Alexandre Kaufman

The accused brought a Rowbotham application seeking state-funded counsel and a conditional stay of proceedings under ss. 7, 11(d), and 24(1) of the Charter on the basis that he could not afford counsel and required representation to make full answer and defence in a complex criminal prosecution involving 21 counts, including criminal organization and drug trafficking offences.

The court accepted that the charges were serious and involved some complexity but found significant deficiencies in the evidentiary record supporting the claim of financial inability.

Evidence suggested the accused had assets, income, and potential access to seized funds, and had prioritized maintaining property interests over funding his defence.

The court held the accused had not demonstrated he exhausted all reasonable avenues to retain counsel.

The Rowbotham application was therefore dismissed.

The Crown sought to qualify a police detective as an expert witness on drug trafficking indicators in a prosecution for possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The proposed opinion evidence addressed crack cocaine consumption patterns, typical quantities held by users, and the absence of consumption tools as indicative of trafficking.

The court applied the Mohan criteria and subsequent guidance from appellate jurisprudence, including Sekhon, emphasizing the trial judge’s gatekeeping role regarding expert evidence.

The court held the proposed opinions were largely anecdotal, insufficiently grounded in specialized expertise, and not necessary to assist the trier of fact.

Given the modest quantity of drugs seized and the proximity of the opinion to the ultimate issue of intent, the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value and the evidence was excluded.

The accused applied for a Rowbotham order seeking state-funded counsel after Legal Aid funding and subsequent appeals were denied.

The charges included more than 75 offences involving drug trafficking, weapons, and proceeds of crime, and the Crown anticipated a lengthy and complex trial.

While the court accepted that the charges were serious and complex and that Legal Aid had been refused, it found the accused failed to establish financial indigence.

The accused had not exhausted available avenues to obtain counsel, including applying for the release of seized assets under s. 462.34(4) of the Criminal Code, and failed to provide full disclosure regarding substantial precious metals purchases exceeding $134,000.

The court concluded that the accused had not demonstrated inability to fund counsel privately and dismissed the Rowbotham application.

The Crown sought an interlocutory injunction preventing the defendant language training business from copying or distributing materials substantially similar to federal Second Language Evaluation tests used for public service hiring.

The court applied the test for interlocutory injunctions and found a serious issue to be tried regarding copyright infringement in Crown-created examination materials.

It concluded that prior access to official test questions would undermine the integrity of the federal language testing regime and cause irreparable harm to the public interest and the Public Service Commission’s mandate.

The balance of convenience favoured protecting the confidentiality of the tests while allowing the defendant to continue operating her business using other materials.

An injunction was granted restraining further use of the protected test content pending trial.

The appellant appealed an order setting aside a previous consent judgment that had dismissed the respondent's action for lack of jurisdiction.

The motions judge had set aside the consent order based on a subsequent change in jurisprudence regarding the court's jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that a change in the law does not constitute 'facts arising or discovered after' an order is made under Rule 59.06(2)(a).

The court also found that the respondent's application to re-open the action was barred by cause of action estoppel.

The appellants sued the respondents for defamation and abuse of public office after the Competition Bureau announced bid-rigging charges against them in a press release and to the media.

The motion judge struck the defamation claim under Rule 21.01(1), finding the statements were a fair characterization of the charges and incapable of bearing a defamatory meaning.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, holding that whether the statements were a fair characterization was a factual issue for trial, but struck the portion of the claim relating to Ontario media publications because the appellants failed to provide the required notice under section 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act.

The appellant appealed an order made under Rule 59.06 that reopened proceedings previously terminated by a consent dismissal.

The respondent argued the appeal should have been brought to the Divisional Court with leave, as the order was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal agreed, holding that an order reopening a matter under Rule 59.06 is interlocutory because it does not finally determine the rights of the parties.

The appeal was dismissed without prejudice to the appellant seeking leave from the Divisional Court.

The respondent sued the Attorney General of Canada for false imprisonment after being held in custody at a federal penitentiary pursuant to an order to produce.

The appellant moved for summary judgment, arguing it was protected by statutory immunity, but the motion judge dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Divisional Court allowed the appeal and granted summary judgment, holding that correctional authorities are immune from civil liability under section 142 of the Courts of Justice Act and section 8 of the Public Authorities Protection Act when acting in good faith in accordance with a court order.

The appellant's vehicle was seized by police as proceeds of crime and held under a detention order.

The appellant, claiming to be an innocent third party, commenced a civil action to recover the vehicle and seek damages for its detention.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to dismiss the action, agreeing that the Criminal Code provisions for innocent third party remedies constitute a complete code, precluding parallel civil proceedings absent allegations of actionable police misconduct.

The applicant, who was under 65 years of age, alleged age discrimination because provincial and federal income tax legislation restricted his ability to split pension income from an RRSP annuity with his spouse, a benefit available to individuals aged 65 and older.

The respondent brought a preliminary request to dismiss the application.

The Tribunal found that section 15 of the Human Rights Code explicitly permits preferential treatment for persons aged 65 and over, which necessarily implies that those under 65 may be denied the same benefits.

The application was dismissed.