critical to the case.

The court awarded Algoma $1,138,809.19 in costs.

GIP's claim for costs against the Monitor was dismissed with no order as to costs, as the court found success between the Monitor and GIP was divided.

GIP Primus, L.P. and Brightwood Loan Services LLC ("GIP"), along with Portco, brought motions seeking orders for Essar Steel Algoma Inc. ("Algoma") to resume payments under a Cargo Handling Agreement, including arrears, and for a priority charge in the alternative.

The motions were based on section 11.01(a) of the CCAA, arguing that Portco provided critical services or licensed property.

The court dismissed the motions, reiterating previous findings that Portco did not provide services or a license, and that the arguments were previously decided.

The court also declined to grant a critical supplier charge under section 11.4 or the general discretion of section 11 of the CCAA, citing lack of application by the debtor, prior rulings, and potential breach of DIP loan terms and prejudice to other creditors.

Following a successful summary judgment motion by the defendant tenant, the court determined the costs of the proceeding.

The defendant had served a Rule 49 offer to settle and sought costs on a partial indemnity basis up to the date of the offer, and substantial indemnity thereafter.

The plaintiff landlord's costs submissions were found to be superficial and non-responsive.

The court awarded the defendant its claimed costs of $45,391.09, all inclusive.

The CCAA monitor of Algoma brought an oppression action under the CBCA against Algoma's parent company, Essar Global, regarding a transaction that transferred Algoma's critical port facilities to a related entity.

The court found that the monitor had standing to bring the action on behalf of creditors.

The court held that the port transaction and a change of control clause giving Essar Global a veto over any buyer of Algoma violated the reasonable expectations of creditors and were oppressive.

The court rejected the business judgment rule defence and ordered the deletion of the change of control clause and amended the agreements to allow Algoma to terminate them after a third-party loan is repaid.

Essar Capital Limited and USW Local 2251 brought motions within a Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) proceeding.

Essar Capital sought to re-open the Sale and Investment Solicitation Process (SISP) and compel the disclosure of information to Essar Global for a potential bid.

Local 2251 sought court advice on engaging in discussions with Ontario Steel Investments Ltd. regarding potential transactions.

The court dismissed both motions, finding no basis to interfere with the established SISP, noting Essar Global's prior failure to demonstrate financial capability and the lack of a formal bid from Ontario Steel.

The court emphasized the need to maintain the integrity of the court-ordered process and avoid delays detrimental to the restructuring.

The plaintiff landlord sued the defendant tenant for outstanding Additional Rent and damages for disrepair after the commercial lease expired.

The tenant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action and for the return of its security deposit.

The court found that the landlord failed to comply with the lease's mandatory notice provisions for Additional Rent for the years 2012-2014, barring those claims.

The landlord's claim for 2015 Additional Rent was allowed as it was made within the required timeframe.

The court also dismissed the landlord's repair claim, finding insufficient evidence that the premises were left in disrepair.

Summary judgment was granted to the tenant for the return of its security deposit less the 2015 Additional Rent.