Kristopher Lee Dixon

The court dismissed the plaintiff’s motion to set aside a registrar’s dismissal order for delay in a motor vehicle accident action.

The plaintiff’s counsel misunderstood the effect of the COVID-19 suspension of administrative dismissals, believing there was additional time to set the matter down for trial.

The court found the explanation for delay unsatisfactory, noting the plaintiff and her counsel failed to move the action forward and did not provide evidence of a plan thwarted by unforeseen obstacles.

The court also found the presumption of prejudice to the defendants was not rebutted, as key evidence and witnesses were no longer available.

The decision emphasizes the responsibility of parties to advance litigation and the court’s intolerance for delay.

The court considered a motion by the plaintiff to set aside an administrative dismissal of a personal injury action for delay.

The court reviewed the relevant factors, including the explanation for delay, inadvertence, promptness in bringing the motion, and prejudice to the defendant.

The court found the explanation for delay satisfactory, attributed the delay to counsel rather than the plaintiff, and found no actual or presumed prejudice to the defendant.

The action was reinstated, but no costs were awarded to either party.

The applicant sought an order declaring the respondent a vexatious litigant.

Despite being aware of the application and court date, the self-represented respondent failed to attend the initial hearing.

The court adjourned the application to a peremptory date and issued an interim order under section 139 of the Courts of Justice Act, prohibiting the respondent from initiating new actions or pursuing steps in existing ones without leave of a Superior Court judge until the application is heard.

The defendant brought a motion under Rule 2.1.01(1) to dismiss the plaintiff's action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court, applying a generous interpretation to the self-represented plaintiff's Statement of Claim, found that despite drafting deficiencies, it contained a discernable cause of action.

The motion was denied, with the court emphasizing that Rule 2.1 should be reserved for the clearest of cases where the abusive nature of the proceeding is apparent on the face of the pleading.

The defendants brought motions to dismiss the plaintiff's action for delay and for breach of a prior consent order.

The court declined to enforce the consent order's limitation on opposition, finding it would cause a clear injustice to the plaintiff due to counsel's failures.

However, the court found inordinate and inexcusable delay by the plaintiff's counsel over a period of six years, which created a substantial risk that a fair trial would no longer be possible.

The plaintiff failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice arising from the lengthy delay and the age of the underlying transactions (15-20 years old).

Consequently, the action was dismissed for delay.

Following a trial in a personal injury action, the court addressed the issue of costs after written submissions.

The successful plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs alleging litigation misconduct by the defendants, including failure to produce an important engineering drawing and challenging the plaintiff’s credibility.

The defendants argued costs should be reduced due to delay and duplication arising from the plaintiff changing counsel multiple times and periods of self‑representation.

The court held that neither party’s conduct justified substantial indemnity costs and emphasized the principle that cost awards must be fair and reasonable rather than matching actual legal fees.

Partial indemnity costs of $200,000 inclusive of taxes and disbursements were awarded to the plaintiff, apportioned in accordance with the liability findings.

The plaintiff brought a negligence action against a municipality and road construction contractors after tripping on a height differential at a crosswalk during an ongoing road reconstruction project.

The court found that the unfinished roadway created a tripping hazard amounting to a condition of non-repair under s. 44 of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The defendants failed to install temporary ramping or provide adequate warning of the vertical gap between the roadway and depressed curb.

The court rejected allegations of contributory negligence and held that all defendants were occupiers responsible for site safety under the Occupiers’ Liability Act.

Liability was apportioned 50% to the paving contractor and 25% each to the municipality and general contractor, and damages were awarded for general damages, income loss, future care, and expenses.

The Crown sought an interlocutory injunction preventing the defendant language training business from copying or distributing materials substantially similar to federal Second Language Evaluation tests used for public service hiring.

The court applied the test for interlocutory injunctions and found a serious issue to be tried regarding copyright infringement in Crown-created examination materials.

It concluded that prior access to official test questions would undermine the integrity of the federal language testing regime and cause irreparable harm to the public interest and the Public Service Commission’s mandate.

The balance of convenience favoured protecting the confidentiality of the tests while allowing the defendant to continue operating her business using other materials.

An injunction was granted restraining further use of the protected test content pending trial.