Kim Nusbaum

The plaintiff, Phong Lam, sued defendants Ken Neumann and Laura Chehadi Jaja for $15 million, alleging failures in union representation and wrongful termination related to his employment.

The defendants brought motions to dismiss the action on grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action, and being frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court granted the defendants' motions, dismissing the plaintiff's action without leave to amend, finding that the claims fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of labour arbitrators and the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, that an identical proceeding was pending before the HRTO, and that the Statement of Claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action against the private defendants under the Charter or Criminal Code, nor personal liability for an employee acting within the scope of employment.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision determining he was not entitled to severance pay under s. 64 of the Employment Standards Act.

The Board had concluded that the employer's payroll calculation for the $2.5 million threshold was restricted to its Ontario payroll, excluding its global payroll.

The Divisional Court found the Board's interpretation unreasonable, holding that the calculation of payroll under s. 64 is not restricted to Ontario employment and must include global payroll.

The application was allowed and the matter remitted to the Board.

Following a summary judgment motion where the defendant was substantially successful in defeating the plaintiff law firm's claim to enforce a liquidated damages clause, the court assessed costs.

The defendant sought partial indemnity costs of $46,750.08, while the plaintiff argued for $10,000.00.

The court found the motion to be of moderate complexity but noted some duplication of effort by the defendant's counsel.

Costs were fixed at $35,000.00 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

Following a decision dismissing the plaintiff law firm's claim for liquidated damages against a former partner, the parties sought directions on consequential issues.

The court ordered the plaintiff to pay $897.15 in interest for withholding the defendant's capital account funds, exercising its discretion under section 130 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court also ordered the defendant to pay her portion of the actual costs to remove her from the firm's corporate and partnership registers, rather than an estimated amount.

The plaintiff law firm sought to enforce a liquidated damages clause against a departing partner.

The defendant partner counterclaimed for repayment of a capital account loan and unpaid draw.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's claims, finding the liquidated damages clause inapplicable as the defendant's departure qualified as a retirement under the partnership agreement.

The court allowed the defendant's counterclaim for the capital account repayment and interest on the portion withheld by the firm, but dismissed the claim for the unpaid draw.

The plaintiff, Bank-Strox Renovation Inc., sought an urgent interim and interlocutory injunction against Laborers’ International Union of North America, Local 183, Derek Melo, and other unidentified individuals, to restrain unlawful picketing activities during a legal strike.

The court found that the plaintiff had made reasonable efforts to obtain police assistance, which proved unsuccessful in preventing ongoing obstruction, trespass, threats, and physical altercations at multiple job sites.

The court determined there was a serious issue to be tried and a reasonable likelihood of irreparable harm to the plaintiff's business and goodwill.

Balancing the constitutional right to picket with the employer's right to carry on business, the court granted an interlocutory injunction against the Union and its members, agents, and representatives, but denied it against Derek Melo personally due to insufficient evidence.

The injunction included terms for a brief vehicle delay and a come-back provision for future amendments.

This is a costs endorsement on appeal from a Superior Court judgment.

The unsuccessful appellants (Essar entities and GIP entities) were ordered to pay costs to the successful respondents (the Monitor and Algoma Steel).

The parties agreed on the quantum of costs but disagreed on whether liability should be several or joint and several.

The court awarded costs on a several basis, allocating 25% to GIP and 75% to Essar, finding that GIP had a more limited role with different issues and less oral argument time than Essar.

A CCAA monitor brought an oppression action under the Canada Business Corporations Act against the parent company (Essar Global) and related entities, alleging that a port transaction transferring critical assets to an Essar-controlled entity was oppressive to Algoma's stakeholders (trade creditors, employees, pensioners, and retirees).

The trial judge found the monitor had standing as a complainant, the action was properly brought as an oppression remedy rather than a derivative action, and the port transaction and its change of control provision were oppressive.

The court granted a remedy modifying the transaction to remove the change of control veto and provide Algoma with termination rights after GIP's loan was repaid.

The appellants appealed on multiple grounds, including standing, characterization of the claim, reasonable expectations analysis, and the appropriateness of the remedy.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment in all respects.

Motions for leave to appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing a motion to require Algoma to resume payments under a Cargo Handling Agreement in the context of CCAA proceedings.

The applicants sought to invoke section 11.01(a) of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to compel payment for post-filing services.

The motion judge had dismissed the motion three times on the same legal grounds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the leave motions, finding no prima facie merit due to issue estoppel and no significance to the practice, as the issues were specific to the unique agreements underlying the Port Transaction.

The defendants brought motions to dismiss the plaintiff's action for delay and for breach of a prior consent order.

The court declined to enforce the consent order's limitation on opposition, finding it would cause a clear injustice to the plaintiff due to counsel's failures.

However, the court found inordinate and inexcusable delay by the plaintiff's counsel over a period of six years, which created a substantial risk that a fair trial would no longer be possible.

The plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice arising from the lengthy delay and the age of the underlying transactions (15-20 years old).

Consequently, the action was dismissed for delay.